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1.
After victory in the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek issued the famous radio speech “Letter to Soldiers and Civilians of the Whole Nation as well as the Peoples of the World after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War.” The main idea of this speech was long interpreted as “returning virtue for malice” (or “good for evil”), a basic principle of the Kuomintang's policy towards Japan. Many scholars who have considered the returning virtue for malice policy in the postwar period include the following major issues: first, China repatriated Japanese prisoners of war and the Japanese diaspora with mercy; second, China allowed the Tenno, or imperial, system to be preserved in Japan; third, China did not participate in the occupation of Japan; and fourth, China gave up the right to ask for war reparations from Japan. This article examines the above four issues to reevaluate the returning virtue for malice policy. The first issue seems to reflect the Chinese national character of being lenient with others. However, it was in fact due to Chiang's anti-Communist strategy and the declared policy of the United States of eradicating Japan's influence in China. With regard to the second issue, Chiang's attitude was merely to let the Japanese people make their own choice, while the fate of the Japanese Tenno system was entirely determined by the US occupation authority, on which Chiang had little influence. The third issue was mainly the outcome of Chiang's focus on domestic political struggle in the postwar era in China. As for war reparations, China actually made efforts to obtain them in the beginning, but had to give up its right eventually. The decision-making process in the Kuomintang government was restrained by American policy and subordinated to Japanese pressure. Thus, it is not persuasive to summarize the basic principle of Kuomintang postwar policy towards Japan as returning virtue for malice.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract

Food security has guided Russia’s food policy since 2010. The article examines the impact of food security policy on the food system. The Russian model of food security combines government intervention in the form of assistance for domestic production while simultaneously restricting market access. Food security does not appear to have a deleterious impact on the food system. We measure impact on four dimensions. Financial support for agriculture continues to increase in nominal rubles. In food production, the beef and dairy branches continue to lag, but increased grain production has made Russia a global leader in grain exports. Average per capita food consumption improved, although the poor consume much less, and the decline of the ruble affects the way Russians shop. The largest impact of food security has been on food trade. Food security policy has brought food to the forefront as an instrument of foreign policy. Food trade is politicized, witnessed by the food embargo against the West and food import bans against Turkey and Ukraine.  相似文献   

3.
日本与新加坡签署自由贸易协定,表明其对外贸易政策发生了一些变化,它有别于日本一贯主张的“多边主义”,这一变化是建立在对多边贸易政策和区域协定重新认识基础之上的,表现为日本积极参与区域协定的具体行动上,其意图是适应外部环境变化以解决自身的经济问题。  相似文献   

4.
Abstract. Economic nationalism reflected in Japanese industrial policy experienced two distinctive stages during 1950–69. It was fragmented in the 1950s as political actors held competing perceptions of national interest and consequently asserted contesting strategies for industrial policy. The tensions between the conservative and the progressive eventually led to a clash in 1960 on the issue of the renewal of the Japan–US security treaty. Economic nationalism began to unify the country in the 1960s as political actors were able to build a consensus on national interest based on economic growth and united around a grand strategy of high growth and liberalisation of trade. During this transition, the perceived external threat to the nation was a major force in generating the momentum for economic nationalism in policy-making, while a fair distribution of economic welfare among social classes through industrial policy was indispensable for economic nationalism to obtain public support.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract

This article uses Japanese, Chinese, and Western European sources to discuss the plan of the main Japanese general Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 to trade with Luzon in the course of the war to invade Korea in the 1590s. In December 1593, Katō Kiyomasa sent a letter from Korea to his territory of Higo directing them to send one of his “Tang boats” to import large quantities of goods such as wheat and silver. At the time, Tang boats were generally used for long-distance routes, and wheat was one of the main goods imported from Japan to Luzon, so this Tang boat may have been sent to Luzon 呂宋. As the East Asian War dragged on, Katō Kiyomasa was very worried about lacking munitions (particularly gunpowder), so he planned on using profits from the Luzon trade to supplement the ever-growing military expenses.

In late-sixteenth-century East Asia, military consumables such as lead and saltpeter were mainly imported through three routes to Japan: the Portuguese Macau–Nagasaki trade, the Chinese smuggler Fujian–Kyushu trade, and the relay trade from China or Southeast Asia through Luzon to Kyushu. However, around 1593, due to the impact of the East Asian War, munitions imported from China to Luzon fell sharply, and the Spanish were also faced with a lack of munitions. On the other hand, while Japan's gold demand as a means of making military expenditures was surging, Katō Kiyomasa certainly planned on importing gold from Luzon and using this to gather munitions like lead and saltpeter in the Japanese domestic market. In addition, starting in the 1590s, apart from Luzon, Japanese merchant ships also started visiting mainland parts of Southeast Asia and trading with them, showing that the red-seal ship trade of the early seventeenth century had origins in the late sixteenth century.  相似文献   

6.
Japan's willingness to negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is not matched by a readiness to liberalise agricultural trade. Japan has used a variety of mechanisms to limit the extent of agricultural concessions in FTAs. Public choice theory predicts that FTAs are a more effective instrument for opening Japan's agricultural market than the WTO because they reshape the domestic politics of Japanese trade in ways that are conducive to further market opening. FTAs do this by altering the domestic politics of trade policymaking on the demand side as well as some aspects of the supply side. On the demand side, business groups mobilise even more strongly to demand an end to agricultural protection, whilst on the supply side, the value of FTAs for broader state interests are recognised by politician-leaders. Various structural obstacles in the policymaking process, however, prevent the altered demand and supply-side dynamics from necessarily delivering free trade outcomes.  相似文献   

7.
This article traces Japanese and Australian media portrayals of the cultural aspects to the bilateral relationship. The article examines popular discourse about Japan and Australia in the media of each country, demonstrating how this has reflected the evolution of the cultural relationship. In Australia, the press has swung from portraying Japan as a problematic source of income from the resources trade, through to the home of ‘cool’ technology and fashion. In Japan, discourse about Australia has ranged from images of a country populated with cute animals, to a regional partner sharing the same democratic ideals. The article draws from the personal experiences of the author who was a correspondent and journalist for Australian and Japanese news corporations during the 1980s and 1990s. The author covered the ‘koala wars’ and the frill-necked lizard boom prompted by the Mitsubishi Mirage television commercial, as well as monitoring the growth in Japanese tourism to Australia. The author also draws on data from tracking surveys conducted by the Embassy of Japanese in Australia.  相似文献   

8.
In this paper, I challenge the conventional view that trade agreements act as a major constraint on Australia’s industry policy options. Through a comparison with South Korea – a country with similar trade obligations to Australia – I find that the Australian government retains significant room to move in the industry policy sphere. However, Australian policy-makers appear far less willing than their foreign counterparts to use that space. To explain Australia’s comparative industry policy in-activism, I move beyond broad-brush explanations centred on ‘liberal ideology’ to explore the ideational, institutional and structural obstacles to the pursuit of a more proactive industry policy approach on the part of Australian policy-makers.  相似文献   

9.
日本经济的核心是日本企业以持续技术革新为基础的国际竞争力。日本企业之所以能持续进行技术革新是与日本政府的政策引导和支持分不开的。本文指出日本政府在国家总体目标之下,利用自身的信息优势和资源优势,根据时代的变迁,制定不同的产业技术政策,通过政策引导,使企业能够明确技术革新的方向,并通过对市场的增进为新技术提供需求,从而促进新兴产业的发展。  相似文献   

10.
日本是世界第3大石油消费国,而且石油对外依存度高达99%以上,作为确保石油供应安全的重要一环,自20世纪60年代初开始,日本逐步建立起了官民并举的石油储备制度。2006年石油、LPG的储备规模分别为172天和78天。本文首先从基地布局和储备数量两个方面介绍了日本石油及LPG储备的现状,在此基础上,从立法、管理体制和政府扶持3个角度阐述了日本建立石油储备的政策措施,最后在借鉴的基础上提出了完善我国石油储备体系建设的政策建议。  相似文献   

11.
A Referendum Law took effect in Japan in May 2010. Since a referendum is a prerequisite to any change to the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’, this is an event with potentially far-reaching consequences. By gauging the Democratic Party of Japan's views on the issue of revision of the constitution—particularly revision of the famous Article 9, with remains a foundation of Japanese security policy—and by extrapolating on the findings, this article aims to further the understanding of the new government's security policy more generally. After finding that the probability that the Japanese government will capitalise on the coming into force of the Referendum Law to reopen the constitutional debate is currently low, the article advances a number of hypotheses as to why this is the case, and discusses scenarios under which the status quo could change. Finally, it draws out the implications (a) of the preceding analysis for DPJ security policy, and (b) of DPJ security policy for the interpretation of the constitution where Article 9 is concerned.  相似文献   

12.
ABSTRACT

Despite a troubled trade history dominated by disputes over agriculture, the negotiation of a European Union (EU)–Australia free trade agreement (FTA) was initiated in 2015. The initiation of these negotiations was made possible because of the shift in EU trade policy towards the negotiation of what the EU terms ‘new generation free trade agreements’. The EU has concluded FTA negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada, and is negotiating other FTAs— notably with Japan and the USA . The EU faces many commercial challenges to its FTA negotiations that go beyond tariff reduction, including the protection of its geographical indicators, public procurement and investor–state dispute settlement. These issues are likely to be substantial features of any EU FTA with Australia. In addition to these challenges, the promotion of sustainable development interests and human rights through FTA negotiations is an important component of the EU’s approach. The EU’s position on the trade-related aspects of sustainable development and the negotiation of human rights conditionality has presented significant challenges to the EU’s trade agenda, particularly in negotiations with Canada and Singapore. This article draws lessons from the EU’s new generation trade agreement negotiations to date. It compares these negotiations with Australia’s approach to FTA negotiations, and analyses potential stumbling blocks for an EU–Australia FTA in light of past tensions in the relationship. The article argues that shifts in both EU and Australian trade policies and positive developments in the relationship mitigate past obstacles to a negotiated agreement. However, EU– Australia relations still suffer from the tyranny of distance. The resulting deficit in foreign policy salience between the EU and Australia broadens the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.  相似文献   

13.
ABSTRACT

The debate over how to reconcile trade liberalization with cultural policy is a long-standing one. There is great variation in how countries have navigated this debate. Furthermore, evolving individual policy approaches show noteworthy dynamism, largely in response to domestic politics, shifts in the international trading system and technological developments. This special issue explores different approaches to the trade and culture debate across geographic space, as well as the evolution across time through analysis of six cases – Canada, the European Union, South Africa, Latin America, the United States and China.  相似文献   

14.
日本政府为改变信息化相对落后的状态,在新世纪初制定《IT基本战略》,决定实施IT立国战略,2005年把日本建设成为世界上最先进的IT国家。为此,日本政府以制定《IT基本法》、实施IT立国战略为中心,通过e-Japan战略、IT新改革战略、IT新改革战略政策纲要和e-Japan重点计划等,积极采取了推进信息化发展的战略和政策措施。在此基础上,日本政府又提出《u-Japan构想》,争取在2010年建设无所不在的网络社会,以消除数字鸿沟,使地方也能够充分利用IT基础设施,有信息均等和机会均等的公平上网环境,以建设充满活力的地方,实现城市和地方的协调发展。  相似文献   

15.
日本的FTA战略动向及其对中国的影响   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
上世纪90年代末,随着第3次FTA浪潮的掀起,日本的通商政策开始出现转变。从以多边体系为中心的通商政策,逐步转向双边、区域、多边共同推进的多层次的通商政策。日本在本地区推行以本国为中心的FTA战略,战略设计上置中国于优先顺序之外,协定内容中将农产品最大限度的采取例外处理,政策制定上又受到传统的战略盟国美国的牵制。在今后的区域经济一体化及中日FTA问题上,日本的农产品贸易自由化问题仍将是主要障碍。而且,中日两国争相与东盟缔结FTA的结果使东盟的中心地位更加明显,长期维持这种结构会导致贸易和投资转移效应的产生。  相似文献   

16.
With 2006 and 2007 marking two important anniversaries in the history of their bilateral ties, Australia and Japan are committed to reaffirming the significance of their relationship and expanding it into new dimensions. The Australian and Japanese foreign ministers have agreed to build a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ between their two countries. What are the factors that motivate Canberra and Tokyo to elevate their bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership? From a Japanese point of view, the main reason is the enhanced strategic importance of Australia with such indicators as Australian's enhanced security role, the structural changes in Asia and movements toward a new regional architecture, Japan's energy and food security, the trilateral strategic dialogue between Australia, the United States and Japan, and shared values and the Australian government's policy toward Japan. Both nations are expected to advance toward an even closer relationship with these factors in mind.1 1. The views expressed in this article, which was written in September 2006, are those of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy of Japan in Australia or the Japanese government. View all notes  相似文献   

17.
This paper critically examines the development of what is known as ‘pop-culture diplomacy’ in Japan. In the postwar era, the country’s cultural diplomacy was propelled by the necessity to soften anti-Japan perceptions, notably in Southeast Asia. In the late 1980s, the popularity of Japanese media culture in Asia began to attract the attention of policy makers, while subsequent globalized practices of soft power and nation branding gave greater emphasis to the use of media culture to internationally enhance the image of the nation, which has meant the promotion of ‘pop-culture diplomacy’ and, more broadly, ‘Cool Japan’. It is argued that pop-culture diplomacy goes no further than a one-way projection and does not seriously engage with cross-border dialogue. The Japanese case also shows that pop-culture diplomacy hinders meaningful engagement with internal cultural diversity and suggests the necessity of taking domestic implications of cultural diplomacy seriously.  相似文献   

18.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the modern Japanese state employed overseas cultural promotion as a way to maximise its interests and image not only in international contexts but also at home. By juxtaposing the Takarazuka Revue’s performances in the United States and Japan during the postwar period, this paper argues that the overseas promotion of this Japanese theatre troupe both depended upon and reinforced the Japanese populace’s nationalistic pride in its culture. The paper also addresses the ways in which the Japanese government used Takarazuka’s theatrical presentations as a means of pursuing its domestic and diplomatic agendas: improving Japan’s international position by proposing shared aspects of popular culture with the US and increasing its sense of nationalism by propagating cultural pride. In doing so, the paper explicates the ways in which Japanese popular cultural considerations interfaced with political concerns in the shaping of postwar Japan’s national identity.  相似文献   

19.
This paper provides an overview of Australia’s experience with trade and industry policy since Federation in light of the dilemmas facing a small, rich, remote, resource-based economy. It focuses on the attempt to diversify away from a dependence on the export of primary products and to move beyond – while still also continuing to exploit – the country’s natural comparative advantage. It examines the rise and decline, purpose and effects, of protectionism; moments of experimentation with interventionist industry policy; and effects of the mining boom. In doing so, it considers Australia’s particular economic circumstances and factor endowments in light of competing notions of comparative advantage and the appropriate role of government in promoting economic development and competitiveness.  相似文献   

20.
Japanese–French negotiation for their 1907 entente revealed contrasting approaches to the application of the Open Door principle in China, particularly to the Fukien province after the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Having learned about France's wish to receive Japanese guarantee for the safety of its colony in Indo-China, Japan strove to define Fukien as its additional sphere of influence once it had secured much needed loans in the Paris financial market. France tried to resist Japan's request to define Fukien as its sphere by adopting a secret note, and attempted to restrain Japan's future expansion into China by enmeshing Japan in the web of political and financial ententes with itself and Britain supporting Open Door. This approach of France was a continuation of French policy toward East Asia since the Boxer Uprising, securing its economic interests by supporting Open Door rather than pursuing territorial competition with other great powers in China. In contrast, the Japanese government strenuously attempted to weaken the general application of Open Door doctrine in China, and could define Fukien as Japan's additional sphere by securing a secret explanatory note for such a purpose.  相似文献   

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