Change and continuity in strategic culture: the cases of Australia and New Zealand

The relationship between strategic culture and defence policies has not yet been much explored. Australia and New Zealand provide some evidence of the impact of strategic culture on defence policy. Australia has a dominant strategic culture which is strong enough to prompt both the major political parties to adopt realist defence policies, even though Labor has a traditionally ‘idealist’ outlook. Until the 1970s, New Zealand had a similar dominant strategic culture which influenced both major political parties, but it was always less strong than Australia's. In recent years, the Labour Party has rejected that culture, and allowed an alternative strategic culture based on its ideology to influence its defence policies. The result has been that on the last two occasions when Labour has been in government, New Zealand's defence policy has changed dramatically.     

Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review

In 2010 the coalition government conducted a major review of defence and security policy. This article explores the review process from a critical perspective by examining and challenging the state‐centrism of prevailing conceptions of current policy reflected in the quest to define and perform a particular ‘national role’ in contrast to a human‐centric framework focused on the UK citizen. It argues that shifting the focus of policy to the individual makes a qualitative difference to how we think about requirements for the UK's armed forces and challenges ingrained assumptions about defence and security in relation to military operations of choice and attendant expensive, expeditionary war‐fighting capabilities. In particular, it confronts the prevailing narrative that UK national security‐as‐global risk management must be met by securing the state against pervasive multidimensional risk through military force, that military power projection capabilities are a vital source of international influence and national prestige and that the exercise of UK military power constitutes a ‘force for good’ for the long‐term human security needs of citizens in both the intervened and intervening state.     

The defence dilemma in Britain

The UK faces a pressing defence dilemma. The declaratory goals of defence policy are struggling to match the demands made by operational commitments and the financial and organizational capacities. The article examines how and why this situation has come about. While recognizing that existing calls for higher defence spending, reform of the Ministry of Defence, efficiency gains or a renewal of the so‐called military covenant between the military and society may address discrete elements of the defence dilemma in Britain, it argues that current problems derive from a series of deeper tensions in the nexus of British defence more widely defined. These include a transnationalization of strategic practice, in ways that both shape and constrain the national defence policy process; the institutional politics of defence itself, which encourage different interpretations of interest and priority in the wider strategic context; and finally the changing status of defence in the wider polity, which introduces powerful veto points into the defence policy process itself. It argues that while a series of shocks may have destabilized existing policy, prompted ad hoc organizational adaptation in the armed forces and led to incremental cost saving measures from the government, a ‘dominant crisis narrative’—in the form of a distinctive and generally agreed programme of change—has yet to emerge. The article concludes by looking forward to a future strategic defence review, highlighting the critical path dependencies and veto points which must be addressed if transformative change in British defence is to take place.     

Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance

Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implications for Australian foreign policy, force structuring, joint operations and the defence industry, which were most coherently laid out in the 1987 White Paper. Later White Papers adapted this framework, but the 2013 White Paper seems to move towards a new approach to defence policy and strategy, which continued use of the term ‘self-reliance’ obscures rather than elucidates.     

Who's making UK foreign policy?

The war in Iraq has intensified a debate about the extent to which Tony Blair's style of government is presidential, secretive, ad hoc, informal and susceptible to groupthink. But who is really making UK foreign policy? This article suggests that there is no simple or singular answer since the government simultaneously pursues multiple foreign policies involving different combinations of institutions, actors and external pressures. It then discusses New Labour's impact upon the four interrelated phases of the foreign policy process: formulation, interpretation, implementation and presentation. The author suggests that Blair's government has found it difficult to implement many of its foreign policy initiatives and has relied instead upon three ‘big ideas’, namely, multilateralism, Atlanticism and neo‐liberalism. To date, it has failed to resolve the practical tensions between these three commitments. The final section explores how the demand for open and accountable government has increased the importance attached to the presentation of foreign policy. This, in turn, has increased the importance of the news media as a battlefield on which the struggle for hearts and minds is taking place. Ironically, the government's unparalleled attempts to sell its foreign policies (both at home and abroad) has opened the policy process up to levels of scrutiny that it may not be able to withstand.     

Why US-Sino strategic competition is good for Australia

ABSTRACT

Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, the United States (US) under President Trump administration’s has embarked on a course toward a more openly competitive US–China relationship. However, the debate in Australia has viewed the new era of US-Sino strategic competition mostly negatively. Indeed, arguments have been made for a need to ‘radically’ rethink Australia’s defence policy in order to prepare for a ‘post-US-led’ regional order. For some analysts, Canberra has even no other choice than to adopt a strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ to deal with an emerging China-dominated regional order and a declining US, confused and unwilling to defend its allies. In contrast, this article argues that on balance Trump’s course correction on China is positive for Australia as the US is likely to maintain its robust engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While the president’s inconsistencies partly undermine US declaratory statements in regards to greater competition with China, a bipartisan consensus is likely to continue to shift US policy in this direction. While greater US-Sino competition requires Australia to assume greater responsibilities for regional security, radical changes to its defence policy and security alignment are not needed.     

More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence

In September 2014 the people of Scotland will vote on whether to become an independent nation, with the defence and security of Scotland proving to be one of the more vociferous areas of debate. This article argues that defence and security implications of this referendum are far more fundamental than either the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaigns have admitted. It makes four points. First, it suggests that the Scottish government's plans for defence and security in NATO and the EU are at odds with its proposed armed forces and that Scotland may well find itself having to make far greater commitments to defence to assure its allies. Second, it argues that a vote for independence will represent a game‐changing event for the remainder of the United Kingdom's defence and security, which will have significant consequences for the United Kingdom's partners and allies in NATO, the European Union and elsewhere. Third, the article contends that even a vote against independence will have a long‐term impact, in that the ‘West Lothian question’ and Scottish support for nuclear disarmament influence the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Finally, the article highlights how this issue has revealed weaknesses in the think‐tank and academic communities, particularly in Scotland. The independence vote does, therefore, represent ‘more than a storm in a tea cup’ and thus there needs to be far greater engagement with these issues within the United Kingdom and elsewhere.     

Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism: Imperial Internationalism in East Africa in the 1920s

This article assesses the influence of international questions on the Conservative and Labour parties’ imperial policy in East Africa in the 1920s. Conservatives encouraged a policy of ‘organic union’, which meant the consolidation of settler control in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika by either formal or informal means. They preferred to ignore or minimise the influence of the League of Nations mandates provisions in Tanganyika, arguing that colonial questions, which in their view included mandatory affairs, were a domestic jurisdiction. The Labour Party was more sympathetic to ideas of liberal internationalism, and pursued a policy of ‘aggressive altruism’ in East Africa when in office, especially in the late 1920s. The article compares the two parties’ respective positions with reference to closer political union, settler relations, labour and land policy, and Indian rights, and by detailing the personal relationship between the conservative governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, and Labour's colonial secretary, Lord Passfield.     

Securing China's core interests: the state of the debate in China

As China has grown stronger, some observers have identified an assertive turn in Chinese foreign policy. Evidence to support this argument includes the increasingly frequent evocation of China's ‘core interests’—a set of interests that represents the non‐negotiable bottom lines of Chinese foreign policy. When new concepts, ideas and political agendas are introduced in China, there is seldom a shared understanding of how they should be defined; the process of populating the concept with real meaning often takes place incrementally. This, the article argues, is what has happened with the notion of core interests. While there are some agreed bottom lines, what issues deserve to be defined (and thus protected) as core interests remains somewhat blurred and open to question. By using content analysis to study 108 articles by Chinese scholars, this article analyses Chinese academic discourse of China's core interests. The authors’ main finding is that ‘core interests’ is a vague concept in the Chinese discourse, despite its increasing use by the government to legitimize its diplomatic actions and claims. The article argues that this vagueness not only makes it difficult to predict Chinese diplomatic behaviour on key issues, but also allows external observers a rich source of opinions to select from to help support pre‐existing views on the nature of China as a global power.     

Mercosur: A Failing Development Project?

Latin America is a developing region. Although it is different from other such regions it shares with them ‘the challenge of change’, particularly as a result of globalization. Its response has been to embrace democracy, neoliberal restructuring and ‘new (open) regionalism’. The ‘Common Market of the South’—Mercosur—was an important regional initiative involving Argentina and Brazil, and included in its various aims was the acceleration of ‘economic development with social justice’. This article explores to what extent development aims have been achieved and whether Mercosur is little more than a loose confederation of states unable to build institutional structures that could help development. To what extent is this the result of traditions that have entrenched elites and prevented a more egalitarian approach? Has the law generally failed its citizens? Or does it have a place in development? The article begins by briefly considering the concept of ‘development’ and seeks to place Latin America within the ‘developmental framework’ and questions whether there is a distinct Latin American development tradition. Within that tradition, and in the context of the ‘inter‐American system’ and globalization, the development of Mercosur is assessed both in terms of institution building and legal traditions. Finally, some preliminary conclusions are drawn about Mercosur's future and the extent to which institutional and other constraints have contributed to Mercosur falling short of its devleopmental potential.     

Dr Fox and the Philosopher's Stone: the alchemy of national defence in the age of austerity

The history of British defence reviews has been one of repeated disappointment: a cycle in which policy failure is followed by a period of inertia, giving way to an attempt at a new policy framework which is then misimplemented by the defence leadership. Each failed defence review therefore sows the seeds of its successor. With this in mind, in 2010 the new coalition government embarked upon an altogether more ambitious exercise: a strategy review comprising a National Security Strategy and a Strategic Defence and Security Review. This article suggests, nevertheless, not only that the 2010 strategy review looks likely to follow past performance, but also that it is coming unstuck at an unprecedented rate. This is a pity since the 2010 review had much to commend it, not least the adoption of a risk‐based approach to security and defence policy‐making. What is the explanation for this outcome? Is it that the British have, as some have suggested, lost the ability to ‘do strategy’, if ever they had it? The authors offer a more nuanced understanding of the policy process and argue that the coalition government in fact has a very clear and deliberate strategy—that of national economic recovery. Yet the coalition government cannot allow national defence and security to fail. The authors conclude with an assessment of the options open to the defence leadership as they seek to address the failing 2010 strategy review and suggest a variety of indicators which will demonstrate the intent and seriousness of the political, official and military leadership of the Ministry of Defence.     

The Other Allies: Military Security,National Allegiance,and the Enlistment of ‘Friendly Aliens’ in the Australian Armed Forces, 1939–45

Abstract

This article investigates military security attitudes toward the enlistment of ‘friendly aliens’ in the Australian armed forces during the Second World War. Employing of?cial correspondence of the period, the study positions contemporary debates regarding the enlistment of Allied nationals from Axis-occupied countries within the context of Australian conceptions of race, British nationality, and national allegiance. It is argued that, while British practice was in?uential and uniformity of Imperial policy was a desired objective, the unique concerns of Australian security, the domestic relationship between citizenship and military service, and the White Australia policy combined to determine the nature and application of Australian security attitudes in this area. In certain cases, these factors exercised severely negative impacts upon ‘friendly aliens’ who volunteered for service in the Australian armed forces.     

The limits of engagement: British foreign policy and the crisis in Zimbabwe

This article examines how the British government has responded to Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis. This case raises several wider issues for British foreign policy, most notably the question of how much leverage London can exercise on the international scene in general, and over relatively small and weak states like Zimbabwe in particular. Zimbabwe’s crisis also raises profound questions about the appropriate balance between bilateral and multilateral policies, and between engaging in public criticism and conducting so–called ‘quiet diplomacy’. While bilateralism clearly has not worked, multilateralism has revealed its own frustrations, especially given the reluctance of many African elites within a number of organizations to criticize President Mugabe’s policies. This reluctance threatens to unravel the British Labour government’s stated objectives in Africa while at the same time raising important doubts over the credibility of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and whether an ‘Africa moment’ can be discerned in the manner articulated by prime minister Tony Blair.     

A call for a new Japanese foreign policy: the dilemmas of a stakeholder state

Japanese foreign policy is at a crossroads. A global power transition is under way; while the United States remains the leading global power, across the globe non‐western developing states are on the rise. Within Asia, China is a growing presence, wielding expansive claims on islands and maritime rights, and embarking on a defence buildup. As power shifts across Asia and the wider world, the terms of leadership and global governance have become more uncertain. Japan now finds itself asking basic questions about its own identity and strategic goals as a Great Power. Within this changing context, there are three foreign policy approaches available to Japan: (1) a classical realist line of working closely with the US in meeting China's rise and optimizing deep US engagement with China by pursuing a diplomacy focused on counterbalancing and hedging; (2) a transformative pragmatist line of rejuvenating itself through Abenomics and repositioning itself in East Asia; and (3) a liberal international line of pursuing a common agenda of enhancing global liberal‐oriented norms and rules through multilateral institutions along with the United States and the Asia–Pacific countries. Current Japanese foreign policy contains a mix of all three approaches. The article argues that a greater focus on the second and the third lines would enhance the current approach; it would ensure that Japan is more in harmony with the global environment and help it work positively for global and regional stability and prosperity, thus enabling Japan to pursue an ‘honorable place in the world’ (as stated in the preamble to its constitution).     

From forward defence to self‐reliance: Changes and continuities in Australian defence policy 1965–90

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's ‘declared’ defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its ‘operational’ policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid‐course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid‐1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of ‘defence self‐reliance’. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's ‘operational’ policy is flawed and in need of replacement The danger is that, as in the past, Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances.     

Strategizing Britain's role in the world

In recent commentaries on British foreign policy, the New Labour and coalition governments have been criticized for lacking strategic thinking. Academics describe a ‘strategy gap’ and note that old ideas about Britain's role in the world, such as Churchill's 1948 reference to ‘three circles’, continue to be recycled. Parliamentarians bemoan the ‘uncritical acceptance of these assumptions’ that has led to ‘a waning of our interests in, and ability to make, National Strategy’. This article argues that a primary problem has been the lack of consideration of how identity, strategy and action interrelate in foreign policy. Using the insights of role theory, the article seeks to address this by outlining six ideal‐type role orientations that the UK might fulfil in world politics, namely: isolate, influential (rule of law state), regional partner, thought leader, opportunist–interventionist power and Great Power. By considering how variations in a state's disposition towards the external environment translate into different policy directions, the article aims both to highlight the range of roles available to policy‐makers and to emphasize that policy often involves making a choice between them. Failure to recognize this has resulted in role conflicts and policy confusion. In setting out a variety of different role orientations, the author offers a route to introducing a genuine strategic sensibility to policy‐making, one that links identity with policy goals and outcomes.     

New Labour’s overseas development aid policy – charity or self-interest?

Robin Cook argued that New Labour’s foreign policy would have ‘ethical dimensions’,(Cook, “Robin Cook’s Speech on the Government’s Ethical Foreign Policy.”) and an assumption is often made, within existing literature, that this is an accurate statement when considering the overseas development agenda of New Labour government’s between 1997 and 2010. Tingley argues that the more left-wing a party, the more likely they are to increase attention on, and funding of, overseas development aid (ODA) projects.(Tingley, “Donors and Domestic Politics.”) This article uses the New Labour governments, from 1997 to 2010, as a case study to test the argument of Tingley and determines that his conclusions are accurate in the case of the UK. This article will then argue, using the work of Breuning that the motivations of the New Labour governments, and the way they conveyed their policy to the electorate changed overtime rather than remaining morally focused for the duration of their time in power.(Breuning, “Words and Deeds.”) By focusing on the rhetoric of the Labour Party, the changes in motivation can be identified in the period 1997–2010, with a distinct move from moral justifications to more self-interested pragmatic reasoning, which confirms Breuning’s argument.     

A new military history of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento: the case of ‘transnational soldiers’

The article discusses new studies of foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the (Anti-)Risorgimento against the background of recent scholarship on ‘transnational soldiers’, which acknowledges the complexities of foreigners' initial motives for enlistment and of the transnational processes inside the single armies. The article suggests that from the mundane structures of military life to the perceptions of the rank-and-file, many aspects of the soldiering experience in the multinational armed groups on all sides of the Risorgimento actually advanced rather than obviated national boundaries. This paper further demonstrates that the military cultures of the nationalists and the anti-unity forces were much more porous and mutually constitutive than is often recognised. The histories of the ‘transnational soldiers’ in the armed groups of the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento are crucial for a possibly new, comparative history of the armed groups of the (Anti-)Risorigmento. This paper explores approaches of the culturally revived ‘new military history’ and suggests that it provides much still unrealised potential for Risorgimento historiography.     

Reassessing the special relationship

The resignation of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister and the transition from Bush to Obama in the US mark the end of the second revival of the US–UK special relationship. The classic era of the special relationship began under the Labour government in the 1940s, though it was Winston Churchill who inspired the concept. It ended with the resignation of Harold Macmillan in 1963. Margaret Thatcher revived close personal relations with the US President as a guiding principle of UK foreign policy and Tony Blair successfully revived them again, even though the end of the Cold War had transformed the framework of transatlantic relations. Over the past 60 years US–UK relations have embedded specific security arrangements which have persisted, largely unquestioned, through the ups and downs of political relations at the top: close links between the two countries' armed forces; access to defence technology and procurement; intelligence ties through the UKUSA Agreement; a semi-independent nuclear deterrent and provision of military bases in the UK and its overseas territories. Public debate on the costs and benefits of these links has been limited; successive governments have discouraged a wider debate. The Obama administration enters office with few of the personal ties to Britain and to English culture, which have underpinned the special relationship. Earlier US administrations have approached relations with the UK from the perspective of US interests, while many British political leaders have felt—and have hoped to find in Washington—a sentimental attachment to Anglo–American partnership. British foreign policy would benefit from a reassessment of the structures of US–UK relations in terms of British interests, costs and benefits.     

Does It Even Work? A Theoretical and Practical Evaluation of the War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 represents a policy that attempts to fill a procedural gap in the Constitution, that is, a clear process by which the use of military force is authorized. Based on what is arguably a misinterpretation of the Constitution, it fails to achieve its objective: to constrain the president's discretion in employing military force unilaterally.

This article addresses the WPR in four sections. First, it examines the law's theoretical underpinnings. Next, it summarizes the law's provisions, its application, and several direct and indirect approaches that have been applied in studying the use of military force and the WPR. Third, using quantitative analysis, the article seeks to answer three basic questions: 1) Has the WPR had any effect on the U.S. president's decision to employ military force?

2) Has the WPR had any effect on the magnitude of force employed in a conflict?

3) Has the WPR had any effect on the duration of conflicts in which the president has employed military force?

Findings indicate that the War Powers Resolution is not a significant factor in presidents' decisions to use military force. Once the president decides to employ force in a given scenario, it also fails to be a significant factor in affecting the magnitude of force that is used. It appears that the law may have an effect on the duration of conflicts involving the U.S. military, but weaknesses in the statistical model leave this question open to further research to confirm or deny this verdict.