The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture

One of the enduring tensions in Russian political culture is that between order and liberty. Indeed, many fear that when faced with the inevitable cacophony of democratic politics, most Russians demand the restoration of order, and by a 'strong hand' if need be. This lack of commitment to democracy among ordinary people is often seen as a major impediment to the consolidation of the democratic transformation in Russia. The purpose of this article is to assess empirically the degree to which the desire for social and political order undermines support for democratic liberty. Based on a survey of the Russian mass public conducted in 1996, and employing within the survey an experiment on support for the imposition of martial law in Russia, I discover that Russians are indeed willing to surrender some liberty for the restoration of order. The preference for liberty reflects general democratic attitudes more than it is sensitive to the particular context within which liberty is suspended. Nonetheless, the context of the dispute is important because it serves to stimulate particular attitudes; for instance, the intervention of a court transforms the conflict from a political to a legal dispute, thereby activating attitudes toward the rule of law. In the final analysis, I conclude that if elites maintain ordered political competition, it is likely that the mass public will maintain individual liberty, and democracy in Russia will prosper accordingly.     

The Crimea conundrum: legitimacy and public opinion after annexation

ABSTRACT

The widespread international condemnation of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 is at odds with the strong local support for the transfer of territory in the peninsula. Though regarded as illegitimate by most governments as indicated in a UN General Assembly vote, the Russian government argued that the transfer was justified since it reflected the majority opinion in Crimea. The examination of attitudes in December 2014 through a representative survey in Crimea confirmed the support for territorial transfer and indicated that most residents believed that their well-being would improve as a result. Most lamented the end of the Soviet Union but strongly trusted President Putin and his policies as a way to improve the local economy. Nearly everyone had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation. There was little difference between the biggest demographic groupings, Russians and Ukrainians, in attitudes and beliefs. Exceptionally, the Tatar minority consistently demonstrated opposition to the annexation, distrust of Putin and supported a return to the circumstances that the peninsula had experienced after 1991. With the exception of this minority, the annexation continues to garner wide popular approval despite international opprobrium, sanctions against Russia and sustained geopolitical tensions in the Black Sea region. This is the Crimea conundrum.     

Alternative identity,alternative religion? Neo‐paganism and the Aryan myth in contemporary Russia

ABSTRACT. As in all post‐Soviet states, the Russian intelligentsia has been preoccupied with the construction of a new national identity since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the place of Orthodox religion in Russia is well documented, the subject of neo‐paganism and its consequent assertion of an Aryan identity for Russians remains little known. Yet specialists observing the political and intellectual life of contemporary Russia have begun to notice that the development of references to ‘Slavic paganism’ and to Russia's ‘Aryan’ origin can be found in the public speeches of some politicians and intellectual figures. This article will attempt, in its first section, to depict the historical depth of these movements by examining the existence of neo‐pagan and/or Aryan referents in Soviet culture, and focusing on how these discourses developed in different spheres of post‐Soviet Russian society, such as those of religion, historiography, and politics.     

Looking ‘The Gift’ in the mouth: Russia as donor (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

While the Soviet Union was a significant donor of international development aid, since the 1990s, a generation of Russians has experienced the subject position of ‘recipient’ in the global political economy. However, following its G8 presidency in 2006, Russia officially signalled its intention to (re‐)emerge as an aid donor. Should the Russian government's efforts to join the global community of donors be understood as a defence mechanism against what Mauss called the ‘wounding’ experience of being treated as a perpetual recipient? International development aid is seen here as a cultural phenomenon whose underlying assumptions are both challenged and affirmed by the arrival of ‘emerging donors’ such as Russia.     

‘Russian merchant’ legacies in post-Soviet trade with China: Moral economy,economic success and business innovation in Yiwu

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on Russian traders operating in China, particularly in Yiwu, the major commercial hub for the ‘small commodity’ trade, and explores the idea of the ‘Russian merchant’ prevalent in Russia today. Rather than examining the new commercial culture from the perspective of global neoliberalism, it deals with Russia’s pre-Soviet merchant estate (soslovie) and its present-day political-ideological evocations. While there is no direct cultural-professional continuity between pre-Soviet and post-Soviet merchants, some similarities have come to the fore and have been encouraged by the state and the Church. This is due to the promotion of a particular moral economy wherein the ‘Russian merchant’ figures as a positive category. Using a case study of a Russian trader in Yiwu, the article illustrates the new ways in which mistrust as well as ‘traditional’ merchant attributes such as patriotism and patriarchal authority, have been harnessed to create a successful Russian transnational business.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia

Abstract. It is inaccurate and misleading to apply the term ‘nationalism’ to Russia prior to the present day. Both Tsarist and Soviet leaders sought to maintain an empire and not a nation‐state, and their national consciousness was imperial rather than national. The lack of Russian nationalism was crucial for Russian history since it explains the failure of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Modern societies cannot be successfully constructed upon the basis of imperial thinking. The absence of Russian nationalism also has significance for nationalism theory. Russia possessed the social, political and cultural characteristics that have been adduced as ‘causes’ of nationalism by a wide variety of scholars, yet Russia failed to develop a nationalist movement. This suggests that what is crucial to modem nationalism is the appearance of a particularist, secular ideology, since the most notable aspect in which Russia differed from Europe was Russia's universalistic, religious and imperialist discourse of national identity.     

Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’

Russia's military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia raise fundamental questions about Russian regional policy, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force. The spectacle of maneouvre warfare on the periphery of Europe could form a watershed in post‐Cold War Russian relations with its neighbourhood and the wider international community. The speed and scale with which Russia's initial ‘defensive’ intervention to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ led to a broad occupation of many Georgian regions focuses attention on the motivations behind Russian military preparations for war and the political gains Moscow expected from such a broad offensive. Russia has failed to advance a convincing legal case for its operations and its ‘peace operations’ discourse has been essentially rhetorical. Some Russian goals may be inferred: the creation of military protectorates in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; inducing Georgian compliance, especially to block its path towards NATO; and creating a climate of uncertainty over energy routes in the South Caucasus. Moscow's warning that it will defend its ‘citizens’ (nationals) at all costs broadens the scope of concerns to Russia's other neighbour states, especially Ukraine. Yet an overreaction to alarmist scenarios of a new era of coercive diplomacy may only encourage Russian insistence that its status, that of an aspirant global power, be respected. This will continue to be fuelled by internal political and psychological considerations in Russia. Careful attention will need to be given to the role Russia attributes to military power in pursuing its revisionist stance in the international system.     

Between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander: The Polish Question at Tilsit, 1807

Abstract

The defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806 and the resulting insurrection in Prussian Poland re-opened the complex ‘Polish Question’. The former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been wiped off the map only eleven years earlier. The large size and the civic traditions of the Polish ‘political nation’ meant that the three partitioning powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) were bound to be alarmed by the developments in Prussian Poland. Napoleon’s attitude to the Poles was cautious, but, as the campaign against Russia (Prussia’s new ally) continued into 1807, he authorized the creation of a Polish army and of a quasi-government in Warsaw. The article examines the negotiations over the future of Prussia’s Polish lands held between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit in June–July 1807. Hard geopolitical considerations influenced the negotiations which eventually produced a compromise solution in the form of a so-called ‘Duchy of Warsaw’ under the King of Saxony. Although the Poles had no direct influence on the negotiations, the Polish military effort on the side of France was an important factor in the outcome of the settlement. The Russians remained deeply wary of the new duchy, especially after its enlargement in 1809. With the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1814–15, Tsar Alexander acquired most of the duchy which was to survive for many years under Russian rule as the so-called ‘Congress’ Kingdom of Poland.     

Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis

This article explores explanations of Russia's unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al‐Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin's resistance to any scenario of western‐led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy‐makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.     

Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules

The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post‐Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.     

The Crimean War and its lessons for today

Orlando Figes's book The Crimean War: a history, based on English, Russian, French and Turkish sources, throws a new light on the Crimean War in a number of ways. It shows that the conflict was far from being a small war, but a landmark event. It was the only example of a war between Britain and Russia—and it led to enormous casualties. It also represented a stage in medical history, since most of the casualties were caused by disease. In Britain, it marked a new advance in the power of the press, which did much to fuel anti‐Russian sentiment. The war was also fuelled, on both sides, by religious and nationalist sentiment—but its most important cause related to the fate of the Ottoman Empire, then in decline, and fears that its collapse could result in a dangerous power vacuum. The war still has a significance for the present day because the collapse of communism has failed to resolve the antagonism between Russia and the West. Here, the book throws an important light on the development of British and western attitudes towards Russia, many of which were shaped in the nineteenth century. The book deserves attention, both here and in Russia.     

The Sources of Support for Separatism: Public Opinion in Three Soviet Republics

Abstract. The replacement of the Soviet Union by independent states rather than by a loose confederation of component republics reflects (in part) the demands for change that were being expressed by mass publics. What caused the people to reject decentralisation of authority within the existing state structure and chose rather to support movements that insisted on the establishment of independent states? We examine whether concerns about ‘discriminatory redistribution’ and ‘cultural preservation’ were more important than questions of ‘efficiency’ or ‘relative deprivation’ as motivations behind support for secession. The analysis is based upon public opinion data from Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania gathered in May of 1990 and in June of 1991. We conclude that although issues related to cultural preservation and discriminatory redistribution were foremost in the minds of separatists, concerns about efficiency and improved management in government are also relevant for understanding support for separatism.     

On re‐examining western attitudes to Russia

There are several strands in western antipathy to Russia which predate the Soviet era by more than a century. Public opinion was always divided on how to respond to the Russia problem; however, neither western nor Soviet leaders sought out war. There is fresh and credible evidence that Brezhnev was a ‘dove’, who was not interested in world revolution and genuinely wanted reconciliation with the United States. The attainment of democracy requires not only an enlightened leader but an intelligent opposition. However, the crucial factor in democratic transition is the avoidance of economic collapse. Nevertheless, the consensus in both Russia and the West in the 1990s was that a laissez‐faire policy was the only viable strategy. This article suggests another strategy which might have avoided or mitigated economic collapse. The consensus in both Russia and the West in the 1990s was that nothing should be done to impede the breakup of the USSR. The example of President Kennedy in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of magnanimity and a model of constructive reconciliation. In the present crisis over Ukraine there may be no alternative to confrontation—but confrontation in itself is a totally inadequate response. Western attitudes must not become an obstacle to reconciliation. Western public opinion can play an important part in forcing the clarification of such attitudes.     

‘Spreading grace’ in post‐Soviet Russia (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

The article addresses the revival of Russian Orthodoxy as a prominent domain in the lives of many Russians. The six authors are interested in the underlying question: What makes Russian Orthodoxy a relevent and modern source of morality and identity? The circumstances of this branch of Christianity significantly differ from what has been discussed in recent years as ‘the anthropology of Christianity’. The article proposes a thematic approach in order to connect the exploration of Russian Orthodoxy to the study of other denominations. A key‐area is the disctinctive articulation between continuity and change, which is crucial to the understanding of some branches of Protestantism as well.     

Existential nationalism: Russia's war against Ukraine

‘If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine’ is the sentiment used by Ukrainian protesters mobilising against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Such a sentiment signifies the stakes of a war where Ukraine is a democratic nation-state fighting for its right to exist against a Russian invasion. Meanwhile, Russia is fighting for a version of Ukraine that is subservient to Russia's idea of what Ukraine should be as a nation-state: under a Russian hegemon geopolitically, where Ukraine's national idea and interpretation of history can be vetted and vetoed by the Russian state. While nationalism scholarship equips us to study Russia's war against Ukraine through the lens of Russian ethnic nationalism and Ukrainian civic nationalism, the ethnic/civic dichotomy falls short of unpacking the more pernicious logics that pervade Russia's intentions and actions towards Ukraine (demilitarisation and de-Nazification). Instead, this article explores the logics of Russia's war and Ukraine's resistance through the concept of existential nationalism where existential nationalism is Russia's motivation to pursue war, whatever the costs, and Ukraine's motivation to fight with everything it has.     

The impact of Russian food security policy on the performance of the food system

Abstract

Food security has guided Russia’s food policy since 2010. The article examines the impact of food security policy on the food system. The Russian model of food security combines government intervention in the form of assistance for domestic production while simultaneously restricting market access. Food security does not appear to have a deleterious impact on the food system. We measure impact on four dimensions. Financial support for agriculture continues to increase in nominal rubles. In food production, the beef and dairy branches continue to lag, but increased grain production has made Russia a global leader in grain exports. Average per capita food consumption improved, although the poor consume much less, and the decline of the ruble affects the way Russians shop. The largest impact of food security has been on food trade. Food security policy has brought food to the forefront as an instrument of foreign policy. Food trade is politicized, witnessed by the food embargo against the West and food import bans against Turkey and Ukraine.     

Creating meanings and traps: competing interpretations of the idea of nation in the debates of Russian Slavophiles and Westernisers in the 1840s

To use Benedict Anderson's metaphor, there are different ways to ‘imagine’ the nation. This means that in the same community there might be various competing interpretations of ‘an idea of nation’. They contribute to some kind of ‘repertoire of meanings’, to which participants of nationalist discourses consciously or unconsciously appeal. If so, it is useful to explore the process of shaping and interaction of competing interpretations of ‘an idea of nation’, resulting in (terminal) domination of particular cohesions of meanings in the public discourses. This article offers a case study of the debates between Russian Slavophiles and Westernisers in the 1840s that are treated as the controversy between two distinct models of ‘an idea of nation’, the conservative-traditionalist and the liberal-progressivist. This distinction, familiar for many countries, was especially evident in Russia with regard to the problem of the preservation of ‘the national self’ in the context of ‘catch-up’ modernisation which took a significant place amongst the complex of issues that shaped the nationalist ‘repertoire of meanings’.     

They Fear Us,yet Cling to Us: Russian Negotiations with Tsushima Domain Officials during the 1861 Tsushima Incident

Over six months in 1861, Commander Birilëv of the Russian Navy constructed a base on the island of Tsushima and attempted to negotiate with local domain officials to turn the island into a Russian protectorate. While official Japanese documents, including Tsushima reports to the Tokugawa government in Edo, claim they vigorously resisted these most unwelcome Russian efforts, Birilëv records the Tsushima officials themselves as the ones who first requested Russian patronage. How can we reconcile these two dramatically different versions of the same event? Due to the relatively isolated position of Tsushima, separated from mainland Japan by the sea, the Russians incorrectly believed they were dealing with a borderland that could be detached from the Tokugawa polity, or even with an independent state, tied to Japan merely by flimsy ‘feudal’ bonds. At the same time, Tsushima officials, afraid of antagonizing the volatile Birilëv, resorted to various stratagems that were misinterpreted by him as signals of desire to switch feudal overlords. The resultant negotiations reveal much about international diplomacy across different political cultures in mid-19^th century Asia, the influence of Russia on the development of the Japanese polity, and the conduct of gunboat diplomacy at the apogee of European imperialism.     

The narratives of exclusion and self-exclusion in the Russian conflict discourse on EU–Russian Relations

The article focuses on the interplay of the narratives of ‘exclusion’ and ‘self-exclusion’ in the Russian discourse on EU–Russian relations. Since the late 1990s, this discourse has acquired an increasingly conflictual orientation, whereby the official foreign policy objectives of ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU and Russia's ‘integration with Europe’ are increasingly problematised across the entire Russian political spectrum. In the analysis of the Russian conflict discourse we shall identify two at first glance opposed narratives. Firstly, the EU enlargement has raised the issue of the expansion of the Schengen visa regime for Russian citizens, travelling to Europe. Particularly acute with regard to Kaliningrad Oblast', this issue has also generated a wider identity-related discourse on the EU's exclusionary policies towards Russia. Secondly, the perception of Russia's passive or subordinate status in EU–Russian cooperative arrangements at national, regional and local levels resulted in the problematisation of the insufficiently reciprocal or intersubjective nature of the EU–Russian ‘partnership’ and the increasing tendency towards Russia's ‘self-exclusion’ from integrative processes, grounded in the reaffirmation of state sovereignty that generally characterises the Putin presidency. This article concludes with the interpretation of the two conflict narratives in the wider context of debates around the project of European integration.