Bush,Obama and a faith‐based US foreign policy

In a calculated move to appeal to his core constituency during his first term, President George W. Bush launched domestic and international faith‐based initiatives designed to leverage public finance for religious groupings to carry out social and welfare functions formerly performed by government or secular organizations. In December 2002 the Center for Faith‐Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) was extended to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Center's intention was to ‘create a level playing field’ for faith‐based and community groups to compete for foreign assistance funding. These presidential initiatives are problematic, however, calling into question the first amendment—the separation of church and state. Upon taking office Barack Obama set up the Office of Faith‐based and Neighborhood Partnerships, promising a greater emphasis on community/neighbourhood programs. The CFBCI remains a fixture in USAID and Obama shows as much enthusiasm for the initiative as his predecessor. Faith‐based international relations and political science scholars have sought to build on these initiatives and call for a greater role for faith in US foreign policy. On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, this article considers the claims for a faith‐based foreign policy by examining the construction of a faith‐based discourse by academics and successive presidents. Using faith‐based initiatives and USAID as a case–study, the article discusses criticisms of the policy and focuses on the role of a conservative evangelical organization, Samaritan's Purse, to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of faith‐based approaches. The article argues that advocates of faith‐based foreign policy, in seeking special privileges for ecumenical religious actors, overlook their declining international significance and the opportunities afforded to less tolerant but more populist religious actors which have the potential seriously to harm US foreign policy objectives.     

Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half‐hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates—both human and technological—that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long‐term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East— something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited.     

The perils of a trade-first US foreign policy

The end of the Cold War, the advent of globalisation, and new horizons in trade theory, all seem to point out to the need for a new American economic strategy. Indeed, for many they beg for the implementation of economism as the new US foreign policy doctrine. The managed trade policy (1993-1996) of forcibly opening foreign markets for the benefit of corporate America showed much of what is wrong with a trade-first agenda in foreign affairs: it accomplished nothing in terms of economic gain while creating dangerous spillovers into other foreign policy areas--such as political and security bilateral relationships--thus endangering the broader goals of US foreign policy. A foreign policy that puts trade at the top of the agenda is unwarranted, probably unsustainable, and ultimately counterproductive. Moreover, it is hardly the most important tool by which the economic wellbeing of most Americans can be enhanced. The return of low productivity figures and a slowing American economy may well rekindle calls for a policy of managed trade. Such calls must be rejected and the lessons of the recent past must be heeded.     

US foreign policy and the pragmatic use of international institutions

The use of international institutions by the United States is characterised by pragmatism. US officials approach institutions as instruments of convenience across time, across regions, and across economic and security issues. US political rhetoric since the end of World War II has emphasised the importance of multilateralism. But in practice, the US approach reflects a process of trial and error and a tendency to focus on what works in terms of US domestic and foreign policy interests. Successive US administrations have proved flexible in modifying, expanding, neglecting and even discarding those institutions whose initial instrumental purpose is no longer essential. These twists and turns have proved frustrating to America's economic and security allies who have been forced to bear the brunt of adjusting to the changing institutional preferences of their more powerful partner.     

Major foreign policy challenges for the next US President

President Obama has been elected to office in the United States during a crisis of confidence in America's capacity to exercise effective leadership in world afairs. National self-indulgence, greedy financial irresponsibility and an unnecessary war have discredited that leadership, a situation that has been compounded by the current global economic crisis. Added to these self-inflicted wounds, this article suggests, are two transformational developments on the world political scene. First, the 'global political awakening' to issues such as climate change, health and social inequality; and second, a shift in the distribution of global power from the West to the East. However, although this shift is occurring, it is a slow process and in the foreseeable future there is no state, or combination of states, that can replace the role America plays on the international scene. What is also clear is that without an American recovery, there will be no global recovery. The American recovery will be a monumental task. But four small, telling words—unify, enlarge, engage and pacify—summarize the essence of the needed response. There needs to be an effort to re-establish a sense of unity between America and Europe; an enlarged coalition of principal players is necessary to promote more effective global management; dialogue engaging a wider circle of partners key to global geopolitical stability should be promoted and maintained; and a deliberate effort not to get bogged down politically and militarily in the Middle East is essential.     

Strategic taboos: chemical weapons and US foreign policy

This article examines US President Barack Obama's foreign policy rhetoric on Syria, specifically in relation to the threat of chemical weapons and the prohibitionary taboo surrounding their use. It contends that Obama's rhetorical construction of the taboo is not simply a commitment to the control of these horrific weapons (where such arms have been comprehended as so extensively vile as to preclude their employment), but that this also represents the strategic linguistic exploitation of these normative ideals in order to directly shape policy. By analysing of presidential speeches made during the conflict, it demonstrates that Obama has manipulated pre‐existing conceptions of chemical weapons as taboo, and also as forms of weapons of mass destruction, to deliberately construct policy in line with his own political ambitions—most notably as a way of forcing a multilateral solution to the situation in Syria. This article challenges existing perceptions of the chemical weapons taboo as an inherently normative constraint, arguing that this instead comprises a more agency‐driven construct. Static notions of the taboo must be abandoned and subsequently replaced with a framework of understanding that recognizes how the taboo can be used as a deliberate driver of foreign policy.     

The Islamic State lexical battleground: US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat

This article suggests that President Obama's consistent references to the extremist Sunni group as ‘ISIL’ (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is not a trivial matter of nomenclature. Instead, the Obama administration's deliberate usage of the ISIL acronym (as opposed to other commonly‐used terms such as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ‘ISIS’, ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’, ‘so‐called Islamic State’ and ‘Daesh’) frames the public perception of the threat to avoid engagement with the requirements of strategy and operations. Both the labelling and the approach could be defended as a response to the unique challenge of a transnational group claiming religious and political legitimacy. However, we suggest that the labelling is an evasion of the necessary response, reflecting instead a lack of coherence in strategy and operations—in particular after the Islamic State's lightning offensive in Iraq and expansion in Syria in mid‐2014. This tension between rhetoric, strategy and operations means that ‘ISIL’ does not provide a stable depiction of the Islamic State. While it may draw upon the post‐9/11 depiction of ‘terrorism’, the tag leads to dissonance between official and media representations. The administration's depiction of a considered approach leading to victory has been undermined by the abstraction of ‘ISIL’, which in turn produced strategic ambiguity about the prospect of any political, economic or military challenge to the Islamic State.     

Innovation and precedent in the Kosovo war: the impact of Operation Allied Force on US foreign policy

The 1990s was a period of strategic innovation in US foreign policy. Operation Allied Force in particular represented an important step in the contorted evolution of America's attitude towards the use of force in the post-Cold War period. That operation demonstrated the growing influence of humanitarian concerns and the extent to which America was willing to reconsider Cold War criteria on the prudence and utility of force in support of its foreign policy. In its decision to intervene in Kosovo, the Clinton administration also divided opinion among the military. This, in effect, reduced the premium placed on the counsels of the armed forces and made it easier for the Bush administration subsequently to ignore their advice. Furthermore, having fought the war multilaterally through NATO, Operation Allied Force made America more wary of doing so again. In other words, the intervention set a number of precedents and left a significant legacy for the way in which US foreign policy was pursued in the decade that followed. This legacy is considered in two parts: the first analyses those issues associated with the use of force debate; the second considers how the Kosovo experience affected US attitudes to coalition warfare.     

The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

Imperialist democracy,ancient Athenians and the US presence in Iraq

This article speculates about possible parallels between the experience of the Athenian empire and the Americans’ rationale for their presence in Iraq. Leaders in both countries sought to make their worlds safe for democracy by military invasion. The Athenian experience is described, drawing on Thucydides and other primary and secondary sources. Then there is a sketch of the scholarly treatment accorded the Athenian empire by writers through to the present day. Finally, allusions to the classical experience by several contemporary writers are examined. These writers articulate a common pessimism about the future prospects for the American presence in Iraq.     

The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy

It is widely recognised that the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), adopted by heads of state and government in 2005, is an important new international principle. Australia has been one of the principle's most significant contributors, with prominent Australians and governments from both sides of politics contributing to its development, emergence, and implementation. This article traces and explains Australia's contribution to RtoP and asks what more it might do to assist in its implementation. It argues that Australia's commitment to RtoP is informed by a synergy of values and interests and has been strengthened by the Rudd government's reengagement with multilateralism. It concludes by calling for the development of a whole-of-government strategy for implementation and by suggesting some policy avenues that might be considered.