日军在华军事谍报活动与七七事变的爆发

1936年前后,日军开始加强对华军事谍报力量,全力收集旨在发动军事进攻必须的谍报,并且在七七事变前夕,基本上完成了对中国陆军部署状况和作战能力等的调查,掌握了中国空军各种绝密信息,摸清了中国北方国防工事的构筑状况。因此,即使仅仅从情报收集的角度来看,七七事变也是日军精心策划的必然产物。     

Science,Technology and Changing Power Relations: the negotiation process of the agreement on Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation, 1955

Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the so-called TT-agreement, in 1955. Previous research has emphasized the viewpoint that the agreement was part of a new ‘softer’ strategy of the Soviet Union, the aim of which was to entangle Finland scientifically and technologically in the Soviet sphere of influence, and that anti-communist Finns formed a unanimous front against this inconvenient initiative. This article illustrates that adopting a different perspective makes possible an interpretation which indicates that the negotiation process for the agreement was less straightforward. Throughout the negotiations it is possible to observe the key issues of centralization and decentralization as well as the question of the status of science and technology policy in Finnish society. In essence, the TT-agreement was about determination of power relations and dominion not only between Finland and the Soviet Union but also between different interest groups inside Finland.     

The Specter of Revolution: Reconsidering Japan's Decision to Surrender

Existing studies of the Pacific War tend to focus on the adverse military situation in explaining Japan's decision to surrender. Special emphasis has been placed on both the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet entry into the war. Although these are no doubt critical to understanding the end of the Pacific War, they fail to tell the whole story. This paper seeks to broaden the scope of the scholarly debate by focusing on Japan's domestic situation as a major factor behind the decision to surrender. It argues that a near-obsessive fear of social revolution among Japan's conservative ruling elite played an important role in prompting Japanese elites to make the decision to end the war.     

Georgii Mirskii and Soviet Theories of Authoritarian Modernization

This article examines Soviet thinking about authoritarian modernization through the life and thought of Georgii Mirskii, a noted expert on Arab politics. Mirskii was a regular adviser and speechwriter for the Soviet Central Committee, and was also followed by the KGB for his criticism of Stalin. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mirskii looked to the example of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser to develop a theory of military-led modernization. This article examines how Mirskii's faith in the ability of Third World militaries to function as modernizing forces changed over time. The course of military politics in the Third World during the 1970s and 1980s, when military coups proliferated, bringing to power violent and self-interested regimes, disabused Mirskii of any faith in military modernization. Examining Mirskii's thought not only sheds light on the ideas that motivated Khrushchev-era Soviet foreign and development policy, it also provides an illuminating comparison for better-studied theories of authoritarian modernization in the United States.     

诺门罕战役与日本人的苏联观——以村上春树的《发条鸟年代记》为中心

《发条鸟年代记》是村上春树在旅美期间完成的一篇重作品,意在通过对诺门罕战役的历史回顾,向世界说明昨天和今天的日本人。本文认为,对文学作品价值的判断,只能依据作品的形象、而不是作品之外的作家的表白。在这个意义上,这部长篇实际上是日本人的苏联观的集中披露,也是日本知识界对近现代日苏关系的艺术梳理。日本人间宫对苏联人鲍里斯表现出本质上又恨又怕的心理。     

The clash of great powers and revolution in the Baltic Sea?

The Soviet party leadership claimed repeatedly after the mid-1920s that the Soviet Union was under an acute threat of intervention. The interpretation was based on different views regarding the development of socialism in the USSR. The role of Finland in the Soviet policy towards other border-states offers a case for observing the relation of ideology and practice in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the Baltic Sea context in 1925. The main interests for the Soviets were plans for military alliances and spheres of influence and intelligence. Contrary to the ideological worldview, the Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) did not see the western great powers, Great Britain and France, as being behind the Baltic alliance plan. Instead, the alliance attempt was primarily seen as an independent Polish initiative, especially lacking British support. The Soviet foreign administration was able to evaluate the grounds for eventual Finnish non-alliance accurately, despite Baltic sympathies and the lack of an active Scandinavian orientation. The results suggest the NKID observed international relations from the traditional viewpoint of Soviet state interests, and on the basis of quite accurate information, not reflecting the needs of ideological interpretation or domestic power struggles.     

Undercover Acolytes: Honganji,the Japanese Army,and Intelligence‐Gathering Operations

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as the Japanese Army sought intelligence on the countries neighbouring Japan, the military made use of the Buddhist priesthood as a cover for intelligence gathering. In addition, elements of the Buddhist priesthood, in particular the Kyoto‐based Honganji sect, were happy to cooperate with the military in its intelligence gathering operations, either by allowing military officers to disguise themselves as monks or by having Buddhist monks gather military intelligence for the Japanese Army. This article examines the relationship between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the activities of military officers who disguised themselves as Buddhist monks and the intelligence gathering activities of Buddhist monks, hoping to shed more light on the part that Japanese Buddhism played in Japan's imperial adventures.     

‘To Prostitute the Elements’: Weather Control and Weaponisation by US Department of Defense

The US military has a long and robust history of scientific research programs, often conducted in conjunction with civilian scientists at non-military governmental agencies as well as universities. These programs flourished in the immediate post-Second World War and the early cold war years, as the field of military science expanded to address the sprawling Soviet threat. One area of growth was in atmospheric science, which had already taken off preceding Second World War in conjunction with the growth of air warfare. Advances in meteorology, cloud science and climatology enabled military interests to align with weather forecasters and also agricultural interests, as old ideas about cloud seeding and weather control were revived in the light of new research. The military, largely through the Air Force, advanced a series of projects investigating the potential of weather and climate control, manipulation, and ultimately weaponisation. These programs, which were sometimes linked to US Department of Agriculture programs aimed at improving agricultural production, persisted for decades. Some of the newly developed tools were deployed: local climate manipulation efforts during the Vietnam conflict were aimed at impeding traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, with mixed results. Significant efforts came during the Weather Bureau leadership of Francis W. Reichelderfer, whose papers contain a wealth of information about efforts ranging from cloud seeding to proposals to drop atomic weapons on hurricanes. These papers, along with those of Weather Bureau scientist Harry Wexler, provide a fascinating window to a time when the US military and scientific establishment seemed poised to grasp the levers of power over nature itself. This paper describes these little-studied programs, and situates these efforts within the broader military science programs accompanying the emergence of air warfare, as well as post-war science programs aimed at countering the Soviet challenge.     

Across the Oceans: development of overseas business information transmission 1815–1875

This article examines the imposed adaptation of Orthodox Finns, who were evacuated from territories ceded to the Soviet Union during the Second World War in the areas where they were settled. It elucidates both the settlement measures taken by the Finnish authorities and the unofficial forms of control, such as labelling and other discriminatory practices, exercised by the local populations. By controlling the behaviour of the displaced persons, the original inhabitants were able to make the newcomers conform to the values, norms and habits of the Lutheran community at both local and national levels.     

满铁的“满洲”经营与附属地各图书馆

日俄战争后日本殖民者以“满铁”为主体,在中国东北进行政治、经济、贸易、交通、文化等侵略。同时利用“满铁”以满铁大连图书馆和国立奉天图书馆为集源中心与附属地各图书馆,形成纵横交错的东北文化调查研究资料收集场所。最终以文事的形式来管理达到实以武备统治东北的目的。     

九一八事变后日本决策层侵华国策的趋同

九一八事变后,日本内阁虽然确立不扩大方针,但自日本经营南满以来,维护满蒙权益成为历届政府、军部海外扩张及处理国际事务的压倒性决策要素,驱动决策层势必迎合军部和关东军的军事侵略行径,推动日本走向扩大战争。同时,以九一八事变为契机,日本国内军权膨胀,军权蔑视政权、军权凌驾政权的军国体制日臻完备,自下而上的国家改造运动,又从下层社会煽起军国热和排外热,加之财阀转向,主动投向军国主义怀抱,形成军财一体,终使日本完成举国一致、趋同侵华国策的异变过程。     

SOVIET ASIAN-PACIFIC TRADE AND THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET FAR EAST

During the 1970s and early 1980s it was generally accepted, by both Soviet and Western specialists, that in the Soviet Far East the expansion of exports to the nations of the Pacific Basin offered a solution to the region's economic problems. However, recent policy statements suggest the rejection of this export-led development strategy. This study examines the changing structure and dynamics of Soviet trade with the Asian-Pacific region. At present, for a combination of economic and political reasons, Soviet trade with the Asian-Pacific region is dominated by exports of machinery and equipment and petroleum to the socialist nations of the region, inasmuch as Japanese demand for Soviet natural resources is stagnant. Therefore, because of the resource orientation of the Far Eastern economy, contemporary trade relations do not favor the expansion of the Soviet Far Eastern export base. Consequently, the future role of the region in the national economic system will be determined largely by the availability of domestic capital investment funds.     

Hindcasting the Japanese Military Base on Midway Atoll (Central Pacific)

Abstract

The Battle of Midway (4–7 June 1942) was the turning point of World War II in the Pacific. Not only did the battle cost the Japanese Navy four of its fleet carriers, it also thwarted Japanese hopes of establishing a seaplane base there. Midway, in conjunction with another in the Aleutians, was to be the anchor of Japan’s eastern defence perimeter. Drawing on an analysis of the Japanese military base on Kiska (Aleutians) this paper reconstructs what equipment the Japanese had destined to be placed on Midway. A comparison with the well-documented Japanese bases on Micronesian atolls allows us to hindcast the appearance of a base that never was.     

论日本与晚清军事教育近代化

19世纪末,日本势力开始渗入到中国的军事教育改革之中,随着日本顾问和教习人数的大量增加,日本逐渐垄断了中国的军事教育权,并由此对中国的军事近代化产生了深远的影响.     

中共临时中央对抗日同盟军工作的指导思想

20世纪30年代初,中共临时中央为了实现创造北方新苏区的革命目标,指示张家口前委在同盟军中开展工作,意图铲除冯玉祥,把同盟军改编为红军,建立苏维埃根据地。这是临时中央在指导地方党的工作中盲目执行“左”倾冒险主义进攻路线的一个具体计划,结果给党的事业造成极大危害。今天总结这一历史教训,有助于深化我们对中国革命史中“左”的认识和反思。     

“一号命令”辨析

一号命令是1969年10月中旬林彪通过军委办事组发布全军的一个战备命令。这个命令是在珍宝岛事件后苏联出现一系列针对中国的军事异动,中共中央判断苏联极有可能对中国发动突然袭击的关节点发出的。林彪在发出命令之前向毛泽东作了汇报,但命令在传输过程中出现冠名等问题,致使这个命令在中央核心层引起一系列复杂反应。九一三事件后,这个命令又被称为林彪篡党夺权的预演,被长期追查,使之更加复杂化,至今存在许多误解。围绕一号命令出现的问题反映出军队存在的一些综合性问题。它与文化大革命中的政治形势,以及军队领导体制的不正常、军队正规化建设制度被否定有直接的关系,折射出文化大革命以来军队建设中潜伏的危机。     

试析美苏建交的历史背景及原因

1929-1933年世界性经济危机使美苏关系发生了深刻变化.身受经济危机困扰的美国迫切需要将苏联作为重要的商品销售市场和原料供应地.伴随着经济危机的加深,日德法西斯势力开始了疯狂的侵略扩张活动,严重影响了美苏自身的安全和世界和平.在不断变化的国际政治现实面前,奉行现实主义外交政策的罗斯福总统终于打开了与苏联建立外交关系的大门.     

‘Forewarned Is Forearmed’: Intelligence,Japan's Siberian Intervention,and the Washington Conference

This article details the intelligence-gathering role of US railroad experts stationed in Siberia and Manchuria from 1917 to 1922. Beginning in April 1920, US railway officials began receiving intercepted correspondence between Japanese officials, passed to them from Japan's military headquarters in Harbin via a former Czechoslovak soldier. The intelligence shows that US officials were aware of highly detailed planning by Japanese expansionists. Whether or not US officials were completely cognisant of the intelligence's significance, these sources provide insight into why US diplomacy helped provide leverage to the moderates within Japan's government. In particular, the intercepted correspondence allows for a reinterpretation of Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya's role during the Siberian expedition. This paper provides evidence that Uchida was not a moderate ally as scholars have traditionally claimed, but a key facilitator of Japan's military expansionists. It argues that the success of the Washington Conference, combined with the military's repeated failures to produce a victory in the Russian Far East, pressured Uchida into withdrawing his support for the expansionist programme. In addition to demonstrating the impact of the Washington Conference and the Siberian intervention on US–Japanese relations, this article helps explain Uchida's later re-emergence in the 1930s as a militarist sympathiser.