Dismantling the Soviet Security System. Soviet–Finnish Negotiations on Ending Their Friendship Agreement, 1989–91.

The Soviet Union had tied Finland to its security system through the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed between the two in 1948. As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s, Finland exited the Soviet sphere of influence – the region controlled through a system of bilateral and multilateral agreements. This article analyses the Soviet–Finnish negotiations to discard the FCMA treaty as a case study of the changing Soviet European neighbourhood policy. It gives important insights into the disintegration of the Soviet foreign policy mechanism during the Gorbachev era as it elaborates on both the intra-bureaucracy conflicts between the Kremlin and the Soviet foreign ministry, MID, and later between the Soviet central government and the Russian republic. As Finland was part of the Soviet security system, analysing Finland's exit from it sheds light onto the crucial change that took place in the Soviet foreign policy doctrine during the perestroika years. The Gorbachev leadership's decision not to defend its sphere of influence with force paved way for the upheavals of 1989 which led to the Cold War's end.     

The idea of mission in Finnish clerical Lutheranism during the Continuation War 1941–1944

On 25 June 1941 Finland embarked on a war against the Soviet Union, as part of Germany's Operation Barbarossa. The war that was about to begin could be considered acceptable and even advantageous politically. However, theologically this was not necessarily the case. The topic of the article is how the war between the states of Finland and the Soviet Union could be justified publicly in relation to a religion whose core message is not to kill, to turn the other cheek to – and even love – the enemy. Due to the close and long‐lasting relationship between the state, the army and the established church, Lutheran priests had a significant role in the war effort. The analysis shows that the answer provided by Finnish Lutheran priests to the question drew significantly upon two versions of missionary thought, the national mission and the world‐historical one. The empirical material consists of articles, speeches, sermons and statements.     

‘A Shop Window Where You Can Choose the Goods You Like’

This article examines the Finnish industrial and trade fairs held in the Soviet Union in the context of Finnish–Soviet trade and scientific–technical cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s. While primarily focused on fairs, it also discusses different activities that accompanied them, such as lectures, visits, and negotiations between Finnish traders and Soviet officials and specialists. This study illustrates how such first-hand contact played an important role in Finnish–Soviet communications. First, they helped Finnish producers showcase their goods and technologies directly to Soviet buyers in various ministries and organizations. Second, these contacts included diverse activities such as face-to-face contacts, lectures, and seminars, being a means of technology transfer from Finland to the USSR . Finally, although they were commercial interactions without explicit ideological purposes – like many international exhibitions of the last century – Finnish fairs demonstrated a technological gap between Finland and the USSR.     

Layers of Disunity: The presidential politics of Finnish business, 1981–1982

This article examines the political activity of business in late Cold War Finland, the main focus being on the presidential election campaign of 1981–1982, which was a major watershed in Finnish politics. The purpose is to investigate the divisions cutting through business circles. Different layers of disunity can be found: a turf battle between business associations and their leaders, divergent attitudes towards the Social Democrats and disagreements concerning Finland’s foreign relations and trade, particularly with the Soviet Union. These divisions were long-lasting: they emerged by the mid-1970s and remained in effect until at least the late 1980s.     

美国对1969年中苏边界冲突的反应

1969年的中苏边界冲突使双方走到了战争的边缘,美国方面对中苏冲突的反应是一个从倾向于中国“好战”和“挑衅”到看清苏联意图的认识过程。美国一直想利用中苏分歧,使其在与苏联争夺霸权的较量中获利。1969年的中苏边界冲突客观上为美国提供了一个绝好的机会,尼克松政府也抓住了这个机会。中苏边界冲突造成的中苏关系空前紧张的形势,使尼克松、基辛格感到美国有可能在处理美、苏、中三角关系中处于优越地位。所以,中苏冲突客观上是促进美国加速调整对华政策的催化剂。     

1952年《中苏橡胶协定》与20世纪50年代的云南农垦

1952年9月15日,中苏两国在莫斯科签署《中华人民共和国中央人民政府、苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟政府关于帮助中华人民共和国植胶、割胶、制胶及售与苏联橡胶的协定》。该协定在扩大中国橡胶生产、派遣苏联专家到中国担任顾问、贷款和还款、售与苏联橡胶、移民云南等方面对20世纪50年代云南农垦系统的发展产生了重要影响。     

From World War to Cold War: Scandinavian media attitudes to the Soviet Union 1945–1948

At the end of the war in Europe in 1945, an alliance-loyalty attitude was predominant among the Scandinavian public voices on the Soviet Union. This attitude incorporated a favourable image of the Soviet war effort and implied that the Soviet system had undergone changes during the war. Another significant group supported the Soviet system more unequivocally. These attitudes were dominant in the Scandinavian media and public debate until late 1945 or early 1946, when opposition to and fear of the Soviet Union began to be openly expressed in conservative and social-democratic newspapers. A bipartisan attitude to the Soviet Union had not developed at this stage, as the alliance-loyalty attitude was transformed into a clearer third-voice attitude that saw the Soviet Union on the one hand as a power which was not worthy of imitation, but which on the other hand accepted that the Soviet Union was seeking international peace and cooperation. Third-voice supporters in the Scandinavian media sought investigative reports on conditions in the Soviet Union, as they claimed that the growing anti-Soviet attitudes were based on a lack of accurate knowledge. Considering that Denmark, Norway and Sweden had experienced different conditions during the war, the differences in public attitudes to the Soviet Union were comparatively small. The public third voice on the Soviet Union was clearly weakened in 1948 by the reception of more critical information on the Soviet system and the perception of news on international developments.     

Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971

Based upon recently published American documents, this article examines the United States's policy towards the crisis which led to the breakup of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh at the end of 1971. President Richard M. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, deliberately kept this policy closely under their control and were guided more by geopolitical than by moral considerations. In particular, they were anxious to forge a new relationship with communist China and the contribution of the Pakistani president, Yahya Khan, in facilitating contacts between the US and China were greatly appreciated by the two men. Nixon's visceral dislike of the Indian prime minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, also contributed to a degree of myopia and misperception regarding India's objectives and their possible consequences. As the conflict between the rebels in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and the central government deepened and Indian involvement on the side of the rebels grew, Nixon and Kissinger saw another threat in the shape of Soviet military and moral support for India. An Indian victory would not only increase India's prestige and position vis-à-vis those of Pakistan, but tip the global balance of power towards the Soviet Union and away from the United States. Frantic diplomatic efforts, combined with scarcely veiled threats, finally succeeded in preventing the total disintegration of Pakistan, but there is some doubt as to whether this was likely in the first place and whether US policy was successful in relation to either China or the Soviet Union.     

新中国成立前夕苏联对华政策剖析--以苏联将使馆由南京撤至广州事件为中心

1949年1～2月间,在中国革命即将取得全面胜利之际,苏联驻华使馆却令人吃惊地追随正在逃亡的国民党政府由南京迁至广州.有关苏联驻华使馆撤离南京的真正用意,是史学界长期以来关注的焦点,同时也是部分研究成果论证苏联、斯大林本人怀疑中国革命说法的基础.实际上,苏联驻华使馆撤离事件是苏联方面采取历史上惯用的双重对华政策的必然结果,既不是苏联方面对中国革命的进程判断失误,也不是苏联方面坚持了不干涉中国内政的原则.相反,在意识形态(革命利益)和国家利益之间发生冲突的时候,苏联方面首先选择的是自身国家利益.苏联驻华使馆在新中国成立前的撤退,符合苏联的国家利益,最大限度地保护了苏联在华的政治和经济利益.客观地看,苏联驻华使馆由南京撤至广州作为外交手段捍卫国家利益本无可厚非,但从联共(布)和中共共同的革命利益出发,上述做法显然欠妥.     

试析美苏建交的历史背景及原因

1929-1933年世界性经济危机使美苏关系发生了深刻变化.身受经济危机困扰的美国迫切需要将苏联作为重要的商品销售市场和原料供应地.伴随着经济危机的加深,日德法西斯势力开始了疯狂的侵略扩张活动,严重影响了美苏自身的安全和世界和平.在不断变化的国际政治现实面前,奉行现实主义外交政策的罗斯福总统终于打开了与苏联建立外交关系的大门.     

《中苏友好同盟条约》与《中苏友好同盟互助条约》之比较

中苏两国于1950年2月14日签订的《中苏友好同盟互助条约》是新中国成立后对外签订的第一个双边关系条约。该条约的签订反映了人民革命胜利后,中华人民共和国与苏联之间建立了完全新型的关系,标志着中苏关系从此走向一个全面合作的历史时期。通过对《中苏友好同盟互助条约》与苏联同中国国民党政府在1945年8月14日签订的《中苏友好同盟条约》的比较来看,《中苏友好同盟互助条约》是中苏双方在充分协商、积极对话的基础上产生的,所强调的不仅是同盟,更是互助与合作。     

试论第二次世界大战前苏联的犹太民族政策

长期以来,国内外学术界均认为反犹主义是斯大林主义的一个基本特征。但是,本文并不认为二者之间有什么必然联系。事实上,在第二次世界大战之前,以列宁和斯大林为首的苏联党和国家领导人为解决苏联现实社会中存在的反犹主义问题曾做出过巨大的努力,并取得了一定的成果。苏联政府在犹太民族政策上强调的是谴责反犹主义,反对犹太复国主义。     

大国对1954年日内瓦会议的态度

日内瓦会议前夕,苏、中、越(印支地区大国),美、英、法的会议态度可以分为三类:社会主义阵营三个国家的主导意见体现为苏联、中国的与会政策,谋求通过会议达成协议,恢复印支和平;美国坚决拒绝缓和;英、法两国持观望态度,一方面寄望于会议达成协议,另一方面又考虑如不能达成协议,即与美国一起筹划东南亚集体防御体系。这样,1954年日内瓦会议前夕,印支局势处在战争与和平的十字路口,是战争还是和平取决于各大国谁的主张占上风,何种态度将主导会议。     

走向分裂:从暗中斗争到公开论战——1960年代中苏关系研究之二

1961年后期,为了将中苏关系缓和的局面继续维持下去,中共中央对苏共二十二大采取了暗中斗争的方略,对定性为是集修正主义之大成的苏共新党纲不做公开直接的批判。其后,随着中国国内经济状况的好转,中共从维护阿尔巴尼亚党人手,开始着手与苏共进行新一轮意识形态斗争。中苏关系缓和的局面结束。1962年新疆中国边民外逃苏联的伊塔事件、中苏在加勒比海危机和中印边界战争期间的外交较量,不同程度地影响了中共中央对中苏关系性质的认识,影响了两党继续务实地寻求共同利益,求同存异,保持关系的基本稳定。特别是毛泽东把中共党内反省三年来政策失误时显露的否：毫“大跃进”、人民公社、总路线的倾向,当作是对赫鲁晓夫关于中共国内政策批评的呼应,进而：重新检讨与苏关系问题,警惕国内外修正主义分子勾结起来进行颠覆活动。与此同时,国际左派队伍的形成使中共领导人认为,中共作为共运领导中心的条件已具备、时机也已成熟。中共做出了中苏两党矛盾已成为敌我性质、赫鲁晓夫已成为资产阶级代言人的判断。毛泽东最终调整对苏方针的基调,改以妥协、让步、缓和关系为主为以主动进攻、做针锋相对的斗争为主。中共开始与苏共进行关于国际共运总路线的大论战。中苏两党关系的破裂成为定局。     

Population Trends in a Contested Pseudo-State: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

A U.S. population geographer specializing in the former Soviet Union surveys the results of an October 2005 census conducted in a contested pseudo-state known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Data from the enumeration provide the first credible information about recent population characteristics, including nationality composition and migration from the war-torn republic. The data make it possible to ascertain the crude magnitudes of population losses in the republic's constituent rayons as well as changes resulting from deaths and expulsion of ethnic Armenians and/or Azerbaijanis. Changes documented since the last (1989) Soviet census in the region indicate that the current republic's population differs quite dramatically from that of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan, complicating efforts to broker a lasting peace agreement between the pseudostate's two neighbors. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: J11, O18, R23, 1 figure, 1 table, 36 references.     

The clash of great powers and revolution in the Baltic Sea?

The Soviet party leadership claimed repeatedly after the mid-1920s that the Soviet Union was under an acute threat of intervention. The interpretation was based on different views regarding the development of socialism in the USSR. The role of Finland in the Soviet policy towards other border-states offers a case for observing the relation of ideology and practice in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the Baltic Sea context in 1925. The main interests for the Soviets were plans for military alliances and spheres of influence and intelligence. Contrary to the ideological worldview, the Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) did not see the western great powers, Great Britain and France, as being behind the Baltic alliance plan. Instead, the alliance attempt was primarily seen as an independent Polish initiative, especially lacking British support. The Soviet foreign administration was able to evaluate the grounds for eventual Finnish non-alliance accurately, despite Baltic sympathies and the lack of an active Scandinavian orientation. The results suggest the NKID observed international relations from the traditional viewpoint of Soviet state interests, and on the basis of quite accurate information, not reflecting the needs of ideological interpretation or domestic power struggles.     

JFK and the future of global leadership

On 10 June 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a speech that changed the world. His commencement speech at American University helped to spur the signing of a world‐changing agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This episode of peacemaking is remarkable for two reasons. First, it arguably helped to save the world, since the nuclear confrontation at that stage of the Cold War was not a ‘stable balance of terror’, as sometimes described, but rather a highly unstable situation that was prone to accidents, misjudgements and potential disasters. Second, this was an episode of statesmanship in which presidential leadership played a crucial role. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that he bore sole responsibility on the US side to find a way back from the brink of nuclear war. He used the ‘peace speech’ to create a novel kind of peace diplomacy, and worked together with his counterpart, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, to pull the superpowers back from this precarious brink.     

FROM GERMANY'S EAST PRUSSIA TO THE SOVIET UNION'S KALININGRAD OBLAST: A CASE OF SEQUENT OCCUPANCE

East Prussia, historically a German region, was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, with the northern, Soviet portion becoming Kaliningrad Oblast of the RSFSR. The author, who has long studied the transformation of the region as part of the Soviet Union, assesses the changes in administration, population and economy that have occurred.     

中国与南斯拉夫建交始末

南斯拉夫是最早承认新中国的国家之一,但中南两国的建交却拖延了五年才得以实现。苏联与南斯拉夫关系的变化是中南建交延搁和实现的主要原因。建国初期,尽管南斯拉夫符合新中国的建交原则,但中国不得不首先考虑苏联的立场和中苏同盟的利益。随着苏南双方外交关系的恢复以及南斯拉夫与东欧国家关系的改善,中南才最终得以建交。     

中国核武器的发展与中苏关系的破裂(1954-1962)(连载一)

近年来中国发展核武器的问题在中苏关系的演进中,特别是在中苏关系破裂中的作用引起学术界的重视.作者根据陆续出版和解密的中国和苏联方面的相关文献档案,对中国发展核武器的基本战略考虑、中国核武器的发展与中苏关系演进的互动关系、苏联政策的变化的动因以及此种变化对中苏关系破裂的影响进行深入分析:认为中国核武器的发展与中苏关系的破裂是一个互动的过程.中国发展核武器在当时背景下,只能争取苏联的援助,苏联向中国提供发展核武器的技术,有其特殊历史背景.1958年下半年后,随着两国在意识形态、对时代和国际形势以及核武器的态度等问题产生重大分歧,这些事件直接或间接促使苏联停止援助中国发展核武器.这成为中苏关系破裂的重要标志,也成为日后中苏论战的一个重要论题.