A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu's Israel

This paper critically questions the state's hostile takeover of planning regulation followed by experimentation initiated by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has been seeking to subordinate the planning apparatus to market calculus and to short‐term political ends. To substantiate this argument, I have examined a large corpus of documents (official government documents, planning records, and court appeals and rulings, and NGO reports) and analyzed the media coverage between 2011 and 2016. By introducing fast‐track planning that is firmly controlled by the central state and focusing on the fictitious delivery of housing units, the structure of the planning regulation has dramatically changed. Further, two already‐dominant government ministries (Finance and Defense) have been significantly empowered, becoming the supervisors of the reformed planning system. In a state captivated by neoliberal fixation and embroiled in a housing crisis, the restructuring of planning governance has been a means to an end.     

Rent control measures of immediate post‐war period (1944–1952) and their impact on urban development in Greater Athens

The purpose of this paper is first to highlight the importance of the immediate post‐war period in influencing development trends and spatial policy in post‐war urban Greece and Athens in particular. Second in this respect, to stress on the critical impact of rent control measures adopted in response to specific social economic and political issues which emerged at the time. Rent control—together with other exceptional reconstruction measures—contributed above all to the reinforcement of the post‐war development pattern, founded on owner occupation and self‐financed Property development. This in the short run acted against a planned policy rationale and to the various planned attempts formulated during reconstruction. In the long run, it has also acted as a determinant for the consolidation of an ‘non‐planning policy’ situation persistent in Athens and in most urban areas in Greece.     

U.S. Civil Society Assistance to Egypt: Thinking Long Term

The interim Egyptian government's excoriation of U.S. support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the country has sparked a crisis that some analysts have called the worst deterioration of United States–Egypt relations in history. As Cairo's smear campaigns against the civil society community foment public mistrust among many Egyptians of NGO activity and foreign funding, U.S. policymakers and practitioners face new challenges in supporting civil society work in Egypt. For a number of reasons, however, Washington's assistance to Egypt should and almost certainly will continue, even if the environment for civil society activity in the country does not improve. Grantors and implementers must think seriously, therefore, about long‐term strategies for assisting civil society development in Egypt, which will require at least some coordination with a government that may be suspicious of U.S. efforts. By standing firm on red lines, improving public messaging in Egypt, carefully fostering local ownership of projects, remaining strictly neutral in identifying grantees and diversifying partnerships, distinguishing between short‐term foreign policy objectives and long‐term efforts to assist civil society development, and using varied democracy assistance tools appropriately, the United States can assist NGOs in Egypt in a way that gives them—and democracy—the best chance for success.     

试论魏玛"福利国家"的早期实践(1918-1920)

一战结束后,德国社会遭遇了政治、经济与社会的多重危机,政府权力亟待合法性认同,社会期稳定。魏玛政府力图把福利国家作为控制与解决危机的一种手段。1918-1920年间,魏玛的福利国家建设曾规范劳动市场、协调劳资关系、改革保险和救济政策、解决住房问题以及调整经济运作模式等方面掀起高潮从短时段看,这些实践活动确立了基本的福利国家原则,维护了政府权威,初步解决了战后德国的社会危机然而从长时段看,这一时期的福利实践存在许多问题,埋下了日后经济危机、社会危机乃至民主危机的隐患。     

试析中法战争中李鸿章态度转变始末

文章论述了中法战争前后战事主要参与者李鸿章对于战争态度的转变过程。从主观和客观两个方面分析了李鸿章“和战不决”的影响因素。笔者认为,李鸿章在中法战争中只是一个参与者,他的很多决策是直接受制于清政府中枢机构或者受到他们极大的影响,战争过程中所表现的犹豫和举棋不定是清政府和战态度以及战争形势变化的综合结果。     

Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011

Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US‐led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub‐national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war‐weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring ‘victory’. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational‐strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.     

Strategy and contingency

The determination that strategy should have a long‐term predictive quality has left strategy seemingly wanting when having to address what are currently called ‘strategic shocks’, such as the recent Arab Spring and the NATO commitment to Libya. The focus on grand strategy, particularly in the US, is responsible for this trend. Its endeavour to mitigate risk in the national interest is inherently conservative, rather than opportunistic, and it is favoured and probably required by powers that are committed to the status quo, that need to manage diminishing resources, and that are dealing with relative decline. Strategy as traditionally but more narrowly defined by generals for use in a military context, is much more exploitative and proactive. Precisely because it is designed to be used in war it presumes that its function is offensive, that it will have to deal with chance and contingency, and that its aim is change. Its task is to deal with the uncertainties of war, and to respond to them while holding on to long‐term perspectives. Clausewitz addressed the issue of ‘war plans’ in book VIII of On war, but the thinker who did most to inject planning into European strategic thought was Jomini. His influence has permeated much of American military thinking. The effect of nuclear planning in the Cold War was to ensure that strategy at the operational level became conflated with broader views of grand strategy—not least when the Cold War itself provided apparent continuity to strategic thought. Since 1990 we have been left with a view of strategy which fails to respond sensibly to chance and accident. Strategy needs context, and a sense of where and against whom it is to be applied. Its core task is to embrace contingency while holding on to long‐term national interests.     

In the Eye of the Storm: Sri Lanka's Front‐Line Civil Servants in Transition

This article narrates how bureaucrats in eastern Sri Lanka operated during and after the war. They managed to keep minimal state services running whilst being locked between the government and the insurgent Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). When the government defeated the LTTE in 2009, civil servants were freed from rebel coercion, but they also lost their counterweight against unappreciated policies from the capital and interference by local politicians. The article links the thinking on armed conflicts with the literature that conceptualizes ‘the state’ not as a coherent entity, but as a subject of continuous negotiation. The state's insigne provides a sense of legitimacy and supremacy, but governments have no monopoly on using it. Other powerful actors capture state institutions, resources and discourse for contradictory purposes. This perspective helps us reconcile the appearance of bureaucratic order with the peculiar and hybrid forms of rule that emerged in the war between rebels and government, and it sheds light on some of the surprising changes and continuities that occurred when that war ended. Public administration is neither just a victim of war, nor plainly a victor of the post‐war situation.     

The idea of mission in Finnish clerical Lutheranism during the Continuation War 1941–1944

On 25 June 1941 Finland embarked on a war against the Soviet Union, as part of Germany's Operation Barbarossa. The war that was about to begin could be considered acceptable and even advantageous politically. However, theologically this was not necessarily the case. The topic of the article is how the war between the states of Finland and the Soviet Union could be justified publicly in relation to a religion whose core message is not to kill, to turn the other cheek to – and even love – the enemy. Due to the close and long‐lasting relationship between the state, the army and the established church, Lutheran priests had a significant role in the war effort. The analysis shows that the answer provided by Finnish Lutheran priests to the question drew significantly upon two versions of missionary thought, the national mission and the world‐historical one. The empirical material consists of articles, speeches, sermons and statements.     

FROM MEMORY TO HISTORY: YEAR 1968 IN FINLAND

As in other Scandinavian countries, in Finland the year 1968 has become a significant memory place, still influencing the current political debate. The first part of the article discusses how the 1960s started in Finland already during the 1950s when matters like internationalism and the Third World, pacifism, party‐political activities, women's issues, critical attitudes towards the church and the army etc. had already begun to affect the general opinion. The student movement in Finland was an essential part of the modernisation process with clear aims and cultural and political consequences. The students became main bearers of radically different vision of society, crucial years being 1964–68. The movement culminated in the occupation of Old Student's House in Helsinki in November 1968. The second part of the article discusses the development of Finnish historiography, as seen in the context of 1968.     

Organizing for British national strategy

In December 1968 Ernest May asked how the US government could gain access to ‘long‐headed’ staffers to provide greater strategic depth to foreign policy. The challenge of long‐term strategy persists: how should government be organized to support it, how can the right people be found to staff it and how can political leaders make time for longer‐term policy‐making given the challenge of the immediate? The policy planning staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have traditionally had the task of supporting longer‐range, broader foreign policy. A small group of diplomats—later leavened by externals from the media, non‐profit and private sectors—was meant to generate an improved approach to British interests and policy. As Robert Wade‐Gery recalls of its role in the 1960s, there was a push to forge fresh links with outside thinking. Did it work? Former policy planners can be circumspect about its achievements. One former British planner said he felt like ‘a spare part rattling around in a tin’, while former American planners have written about the challenge of injecting fresh thinking when detached from decision‐making. Other planners were dragged into operational work or speechwriting. Many planners nonetheless enjoyed the opportunity to think more broadly. Policy planning can be intellectually rich without being the source of actionable strategic thinking about the long‐term national interest. This article suggests that a greater focus on people rather than systems might help to foster more strategic, anticipatory and innovative thinking about the national interest.     

Taqiyya as Polemic,Law and Knowledge: Following an Islamic Legal Term through the Worlds of Islamic Scholars,Ethnographers, Polemicists and Military Men

Taqiyya is an Islamic juridical term whose shifting meaning relates to when a Muslim is allowed, under Sharia law, to lie. A concept whose meaning has varied significantly among Islamic sects, scholars, countries, and political regimes, it nevertheless is one of the key terms used by recent anti‐Muslim polemicists such as Robert Spencer or Daniel Pipes, and has been used by US Prosecutors to explain terrorist behavior. This paper seeks to summarize the complex uses of the term and show how a specific concept in a legal system can be used and interpreted by both adherents of that system and enemies in a wide variety of ways, taking on different meanings while referring to effectively the same set of practices. The term is debated in a scholarly way in the scholarly literature, as an ethnographic term, and finally, as an operational concept used as a tactic in a war and demanding countertactics tailored to it. The paper will discuss the social purpose of having such ambiguous concepts available within one's society, and the idea that making the ambiguous specific can be a valuable weapon in polemical attack.     

Partisan politics and the public sphere: The civil war north

The Civil War North presents an interesting case study of the relationship between a highly politicized public sphere and partisan electoral politics. Although the two‐party system remained intact throughout the war, the concept and practice of partisanship was challenged by the social experience of Northerners who ‘acted politically’ when they took part in the war effort. The creation of a mass citizen army and the mobilization of women and men on the home front meant that parties lost their function as the crucial mediating channel between citizen and government. The more that politics mattered, the less partisanship seemed to be relevant. The war exposed the latent non‐partisan political energies of Northern society. These conclusions bolster the arguments of those scholars who, questioning whether partisanship was as deep or as widespread as previously supposed, have begun to suggest that the ‘party period paradigm’ does not capture the entirety of the nineteenth‐century political experience.     

Managing Dissent in a Post‐genocide Environment: The Challenge of Political Space in Rwanda

This article analyses how political space, defined here as the ability of actors other than the government to critically engage in debate on government policy and practice, is being constituted in post‐genocide Rwanda. Using evidence from interviews with civil society activists and examples from the Rwandan Government's post‐genocide policies, it explores the kind of political space which results from an interplay of potentially competing influences. These include the promotion of a liberal approach to democracy, favoured by many of Rwanda's donors, and a more tightly‐managed and limited transition which is both preferred by and beneficial for the RPF Government. The article shows that although space could be seen in some areas as opening, this trend is hampered by government actions, including legislative and shadow methods, by donor reluctance to pressure the ruling RPF and by fear within civil society of tackling politically sensitive issues. In conclusion, the author suggests that this fear is reinforced by government policies which narrow perceptions of political space, exacerbated by perceived abandonment of civil society by donors, and that in combination these factors pose a long‐term challenge to more openly contested politics in Rwanda.     

British national interest in the Gulf: rediscovering a role?

The British government is in the process of re‐energizing its relations with the Gulf states. A new Gulf strategy involving a range of activities including more frequent elite bilateral visits and proposals sometimes touted as Britain's military ‘return to east of Suez’ are two key elements of the overarching strategy. Such polices are designed to fall in line with British national interest as identified by the government‐authored 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), which emphasizes the importance of security, trade, and promoting and expanding British values and influence as perennial British raisons d'etat. In the short term, the Gulf initiatives reflect and compliment these core interests, partly based on Britain's historical role in the region, but mostly thanks to modern day trade interdependencies and mutually beneficial security‐based cooperation. However, there is yet to emerge a coherent understanding of Britain's longer‐term national interest in the region. Instead, government‐led, party‐political priorities, at the expense of thorough apolitical analysis of long‐term interests, appear to be unduly influential on the origins of both the Gulf proposals and the NSS conclusions themselves. Without a clear strategic, neutral grounding, both the Gulf prioritization and the NSS itself are weakened and their longevity undermined.     

All the way? The evolution of German military power

German strategic decision‐makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO‐led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies’ reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision‐makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the ‘small war’ in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill‐prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war‐fighting. In addition, the government and the Bundeswehr lack vital strategy‐making capabilities. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force.     

Urban Pacification and “Blitzes” in Contemporary Johannesburg

The term pacification is regularly used in urban scholarship as a euphemism for state violence and social control. However, this term is used loosely and is underexplored as a concept. This paper aims to address this gap by discussing recent critical theory on pacification, which argues that the term captures the combination of war and police power in the replication of capitalist order. This concept will then be applied to a case study of “blitzes”, a practice which became central to urban management in Johannesburg from the late 1990s. Originally, the word was used to refer to aggressive raids led by the police in “trouble” spots, but has since been expanded to include inspections on general services. Understood as pacification, blitzes reflect how the state is constantly engaged in a low‐intensity war against perceived “disorder”, which is intended to control and discipline spaces in South Africa's largest city.     

The effectiveness of public participation in the environmental impact assessment process – a case study of the projected Sierilä hydropower station at Oikarainen,northern Finland

One of the most difficult challenges in environmental impact assessment (EIA) is the effectiveness of public participation. This article addresses this question by looking at evaluation criteria applied during the EIA process for a northern Finnish hydropower project. The problematics of public participation is discussed in connection with the EIA process and social impact assessment for the projected Sierilä hydropower station in the village of Oikarainen, near Rovaniemi, in northern Finland, during which the local population has been viewed as not being sufficiently competent as the project developer, Kemijoki Ltd. Nevertheless, carrying out an EIA seems to be a starting point in the long‐term process of increasing the effectiveness of public participation and the influence of local communities on hydropower planning processes in Finland.     

Childhood in the shadow of war: filled with work and play

This study was focused on war-time childhood. The target period covers the war years 1939–1945 and the years of post-war reconstruction. The research was based on memories of 13 participants who lived in the countryside in northern Finland during the Second World War. The purpose of the study was to find out what children's everyday life was like during the war. According to the results, children did play regardless of the war situation. Children also participated in household work actively. By highlighting children's experiences and perspectives, this study provided important information about children's survival during war time. The study also helps understanding the effects of wars from children's point of view.     

WOMEN IN RELIEF WORK

This article suggests that it could be fruitful to approach women's employment in the context of the labour market rather than the household. In Finland until World War II, the public‐work schemes and relief work were the preferred policies concerning unemployed men and women. Women eligible to relief work were taken to work in mainly textiles in non‐residential workhouses. The difficulties faced in applying the ‘workfare’ policy to unemployed women paved the way for cash benefits in post‐war Finland. It is suggested that the Finnish case opens up a wider perspective on the relationship between the ideology of workfare and the rise and fall of the hegemony of wage labour.