Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002

What factors explain Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases? Despite the importance of this question of law and policy, few empirical studies have explored the problem on the area of racial and ethnic discrimination. This study seeks to fill this gap by assessing the importance of the solicitor general, the federal government's representative before the Supreme Court, as a litigant and in the filings of amicus curiae briefs. The findings confirm that the solicitor general's presence in civil rights cases does matter when explaining whether the Supreme Court reaches a liberal or conservative outcome. This research demonstrates the significance of executive‐judicial interaction in explaining Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases.     

Supreme Court Activism in Economic Policy in the Waning Days of the New Deal: Interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1941–1946

Students of the Supreme Court universally agree that it made a dramatic shift in 1937. First, in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, ¹ it retreated from the unbridled use of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to invalidate state economic regulatory legislation. Then, in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation , ² the Justices widened the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. This looser reading of the Commerce Clause was solidified in 1941 with United States v. Darby Lumber Company ³ and Wickard v. Filburn. ⁴ So decisive were these cases in dividing what went before from what came afterward that Bernard Schwartz has said, "The 1937 reversal marked the accession of what may be considered the second Hughes Court—so different was its jurisprudence from that of the Hughes Court that had preceded it." ⁵ Whereas the defining jurisprudence of the former had been close supervision of economic policy, the latter refused to second guess the economic wisdom of congressional (and state) regulatory initiatives. Alpheus T. Mason summarized Justice Harlan Fisk Stone's approach, which was indicative of the entire Court of this era, as one that would not say that "no economic legislation would ever violate constitutional restraints, [but that] … in this area the court's role would be strictly confined." ⁶ Confirming this approach, between 1937 and 1957 the Supreme Court struck down only four federal statutes as unconstitutional, none of which were economic in nature. ⁷     

Many Voices,One Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court

E pluribus unum—out of many, one—is the phrase emblazoned on the Seal of the United States, which refers to the notion that a single American voice emerges from the many diverse groups that constitute the nation. The legislative and executive branches of government often act as one voice through legislative bills and executive acts, aggregating diverse interests that reflect the national will. The notion of e pluribus unum, however, is not often applied to the judiciary, a branch of government the members of which are viewed, not as outlets for the will of the people, but as gatekeepers of the rule of law. But while the Supreme Court may not speak directly for the people, its opinions speak to the people, and the methods used by the Justices to express those opinions have revealed changes in the conception of the Court's voice throughout history.     

The Invisible Dance: The Supreme Court and the Press

Abstract

In America, Tocqueville writes, men were born equal; they did not have to become so.¹ But he is not unaware of the radical democratic character of the American revolution of which Gordon Wood has reminded us.² Prior to 1776, Tocqueville observes, the democratic principle was “far from dominating the government of society.” It was the Revolution that made it “the law of laws.” “The war was fought and victory obtained in its name” (1:1, ch. 4. 59).     

The Journalist as Historian: Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties, and the Supreme Court

The genesis of the column that Anthony Lewis wrote for The New York Times between 1969 and 2001 was a red face—not Lewis's, but that of Arthur Ochs Sulzberger. The Times ' publisher offered Lewis the column as a consolation prize after outgoing executive editor James Reston mistakenly informed Lewis that the job of deputy to A. M. Rosenthal, the new executive editor, was open and that Lewis was a logical candidate. ¹     

The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General

"When the Supreme Court invites you, that's the equivalent of a royal command. An invitation from the Supreme Court just can't be rejected." ¹ The guest most frequently invited to the Supreme Court is the Solicitor General. Even before the practice of the Supreme Court calling for the views of the Solicitor General process developed, the Court occasionally invited the Solicitor General to participate as amicus in important cases by submitting a brief and/or participating in oral arguments before the Court. ² As then–Solicitor General Simon E. Sobeloff remarked to then–Attorney General Herbert Brownell in a 1954 letter about the landmark school desegregation cases, "The Supreme Court has expressly extended an invitation to the United States to participate in the reargument. While this by no means compels participation, such an invitation is not to be lightly declined." ³     

The Early Supreme Court and the Challenges of Riding Circuit

The ratification of the United States Constitution ushered in a new system of government. No longer did the thirteen states merely hang together by the threads of a confederation; they now bonded to each other as one nation. Organized chiefly by the first three articles of the Constitution, a federal government began to take shape. The Framers expressly laid out the functions and duties of the first two branches in the first two articles—the legislative and executive. However, Article III, which organized the judiciary, remained short and ambiguous. The Founders charged the First Congress with the task of organizing the federal judiciary. Even after Congress created the judiciary, however, questions still plagued the system. This essay argues that the actions taken by the Justices of the early Supreme Court to ease the burden of circuit riding expanded and further defined the judiciary's role as a branch of government.