Political Obstacles to Decentralization: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines

Decentralization has swept across the developing world in recent years. Although the speed and scope of the shift toward more decentralized practices is striking, decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Rather, it faces enormous political obstacles and can be subject to serious setbacks. This article accounts for attempts by national politicians to thwart decentralization in two countries that recently adopted some of the most significant decentralizing changes in their respective regions: Argentina and the Philippines. Based on fieldwork in each country, it suggests that even after the political decision to decentralize has been made, national politicians may face deep‐seated incentives to preserve centralized control over fiscal policy. In Argentina, President Carlos Menem partially reversed the previous decentralization of revenue because fiscally‐independent provincial governors were a challenge to his political interests and capabilities. In the Philippines, legislators attempted to reverse and then circumvent decentralization since it threatened their status as brokers claiming personal credit for negotiating fiscal transfers from the centre. The article identifies an intermediate outcome in both countries, according to which decentralizing policies are neither entirely reversed nor implemented as initially designed.     

Sector‐Specific Development and Policy Vulnerability in the Philippines

Why does a state build institutional capacity in certain sectors rather than others? Despite having gained leverage explaining the emergence of institutions in the developmental states of East Asia, we have comparatively weak accounts for sub‐national variation in institutional strength, a much more common phenomenon. Investigating the surprising achievements of the Philippines’ National Irrigation Administration, this article advances a theory of sectoral success in the face of a generally poor developmental record. The author demonstrates that executives will only construct institutional capacity when facing strong political pressure combined with resource scarcity. Such vulnerability permits politicians to exercise discretion in choosing which policies to pursue, allowing them to avoid upsetting their coalitions. Once a politician achieves some degree of policy success, he or she is then able to avoid engaging in similar reforms in other fields. Thus we see pockets of institutional capacity in states that otherwise struggle with developmental tasks.     

State–Society Relations in Land Reform Implementation in the Philippines

Contrary to earlier pessimistic predictions, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) in the Philippines has achieved significant success in land redistribution, although not quite matching the original claims of the state. The dominant public policy and land reform literature, broadly divided between state‐centred and society‐centred approaches, has difficulty in fully explaining the unexpected outcomes of the CARP process. Going beyond these dichotomous views, and using Fox’s interactive framework for analysing state–society relations, this article argues that redistributive land reform can be implemented in a politically hostile situation when initiatives by state reformists ‘from above’ positively interact with social mobilizations ‘from below’.     

The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the Post-War Consensus

The post-war settlement among the policy elite is central to much historical literature. This article considers the rise and fall of the idea of ‘industrial democracy’, and its relationship to this settlement. The elite failed to respond coherently to claims for workplace democracy. The notion that politicians could work with ‘the unions’ and ‘industry’ was shown to be deficient. The unions contained numerous views, many hostile to industrial democracy in the form proposed by Bullock and the TUC. Industry was almost uniformly antagonistic. The notion of consensus ostensibly underpinned the attempts of Labour and Conservative politicians to progress this issue. In truth, this was a curious approach. The debate over Bullock was, at root, an argument over whether the owners of capital should cede some of their power in favour of organised labour. There was never likely to be agreement on this. The inconclusive debate over Bullock ultimately showed how fragile the consensus was. The political elite could not forever smooth over underlying disagreements between capital and labour, or between groups of workers with differing interests.     

ANALYZING POLICY IMPACT: SELECTION OF A LINEAR TREND MODEL

Policy analysts, as well as politicians, have shown great interest in assessing both short-term and long-term consequences of public policies in recent years. Recent time-trend studies have attempted to depict the time dimension of policy consequences through extensions of regression techniques. This study examines three linear trend models which have been used to depict policy impact through time-series analyses, and identifies the relative advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of each model. The three models are applied in a quasi-experimental time-series design to time-series of per capita state expenditures for large cities, in eight states, over a twenty-year period. Differences in degrees of multicollinearity and autocorrelation inherent in the three models are discussed, and the model providing the most conservative coefficient estimates is identified.     

The Politics of Service Delivery Reform

This article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service reform. It adopts a principal–agent framework, comparing reality with an ‘ideal’ situation in which citizens are the principals over political policy‐makers as their agents, and policy‐makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of external actors — international financial institutions and donors. In practice, international agencies and core government officials usually act as the ‘principals’ in the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral factors. Organizational reforms, particularly in the social sectors, present greater difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms.     

The OECD and the Reconfiguration of the State in Emerging Economies: Manufacturing ‘Regulatory Capacity’

This article explores attempts to construct ‘regulatory capacity’ in developing countries, focusing on the work of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) and its role as an international standard‐setting institution in regulatory governance. The article explores how the construction of specific forms of regulatory capacity, and attempts to orchestrate the adoption of regulatory reform agendas in emerging economies, reflect broader processes of political‐policy transfer that impact state capacity and the ability of developing states to manage economic development. By analysing the OECD's engagement practices with third party organizations such as APEC (Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation organization) and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and its specific engagement with emerging economies through country ‘reviews’ and ‘audits’, the author explores the implications for state capacity in terms of the adoption of regulatory systems of governance.     

The Myth of “Broken Britain”: Welfare Reform and the Production of Ignorance

Abstract: This article takes on the challenge of what Robert Proctor calls “agnotology” (the study of ignorance) to analyse the current assault on the British welfare state by think tanks, policy elites and conservative politicians. The assault is traced back to the emergence of the Centre for Social Justice think tank, founded in 2004 by the current Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan‐Smith. I argue that a familiar litany of social pathologies (family breakdown, worklessness, antisocial behaviour, personal responsibility, out‐of‐wedlock childbirth, dependency) is repeatedly invoked by the architects of welfare reform to manufacture ignorance of alternative ways of addressing poverty and social injustice. Structural causes of poverty have been strategically ignored in favour of a single behavioural explanation—“Broken Britain”—where “family breakdown” has become the central problem to be tackled by the philanthropic fantasy of a “Big Society”. My agnotological approach critically explores the troubling relationship between (mis)information and state power.     

Bureaucratic Competition in the Policy Process

Recent scholarship has emphasized the important role that strategic bureaucratic actors play in the formulation of public policy. This study builds on that research by exploring the ways in which agencies strategically compete with one another over the content and character of public policy. Using insights from the literature that explicitly models bureaucratic competition, the study adapts an existing model of policymaking in subsystems to generate expectations about the causes and consequences of bureaucratic competition in the policy process. Finally, the article explores the utility of these propositions through a case study of a protracted policy battle over the management of natural resources in the western United States.     

The Tax Policy Regime in American Politics, 1941-1951

This article analyzes the inception of the mass income tax during the Second World War as a decisive moment when relations among state, market, and citizens were reconfigured in a durable way. The state institutionalized the means to devise tax reform–a policy regime–during this formative period of partisan conflict over macroeconomic management strategies. The approach to policy analysis presented here illuminates the process by which political choices are made among competing policy visions embedded in state agencies. This study demonstrates that a policy regime perspective, when applied in a complementary way with interest-driven or institutionalist accounts, is best equipped to bring important but tacit constraints into clear analytical focus.     

Private Citizens as Policy Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Autism Mandates and Parental Political Mobilization

Growing bodies of research in the social sciences point to politicians, bureaucratic officials, interest groups, and other actors who serve as policy entrepreneurs. In this paper, we argue that private citizens can also serve a primary role as policy entrepreneurs. To analyze this phenomenon, we investigate the behavior of private citizens and their role in changing state policies surrounding insurance mandates for autism coverage. Using a thematic analysis of focus groups and interviews conducted with individuals active in the push for autism policy change, we demonstrate that private citizens meet all of the requirements identified for policy entrepreneurs in the existing literature. We then investigate when, why, and how these private citizens step forward into the policy process as entrepreneurs. We show that entrepreneurship occurs when private citizens have needed resources, a sense of duty to fix a policy status quo they see as unjust, and a stake in policy change. We conclude by discussing the importance of our findings to the study of public policy and their generalizability beyond autism policy.     

Institutions, Bureaucratic Decisions, and Policy Outcomes: State Insurance Solvency Regulation

Although over the past 2 decades several scholars have documented a link between institutional arrangements and policy choices, few studies have demonstrated how different institutional arrangements give rise to different policy outcomes. Further, although some studies have related bureaucratic resources to policy decisions, almost none have illustrated that the way state agencies actually deploy regulatory resources—policy outputs—significantly influences policy outcomes. Focusing specifically on the insurance industry in the United States, in this article we illustrate the impact of state regulatory activities on the solvency of firms in the insurance industry from 1987 to 1997, and in doing so we emphasize the differences between policy outputs and policy outcomes. In the case of policy outputs, for example, we find that elected insurance commissioners, divided state government, budgetary resources, and larger insurance sectors lead to more aggressive solvency examinations of insurers. In addition to examinations, however, we discern an important role for both regulatory and political institutions in subsequent insurer insolvencies.     

Can the Wrongs be Righted? Prospects for Remedy in the Philippine Oil Palm Agro‐industry

State‐based and corporate remedies are increasingly offered as solutions to intractable issues provoked by land‐based investments, such as the oil palm agro‐industry. This article critiques this shift towards procedural governance fixes, drawing on theories of the legitimizing function of corporate responsibility and mechanisms of elite capture in agrarian states. The authors contrast the ambition of remedy with local reality in one controversial oil palm project in Palawan Province, the Philippines, showing that it was operated by companies, banks, agencies and politicians who either lacked the capacity to rein in the project once it became evident that it was causing harm to farmers, or showed no interest in doing so. As one of the first detailed examinations of the growing oil palm sector in the Philippines, the study adds to understandings of the shifting nature of elite capture through transnational agro‐industry. It also shows that the remedies discourse remains rooted in colonial doctrines and neoliberal constructs and thus tends to deflect attention away from more appropriate harm prevention strategies. The authors argue that functional remedies will only arise once states and companies confront competing land and resource claims and relinquish more control over new procedures to local and indigenous communities.     

Von der Wissenschaftsverwaltung zur Wissenschaftspolitik. Friedrich Althoff (19. 2. 1839-20. 10. 1908)

Friedrich Althoff (1839–1908) was one of Germany's three great administrators of science and humanities between Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) and Carl Heinrich Becker (1886–1933). He was perhaps the most prominent representative of Prussian bureaucratic liberalism and the first eminent politician of culture or — in the words of W. H. Dawson — “the most enlightened but also the most dictatorial Minister of Education Prussia has ever had”. Althoff dominated the state administration of higher education in Prussia between 1882 and 1907, serving as Ministerial director over higher educational affairs under at least four ministers. The so-called “Althoff system”, that he built pushed the development of German science and scholarship to a dominant position in the world, rationalized the universities and further subordinated them to state or ministerial policy through a rigid control of professional appointments, started the mobilization of private capital in support of German scientific hegemony (founding of Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft), and put forward the Prussian tradition — ultimately an unsustainable one — of strong personal administration, by which Althoff systematically manipulated or overrode the very bureaucratic apparatus he had helped to create. On the other hand his policy defended academic freedom, patronized Catholic and Jewish scholars against reactionary university faculties as well as the so-called Kathedersozialisten against the influences of big business and laissez-faire capitalism. As a creator of german cultural foreign policy he paved the way for more international understanding and peace policy, an alternative to the war-aims policy of Imperial Germany on the eve of the Great War.     

Bureaucratic Leverage over Policy Choice: Explaining the Dynamics of State-Level Reforms in Telecommunications Regulation

While state governments have enjoyed greater control over regulating local telephone service providers since 1984, movement toward efficiency-based policy reform (e.g., adoption of competitive markets) has proceeded slowly. We investigate this pattern by addressing how the degree of policy discretion held by state public utility commissions (PUCs) affects reform of local telephone exchange regulation. Using precise measures of both PUC discretion and state policy changes over time, we find that states with "stronger" PUCs (more policymaking authority) are significantly more likely to move toward efficiency-based policy regimes and away from traditional rate-of-return regimes. Greater PUC discretion systematically related to state adoption of efficiency-based reforms over time suggests that regulators are using updated information about policy impacts to inform their policymaking activities. Our findings contradict a common presumption that regulatory bureaucracies are simply motivated by a desire to increase their control over policymaking. Instead, state PUCs are a key source of telecommunications policy reform in the states.     

The Struggle to Reform Regulatory Procedures, 1978–1998

This article examines the attempts between 1978 and 1998 to enact general regulatory procedural reform legislation. Two decades of off-again, off-again legislative efforts have yielded only fragments of reform. A major explanation for this, despite the official popularity of reform, seems to be the inability of putative reformers-traditionalists, populists, and restrictivists-to agree among themselves on the direction and content of general reform legislation. This experience raises a number of important theoretical issues for students of regulation, including the ethicalness of using procedural restraints deliberately to disrupt or impede the regulatory process and the impact of procedural controls on regulatory policy.     

Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond Effectiveness,Efficiency, and Performance

Studies of failure typically assess public policies through the lenses of effectiveness, efficiency, and performance. Here I wish to propose a further dimension to the evaluation and assessment of policy failure—legitimacy. The substantive elements of public policies and the procedural steps taken by authoritative decision makers during the policy cycle affect the perception of policy legitimacy held by both stakeholders and the public. In substantive terms, policy content should align with the dominant attitudes of the affected policy community and, ideally, the broader public. Procedurally, factors such as policy incubation, the emotive appeals deployed to gain support for an initiative, and the processes of stakeholder engagement shape the legitimacy of public policies and the governments who promote them. This argument is based on a comparison of education reform in two Canadian provinces during the 1990s. Governments in Alberta and Ontario pursued common agendas of education reform, but while Alberta achieved success, the Ontario government experienced a series of setbacks and lost the support of education stakeholders and the public. The root of Ontario's failures lies in the realm of legitimacy. These findings highlight the fact that the strategies used for enacting policy change may fail to bring about the necessary consensus among societal actors to sustain a new policy direction and calls attention to our need to better understand how governments can achieve meaningful public participation while still achieving legislative success in an efficient fashion.     

"New Governance" and Associative Pluralism: The Case of Drug Policy in Swiss Cities

Throughout the 1990s, hierarchical administrative governance structures have been replaced by self-governing networks for various motives, one of which is to improve the authenticity and democratic quality of public decisions. Thus, "new governance" has been praised for its propensity to provide a plurality of civil society organizations with access to the decision process. This article explores these claims based on the case of drug policy in Swiss cities. We show that self-governing networks indeed seem to have increased the involvement of civil society organizations in the policy process. However, we also find evidence that self-governing networks may in the longer run induce state control over civil society organizations, thus ultimately reducing associative pluralism. They do so either by imposing a policy paradigm or by excluding actors who do not comply with the dominant paradigm from the networks. We conclude by arguing that self-organizing networks should not be dismissed, given that former hierarchical bureaucratic approaches to drug-related problems have failed even worse. Rather, their long-term effects should be subject to further examination aimed at developing adequate responses to their shortcomings.