中日地方交流与合作的现状分析

随着经济全球化步伐的加快,国际交流与合作的发展正在由国家层次向地方层次纵深,而各国中央政府对地方的放权,也使得地方在国际交流与合作中的地位和作用显得越来越重要。日本是与我国开展地方性交流与合作最活跃的国家,其载体主要是友好城市。在全球化和地方化日益发展的背景下,中日地方间交流与合作呈现出许多新特点,同时也存在着一些问题,如何解决这些问题,以促进地方间的交流与合作进一步向前发展对中日双方来说都是十分重要的。     

An Independent Palestine: The Security Dimension

If negotiations produce an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict then a sovereign, independent Palestine may emerge. But what is required for it to succeed? Nothing is more important than the security of a Palestinian state–for itself, for Israel, and for the region: security trumps all else. In addition to the problem of dealing effectively with opposition to a peace agreement within Palestine or directed against it from outside, the nature and magnitude of the security challenge will depend in large part on three issues: the drawing of borders between Israel and Palestine–and whether they are porous or marked by a rigid line of barriers; whether Israeli settlements are withdrawn, or in part incorporated into Israel, perhaps through land swaps with Palestine; and what arrangements are made for Jerusalem. One answer is the creation of effective Palestinian military forces (in addition to police), but this course could be divisive; a second is the development of a series of Israeli–Palestinian confidence‐building and share–security measures, including intelligence cooperation; a third is progress towards reducing external threats to Israel–Palestine, including success in Iraq and in defusing other Middle East problems. Most useful, however, would be the creation of an American‐led peace enabling force, ideally modelled on NATO. This force would need to be agreed by both Israel and Palestine; it must be adequately staffed, trained and equipped; its duties and rules of engagement must make sense to all parties; and it must be part of a network of dispute‐resolution and confidence‐building measures in full partnership with Israeli and Palestinian authorities.     

Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy,Terrorism and British Security Inside and Out of Palestine, 1944–47

This article discusses the global aspect of Zionist terrorism against Britain during 1944–47, relying on recently declassified documents and Hebrew records. Britain struggled against a global terrorist campaign which attacked British targets in Palestine, Egypt and the wider Middle East, continental Europe and the United Kingdom. This article refutes claims by other authors that British rule in Palestine failed because of intelligence failure. Intelligence failure was limited, but so were successes. British intelligence produced reasonable assessments on Zionist politics, but could do little to prevent violence without the cooperation of the Jewish Agency. Success was driven by a combination of signals intelligence, secret agents, one key defector, interrogations and intelligence shared by the Jewish Agency. Failure resulted from a weak understanding of the Zionist underground and from lack of cooperation by Agency authorities. Normally Britain's junior partner, the Jewish Agency was, by 1945, struggling against British restrictions on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. Its militia, Haganah, turned to cooperation with terrorists. British intelligence predicted that such developments could occur, but failed to identify them as they unfolded. Britain's dependence on Zionist security intelligence was a key vulnerability that never was addressed by policy-makers. The Jewish Agency leveraged its cooperation, applying it to prevent terrorism in Egypt and the United Kingdom, where violent incidents would harm the Zionist cause. It had little reason to prevent terrorism in the key battlegrounds of Palestine or Europe, and so terrorism harmed Britain's will to continue fighting. The root cause of Britain's failure was at the policy level. Despite known weaknesses, government never assessed its own will and ability to uphold restrictions on Zionist immigration, or to fight terrorism, as against the Yishuv's will and ability to struggle against Britain.     

Benevolent hegemon,neighborhood bully,or regional security provider? Russia’s efforts to promote regional integration after the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis

Russia has tried to use economic incentives and shared historical and cultural legacies to entice post-Soviet states to join its regional integration efforts. The Ukraine crisis exposed the weaknesses of this strategy, forcing Russia to fall back on coercive means to keep Kiev from moving closer to the West. Having realized the limits of its economic and soft power, will Russia now try to coerce post-Soviet states back into its sphere of influence? Fears of such an outcome overestimate Russia’s ability to use coercion and underestimate post-Soviet states capacity to resist. Rather than emerging as a regional bully, Russia is trying to push Eurasian integration forward by becoming a regional security provider. The article relates these efforts to the larger literature on regional integration and security hierarchies – bridging the two bodies of theory by arguing that regional leaders can use the provision of security to promote economic integration. Despite initial signs of success, we believe that the new strategy will ultimately fail. Eurasian integration will continue to stagnate as long as Russia’s economic and soft power remain weak because Russia will be unable to address the economic and social problems that are at the root of the region’s security problems.     

Shared rivers and conflict – A reconsideration

Neomalthusians have regularly predicted "water wars" while cornucopians have argued that there is no inherent water scarcity and liberal institutionalists have seen cooperation as a more likely outcome of competition for limited water resources than violent conflict. Three earlier studies have found a positive statistical relationship between shared rivers and low-level interstate conflict. Based on a more comprehensive dataset, an improved model of conflict, and a more appropriate control for geographical opportunity, we argue that these results are spurious and that we cannot establish a conflict-inducing effect of shared rivers over and beyond contiguity itself. In fact, the new dataset presented here makes it clear that nearly all neighbors in the international system share at least one river. This calls for a different approach to investigating interaction in shared river basins. This notwithstanding, freshwater and other shared resources may still provide a mechanism to explain why contiguity is robustly associated with conflict, so the water-conflict scenario cannot be dismissed. Indeed, our results show that among river-sharing states, basins with an upstream/downstream configuration increase the risk of conflict. The article finally discusses how river interaction should be further investigated based on these results and what new data are needed to enable such research.     

“THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MARITIMES”: A REAPPRAISAL

Will the post-9/11 environment revive Canada–US intelligence cooperation and catalyze a security community? A comparative study based on intelligence principles, ideas, norms, orientations, and institutions drawn from the literature predicts cooperation but not necessarily a security community, owing to different (a) histories, (b) security interpretations/agenda placements, (c) political and legislative cultures, (d) degrees of public acceptance, and (e) domestic–international inclinations. Waning British influences, evaporating Anglo-Saxon identities, and changing strategic interests compel Canada to play Thomas Hughes's butcher role, and the US the more encompassing intelligence-policy maker role.     

The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?

Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro‐Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation?     

Humanitarian security regimes

This article introduces a novel concept, humanitarian security regimes, and enquires under what conditions they arise and what is distinctive about them. Humanitarian security regimes are driven by altruistic imperatives aiming to prohibit and restrict behaviour, impede lethal technology or ban categories of weapons through disarmament treaties; they embrace humanitarian perspectives that seek to prevent civilian casualties, precluding harmful behavior, protecting and ensuring the rights of victims and survivors of armed violence. The article explores how these regimes appear in the security area, usually in opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful states. The existing regimes literature has mostly taken a functional approach to analyzing cooperation, lacks a humanitarian hypothesis and does not explore the emergence of new regimes in the core area of security. The author argues that in the processes of humanitarian security regime‐making, it is the national interest that is restructured to incorporate new normative understandings that then become part of the new national security aspirations. This article intends to fill this gap and its importance rests on three reasons. First, security areas that were previously considered to be the exclusive domain of states have now been the focus of change by actors beyond the state. Second, states have embraced changes to domains close to their national security (e.g. arms) mostly cognizant of humanitarian concerns. Third, states are compelled to re‐evaluate their national interests motivated by a clear humanitarian impetus. Three conditions for the emergence of humanitarian security regimes are explained: marginalization and delegitimization; multilevel agency, and reputational concerns.     

Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation?

This article surveys current security challenges and identifies obstacles to effective global and regional responses and cooperation in an era when security has become increasingly divisible. The new situation is partly explained by the complexity and variety of security challenges, both traditional and new, and by the linkages between them. It argues that a new pattern of improvised, ad hoc and often case‐specific security mechanisms has developed, which it calls Collective Conflict Management (CCM). The argument is illustrated by reference to cases of CCM where a wide range of actors—multilateral institutions at the global and regional levels, individual states or ad hoc coalitions, professional and commercial bodies, and non‐governmental organizations—collaborate in an effort to manage specific security threats and challenges, bringing together a variety of relationships, resources and skills. The urge for collective action, rather than unilateral or single actor‐led, is motivated by a number of factors and ‘drivers”, not all of them necessarily positive or constructive. The article concludes that the success or failure of CCM will depend in part on the severity of the problems it faces and in part on the motives and incentives behind collective responses. This new pattern raises interesting and important questions for the future of international security. While CCM may be untidy and lack clear norms and standards, in many cases it may be the best available in an increasingly fractured world.     

From “Thin” to “Thick” (and Back Again?): The Politics and Policies of the Contemporary US–Canada Border

Despite making modest progress on challenging management and security issues common to their shared border, the United States and Canada have, in recent years, slipped behind on advancing a progressive border agenda. The momentum unleashed under the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan, signed in late 2001, has slowed in the face of new regulations at the border, many of which were initiated by the United States. These include significant changes in US admission procedures under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), new border policing resources and protocols, as well as new customs and inspection fees. The much-heralded Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), designed to facilitate both trade and security between the two countries, has also lost momentum, with the last trilateral meeting of leaders resulting in little more than a press release. As a result of these and other developments, it appears that rather than “thinning,” the US–Canada border is “thickening” at precisely the time when greater economic and security cooperation is necessary to bolster North American competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy and complex security environment. This article will investigate some of the key reasons behind these policy developments, exploring some of the early positions that frame approaches to border management in the Obama administration. It will also offer some thoughts on opportunities for improved border management policies by providing some specific recommendations, which may help advance solutions to pressing – and festering – bilateral security and trade issues.     

Institutionalization,path dependence and the persistence of the Anglo‐American special relationship

One of the remarkable phenomena in post‐Cold War world politics is the persistence of the Anglo‐American special relationship (AASR) in spite of recurrent announcement of its death by pessimists. Current scholarship on Anglo‐American relations largely draws on interests and sentiments to explain the persistence of the AASR, ignoring other important contributing factors such as institutionalization. This article is the first to give serious consideration to the role of institutionalization in influencing the persistence of the AASR. By using the concept of path dependence, this article argues that the high‐level institutionalization in Anglo‐American intelligence, nuclear and military relations plays a seminal role in contributing to the persistence of the AASR in the post‐Cold War era. The institutionalized intelligence relationship is exemplified by the relationship between the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US's National Security Agency (NSA), which is underpinned by the UKUSA Agreement. The institutionalized nuclear relationship is exemplified by a variety of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs), which is underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The institutionalized military relationship is exemplified by routinized military personnel exchange programmes, regular joint training exercises and an extremely close defence trade partnership. The high‐level institutionalization embeds habits of cooperation, solidifies interdependence and consolidates mutual trust between the UK and the US in their cooperation on intelligence, nuclear and military issues.     

Intelligence cooperation and new trends in space technology: do the ties still bind?

For the first time since the 1970s, Canberra cannot assume the joint facilities will continue to underpin the Australia–US alliance. Intelligence cooperation via outer space, described as the ‘strategic essence’ of this relationship, is poised for transformation. New technologies are being developed for satellite communication, with laser systems capable of bypassing ground control stations outside US territory. As a result, the one indispensable role for Australia in US national security—hosting infrastructure to relay intelligence about nuclear and missile activity—could become irrelevant in the years ahead. With questions raised about the Trump administration’s commitment to security partners and the risk of US disengagement from Asia, these findings have implications for Australian alliance diplomacy. If intelligence ties bind these countries together at present, Canberra can expect some risk of loosening in the future and will need to think carefully about the development of national intelligence resources over the long term.     

胡适关于中国近代文化转型的几个重要观念

在令大多数中国人长期困惑的中西文化的关系问题上,胡适化与看来同自己的固有文化大不相同的现代世界新文化泰然相处,并怎样以最有效的方式吸收现代的新文化,使它能同我们的固有文化相一致、相协调和继续发展.胡适指出,各民族的文化本质上是有同一性的,是可以互相借鉴的.因此,不存在所谓东方文化是精神的,西方文化是物质的这种大分别.胡适又指出,历来各民族的文化交流的常态都是自由选择,各取所需.胡适还强调指出,任何文化都有其自身的"根本保守性",也就是所谓"文化本位".这个"文化本位"实际上就是那无数无数的人民.基于这样的认识,就能够以一种开放的文化观念来处理中国文化与世界新文化的关系,化解种种困惑,较好地解决近代文化转型中遇到的各种问题.     

Political Security Issues at the Concluding Statements of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Sessions 1981–2001: an Analytical Study of the Content

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contents of the concluding statements of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sessions from 1981 to 2001 concerning political and security issues. In particular, the study reviews six topics, including cooperation in the military field, cooperation in the field of security, the Iraqi‐Kuwaiti issue, the Arab‐Israeli conflict, cooperation in the field of fighting terrorism, and GCC Iranian relations. The GCC Supreme Council affirmed the right of the Palestinians to establish their independent state whose capital would be Eastern Jerusalem. The GCC demanded the elimination of weapons of mass destruction when it came to the issue of the Iraqi ‐ Kuwait problem. Concerning the relations between the GCC and Iran, the emphasis was on calling for a peaceful resolution to the problems of the islands [Abu Musa, Tunb Major and Tunb Minor]. The GCC stressed the importance of intensive communications among the security agencies in the member states, and condemning terrorism in all its forms and types. Finally, the GCC expressed satisfaction with the accomplishments in the military and defense sector.     

Organising cyber security in Australia and beyond

The Internet is an interconnected network and cyber security requires collective action. How that action is organised has important implications for national security, including the defence against cyber attacks and malicious activities. This article explains the origins and institutionalisation of cyber security in Australia—particularly ‘civilian cyber security’. The authors trace the origin of Australia’s first computer emergency response team and explain how this organisational form spread from the USA. Through it, Australia helped enable international cooperation. Domestically, however, the authors argue that the Australian government has struggled with the delegation, orchestration and abdication of responsibility for civilian cyber security, underinvesting in civilian organisations while overrelying on military and intelligence agencies. The history of this organisational field provides valuable insight into how to improve national policy and operations for cyber security.     

Local Community Characteristics and Cooperation for Shared Green Reputation

This article examines how basic socioeconomic and political factors are associated with higher levels of cooperation to garner a local community's shared green reputation. We analyze panel data on participation efforts in a collective voluntary environmental program, the Ecological Blue Flag Program, by the entire population of beach communities in Costa Rica between 2001 and 2009. Collective voluntary environmental programs are relatively new and aim to improve environmental performance and shared “green” reputation through joint participation and certification of multisector groups comprising businesses, governmental institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Our results indicate that higher levels of within‐community cooperation for shared green reputation are more likely in seashore localities with lower income inequality and/or a higher number of businesses. These findings run counter to research suggesting these same characteristics are associated with lower levels of cooperation in the management of common pool natural resources such as fisheries and forests. We also find that within‐community cooperation is positively correlated with a greater proportion of expatriates from industrialized countries and/or with higher levels of democratic political participation.     

Collective Action and the Evolution of Intergovernmental Cooperation

Voluntary cooperation among governments holds tremendous promise for solving policy problems with regional and national scope. In this article, we apply insights from the theory of institutional collective action to understand the evolution of cooperative governmental institutions. We address the question: What makes a government decide to exit an existing cooperative arrangement and join a new one with a stronger central authority? Our empirical analyses examine state choices about whether to participate in the new Interstate Compact for Juveniles or remain in an existing compact that serves the same purpose. The findings shed light on how governments make trade‐offs between their desire to maintain their autonomy and the need to overcome the transactions costs, coordination problems, and free‐rider problems associated with cooperative governance in order to achieve policy gains.     

On the identity of NATO

Although we may well be missing the point about NATO if we conceptualize it as just another military alliance, defining NATO as a community of liberal democratic values and norms is problematic. A distinction must be made between a community of values linked to particular experiences and a particular context and a community based on democratic principles. What has kept NATO together beyond the Cold War is a sense of shared history and fate. If such a 'value-hypothesis' about NATO is correct, the continued survival of the organization does not depend only on the marginal costs of maintaining it continuing to outweigh those of creating a new organization. The future of NATO will also depend on the extent to which it is possible to restore (or reestablish) a sense of shared fate and mutual confidence across the Atlantic.     

The presentation of research in and under existing buildings

Abstract

Rarely do buildings remain unchanged over long periods. Damage due to the ravages of time, destruction by human violence or natural catastrophes force repairs. In pre-industrial centuries attempts were made to incorporate existing walls into repairs and additions. Since the finished building should give a uniform impression, however, traces of remodelling were rarely visible, usually hidden under a new ‘skin’. Researching and repairing such remodelled buildings often lead to the discovery of earlier remains. Should these new discoveries be kept visible in order to document and to demonstrate the historical process? Reconstruction of pre-existing buildings is less problematic if the later, existing structures are removed, but it is necessary to deal with the lack of simultaneity – one must add to the structures remaining, resulting in mostly hypothetical reconstructions. This problem is illustrated mainly by examples from Ratisbon and Prague. Excavations lead to similar questions – seldom are remains from a single period uncovered. There are usually traces of different successive stages. If the excavation area is open to the sky, the problem is how to conserve what has been uncovered and make it understandable. Excavations and the presentation of their results inside existing buildings pose different problems. Solutions include leaving openings in, or creating room below, the new floor in order to leave earlier remains accessible.