蒋介石“反攻大陆”始末

有三个重要因素促使蒋介石急于在1965年发动"反攻大陆"的战争:一、中共研制成功原子弹;二、越战的持续扩大;三、蒋介石担心自己年寿有限,他必须尽早发动反攻战争     

蒋介石与冈村宁次及“白鸿亮团”内幕

说起日本女间谍,人们自然会想到臭名远扬的川岛芳子。而本文要介绍的是另一个中国血统的日本女谍苏姬,抗日战争时她认贼作父,为日本帝国主义者效劳,给自己的祖国带来许多危害。     

溪口盛产“蒋介石”

中国如此之大,各地有各地的自然风光,各地有各地的文化特色,各地有各地的独特产品。倘是初初接触了,虽有觉得新奇者,但谁也不会感到怪的。惟独这浙江奉化溪口有些格外,乍一看了,真真地会让人生出许多的兴味来。因为,溪口除了迷人的自然风光与悠久的历史文化而外,在不少的旅游点     

蒋介石“处罚”杜聿明

中国的下级官员在上级面前,一般都乖得象小宝宝,许多时候甚至到了做“螺丝钉”的地步,他们知道违抗上级的命令,事情干得漂亮,不会落下个“好”字;一旦再出现差错,就等于一脚踏进了地狱。     

蒋介石“放水”长征说辨正

在第五次"围剿"后期,蒋介石运用"驱其离巢"策略,逼迫红军西走。这从表面上看虽有"放水"之嫌,但实际上乃是欲擒故纵,他早已在"远处张网"。红军突围后,蒋介石又在日记中以"不可错过剿匪成功之大好机会"自勉,频繁调动和督促各部,希图用多道封锁线剿灭红军,阻其入黔。而在红军进入贵州前后,蒋介石确实开始将追剿中共与统一西南两个问题结合起来考量,以求"一石二鸟"。但他从未放松追堵,仍处心积虑欲消灭红军,并无驱其入川之意。红军巧渡金沙江后,蒋介石更是在日记中懊恼不已,视为"用兵一生莫大之耻辱"。因此,或许蒋介石的某些决策在客观上有利于红军突围,但其主观上从未有意"放水"。进而言之,尽管蒋介石后来借追剿之机统一了西南,但却不能倒果为因地反推他当初便纵共"西窜"。在他的内心中,追剿始终是首要任务,并深以未竟全功为憾,解决西南问题只是其聊以自慰的一个收获而已。     

"西藏问题"与肯尼迪政府对华遏制孤立政策考察

始于近代的所谓“西藏问题”是帝国主义侵略中国的产物。1949年后,美国是以该问题为借口干涉中国内政最为积极的西方国家。本文讨论了肯尼迪政府玩弄“西藏问题”国际化的手段,重点分析由中情局负责组织实施的一系列旨在破坏西藏稳定、分裂西藏的活动,认为其实质是借此对新中国实施遏制孤立政策。针对肯尼迪等人对中国的敌视态度,中国采取了必要的坚定立场,中美紧张关系在当时不可能得到根本缓解,更难以有所突破。     

台湾为何没在“文革”时“反攻大陆”

1965年1月13日,蒋介石正式颁布命令,特任蒋经国为“国防部长”。至此,蒋经国方才名副其实地掌握台湾的军权。虽然台湾的“国防组织法”规定,军队的统帅权由“参谋总长”和“国防部长”分享,然而在国民党政权的机构中,官职的权限大小,均因人而异。蒋经国出任“国防部长”后,“参谋总长”逐渐成为他的幕僚。     

蒋介石反攻大陆的GT-5计划

自1949年逃往台湾后,蒋介石始终没有放弃反攻大陆的梦想。为了得到美国的支持,蒋介石一次次向美国兜售各种形式的反攻计划。约翰逊执政后,不断升级对越南的战争,蒋介石认为有机可乘,遂向美国提出了新的反攻大陆的GT-5号计划,企图攻占大陆的西南五省,但最终仍以破灭而告终。     

蒋介石的反“台独”立场述论

二战结束以后尤其是偏安台湾一隅的四分之一世纪里,蒋介石始终坚持反台独立场,不仅对岛内外台独组织及其活动坚决取缔,严厉打击,而且对日本政府及右翼政客支持台独的行径进行了谴责,对其策动台湾当局独立的建议予以拒绝。这是台独势力在此期间未能坐大和两个中国、一中一台图谋未能得逞的重要原因之一。     

The basic structure of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic strategy

As a leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek carried on Sun Yat-sen's legacy of using diplomacy as a force in the modern era and planned to rely on diplomacy to revise China's unequal treaties with foreign powers. Chiang elaborated on Sun's ideas and maintained that diplomacy as a war without battles worked more effectively than wars with battles. Faced with the threat of Japanese invasion, he upheld the strategy of using one foreign country to control another. He expected the outbreak of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union or between Japan and the United States so that a war between Japan and China could be avoided. Chiang engaged in active diplomacy aimed at turning these expectations into reality. His diplomatic strategy had an impact during the Anti-Japanese War.     

The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War

After victory in the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek issued the famous radio speech “Letter to Soldiers and Civilians of the Whole Nation as well as the Peoples of the World after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War.” The main idea of this speech was long interpreted as “returning virtue for malice” (or “good for evil”), a basic principle of the Kuomintang's policy towards Japan. Many scholars who have considered the returning virtue for malice policy in the postwar period include the following major issues: first, China repatriated Japanese prisoners of war and the Japanese diaspora with mercy; second, China allowed the Tenno, or imperial, system to be preserved in Japan; third, China did not participate in the occupation of Japan; and fourth, China gave up the right to ask for war reparations from Japan. This article examines the above four issues to reevaluate the returning virtue for malice policy. The first issue seems to reflect the Chinese national character of being lenient with others. However, it was in fact due to Chiang's anti-Communist strategy and the declared policy of the United States of eradicating Japan's influence in China. With regard to the second issue, Chiang's attitude was merely to let the Japanese people make their own choice, while the fate of the Japanese Tenno system was entirely determined by the US occupation authority, on which Chiang had little influence. The third issue was mainly the outcome of Chiang's focus on domestic political struggle in the postwar era in China. As for war reparations, China actually made efforts to obtain them in the beginning, but had to give up its right eventually. The decision-making process in the Kuomintang government was restrained by American policy and subordinated to Japanese pressure. Thus, it is not persuasive to summarize the basic principle of Kuomintang postwar policy towards Japan as returning virtue for malice.     

中美关系史上一件"谜案"的历史考察 --"罗斯福下令史迪威除掉蒋介石之说"辨析

近年来,开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威清除蒋介石的说法出现于国内许多论著中.本文从罗斯福对华政策、开罗会议期间罗斯福与蒋介石关系、美在华中国通对蒋介石的态度等方面对这一说法进行了辨析,指出开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威干掉蒋介石的说法纯属子虚乌有.     

论蒋介石与抗战期间的军事会议

在长达八年的抗日战争中,随着国际反法西斯战争形势与中国正面战场抗击日军的历次会战态势的变化,蒋介石连续召开一系列军事会议,制定并调整了对日作战方针,检讨了各次会战,策定了相应的战略战术,从中反映出蒋介石对形势的估计、对敌我双方军队的认识等,比较能够符合实情,也产生了一定的积极作用。但从总体上讲,蒋介石的话是“耳边风”,一吹就过,对国民党军队的劣根性改造无济于事。     

蒋介石与黄埔建军

黄埔军校的建立,催生了一支区别于中国传统军队的新型军队,在中国近代历史上具有重大意义。作为黄埔军校校长,蒋介石对军校有着十分重要的影响,从政治、组织、思想等方面,为军校构架了一个基本的轮廓。     

Chiang Kai-shek and the 1947 Reorganization of the National Government

When the Guomindang (GMD) took charge in 1927, it implemented the “political tutelage” system. Participation of other parties in politics was disallowed. But after the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), under the combined effect of internal and external pressure, the GMD needed to adopt a constitution, reorganize government and establish multi-party participation. The April 1947 governmental reorganization was the starting point of a transformation from a “political tutelage” system to a constitutional system. Though this reorganization introduced many non-GMD members into the government, it did not change the GMD’s one-party dominance. Its desired transformation of China from one-party “political tutelage” into a constitutional democracy still remained limited.     

蒋介石与宋明理学

本文通过对《蒋介石日记》的解读与论证,从新的角度证明了“宋明理学”对蒋介石的道德取向、人格塑造及思想理念的潜在影响。     

鲍罗廷与国民政府迁移中的政治角力

第一次国共合作时期发生的国民政府迁移问题及其解决,是国民革命由盛及衰的重要转折。鲍罗廷为代表,以国民党左派、国民党中的反蒋派和共产党人为一方,与蒋介石为另一方展开角力。从搁置迁都之议,到党政中枢迁移武汉,在不同的阶段中,鲍罗廷整合各路资源,提出关键性的建议,为迁都问题的解决发挥了举足轻重的作用。迁都之争的胜利不能巩固,有其一定的必然性,并与鲍罗廷的战略、策略相关。     

抗战胜利后蒋介石对宪政的态度

随着抗战进入尾声,蒋介石对宪政的态度由消极变为积极,而战后的新形势和日益临近的宪政对其政治策略产生了重大影响。政协会议上,蒋对中共和中间势力做出重大让步。政协决议对国民党宪政设计的更改,在国民党内激起轩然大波,蒋发觉事态发展已出乎自己预料之外。国民党六届二中全会上,蒋对宪政的态度暗中转变。在蒋的默许下,国民党虽未公开撕毁政协决议,但政协决议事实上已不能为国民党所执行。会后,蒋介石受党内强硬势力影响,对宪政的态度从温和的积极一变而为强硬的积极。中共态度也随之强硬,最终国共两党在宪政问题上分道扬镳。