Science as propaganda: Swedish scientists and the co-production of American hegemony in Sweden during the cold war, 1953–68

This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish–American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well.     

Hegemonic constraints: The implications of 11 September for American power

At the heart of the post-11 September world lie several critical issues surrounding US power: its unprecedented primacy, the way in which it is exercised, and how it is perceived and received around the world. Even as US primacy and 'hard' power projection have been reinforced, the terrorist attacks and Washington's responses have adversely affected the vital 'soft' foundations of its power: the appeal of American values and culture; the perception that US hegemony is benign; and the apparent legitimacy of the exercise of American power. These trends will, in the longer term, constrain US hegemonic power by limiting the effectiveness of foreign and security policies. At the international level, Washington will experience increased friction and costs in dealing with its allies and other friendly states; and at the domestic level, the Bush and subsequent administrations will have to take into account rising domestic costs of 'blowback'.     

China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies?

This article critically reviews the suggestion that we are experiencing a ‘succession of hegemonies’ from the United States to China. It develops Martin Wight's writings on hegemony, and introduces a fundamental distinction (not made by Wight) between a power transition and a hegemonic succession. Wight held complex views about the nature of power and at times seemed to subscribe to a purely materialist account. Elsewhere he was more nuanced and appealed to the purpose of dominant states as part of his argument that influence does not correlate exactly with mass and weight. This suggestion is developed in the author's view of hegemony—as distinct from primacy—as denoting a legitimate practice within international society. These ideas are then superimposed upon current debates about a power transition, or a succession of hegemonies, as between the United States and China. The existing debate conflates those two issues. Accordingly, while it can readily be acknowledged that there are important indicators of a shift in the material distribution of power, this in no way amounts, as yet, to any kind of hegemonic succession. For the latter to occur, there would need to be clear evidence of an effective socialization of the aspirant hegemon's purpose and support for its preferred order. On the contrary, to date China has been largely content to operate within existing frameworks, rather than instigate a revision of them, and does not yet present a model for emulation elsewhere. It is possible that a power transition, without any hegemonic succession, could be corrosive of global governance.     

China's regional policies: how much hegemony?1

China is commonly assumed to be seeking hegemony in its region. Yet China's region involves it in relationships with major states with their own hegemonic or leadership interests—the US, Russia, Japan and India. This article examines each of China's regional relationships in terms of the prime interests of China's foreign policy framework. It concludes that it is important to distinguish between hegemonic capabilities and intentions: that while China will want to extend its influence as a regional power, its capability to do that will continue to grow in each of its subregions, its ability to exercise that power and influence will be limited. In the past its efforts have been largely to seek secure borders and economic opportunities and that for some years those objectives, together with energy security, are likely to remain the priority.     

The ‘R’ in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?

The concept of emerging powers presupposes several features shared by the states in question including regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role and the contesting of US unipolarity. This article assesses the role of Russia as an emerging power. It asks how Russians interpret the international system, what kind of system they would prefer, what they are trying to do in the current system and why, and how these considerations affect their relations with the US hegemony, other centres of power such as the EU, and other emerging powers. The author discusses the structural, liberal and regional interpretations of state behaviour and how they relate to the Russian model, arguing that Russia's policy is strongly affected by its domestic economic and political context. Russia is highly responsive to trends in the former Soviet Union and regions it perceives to be in its own space (e.g. EU and NATO Europe and north-east Asia). In the larger international system, Russia's approach is a mix of partnership or acquiescence on matters of vital interest to the hegemonic power, and more competitive behaviour on issues deemed central to Russian but peripheral to US interests. The article concludes that Russia is not an emerging power in the conventional sense. Its foreign policy is dominated by efforts to reverse the decline of the 1980s and 1990s. This entails fostering international conditions conducive to allowing reconsolidation without external hindrance. Its second major priority is regional: to restore Russian influence over the former Soviet states. In essence, Russian policy aims to limit further losses and promote conditions that will allow it to re-emerge as a great power.     

Rethinking the Creation of North Norway as a Region

Abstract

The subject of this article is the creation of North Norway from the late eighteenth century to the present day. Some initial remarks about the relationship between nations and regions are followed by a number of interpretations of recent national and nationalism debates. The former synthesis of the creation of North Norway as a region is analysed, using approaches that on the one hand could be described as an actor stage theory, and on the other as structurally modernistic. As an alternative, a new theoretical approach inspired by cultural hegemonic theories is presented. This cultural hegemonic approach uses the works of Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) as a point of departure and is related to the concepts he developed, such as “hegemony”, “counter-hegemony”, “historic bloc”, “civil society” and “organic intellectuals”. A new synthesis of the historical regional formation process, based on a cultural hegemonic approach, is then presented, showing that North Norway as a region is the result of a long-lasting, contradictory and continuous process. Six periods are identified in the creation of the region: the period from the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century up to the second decade of the twentieth century emerges as a time-frame for a counter-hegemonic nation-building project. Since then, North Norway as a region has developed through hegemonic struggle between different kinds of region- and nation-building projects within and outside the region.     

Ethics Appropriate for an Empire: A Question Whose Time Has Come

Abstract

This article offers a Christian ethical commentary upon the debate over the contemporary "American Empire." While many decry unprecedented US global dominance based on various secular standpoints, few have articulated religiously-grounded perspectives on this new US relation to the world. The task of mustering religious objections to openly imperial ambitions looms particularly large in light of prominent unabashed defenses of US global hegemony. The paper has three parts: (1) preliminary clarifications regarding terminology and context; (2) a survey of policies (e.g., unilateralism in foreign policy, interventions, a doctrine of pre-emptive war, diminished regard for international institutions) that reflect imperial ambitions and conflict with mainstream Christian perspectives on global justice and self-determination; and (3) a tentative listing of seven criteria appropriate for the pursuit and exercise of power on the part of global hegemons, in light of Christian principles. The constructive task is aimed at offering ethical constraints, such as the judicious correlation of means and ends in foreign policy. We will evaluate the contributions of Catholic social thought and the school of Christian realism on key questions: Is the notion of empire ever morally acceptable? Is "benevolent hegemony" possible in our times? If so, on what terms?     

Shale gas and the revival of American power: debunking decline?

The spectre of American decline is once again animating both observers and practitioners of US foreign policy. The global financial crisis, a faltering American economy and continued costly and controversial military engagements overseas have been presented as conclusive proof that American foreign policy will soon lack the resources needed to sustain its previous international hegemony. Arguments of domestic weakness have been linked to analyses of the economic vitality of America's competitors to demonstrate a seemingly watertight case for relative decline. The inexorable rise of China has been presented from various quarters as evidence that the American era will soon be drawing to a close. Yet, such declinist arguments continue to suffer from fundamental weaknesses, overestimating the likely future strength of America's rivals while concurrently downplaying the capacity of the US to rejuvenate its economy and thus revivify its liberal universalist creed. The most interesting development in this regard has been the sudden resurgence of the US energy sector. Written off less than a decade ago as being in terminal decline, the American oil and gas industry has staged a remarkable recovery. Vast reserves of shale gas and accompanying tight oil offer the potential to aid the revival of the American economy, with some forecasts pointing to US energy self‐sufficiency within two decades. Notions of US relative decline may yet prove premature. The geopolitical impact of American energy self‐sufficiency is likely to be very significant, making an important contribution to a reversal of the US trade deficit, a revival of America's industrial base, and the possibility of a corresponding relative decline in power for conventional fossil fuel exporters.     

Hegemony,liberalism and global order: what space for would‐be great powers?

This article, and the four that follow, consider some of the ways in which China, Russia, India and Brazil have responded both to US hegemony and to the changing character of international society. This article sets out some of the major analytical questions that emerge when thinking about the foreign policy options of these countries and some of the principal conceptual and theoretical categories within which those questions may be usefully framed. The first section examines the reasons for taking these countries as a group. The second section provides a brief overview of two of the most common theoretical perspectives from which the systemic pressures on these countries have been understood. The third considers their actual and potential strategies and options under five headings: their status as regional powers; their behaviour within and towards international institutions; their relations with the United States; collaboration among them and evidence for the possible emergence of balancing behaviour; and the links between economic development and foreign policy.     

Africa's Next Debt Crisis: A Relational Comparison of Chinese and Western Lending to Zambia

Africa faces a new debt crisis fuelled by Chinese and Western lending. At the forefront is Zambia, which defaulted on Eurobond payments in 2020. The article sets the developing Africa-wide crisis within a relational comparison that draws the current Zambian moment together with the financial collapse of the 1980s. By placing Chinese lending within a comparative global frame, we make three contributions. First, Zambia provides a “spatial fix” for capital, but such African borrowing is not passive and shapes hegemonic struggles between China and the US. Thus secondly, Africa's relationship with debt is co-constituent in the remaking of the global economy, as signalled by the contested execution and interpretation of development-as-modernisation. Finally, a relational comparison of the two debt crises demonstrates that global capitalist hegemony is, partly, engineered by the consent and coercion of African governments, yet the human costs of borrowing are fully borne by the world's poorest.     

从冲突到和解:近代英美关系考察

近代是英美关系发展变迁的重要历史时期,在一个多世纪的时间里英美由战争、冲突逐步走向了接近与和解。在此过程中,国际体系及其变更、地缘政治、心理要素与文化制度的认同、新兴强国崛起和国家战略调整等诸多因素共同起到了重要的作用。作为英美历史性接近的结果,到19世纪末,英国启动了向美国“转让”世界霸权的进程。就深远影响来看,它还使美国开始更多地卷入欧洲事务和世界事务,并促成了20世纪国际关系中另一项重大事态的出现——美国世界霸权的逐步确立。     

Seeking a Sense of Belonging: The Exclusion of Female Doctorate Holders in South Korea and the US

Despite the vast literature on East Asian international students in higher education during the current era of globalization, few studies examine how the international migration of doctorate holders is gendered. The migration and career choices of Korean women who hold doctorates from American universities, we argue, are shaped by geographical imaginations based on the political connections between South Korea and the US and their personal experiences from their home and host countries. The notion of the US as an ally of South Korea and the hegemony of US higher education in Korean academia have led Korean women to pursue doctorates in the United States. Yet, the Korean women who participated in this study revealed that earning a doctorate from a world-class university did not necessarily bring them greater mobility. Whether the interviewees returned to Korea or not, they found themselves situated within the hierarchy of gendered power relations and excluded from everyday practices such as decision-making both at home and at work. Consequently, they attempted to build a sense of belonging at various geographic scales. This study found that Korean women scholars’ migration and career choices were the multi-layered outcome of gendered power relations within the family, political connections between the two countries, and cultural values of their home and host countries.     

Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance

For more than a decade, Russia's foreign policy has sought to challenge the international consensus on a number of issues. Today, as the international internet ecosystem is becoming more volatile, Moscow is eager to shift the western narrative over the current global internet governance regime, in which the United States retains considerable leverage. In a context wherein states increasingly forge links between cyberspace and foreign policy, this article explores Russia's deepening involvement in internet governance. The disclosure by Edward Snowden of the US government's wide net of online surveillance contributed to legitimize the Russian approach to controlling online activity. While the struggle around the narrative of internet governance has been heating up since then, Russia actively seeks to coordinate internet governance and cyber security policies with like‐minded states in both regional forums and the United Nations. By introducing security concerns and advocating more hierarchy and a greater role for governments, Moscow is contributing to the politicization of global cyber issues and seeking to reshape the network in accordance with its own domestic political interests. Indeed, the Russian leadership has come to consider the foreign policy of the internet as the establishment of a new US‐led hegemonic framework that Washington would use to subvert other sovereign states with its own world views and values.     

Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks

One recent focus of research in international relations theory is that of “long cycle theory,” associated primarily with George Modelski and William Thompson, which posits serial cycles of hegemonic dominance — Venice, Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States — lasting approximately for one century. These hegemonic cycles are highly correlated with, or underpinned by, maritime and commercial dominance. Some aspects of long cycle theory have been contested by the rival “world systems” theory, that has fewer cycles and a disinclination to separate the military and economic dimensions of hegemony. Heretofore, naval power, as reflected in capital ship construction and orders of battle, has been used to measure maritime dominance. This research suggests that data for rival and successive global basing access networks could be used to inform and query the basis of long cycle theory; i.e., to provide a measure of “global reach”. There are additionally, interesting conceptual questions about the basis for basing access, as it has evolved historically; specifically, from a basis in conquest to one dependent upon diplomacy and various quid pro quo. The article suggests the need for more historical data collection on bases.     

The Italian political system and détente (1963 - 1981)

This article examines the impact of détente on the Italian political system, linking together internal and international dynamics in both the political and the economic spheres. Relying on various new archival sources, it analyzes the conflicting effects on Italy of both the relaxing of Cold War tension and bipolarism, and the 'bipolar' strategy to reassert US hegemony: the failure of the reformist design of the center?-?left of the 1960s; the 'strategy of attention' in 1969?-?71 and its sudden halt; the building of a 'devaluation model' after the end of Bretton Woods, and the consequent shift from Kissinger's neo-centrism to 'national solidarity'. Détente favoured a crisis of the centrist pattern of Italian politics but at the same time the 'bipolar' features of both the US and the Soviet 'strategies of détente' led to a decline in US hegemony, relaunching the DC's centrality and its ability to manage external constraints. Reaganism was to recast US hegemony on a new basis.     

Kim Dae-jung and the Persistence of Anti-Communist Hegemony in South Korea

Existing writings that explore the relationship between inter-Korean relations and the political economy of South Korea stress the role of the ruling ideology of anti-communism in the domestic struggle for power or hegemony. They also consider Kim Dae-jung a member of the hegemonic group because he represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and, thus, they contend that the level of inter-Korean reconciliation during his presidency was a product of the hegemonic group’s accommodation of the people’s nationalist demands. Their arguments are, however, contradictory because, among other things, Kim was one of those most severely damaged by the hegemonic group’s ruling ideology. Drawing on Gramsci’s concepts, such as historical bloc and hegemonic project, I attempt to resolve the contradiction by arguing that Kim was not a member of the hegemonic group, but a leader of the counter-hegemonic liberal nationalists. Accordingly, this article demonstrates Kim’s stance on the chaebol-centred economic structure and his abortive attempt to change it. By the same token, it argues that the inter-Korean reconciliation was a hegemonic project to realise the liberal nationalists’ vision of peaceful unification through a liberal approach and to undermine the anti-communism with which the hegemonic group had exercised ideological leadership for decades.     

英语霸权的历史演变——国际关系视角下的语言问题

英语霸权是一种民族国家的语言霸权形式。英美民族国家霸权的历史进程不仅确立了英语在全球国际体系中的霸权地位,而且决定了英语霸权内涵的演变——这是一个从地理平台语言霸权到制度语言霸权,再到软权力语言霸权不断深化的过程。从国际关系的视角来看,语言霸权是文化霸权的核心,其霸道的本质毋庸置疑;英语霸权目前在全球导致了新的社会不平等。对于"平等"的关注和反应,是英语霸权在未来岁月里所面对的最重要的议程。     

古代希腊城邦自治观念与霸权兴衰——试析公元前386至公元前371年斯巴达与雅典的称霸

古代希腊的城邦自治（autonomia）观念始于公元前5世纪,及至《大王和约》发展为希腊城邦处理相互间关系的准则。就公元前4世纪霸权的兴衰、更迭和发展进程而言,城邦自治原则的最终确立影响极大。该原则虽为强邦所滥用,在一定程度上沦为实现霸权的工具,但也阻止了联盟作为一种霸权向帝国的发展。城邦自治观念与霸权所呈现出的这种相反相成的复杂关系,是梳理希腊城邦邦际政治史的一条重要线索。     

Ethnic/National Identity Incrimination in and through Social Constructionism

Social constructionism, and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory in particular, are well-known for their anti-essentialist understanding of identity. Hence these discourses have theoretically been utilized for understanding social identity construction and for deconstructing identities. However, I claim that social constructionism and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory may have the as yet non-theorized operation of detecting and combating wholesale indictments of identities. This operation helps us diagnose how ethnic identity and affect become incriminated as supposedly inextricably intertwined with racism, chauvinism and related pathologies. Yet interestingly, instead of unveiling and critiquing the new hegemony of blanket indictment of ethnic identity/affect, social constructionism and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory have been used to incriminate identity as such. The present article interprets Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory against the grain to chastise the tendency to declare ethnic identity/affect as the new enemy. It shows how such new, hegemonic incrimination aspires to fill the empty signifier of peaceful coexistence with otherness, yet runs the risk of effacing otherness. The article concludes with an example of a reconstructive alternative.     

Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.