British Surrenders and the South African War, 1899–1902

Based on primary research, this article examines more than 1000 cases of surrender in the British Army during the South African War, 1899–1902. It concludes that the majority of surrenders were caused by five conditions: faulty leadership, the removal of effective leadership through injury or death, lack of necessary supplies, decisive disadvantage in terms of numbers and the use of questionable tactics by the enemy. An examination of surrender gives insight into morale, resource allocation, discipline, decision-making and military law.     

Race,Masculinity and Imperialism: The British Officer and the Egyptian Army (1882–1899)

In recent years, there has been increased historical interest in the way in which Western militaries have understood, interacted with and represented Oriental native peoples. However, the influence which the Western perception of the Orient had on the British officers seconded to reform and lead the Egyptian Army between 1882 and 1899 has been overlooked. This oversight is particularly surprising since the reformation the Egyptian Army and its use in the re-conquest of the Sudan between 1896 and 1899 constituted one of the main British military commitments to the Middle East at the height of Empire. Consequently, an examination of the reformation of this force offers the opportunity to examine not only the construction of British racial ideas and their influence on imperialism, but also how they directly affected British actions in Egypt and Sudan. In order to fill this gap in the historiography, this article examines how Western ideas on race, masculinity and imperialism affected the British reformation and leadership of the Egyptian Army as well as how the Europeans attached to the force represented the region in their writing. It argues that the notion of Oriental inferiority quickly became institutionalised amongst the British officers seconded to the force and this not only had a major influence on how the Egyptian Army was both reconstituted and led, but also on how those Europeans attached to the force wrote about their experiences.     

The Dutch social democrats and the South African war, 1899–1902

This article examines the attitude of the Dutch Social Democrats towards the South African War (1899–1902). At the beginning of the war the SDAP (Social Democratic Workers’ Party) had three seats in the Staten‐Generaal (Parliament). By 1902 this had increased to seven. The South African War created a wave of nationalism in the Netherlands. The Boers were of Dutch descent, and the Dutch generally saw the war as their own. As much as it wanted to assist the Transvaal, the Dutch government, however, could not afford to annoy Britain upon whom she depended for commercial protection of her East Indian colonies. In Social Democratic circles there was a mixed reaction to the war, particularly as their enemy, the Dutch bourgeoisie, had taken the side of the Boers. Arguments were raised for and against on the one hand, humanitar‐ianism and the law of nations, and on the other, historic‐materialistic considerations. The organs of the SDAP—De Sociaaldemokraat and later Het Volk—supported the Boer cause. Their internationalism almost compelled the Social Democrats to stand aloof from the chauvinistic Dutch bourgeoisie. They pointed out that the Netherlands, with its policy on Acheh, an independent sultanate on Sumatra, was in actual fact also an imperialistic nation. Anti‐British sentiment among the Social Democrats rose sharply when the Amsterdam diamond cutters also became victims as many lost their jobs in the wake of the war. Chamberlain (the British Colonial Secretary) and Kitchener (British Commander‐in‐Chief) were seen as war criminals. When, towards the end of 1901, the Amsterdam Water Transport Leagues attempted to organise an international boycott of British shipping, the SDAP sympathised with the plan, but did not give its official approval. Nothing came of the attempt. The Dutch Social Democrats reluctantly accepted the peace, feeling that the Boers would in the future be exploited by British capitalism.     

The British Archaeological Association and the Genesis of J. C. Bruce’s The Roman Wall

On 31 July 1849, John Collingwood Bruce gave a lecture on Hadrian’s Wall at the British Archaeological Association’s annual Congress in Chester. This was his first lecture outside his native North-East on the subject on which he was soon to become the leading authority. Two primary accounts of the occasion survive, but are contradictory in several details. These contradictions are explored, the accuracy of the account in the JBAA upheld and the importance of the occasion emphasised.     

The Imperial War Relief Fund and the All British Appeal: Commonwealth,Conflict and Conservatism within the British Humanitarian Movement, 1920–25

This article explores the intersection of internationalist and imperial humanitarian ideals in the aftermath of the First World War via a case study of a hitherto overlooked humanitarian organisation—the Imperial War Relief Fund. In an era of increased international collaboration between humanitarian organisations, the Imperial War Relief Fund instead promoted an imperial approach, seeking to unite the ‘efforts of the dominions and mother country’ for the relief of Europeans suffering the effects of the First World War. The Fund was enthusiastically supported in Britain by a number of leading conservative public figures, who hoped that an empire-wide humanitarian campaign might guard against imperial disintegration and reverse Britain's perceived loss of prestige in the postwar order. Despite its initial successes, the Imperial Fund was subsequently usurped by British humanitarian organisations which were more internationalist in their outlook and rhetoric, most significantly the Save the Children Fund. This did not represent, however, a straightforward displacement of imperial co-ordination in favour of more internationally focused humanitarian action. Rather, the Save the Children Fund was able to draw support away from the Imperial Fund only by echoing its imperial rhetoric. This article argues, therefore, that, while the Imperial Fund was a relatively short-lived venture, its lasting legacy was to ensure that the British humanitarian movement was a space in which notions of Britain's imperial status, and its concomitant duties, would survive within an humanitarian landscape in which internationalist ideals were increasingly prevalent.     

Communications,Qajar irredentism,and the strategies of British India: The Makran Coast telegraph and British policy of containing Persia in the east (Baluchistan)—Part I

Qajar irredentism brought Persia to make some advances in Baluchistan in the 1830s and 1840s, but in early 1860s, the continuation of this advance was threatened by one of Britain's main imperial interests and needs: the Indo-European telegraph line, which was to cross the Makran Coast overland. Persia sought to use this need for getting British recognition for its claims over Baluchistan. This put the British under pressure, for they did not wish to alienate Persia, through whose territories the line was to pass. The British government tried to appease the Persians with a simple declaration that the telegraph would not affect their claims and by taking the telegraph away from disputed territories. One major thing was faulty in this “solution,” for it was the British who decided which territories were “disputed” or “undisputed,” not the Persians.