Climate change and conflict

The prospect of human-induced climate change encourages drastic neomalthusian scenarios. A number of claims about the conflict-inducing effects of climate change have surfaced in the public debate in recent years. Climate change has so many potential consequences for the physical environment that we could expect a large number of possible paths to conflict. However, the causal chains suggested in the literature have so far rarely been substantiated with reliable evidence. Given the combined uncertainties of climate and conflict research, the gaps in our knowledge about the consequences of climate change for conflict and security appear daunting. Social scientists are now beginning to respond to this challenge. We present some of the problems and opportunities in this line of research, summarize the contributions in this special issue, and discuss how the security concerns of climate change can be investigated more systematically.     

Climate change,human security and violent conflict

Climate change is increasingly been called a ‘security’ problem, and there has been speculation that climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict. This paper integrates three disparate but well-founded bodies of research – on the vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change, on livelihoods and violent conflict, and the role of the state in development and peacemaking, to offer new insights into the relationships between climate change, human security, and violent conflict. It explains that climate change increasingly undermines human security in the present day, and will increasingly do so in the future, by reducing access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods. Climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods. We argue that in certain circumstances these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security may in turn increase the risk of violent conflict. The paper then outlines the broad contours of a research programme to guide empirical investigations into the risks climate change poses to human security and peace.     

Trends and triggers: Climate,climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000–2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by expected changes in climate.     

Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict

In a world of rising sea levels and melting glaciers, climate change is most likely occurring but with uncertain overall effects. I argue that we can predict the effects of climate change on migration by exploring the effects of environmental problems on migration in recent decades. People can adapt to these problems by staying in place and doing nothing, staying in place and mitigating the problems, or leaving the affected areas. The choice between these options will depend on the extent of problems and mitigation capabilities. People living in lesser developed countries may be more likely to leave affected areas, which may cause conflict in receiving areas. My findings support this theory, and suggest certain policy implications for climate change.     

Climate change,conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of the effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water variability

Climate-driven water variability is a natural phenomenon that is observed across river basins, but one that is predicted to increase due to climate change. Environmental change of this kind may aggravate political tensions, especially in regions which are not equipped with an appropriate institutional apparatus. Increased variability is also likely to challenge regions with existing institutional capacity. We argue that our best attempts to assess the ability of states to deal with variability in the future rest with considering how agreements have fared in the past. In this paper, we explore treaty effectiveness, or treaty resilience, by investigating whether particular water allocation and institutional mechanisms help mitigate inter-country tensions over shared water. We use water-related events from the Basins at Risk events database as a dependent variable to test particular hypotheses regarding the impact of treaty design on conflict and cooperation over time. A broad set of climatic, geographic, political, and economic variables are used as controls. The analysis is conducted for the years 1948–2001 using the country dyad as the level of observation. Findings pertaining to our primary explanatory variables suggest that country dyads governed by treaties with water allocation mechanisms exhibiting both flexibility and specificity evince more cooperative behavior. Country dyads governed by treaties with a larger sum of institutional mechanisms likewise evince a higher level of cooperation, although certain institutional mechanisms appear to be more important than others.     

Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies,vulnerability and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

The mounting evidence for climate change has put the security implications of increased climate variability high on the agenda of policymakers. However, several years of research have produced no consensus regarding whether climate variability increases the risk of armed conflict. Many have suggested that instead of outright civil war, climate variability is likely to heighten the risk of communal conflict. In particular, erratic rainfall, which reduces the availability of water and arable land, could create incentives for violent attacks against other communities to secure access to scarce resources. Yet, whether groups resort to violence in the face of environmentally induced hardship is likely to depend on the availability of alternative coping mechanisms, for example through market transfers or state accommodation. This suggests that the effect of rainfall anomalies on communal conflict will be stronger in the presence of economic and political marginalization. We evaluate these arguments statistically, utilizing a disaggregated dataset combining rainfall data with geo-referenced events data on the occurrence of communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008. Our results suggest that large negative deviations in rainfall from the historical norm are associated with a higher risk of communal conflict. There is some evidence that the effect of rainfall shortages on the risk of communal conflict is amplified in regions inhabited by politically excluded ethno-political groups.     

Climate shocks and conflict: Evidence from colonial Nigeria

This paper offers a historical micro-level analysis of the impact of climate shocks on the incidence of civil conflict in colonial Nigeria (1912–1945). Primary historical sources on court cases, prisoners and homicides are used to capture conflict. To measure climate shocks we use the deviation from long-term rainfall patterns, capturing both drought and excessive rainfall. We find a robust and significant curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between rainfall deviations and conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean Savannah) and where (pre-) colonial political structures were less centralized. We find evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops (such as cocoa and palm oil) compared to subsistence farming areas, suggesting that agricultural diversification acts as an insurance mechanism against the whims of nature. Additional historical information on food shortages, crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence is used to explore the climate–conflict connection in greater detail.     

Climate change, uncertainty and prehistoric hunter–gatherer mobility

The onset of Little Ice Age conditions in California’s Sierra Nevada mountains resulted in increased temporal and spatial variability, and hence uncertainty regarding the distribution and production of resources targeted by its inhabitants, the Western Mono. The Mono responded with a risk-averse strategy composed of lowland winter population aggregation supported by logistical forays and seasonal residential dispersals to the high country, both ways of averaging variance in environmental productivity. These patterns were reconstructed using surface archaeology, GIS, and two straightforward spatial statistics, nearest-neighbor and variance-to-mean ratios, that combined provide a robust, objective picture of population aggregation and dispersal and the scale of these phenomena in different environments and seasons. These diverse strategies conform to expectations regarding the best ways for hunter–gatherers to cope with uncertainty, particularly in mountain environments. Despite this, the residentially mobile aspect of the pattern is rare in mountains and probably the result of historical connections between the Mono and Great Basin groups employing similar behaviors. Ultimately, this research suggests that climate change and environmental variability condition risk-averse, satisficing economic behaviors focused more on security than optimization, implying that pronounced environmental variability runs counter to economic intensification and its association with the evolution of more complex societies.     

The political ecology of recovery from armed conflict: the case of landmines in Mozambique

The devastation wrought by landmines on local populations is well known. However, the broader effects of mine presence on postwar recovery, and the progress of a ‘peace process’, remain largely unexamined. Both the academic and the practitioner literature regarding landmines lack a framework within which the mix of economic, political, social, agricultural, and ecological repercussions of mine presence in a context of postwar recovery can be investigated. Here, we consider the utility of political ecology to examine the influence of landmine presence on the socioecological relations important to postwar recovery in Mozambique. Landmines constitute the primary obstacle to the reconstruction and development in Mozambique. Because mine presence influences different aspects of recovery differently, we have selected three cases in the country where mine presence has impacted important components of recovery: agriculture, transportation corridors, and international investment. Peace process and recovery efforts by the international community do not presently address the broader, non-medical influences of landmine presence on recovery, and it is the intention of this article to contribute to an initial examination of these issues.     

Close-up on renewable resources and armed conflict: The spatial logic of pastoralist violence in northern Kenya

Methods of spatially disaggregated conflict analysis are becoming increasingly popular and open avenues for systematic micro-level research. Especially within the field of environmental security research they bear the promise of a better assessment of environment–conflict linkages at the sub-national level. Yet, this branch of research lacks a thorough theoretical involvement with the spatial logic of armed contests over renewable resources and this hampers the use of highly disaggregated data. To address this shortcoming, the present contribution proposes an actor-centred approach, which allows determining the precise locations of violent events in armed contests over renewable resources. It is developed by analysing the spatial logic of pastoralist violence in northern Kenya, a frequently cited example of scarcity-related struggle over renewable resources. The analysis demonstrates that pastoralist violence in northern Kenya has frequently occurred close to well sites and in locations of higher rainfall, which offer favourable conditions for livestock raiding. These results lend support to narratives of pastoralist violence, which emphasise the strategic use of violence with regard to the ecological opportunities and constraints of African rangelands. They also highlight more generally that conflict locations reveal more about the strategic choices made by armed groups in a given conflict situation than about the ultimate causes of their struggle. This calls for a more conscious use of disaggregated data in environmental security research.     

Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited

For proponents of the view that anthropogenic climate change will become a ‘threat multiplier’ for instability in the decades ahead, the Syrian civil war has become a recurring reference point, providing apparently compelling evidence that such conflict effects are already with us. According to this view, human-induced climatic change was a contributory factor in the extreme drought experienced within Syria prior to its civil war; this drought in turn led to large-scale migration; and this migration in turn exacerbated the socio-economic stresses that underpinned Syria's descent into war. This article provides a systematic interrogation of these claims, and finds little merit to them. Amongst other things it shows that there is no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in Syria's pre-civil war drought; that this drought did not cause anywhere near the scale of migration that is often alleged; and that there exists no solid evidence that drought migration pressures in Syria contributed to civil war onset. The Syria case, the article finds, does not support ‘threat multiplier’ views of the impacts of climate change; to the contrary, we conclude, policymakers, commentators and scholars alike should exercise far greater caution when drawing such linkages or when securitising climate change.     

Climate change and Zhou relocations in early Chinese history

In Chinese history, the development of the Zhou tribes and the dynasties that succeeded them between 3550 and 2200 BP in the middle reaches of the Yellow River is known as the period of ‘Five Relocations’. Most of these relocations appear to have been forced by the pressure of nomadic invasions and occupations from the northern steppe. Historians simply attributed these relocations to political and military causes. However, palaeoclimatic studies show that the Zhou tribes and their successor dynasties developed at the demise of the Holocene Climatic Optimum when regional climate became highly variable and unstable. An integrated analysis of environmental change over the Loess Plateau and the Mongolian steppe facilitates a credible understanding of the linkage between climatic events and these relocations. It indicates that the relocations caused an expansion or contraction of the settled regions over the drought-prone semi-arid lands. During climatic amelioration, dry farming societies pushed upward to the Loess Plateau where increased precipitation and soil moisture allowed cereals to be cultivated. When hit by droughts and the associated disasters, both the dry farming societies and the nomadic tribes had to move southward to find an environment suitable for their food production. Migration and relocation were, therefore, basic strategies to secure the resources necessary to sustain an agricultural economy. The settled frontier was pulled back as dry farming societies from the upland plateau retreated to the lowland riverbanks of the Guanzhong Basin. Even though there were political and military intentions, climatic events played an essential role in the relocations of the Zhou tribes and the successive dynasties.     

Human conflict and ecosystem services: finding the environmental price of warfare

Environmental degradation resulting from warfare is a growing concern, particularly with increasing recognition of humanity's dependence on healthy ecosystems. Though environmental legislation does exist that seeks to prevent or mitigate environmental harm before, during and after conflict, it has limited scope and effectiveness. This may be one reason why the environmental laws of war are so rarely applied in attempts to bring parties responsible for environmental harm to justice. Enforcement of such legal instruments also requires appropriate quantification of environmental damage, which is particularly difficult in a warfare context. A focus on the loss of environmental resources, habitats or ecosystems is only part of the story—the real cost of environmental damage is in the loss of ecosystem services that such resources provide, both now and in the future, and which regional and global human societies depend upon. The ecosystem services framework, wherein the costs of damage to ecosystem services are quantified in economic terms, may prove a more effective way of highlighting the environmental damage resulting from warfare. Moreover, quantification along monetary lines is potentially more likely to establish a solid case for justifiable reparations than criteria relating to loss of biodiversity or ecosystem health, which are more difficult for society and governmental agencies to place specific values on. This article discusses the ecosystem services framework in the context of warfare, and highlights both the potential and the challenges that may accompany adoption of such a framework by the international community.     

Climate change during the Iron Age in the Shashe-Limpopo Basin,southern Africa

Recent research refines previous interpretations about the role of climatic factors in the development of Mapungubwe. First, the Medieval Warm Epoch started at about AD 1000, rather than 900. At about AD 900, Zhizo people moved into the Shashe-Limpopo Basin, most likely to hunt elephants for the East Coast trade. Secondly, a dry period at about AD 1200–1250 affected farming societies over a wide area. In the Basin, multiple rainmaking episodes occurred at this time. A similar situation took place around Makapansgat and at Great Zimbabwe. Thirdly, Mapungubwe was probably abandoned in AD 1300 because of cooler and drier conditions. At this time, it would have been impossible to maintain floodplain agriculture at the intensity necessary to support the large population. Agricultural failures probably undermined political authority, contributing to Mapungubwe's abandonment and shift in power to Great Zimbabwe. This detailed sequence challenges the re-calibrated climatic series from Makapansgat.     

River metamorphosis and environmental change in the Macdonald Valley,New South Wales,since 1949

A significant metamorphosis of channel form occurred on the lower Macdonald River between 1949 and 1955; width and width-depth ratio increased and depth, sinuosity and weighted mean per cent silt-clay in the channel perimeter decreased. The channel has remained unstable since 1955, exhibiting frequent variations in bed elevation and a recent period of minor channel contraction followed by slight enlargement. Since 1946 there has been an increase in summer and annual rainfall and an abrupt, upward shift of the annual series flood frequency curve. As a result an increased proportion of the total sediment load of the river is now being transported as bed-material load. The change in sediment load is a result of greater stream competence and the consequent reworking of sandy sediment temporarily stored within the channel as benches. The observed channel changes are a quasi-adjustment to the increased flood and bed-material load discharges.     

Climate change and security: examining China's challenges in a warming world

The environment is increasingly affected by global climate change. While the causes of climate change are generated across the globe, the impacts of climate change will be highly variable at the local level. An increased scientific understanding of the potential impacts that climate change may have within China has raised new concern among China's leaders. Given that China's domestic realities inform its international policy choices, understanding how climate change may affect its population and natural resources is critical to global climate stabilization efforts. This article examines how the impacts of climate change on China, and China's response, will drive security challenges domestically, as well as in the greater Asian region and around the world. It shows that the impact of climate change on China will be significant and may have sizable adverse economic implications, particularly on vulnerable east coast economic centers. Water scarcity is a problem that already challenges China's leadership and one that will be exacerbated under projected climate impacts. In addition, the country faces the risk of international retaliation should it fail to undertake serious greenhouse gas mitigation actions. Yet China is not without options, and is already well poised to become a leader in the low-carbon technology revolution.     

Cosmos,chaos: finance,power and conflict

The article explores parallels between the fragility of globalization on the eve of the First World War, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1907, and today's crisis of globalization following the post‐2007 recession. The fragility and interconnectedness of the international economy in both cases could provide a basis for an economic–military strategy. The temptation of using economic connectedness as a substitute for conventional and costly military strategy makes this course particularly attractive to a hegemon—the UK then, the US now—that is facing powerful competition from rising powers (Germany and the US then, China now). The challengers are likely to find their own alternative strategy, and the result breeds uncertainty. In consequence, rule‐based international orders are generally strained by transitions of power, even though all the parties see the desirability and need for a common system of rules.