Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat: implications for Africa

Once it was an environmental issue, then an energy problem, now climate change is being recast as a security threat. So far, the debate has focused on creating a security ‘hook’, illustrated by anecdote, to invest climate negotiations with a greater sense of urgency. Political momentum behind the idea of climate change as a security threat has progressed quickly, even reaching the United Nations Security Council. This article reviews the linkages between climate change and security in Africa and analyses the role of climate change adaptation policies in future conflict prevention. Africa, with its history of ethnic, resource and interstate conflict, is seen by many as particularly vulnerable to this new type of security threat, despite being the continent least responsible for global greenhouse gas emissions. Projected climatic changes for Africa suggest a future of increasingly scarce water, collapsing agricultural yields, encroaching desert and damaged coastal infrastructure. Such impacts, should they occur, would undermine the ‘carrying capacity’ of large parts of Africa, causing destabilizing population movements and raising tensions over dwindling strategic resources. In such cases, climate change could be a factor that tips fragile states into socio‐economic and political collapse. Climate change is only one of many security, environmental and developmental challenges facing Africa. Its impacts will be magnified or moderated by underlying conditions of governance, poverty and resource management, as well as the nature of climate change impacts at local and regional levels. Adaptation policies and programmes, if implemented quickly and at multiple scales, could help avert climate change and other environmental stresses becoming triggers for conflict. But, adaptation must take into account existing social, political and economic tensions and avoid exacerbating them.     

Weather variability and conflict forecasts: Dynamic human-environment interactions in Kenya

While conflict prediction has gained considerable attention in recent years, the existing literature has relied mainly upon aggregated data for large administrative areas or even entire countries. Such approaches obscure significant geographic variation of conflict dynamics based on household and individual experiences. Conflicts are highly localized, shaped by social and economic contexts that vary across space and change throughout time. We predict two types of conflict reported by respondents in a 2018 Kenyan population survey (N = 1,400) using an identical survey carried out in 2014 in the same enumeration areas (sample locations). We use a conditional random forest (CRF) machine learning method for forecasting. Due to heavy reliance on agriculture in Kenya, we expect that adding weather variability and vegetation health (“environmental”) predictors to a CRF model with 29 demographic and contextual variables will improve the performance of our baseline forecasts. Against our expectations, adding environmental predictors does not enhance our 2018 predictions. Models with only environmental data have the worst fit. A logical extension of many “climate-conflict” studies is that environmental data should improve our ability to predict the location and timing of conflict, yet we find that they generally do not. We interpret this finding through the lens of human-environment interactions research developed in human geography and political ecology. These studies similarly emphasized that circumstantial and historical political, economic, and social relationships have greater credibility for understanding conflict than the weather.     

Climate change and conflict: Making sense of disparate findings

This introduction to the special issues starts with a general overview of the literature. The relationship between climate, climate change, and conflict has been empirically tested in a wide variety of studies, but the literature has yet to converge on a commonly accepted set of results. This is mainly due to poor conceptualization of research designs and empirical measurements. Data are often collected at different temporal, geographic, and social scales. In addition, “climate” and “conflict” are rather elusive concepts and scholars have utilized different measures of each. The choice of measures and empirical tests is not a trivial one, but reflects different theoretical frameworks for understanding environmental influences on conflict. Therefore, results from different analyses are often not commensurable with one another and readers should be wary of broad, sweeping characterizations of the literature. The individual contributions to the special issue are also discussed. Articles herein focus on different geographic regions, temporal periods, and levels of conflict, adding additional layers of complexity to our understanding of the climate/conflict nexus.     

Good for glaciers,bad for people? Archaeologically relevant climate models developed from reconstructions of glacier mass balance

We present a new climate and vegetation model, and discuss applications with a study of medieval land degradation and settlement abandonment in þórsmörk, Iceland. Existing meteorological data are used as the starting point for modelling glacier snowlines (equilibrium lines), and this is developed to model seasonal snowcover, potential vegetation and growing season. The current status and past fluctuations of glaciers across Iceland provide independent spatial and temporal constraints to the model. In þórsmörk, there was extensive landscape degradation and settlement abandonment in the late Medieval period, with an unclear role for climate change. Modelling of the landscape impacts of a 1 °C fall in temperatures shows that climatically induced degradation through reduced vegetation, growing season, and increased snowcover had limited effects on the once settled area, highlighting the importance of anthropogenically driven change. High resolution modelling offers a significant potential for assessing ‘what if’ questions, and identifying key empirical tests.     

Conflict on the urban fringe: Urbanization,environmental stress,and urban unrest in Africa

Most research on the security implications of environmental and demographic change does not explicitly distinguish between urban and rural areas. While statistical conflict analyses are increasingly sophisticated with respect to spatial and substantive disaggregation they largely ignore the possibility that urban and rural areas may be affected differently. In Africa, a continent assumed to be particularly vulnerable to the social and economic externalities of environmental and demographic change, less than one percent of the land mass is defined as ‘urban’. Yet, the population that lives in African cities is expected to increase by more than 150% between 2020 and 2050 according to UN population forecasts, massively outpacing rural population growth estimated at 35%. Given the vast social transformation associated with this process of rapid urbanization, understanding the dynamics and consequences of urban population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its possible relationship with environmental factors is key to reducing vulnerabilities and facilitating sustainable urban growth on the continent. In this article we argue that high urban population growth may strain the provision of public services in urban areas, heighten competition over scarce urban land, and increase the chances of urban social unrest. We expect population pressure to have the most profound effects on social unrest in peri-urban areas, meaning the urban outskirts. We further investigate whether environmental push factors, operationalized as droughts happening in rural areas proximate to the urban centers, could be driving any effect of urban population growth on social disorder, possibly supporting concerns over climate change-induced social unrest. We test our expectations on a sample of similarly sized urban and peri-urban ‘grid cells’ covering the whole of the African continent for the 1997–2010 period, using geo-coded social unrest data. Our analysis shows that urban population growth is associated with increased unrest in the peri-urban areas only. We find no evidence, however, that this relationship is driven by environmental push factors in the form of nearby droughts. The study contributes insights relevant to the broader debates about possible security implications of hyper-urbanization and climate change.     

Political geography and climate change: Introduction to a virtual special issue of Political Geography on climate change and political geography,November 2015–February 2016

Climate change is a major issue in global politics, one that has profound implications for the future of the planet, and one that political geographers have been addressing in recent years. This special virtual issue of Political Geography highlights the contributions made in the journal to addressing both the empirical questions of how climate change might cause conflict and human insecurity and the larger questions of how climate is represented in political discourse and policy discussions.     

On exposure,vulnerability and violence: Spatial distribution of risk factors for climate change and violent conflict across Kenya and Uganda

Recent studies discuss the link between climate change and violent conflict, especially for East Africa. While there is extensive literature on the question whether climate change increases the risk of violent conflict onset, not much is known about where a climate-conflict link is most likely to be found. We address this question by analyzing the spatial distribution of the factors commonly associated with a high exposure and vulnerability to climate change, and a high risk of violent conflict onset in Kenya and Uganda. Drawing on recent literature and quantitative data for the period 1998–2008, we develop various specifications of a composite risk index (CRI) with a spatial resolution of half a degree for Kenya and Uganda in the year 2008. A quantitative comparison with conflict data for the year 2008 provides support for the composite risk index. Finally, the composite risk index is contrasted with the findings of three qualitative case studies, which provide mixed support for the index and help to identify its strengths and weaknesses as well as conceptual needs for further quantitative studies on climate change and violent conflict.     

Diffusion patterns of violence in civil wars

Much of the current conflict literature attempts to explain the occurrence of violence as the result of determinants exogenous to the conflict process. This paper takes a different approach and analyzes how violence in civil wars spreads in space and time, drawing on earlier work on micro-diffusion of violence in criminology as well as high resolution conflict data. Two general scenarios are distinguished in our analysis: the relocation and the escalation of conflict. Relocation diffusion corresponds to a shift in the location of violence, whereas escalation diffusion refers to the spatial expansion of the conflict site. We argue that unconventional warfare in civil wars without demarcated front lines should primarily lead to the second type of pattern. We describe an extension to a joint count statistic to measure both diffusion types in conflict event data. Monte Carlo simulation allows for the establishment of a baseline for the frequency of contiguous conflict events under the assumption of independence, and thus provides a significance test for the observed patterns. Our results suggest that violence in civil wars exhibits patterns of diffusion, and in particular, that these patterns are primarily of the escalation type, driven by the dynamic expansion of the scope of the conflict.     

The Links Among Contested Knowledge,Beliefs, and Learning in European Climate Governance: From Consensus to Conflict in Reforming Biofuels Policy

The close link between scientific knowledge, learning, and beliefs is particularly relevant in environmental policymaking and the interaction of environmental with economic development‐focused policies. This article contributes to a more refined understanding of the links among scientific knowledge, belief changes, and the move from a collaborative to an adversarial policy subsystem within the Advocacy Coalition Framework. It analyzes the process of drafting and negotiating the biofuels aspects of the European Renewable Energy Directive, which was dominated by political disagreements between two advocacy coalitions. Their initial agreement on increasing the share of renewable energies in transport turned into conflict after new scientific evidence emerged on the negative environmental and climate change impacts of crop‐based biofuels. The environmental coalition changed its empirical policy beliefs to reflect normative policy beliefs on environmental protection. This change in empirical policy beliefs uncovered a pre‐existing conflict with the normative policy beliefs of the economic development‐focused coalition. As a consequence, the collaborative policy subsystem shifted to an adversarial policy subsystem.     

Late Glacial and Holocene Vegetation History at Dublin Bog North-Central Tasmania

Percentage and influx pollen analyses of a 9.17 m core from Dublin Bog give a post last glaciation vegetation history (-13.6 to 0 ka BP) for the upper Mersey Valley. Herbaceous vegetation of Gramineae, Compositae and Chenopodiaceae developed rapidly after deglaciation and lasted until 13.2 ka BP. Around 13 ka BP Eucalyptus woodland and forest developed rapidly on the valley floor. At the same time Pomaderris apetala became an important understorey shrub/tree, and Phyllocladus aspleniifolius rainforest developed in the gullies on the upper slopes of the Mersey Valley and in the valleys to the west The major change in climate from late glacial cold (and probably drier conditions) to warm humid conditions similar to present occurred between 13.2 and 13 ka BP. Wet sclerophyll Eucalyptus forest occupied the valley throughout the post glacial and attained its maximum development between 11.7 and 8.4 ka BP. Rainforest never occupied the valley floor extensively. Phyllocladus aspleniifolius sattained an early maximum about 13 ka BP. The peak of Pomaderris apetala and expansion of Dicksonia antarctica suggests that the climate was warmer and wetter between 10.3 and 8.4 ka BP than at other times. Nothofagus attained its maximum development between about 10.3 and 6 ka BP. Both sclerophyll and rainforest vegetation associations in the upper Mersey Valley appear to have been very stable and similar to their present floristic compositions during the Holocene. Aborigines occupied the valley by 10 ka BP. Fire was always present in this marginal area between the wet climate of western and the dry climate of eastern Tasmania. Fire did not cause replacement of rainforest by wet sclerophyll forest on the valley floor, though it could have prevented rainforest establishment     

Trends and triggers: Climate,climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000–2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by expected changes in climate.     

Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict

In a world of rising sea levels and melting glaciers, climate change is most likely occurring but with uncertain overall effects. I argue that we can predict the effects of climate change on migration by exploring the effects of environmental problems on migration in recent decades. People can adapt to these problems by staying in place and doing nothing, staying in place and mitigating the problems, or leaving the affected areas. The choice between these options will depend on the extent of problems and mitigation capabilities. People living in lesser developed countries may be more likely to leave affected areas, which may cause conflict in receiving areas. My findings support this theory, and suggest certain policy implications for climate change.     

Forty-five years in climatology—a personal odyssey

This article presents a personal perspective on an academic and research vocation spanning a period of over 45 years. It starts with my early involvement in geography and climatology and terminates with my recent experience in a large interdisciplinary research venture. The presentation highlights, with specific examples, the importance of mentors. Also emphasized is the indispensable input of colleagues and graduate students to successful research endeavours. Most of my career has been centred on McMaster University, and I naturally draw on my experiences there. There have been great changes in the research world over the past few decades. Although the number of faculty and graduate students at McMaster remained relatively constant, the research output per person more than doubled. This is attributed in large part to the accelerating technological advancements in our ability to measure and our ability to process and manipulate data. In the environmental sciences, this has revolutionized the spatial and temporal scope of the scientific questions that can be addressed. Such major changes have stimulated a marked trend towards interdisciplinary research that has evolved from mainly wishful talking to active pursuit in a search to understand complex environmental interactions. Important among these is gaining insights into the processes and feedbacks driving climate change, whether natural or anthropologically induced. Equally important is gaining an understanding of the potential impacts resulting from climate change. My perception of my successes, failures and near misses divides chronologically into three periods that cover research in the early years, research in the central subarctic and research in the Mackenzie River Basin.     

Climate change, conflict and development in Sudan: global neo-Malthusian narratives and local power struggles

Dystopian accounts of climate change posit that it will lead to more conflict, causing state failure and mass population movements. Yet these narratives are both theoretically and empirically problematic: the conflict–environment hypothesis merges a global securitization agenda with local manipulations of Northern fears about the state of planetary ecology. Sudan has experienced how damaging this fusion of wishful thinking, power politics and top-down development can be. In the 1970s, global resource scarcity concerns were used locally to impose the fata morgana of Sudan as an Arab-African breadbasket: in the name of development, violent evictions of local communities contributed to Sudan's second civil war and associated famines. Today, Darfur has been labelled ‘the world's first climate change conflict’, masking the long-term political-economic dynamics and Sudanese agency underpinning the crisis. Simultaneously, the global food crisis is instrumentalized to launch a dam programme and agricultural revival that claim to be African answers to resource scarcity. The winners, however, are Sudan's globalized Islamist elites and foreign investors, whilst the livelihoods of local communities are undermined. Important links exist between climatic developments and security, but global Malthusian narratives about state failure and conflict are dangerously susceptible to manipulations by national elites; the practical outcomes decrease rather than increase human security. In the climate change era, the breakdown of institutions and associated violence is often not an unfortunate failure of the old system due to environmental shock, but a strategy of elites in wider processes of power and wealth accumulation and contestation.     

The Kilosa Killings: Political Ecology of a Farmer–Herder Conflict in Tanzania

Farmer–herder conflicts in Africa are often presented as being driven by ‘environmental scarcity’. Political ecologists, however, argue that these conflicts should be analysed within a broader historical and policy context. This article presents a case study of a local conflict in the Kilosa District in Tanzania that tragically culminated in the killing of thirty‐eight farmers on 8 December 2000. To understand the conflict, the authors argue that it is necessary to study the history of villagization and land use in the District, as well as national land tenure and pastoral policies. Attempts at agricultural modernization have fostered an anti‐pastoral environment in Tanzania. The government aim is to confine livestock keeping to ‘pastoral villages’, but these villages lack sufficient pastures and water supplies, leading herders to search for such resources elsewhere. Pastoral access to wetlands is decreasing due to expansion of cultivated areas and the promotion of agriculture. The main tool that pastoralists still possess to counteract this trend is their ability to bribe officials. But corruption further undermines people's trust in authorities and in the willingness of these authorities to prevent conflicts. This leads actors to try to solve problems through other means, notably violence.     

Mitigating conflict with collaboration: Reaching negotiated agreement amidst belief divergence in environmental governance

High levels of conflict among coalitions in a policy process are often attributed to belief divergence and may lead to policy gridlock. Thus, reducing belief divergence may facilitate negotiation and open the door for policy change. Beliefs are notoriously difficult to change, however, especially in high-conflict settings. Collaborative governance has been touted as one method for mitigating conflict to a level where negotiation is possible by means including but not limited to belief change. This study investigates the relationship between belief divergence as a driver of policy conflict and collaborative governance as a conflict mitigation tool by analyzing the beliefs of two opposing coalitions as they participate in a decade-long collaborative environmental governance process that ended in negotiated agreement. Using longitudinal survey and interview data, we find that coalitions' beliefs diverge more at a later point in the process, due primarily to the reinforcement and strengthening of one coalition's beliefs; however, we also identify aspects of the collaborative process that helped foster negotiated agreement amidst this growing belief divergence. These findings can inform scholarship on conflict mitigation in environmental governance as well as the design of more effective collaborative processes in high-conflict settings.     

Climate change,human security and violent conflict

Climate change is increasingly been called a ‘security’ problem, and there has been speculation that climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict. This paper integrates three disparate but well-founded bodies of research – on the vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change, on livelihoods and violent conflict, and the role of the state in development and peacemaking, to offer new insights into the relationships between climate change, human security, and violent conflict. It explains that climate change increasingly undermines human security in the present day, and will increasingly do so in the future, by reducing access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods. Climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods. We argue that in certain circumstances these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security may in turn increase the risk of violent conflict. The paper then outlines the broad contours of a research programme to guide empirical investigations into the risks climate change poses to human security and peace.     

Concerning values: what underlies public polarisation about climate change?

Climate change is a partisan issue, with increasingly politically polarised responses, particularly in Anglophone countries. While politics clearly have a role in determining attitudes to climate science and policy, understanding the human values that underlie attitudes offers advantages over a focus on political differences. This study examines public concern about climate change in Hobart, the state capital of Tasmania, Australia. Hobart is a microcosm of polarisation about environmental issues due to its long history of conflict over natural resource use. Using a survey of 522 citizens of Hobart, the research examines the values underlying concern and unconcern about climate change. Applying an innovative analysis of human values to this area of research, I have found that, in the Tasmanian context, the unconcerned may be categorised into two groups with opposing values: people who prioritise national security, social order, and tradition; and people who value freedom of choice and the ability to make their own decisions. High levels of climate change concern are associated strongly with care for nature, suggesting that climate change is seen primarily as a threat to the environment, rather than to humanity. In this article, I argue that understanding the values underlying divergent interpretations of the threat of climate change is essential to resolving deadlock in political discourse. The work draws lessons for re‐engaging the unconcerned in inclusive conversations about climate change through narratives addressing a broader range of values.     

Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies,vulnerability and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

The mounting evidence for climate change has put the security implications of increased climate variability high on the agenda of policymakers. However, several years of research have produced no consensus regarding whether climate variability increases the risk of armed conflict. Many have suggested that instead of outright civil war, climate variability is likely to heighten the risk of communal conflict. In particular, erratic rainfall, which reduces the availability of water and arable land, could create incentives for violent attacks against other communities to secure access to scarce resources. Yet, whether groups resort to violence in the face of environmentally induced hardship is likely to depend on the availability of alternative coping mechanisms, for example through market transfers or state accommodation. This suggests that the effect of rainfall anomalies on communal conflict will be stronger in the presence of economic and political marginalization. We evaluate these arguments statistically, utilizing a disaggregated dataset combining rainfall data with geo-referenced events data on the occurrence of communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008. Our results suggest that large negative deviations in rainfall from the historical norm are associated with a higher risk of communal conflict. There is some evidence that the effect of rainfall shortages on the risk of communal conflict is amplified in regions inhabited by politically excluded ethno-political groups.     

Angola 2025: The Future of the “World's Richest Poor Country” as Seen through a Chinese Rear‐View Mirror

Abstract: As Africa's foremost “emerging market” Angola is receiving increasing recognition for its oil wealth, leading to attempts to engage it as a strategic partner, especially amongst the “rising powers”. In particular, there has been considerable escalation in development cooperation between Angola and China recently, though relatively little is known about the precise terms of this “partnership” despite China's key role in Angola's post‐conflict reconstruction. The growing importance of Chinese credit lines and increasing presence of Chinese corporate agencies across Angolan territory raise important questions about development, poverty reduction and inequality; governance and labour relations; and Angola's institutional capacity and the social structure of its cities. This paper critically examines the specific outcomes of Angola's “partnership” with China along with the hybrid conceptions and tangled geographies of “development” produced as a result. In particular, it seeks to interrogate the visions of Angola's future articulated by the Angolan state and the reference points and “models” of development that they draw upon.