Ghana,India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960–1

This article examines the role of Ghana and India at the United Nations during the Congo crisis from July 1960 to February 1961. The role of non-aligned countries both in the UN peacekeeping force, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), and in the negotiation of Congo policy was fundamental to the evolution of events. The article shows how Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana used the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Afro-Asian bloc to alter UN Congo policy. In leveraging their influence with in the General Assembly, the NAM was able to sustain the UN effort in the Congo and preserve the prestige of the organisation. In the process, NAM members realised the benefits and the limitations of non-aligned politics in the context of a violent, anti-colonial war. The crisis had the effect of rupturing the status quo at the UN and in the eight months under study here, it is argued that the actions of the NAM within the UN helped to activate the agency of the organisation in pursuit of neutralist principles. The Congo crisis served as the turning point in the decolonisation drama and NAM's influence over UN Congo policy represented a dynamic form of anti-colonial internationalism.     

To live and let die: Food,famine, and administrative violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979

Between 1975 and 1979 approximately two million people died in the Cambodian genocide. We argue that the mass violence that transpired during this period was a manifestation of the Khmer Rouge's attempt to make life. Through a focus on the production of both violence and vulnerability we direct attention to the contradictory policies and practices forwarded by the Khmer Rouge that were designed to maximize life through the maximization of death. Specifically, we consider the mass starvation that accompanied the genocide as a structure of violence; we forward the argument that the rationing of food constitutes a calculated yet contradictory policy, namely that food rations represent in material form an inner contradiction of fostering life and disallowing life. Subsequently, the policy of forced rations—which imposed a particular space of vulnerability on Cambodia's population—resulted in massive loss of life through starvation and disease that were not the unintended side-effects of poor research, poor planning, or poor implementation on behalf of the Khmer Rouge, but rather were the necessary consequences of a proto-capitalist form of state-building.     

To live and let die: Food,famine, and administrative violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979

Between 1975 and 1979 approximately two million people died in the Cambodian genocide. We argue that the mass violence that transpired during this period was a manifestation of the Khmer Rouge's attempt to make life. Through a focus on the production of both violence and vulnerability we direct attention to the contradictory policies and practices forwarded by the Khmer Rouge that were designed to maximize life through the maximization of death. Specifically, we consider the mass starvation that accompanied the genocide as a structure of violence; we forward the argument that the rationing of food constitutes a calculated yet contradictory policy, namely that food rations represent in material form an inner contradiction of fostering life and disallowing life. Subsequently, the policy of forced rations—which imposed a particular space of vulnerability on Cambodia's population—resulted in massive loss of life through starvation and disease that were not the unintended side-effects of poor research, poor planning, or poor implementation on behalf of the Khmer Rouge, but rather were the necessary consequences of a proto-capitalist form of state-building.