District Voter Turnout and Dyadic Representation in Congress

One of the most important tools by which citizens can influence their elected officials' behavior is through voting—the electoral connection. Previous studies demonstrate that the opinions of voters are better represented than the opinions of nonvoters within an electoral jurisdiction, but we do not know whether jurisdictions with higher levels of aggregate voter turnout are better represented by their elected officials compared to those with lower levels of turnout. Using data compiled across five congressional sessions (2003–2013), this article investigates whether congressional districts with higher voter turnout are better represented by their member of Congress (MC). We find evidence that district voter turnout positively conditions the relationship between district opinion and MC voting behavior even after accounting for the possible effects of electoral competition and district income and racial demographics. In addition, we uncover evidence that partisan differences exist in this conditioning effect such that higher voter turnout enhances roll call voting responsiveness among Democratic MCs but not among Republican MCs. These findings suggest that congressional districts as a whole benefit from a political responsiveness standpoint when more of their constituents turn out to vote and contribute to literatures on political representation, political participation, democratic accountability, and the U.S. Congress.     

The Modern Presidency and Theories of Accountability: Old Wine and Old Bottles

This study attempts to reconcile two apparently conflicting characteristics of congressional voting–stability in congressional decisionmaking and efforts to influence change in congressional voting decisions–by developing a concept and measurement of congressional voting response to short-term forces. The analysis indicates that congressional members do occasionally deviate from established policy positions on a subset of votes in response to the President of their party. In general, congressional members are more likely to deviate from their general policy positions when the policy area is characterized by change.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

Public and Partisan Opinions of the Speaker of the House

Using polling data from 1982 to 2009, I develop a model of public opinion toward the Speaker of the House. I show that, in addition to economic and institutional factors, the speaker's ideology and events associated with the speaker's responsibilities in office affect the public's opinion toward this congressional leader. I also examine the partisan differences in the formation of public opinions about the speaker. I find that minority party partisans are more likely to have negative evaluations of the speaker when the speaker has more ideologically extreme views which lead to higher levels of polarization. In addition, members of different parties weigh economic and institutional factors differently in their evaluations of the speaker.     

Leaving on a Jet Plane: Polarization,Foreign Travel,and Comity in Congress

No political observer, politician, or political scientist doubts that party polarization has weakened the social fabric of Congress. Measuring that effect, however, is exceedingly difficult. In this article, we operationalize the congressional social fabric by examining the foreign travel behavior of members of Congress over time. We evaluate the social disintegration in Congress by examining if and whether changes in member travel can explain why the social connectedness of members has waned. Using a unique dataset of foreign travel for House members from 1977 to 2012, we find that Republican House members, in particular, have altered their foreign travel patterns. Ideologically extreme members have always been less likely to take foreign trips, but extremely conservative Republican have become much more likely to travel only with co-partisans as polarization has increased in Congress. Ideologically moderate Republicans, while still traveling as members of bipartisan delegations, have also increased their willingness to travel only with fellow Republicans. Our results suggest that bipartisan foreign travel is a victim of the partisan war waging in Congress.     

Whose Approval Matters? Reelection,Constituency Approval,and Senate Support for President George W. Bush

Debate exists concerning the impact of presidential approval on congressional support for the president. One source of this debate is that while theory specifies an electoral connection, suggesting that legislators will be responsive to approval within their reelection constituency, most research employs national approval measures. Lack of constituency-level data has forced studies to use national measures of approval, but in as much as national and district level approval differ, national approval will not provide quality estimates of district opinion on the president. This article uses SurveyUSA data from 2005–2006, which provide state-level estimates for approval as well as breakdowns by partisanship (Democrats, Republicans, Independent). Analysis finds that, with controls, state-level approval has a statistically significant, albeit marginal, impact on senator support for the president. Stronger effects on support are found for approval from the senators’ reelection constituency, defined as voters of the senators’ party. These findings suggest directions for future research.     

Five Factions,Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994–2002

This paper examines the extent of ideological cohesion and distinction of two Republican congressional factions (the conservative Republican Study Committee and the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership) and three Democratic congressional caucuses (the moderate Blue Dog Coalition, the liberal Congressional Black Caucus, and the liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus) in the House of Representatives from 1994 to 2002. Whereas much of the literature on congressional caucuses has focused on the reasons members join such groups and the policy and political orientations of those groups, this paper examines how much unity exists in the voting behavior of the members of Congress who join caucuses in comparison to their fellow partisans not in a faction. Although political parties are still a major unifying force for their respective party members, we do find that factional members are more ideologically cohesive than are nonfactional members. Joining a faction is not an insignificant activity for members. Factions allow like-minded colleagues to come together and vote on common issues, at times against direction of their party.     

Medicaid Expansion and the Political Fate of the Governors Who Support It

We provide evidence regarding potential policy feedback effects of healthcare reform by estimating the effect of Medicaid expansion on public support for the state actor most closely associated with responsibility for the expansion decision—the governor. The discretion granted to state governments concerning Medicaid expansion has created the potential for significant variation in mass feedback effects across the states. We are particularly interested in how these effects are influenced by the emerging racial polarization over healthcare policy, and how this may lead to different types of feedback effects that align with partisan, ideological, and racial cleavages. We estimate the impact of Medicaid expansion on gubernatorial approval, utilizing five waves of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2008–16). We find that on average, expansion led to a modest, yet statistically significant increase in gubernatorial approval. However, there is important variation both within and across states in the effect of expansion. Specifically, we find that governors were more likely to be rewarded for expansion by those who supported President Obama, and those who resided in states where the Medicaid recipient population is more likely to be white.     

Building Alliances or Rallying the Base: Civil Religious Rhetoric and the Modern Presidency

Abstract

Civil religious rhetoric has been utilized throughout American history to legitimize political interests by drawing upon broadly shared beliefs regarding the nation’s identity, meaning, and purpose in the world. Although scholars have traditionally assumed this rhetoric was employed to unify the nation, others emphasize its potential to exacerbate conflict as policy debates morph into battles over the national identity. This research project analyzes presidential speeches from Franklin Roosevelt through Barack Obama (1939–2012) and finds that the type of speech delivered, public approval of the president, and the partisan composition of Congress influence the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. It concludes that modern presidents have more often relied upon civil religion to rally the partisan base than build alliances with the opposition.     

"Don't Go Changing to Try and Please Me": A Preference-Consistency Analysis on Trade Policy in the U.S. House

Trade voting in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993 to 2001 provides an opportunity to move beyond examining the determinants of trade voting on single bills and to focus on the consistency members of Congress demonstrate in their trade preferences. We find that while a significant percentage of House members are consistent in their trade preferences during the time period, a surprising percentage of those members serving over the entire period are inconsistent, affecting important changes in U.S. trade policy. Ideological, partisan, and constituency- based factors prove significant cross-pressures on House members' trade preferences throughout the time period; however, we unearth differences in effects between the two parties. It is these cross-pressures that lead to inconsistent preferences among some legislators.     

When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use Committee Assignments as Rewards?

Theories of parties in Congress contend that one tool that party leaders possess to induce loyalty among rank-and-file members is control over committee assignments, but conventional tests of this linkage have failed to distinguish loyalty from simply voting one's preferences in accordance with party leaders. We characterize loyal legislators as having a higher propensity for voting with party leaders when it matters, even when their preferences diverge from the mainstream of their party. Testing this strong definition of loyalty on committee assignment data for 1991–2015, we show that majority party members who support their party on the subset of votes for which party leaders have taken positions in floor speeches are more likely to be rewarded with plum committee assignments, especially those members on the ideological extremes.     

Representational Inconsistency: Presentation of Self and Explanations of Washington Activity in Campaign Mail and Franked Mail

Studies of representation have focused primarily on the correlation between legislators’ voting records and their constituents’ preferences; however, accountability inevitably includes representatives’ explanations of their legislative actions. Unlike previous research that has examined consistency within a single form of communication, this study systematically examines legislators’ consistency in the explanations they give across different means of communication. Contrary to arguments that members of Congress do not vary their explanations or presentational styles, we find that incumbents present themselves to constituents differently through different methods of communication. Using the 2006 Campaign Communication Survey, a random survey of registered voters in Ohio and Pennsylvania who were asked to send in all campaign mail received during three weeks in 2006, we compare the content of campaign mail and franked mail incumbents send to constituents. Even though the mediums of communication are similar and the timing of franked mail suggests its use as a campaign tool, we find incumbents use these different tools to present themselves to their constituents in different ways. As such, we argue that fully understanding a member of Congress's representational style requires an examination of a wide range of congressional activities.     

Ideological Primary Competition and Congressional Behavior

Abstract

Primary challenges on an incumbent’s more extreme flank have become increasingly common in congressional elections. We explore the consequences on the legislative behavior of successful incumbents following these types of challenges. We propose that the effect of extreme ideological primary challenges is conditioned on whether the member belongs to the majority or the minority party. We test our expectations on primary elections from 2000 to 2012 and corresponding changes in voting behavior in the next Congress. We find that incumbents in the majority party who have defeated an extreme ideological primary challenge are less likely to support their party, especially on key votes. We expect this reaction is because they fear appearing too moderate and thereby encouraging another extreme ideological primary challenge. We find that incumbents in the minority party who face an extreme ideological challenge do not change their general voting behavior, but are more likely to vote with their party on key votes.     

Owning Valence Issues: The Impact of a “Culture of Corruption” on the 2006 Midterm Elections

The 109th Congress commenced with a huge ethical cloud hanging over the Capitol. In January 2005, prominent Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff admitted conspiring to defraud Native American tribes and corrupt public officials. As a result, the Democratic Party chose to adopt corruption as a central theme of their 2006 congressional campaign. They argued that the scandal resulted from a “culture of corruption” fostered by Republicans, who controlled Congress. Although past research shows that voters do punish at the polls congressional incumbents under criminal investigation, little is known about whether the mere appearance of wrongdoing can be assigned to an entire party and cost its candidates votes. Utilizing data from a variety of sources, we find that systemic efforts by House Democratic leaders to frame Republicans as “owning” the scandal—whether individual members actually received Abramoff funds or not—were largely successful in the polls and at the ballot box. These findings suggest that scholarly views of the influence of corruption may have been overly restrictive and that voters are willing, at least in this case, to punish public officials who “appear” to be corrupt.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

The coordinated behavior of members of a state delegation to the U.S. Senate can provide constituents in a state greater representation in Congress. Despite this potentially improved level of representation through coordination, popular and scholarly accounts of the U.S. Senate often feature senators from the same state at odds with one another on a variety of policy issues. In this research, we investigate competing expectations regarding the frequency (across topics) of collaborations between members of a state delegation to the Senate. We then test our expectations using patterns in bill cosponsorship in the 103rd–110th U.S. Senates. We find that senators from the same state work together often on the development of legislation, and that this coordinated activity is consistent across a variety of bill topics across many sessions of congressional activity. Notably, same-state status is an even stronger predictor of support via cosponsorship than is same-party status, raising possible avenues of breaking through partisan gridlock.     

The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Polarization and Presidential Success in Congress

For better or for worse, presidents receive much of the credit and much of the blame for their legislative success in Congress. Indeed, much has been written about the correlates of presidential success in Congress. In this article, we test the proposition that presidential success in Congress is mainly a function of context and the context of presidential interactions with Congress has changed over the past 50 years. Specifically, it is both the best of times and worst of times for presidential relations with the legislative branch. It is increasingly the case that because of partisan polarization in Washington, presidents can be quite successful, if they command a majority. However, if they face a divided government gridlock is the result and overcoming that gridlock has gotten to be more difficult over time.     

Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws passed from the 95th through the 108th Congresses in order to demonstrate the specific influence of presidential signing statements on future congressional amendment activity. The results of our analysis lend support to the theory that laws receiving presidential signing statements are in fact more likely to be revisited and revised by Congress. These findings add to the literature both on presidential signing statements as well as the evolution of laws.     

Presidential Impeachment and Institutional Dynamics in the Iran-Contra Affair and the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal

This paper analyzes institutional dynamics affecting Congress's impeachment decisions regarding the Iran-Contra Affair and the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. While other scholars have explained the Clinton impeachment by pointing to differences in the nature of the scandals–a decoupling of public opinion from legislative action, increasing partisanship, and a new media regime–these explanations overlook the nature of impeachment as an institutional confrontation, governed by institutional choices and dynamics. Taking an institutional approach, we argue that congressional decisions were strongly affected by the institutional arrangements adopted by Congress to handle the scandals' investigations. In brief, the earlier strategic approaches of party leaders and the congressional investigatory approach restrained inclinations to impeach President Reagan, while later ones promoted President Clinton's impeachment. More broadly, this analysis demonstrates the important interaction between institutional choices and party leaders' powers and strategies in affecting congressional action.     

Business Backgrounds and Congressional Behavior

In the following paper, we analyze whether the behavior of members of Congress with business backgrounds differs from that of other legislators, and we find that it does. Specifically, House members with business backgrounds have closer relationships with business interests (as measured by larger contributions from corporate PACs) and demonstrate more probusiness roll call voting. We also find that members making a direct transition from a business career to the House sponsor more business-focused legislation. The significance of a business background is consistent across different forms of behavior, though the magnitude of effects is generally modest. Our findings contribute to a growing body of literature emphasizing the importance of legislator backgrounds to their behavior in office.

Republican Pete Coors brings it up in nearly every campaign speech: There are too many lawyers in the U.S. Senate.... His point is that he'd like to see more successful businesspeople running the country the same way they guide their companies. (Florio 2004)     

Gender and Patterns of Roll Call Voting in the U.S. Senate

Previous studies of gender and representation at the state legislative level and in the U.S. House of Representatives have shown that women tend to be more liberal than their male colleagues and are more likely to support women's issues. Because of the limited presence of women in the body over the years, there is scant empirical evidence to confirm whether this pattern is present in the U.S. Senate. Sound theoretical basis indicates that the institutional rules of the Senate, the Senate's individualistic culture, the Senate's six-year election timetable, and the national profile of U.S. senators may create conditions that allow gender differences in roll call voting to be more easily detected than is possible in more rigidly structured institutions such as the U.S. House. This study employs a longitudinal design that pools roll call voting data from the 103rd Congress through the 110th Congress to determine whether female senators compile substantively different policy records than their male colleagues. The results indicate that gender does systematically influence roll call voting patterns in the Senate. However, it is largely a function of female Republicans voting in a less conservative fashion than male Republicans on the basic left-right policy space and on a smaller set of issues of importance to women.