1951至1972年蒋介石政权的琉球政策

1879年,日本吞并琉球。开罗会议期间,美国总统罗斯福询问蒋介石,战后如何处理琉球问题,蒋介石提议可由中美共管琉球。1945年,美军攻占琉球。根据《旧金山和约》,美国单独托管琉球,建立了大批军事基地。为了扶植日本,1971年6月17日,美国与日本签署了"归还冲绳协定"。1972年5月15日,美国将琉球交给日本管辖。在台湾的蒋介石政权认为,琉球不是日本的固有领土,琉球的主权属于琉球人民,多次发表声明,反对美国将琉球的行政管辖权交给日本。     

The Politics of an Emergent Global Regime for Controlling Tax Competition

This article probes what I call the emergent global regime for controlling tax competition. Since at least the early 1990s, states have perceived that competition for investment, whether through direct subsidies or tax incentives, threatens to undermine the fiscal underpinnings of the modern state, particularly in terms of its provision of social welfare programs. As states have provided financial or fiscal subsidies to capital (especially mobile capital), they have had to compensate through some combination of imposing higher levels of taxation on other actors, running higher deficits, and cutting spending. Each has shown itself to have substantial problems, and the response of states has now come full circle: to reconsider the competition for investment that causes the fiscal problems in the first place.     

杜勒斯与美国的琉球政策(1950-1951)

如何处理琉球群岛,是美国战后对日和约中需要解决的主要问题之一。1950年4月,杜勒斯被杜鲁门总统任命为国务卿顾问,负责对日和约问题。当时,美国政府内部特别是军方和国务院之间对此存在争论和分歧。杜勒斯因应美国遏制共产主义发展的亚洲政策主要目标,与美国政府内部各方、美国各盟国、苏联、日本等折冲博弈,基本上界定了琉球政策的框架。为满足各方需求,杜勒斯创造了“剩余主权”这一全新概念,通过《旧金山和约》确保了在联合国托管的名义下,美国对北纬29度以南的琉球群岛进行排他性战略控制。同时,杜勒斯主导了《美日安保条约》《美澳新安全条约》《美菲共同防御条约》的形成,初步构建了美国在亚太地区以琉球群岛军事基地为核心的防卫体系。     

The Determination of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948–1974*

The picture of the American state policy-making process which emerges from this analysis is one of a system where politics as well as economics matter a great deal. Partisanship and legislative competition are shown to have demonstrable effect on policy output. The control partisan preference exerts over policy decisions is severely constrained in taxing and spending areas, however, and is conditional on forces external to the model presented here. Surpassing the control over policy output exhibited by partisanship is the extent to which the electorate, or the electoral process, holds the parties responsible for policy performance. Apparently the public doesn't believe that “politics doesn't matter.”     

1936—1941年日本对德政策及其影响

1936—1941年,日本推动对德结盟政策的中心目标是为了实现独霸中国和向太平洋地区扩张。本文深刻地揭示日本对德政策发展演变的轨迹,展现日本对德军事同盟政策的本质特征,并深入研究日本在"南进"和"北进"的战略转换过程中,谋求对德结盟的利益最大化,并通过实证分析,论证日本对德结盟政策中的"竞争"、"对抗"心理,从而说明帝国主义间结盟的利益至上原则。同时,还对日、德、意、苏"四国军事同盟"构想及其演变过程进行考证,指出1941年的《日苏中立条约》实质是该"四国军事同盟"构想的一个畸变。这可以全面透视20世纪三四十年代日本推动对德结盟政策变化的动因和措施,以及对远东国际关系产生的重大影响。     

1941－1949年美国在中国的军事机构及其沿革

从 1 8 35年建立其海军东印度分遣队 (ｔｈｅＥａｓｔＩｎｄｉａｎＳｑｕａｄｒｏｎ)起 ,美国就开始了它在中国领水和领土上的长期存在。只是在日本开始全面侵华战争后 ,美国政府为避免美日冲突才开始从中国撤军。1 937年 1 2月 1 2日 ,在南京附近的江面上 ,日本飞机蓄意炸沉了美国长江巡逻队 (ｔｈｅＹａｎｔｚｅＰａｔｒｏｌ)炮艇“帕奈号”(Ｐａｎａｙ) ,迫使美国逐步撤出其巡逻队。 1 938年 2月 ,美国决定从天津撤出它1 91 2年就开始驻扎在那里的美国陆军第 1 5步兵团 (ｔｈｅＵ .Ｓ .Ａｒｍｙ’ｓ 1 5ｔｈＩｎｆａｎｔｒｙＲｅｇｉｍｅ…     

The Federal Budget: Policy,Process, and Politics

Fiorina, Morris. Divided Government. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Pp. xi, 138. $13.00 Paperback.

Jacobson, Gary C. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition' in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Pp. xvi, 152. $15.95.

Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. Pp. viii, 228. $25.00 Hardback.     

The Tax Threshold: Policy, Principles, and Poverty

In the absence of an independent poverty standard, postwar Britishgovernments have tended to use current, politically determinedsocial security scales (from Unemployment Assistance in the1930s to Income Support today) as their definition of minimallyadequate income levels, commonly known as an ‘officialpoverty line’. A basic principle of taxation since thedays of Adam Smith, however, has been that incomes below theminimum income required for socially defined necessities shouldbe free of tax. The personal tax allowance which determinesthe income tax-paying threshold thus also provides a practicaldefinition of such an official poverty line. Royal Commissionsand official committees since the nineteenth century have endorsedSmith's principle, but it only acquired major political significanceafter the Second World War when income tax began to affect lowearners, particularly after the 1960s when poverty was ‘rediscovered’in the UK. In spite of this potential coincidence of purpose,a review of evidence and interviews with officials shows thatthere has been no co-ordination of policy between the Treasuryand Inland Revenue responsible for determining the level ofthe tax allowances, and the Social Security ministries responsiblefor the minimum benefit scales. The tax threshold has consequentlycontinued to be determined by considerations of political economyand administration and not by the alleviation of poverty. ^* This paper is part of a larger project on concepts of povertyand need in British income maintenance systems, chiefly the‘Assistance’ schemes which ran from 1934 to 1966.I am grateful to the many people who have helped with the project,regrettably too numerous to name here. I am particularly indebtedto Sir Norman Price and Sir Kenneth Stowe, James Meade, DellaNevitt, and). Leonard Nicholson for information on the tax issues,and want to record my thanks to them and to Fran Bennett, JohnHills, Chris Pond, and Adrian Sinfield, and especially RodneyLowe, as well as participants in seminars at the Universitiesof Edinburgh and Essex, and in Budapest, for their advice onthis paper.     

台湾法律地位的扭曲——英国有关政策的演变及与美国的分歧（1949-1951）。

日本战败后,台湾回归中国。在相当一段时期内,英美政府对台湾地位的变更并没有提出任何疑问。但是,随着中国共产党取胜的前景越来越明朗,英美对台政策开始发生变化。为了防止中共占领台湾,英美都提出了在对日和约缔结之前,台湾在法律上还是日本领土的说法。中华人民共和国成立后,英美态度一度出现转变,明确承认台湾是中国的一部分,准备接受中共占领台湾的现实可能。朝战爆发后,美国对台政策再次发生转变。英国尽管仍表示要遵守开罗宣言的承诺,将台湾交还中国,但最终不得不把它与朝鲜问题挂钩,而暂时回避了履行开罗宣言的责任。在缔结对日和约的过程中,英国曾坚持应邀请中华人民共和国的代表参加,并在和约中规定日本将台湾交还中国。但在美国的反对下,英国最终退让,英美达成国共双方均不参与和约签署、和约只言日本放弃台湾主权而不明文交给中国的妥协。50年代初英美围绕台湾地位的讨论充分表明,台湾地位问题的提出是冷战背景下人为的产物。     

'An unholy row in Lancashire': The Textile Lobby, Conservative Politics, and Indian Policy, 1931-1935

This article argues that the ‘Lancashire lobby’remained a vital presence in British politics in the 1930s,not relegated to the political sidelines by ‘gentlemanlycapitalists’ at Westminster. The region's strength, inConservative circles especially, was based not on its numericalstrength in MPs, or in its economic might, but in the symbolicimportance Lancashire had for Conservatives. As this articledemonstrates, this was most evident during the debates overthe Government of India Bill between 1931 and 1935, when theparty's leadership made great, and successful, efforts to keepthe region's representatives from opposing the Bill, and potentiallyswinging many other Tories into opposition as well.