A Review of “Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government”

We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007. The results indicate that the type and number of objections raised in presidential communications affects congressional oversight activity.     

The Politics of Credit in Presidential Signing Statements

The separation of powers often makes it difficult to understand who is responsible for legislative outcomes. Both members of Congress and presidents seek to shape perceptions of policy responsibility to their advantage. Yet, the relative size of the president's rhetorical stage gives him disproportionate influence in molding these discussions at critical moments. Given these circumstances, how, when, and why, do presidents claim credit for themselves and attribute credit to members of Congress for legislation? Using an original dataset based upon a content analysis of all presidential signing statements from 1985–2008, we find that presidential strategies to claim and attribute credit for laws are greatly impacted by both political context (approval, divided government, midterm elections, and party power) and bill-specific attributes (appropriations, salience, and veto threats). The theory and results highlight the importance of taking multiple institutions into account when thinking about credit.     

Congress,Health Care Reform,and Reconciliation

This article explores the role of reconciliation in the passage of health care reform in the 111th Congress. Although counterintuitive, the analysis suggests that the loss of a filibuster-proof super-majority with the election of Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) aided Democrats in clearing the overhaul package by facilitating the use of reconciliation. Reconciliation provided the critical procedural mechanism enabling health care reform to be enacted into law. Despite reconciliation's importance, substantively the reconciliation “fixes” were relatively modest amendments. Moreover, notwithstanding the use of reconciliation, Congress passed the health care legislation with largely conventional means—separate health care reform measures cleared the House and Senate in 2009, in 2010 the House approved the Senate bill, and then both chambers quickly passed the reconciliation addendum. This research draws on discussions I had with over a dozen key actors after health care reform passed.     

Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate

Obstruction is a fundamental aspect of legislative politics. In the United States Congress, senators exercise procedural prerogatives to defeat a bill with which they disagree on policy grounds. We argue that senators also utilize obstructive tactics in order to do more than block legislation with which they disagree. We claim that legislators engage in “weak” (as opposed to strong) obstruction in an effort to accrue political benefits to themselves and their constituents, but only when senators support the underlying policy the bill addresses. We test our theory by measuring the frequency with which senators engage in weak obstruction on bills that passed the Senate between 1973 and 2013. We find that senators are significantly more likely to engage in weakly obstructive behavior when they stand to benefit politically.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

Putting on the Brakes or Pressing on the Gas? Media Attention and the Speed of Policymaking

Media attention is fundamental to the policy process and policy change in punctuated equilibrium theory. In this literature, media attention is usually conceptualized as fomenting or contributing to shifts in attention, positive feedback, and large‐scale policy change. This article extends how we understand the role of the media and punctuated equilibrium by arguing that media coverage can also contribute to negative feedback and stability in the political system. Media attention should also slow down the speed of policymaking and the momentum for policy change as new policy participants and problem definitions enter the debate. Using event history analysis, this article tests the effects of media coverage on the length of time it takes legislation, once introduced, to become law for public laws from the 109th U.S. Congress (2005–06). Findings provide support for media attention “putting the brakes” on policymaking. Controlling for other factors, the speed of bill passage slows down as media attention increases. This effect decays over time for high levels of media coverage.     

Coalition-Building by Party Leaders: A Case Study of House Democrats

This study explores the process by which party leaders build winning coalitions. Focusing on House passage of impoundment legislation in the 93rd Congress, the essay documents the extensive efforts of Democratic leaders to create a viable bill and persuade party members to support it. Analyses of whip counts demonstrate that the leaders passed the impoundment bill in part because they could bargain with and convert “successful” party members whose past career advancement and future achievements depended in part on leadership assistance. The essay concludes by identifying six conditions that nurtured the bargaining capacity of the Democratic leaders and fostered their coalition-building success.¹     

In God We Trust: Abraham Lincoln and America's Deathbed Repentance

Abstract

This article maps several key moments in the evolution of religious symbolism and language on US currency, focusing largely on Abraham Lincoln's overlooked role in signing the motto "In God We Trust" into law. Interpreting the motto through the lens of Lincoln's "Second Inaugural Address"—which he delivered just one day after Congress passed the first statute allowing "In God We Trust" to be stamped on US coins—offers a counter-intuitive interpretation of the motto that functions as a deep, ironic, and historically significant critique of religious nationalism.     

Passing Nonincremental Policy: Presidential Influence in Congress,Kennedy to Carter

This article represents an important step in understanding early, modern presidents’ strategic use of signing statements by taking a sharp focus on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In contrast to recent presidents who have used the instrument increasingly to challenge legislative provisions, Eisenhower's use of signing statements was rather complex—from political credit-claiming, explaining the provisions of bills to the American public, and reinforcing his views on the federal-state balance of power—to maintaining bipartisan relations on foreign policy, shaping implementation of congressional bills, and selectively criticizing Congress for overspending. The theoretical framework devotes particular attention to the interplay of contexts—electoral, institutional, and economic—on Eisenhower's use of signing statements by policy area across his two terms.     

Before the Honeymoon Ends: Presidential Leadership and Congressional Response

Academicians and journalists inevitably pass judgment on the progress of a president's major "honeymoon period" initiatives. Obviously, the success of those initiatives will depend on how Congress responds to new presidents. Data on aggregate congressional response to the "honeymoon" initiatives of the Carter and Reagan presidencies are presented in order to explore how members of Congress react as they evaluate and interact with a new president. Evidence suggests that, despite the conventional wisdom regarding Carter's limited political ability and inflexible nature, members of Congress were more inclined to emphasize organizational deficiencies. Conversely, while Reagan was perceived to be almost as inflexible as Carter, he received superlative marks for organizational efficiency and for providing access to Congress. The analysis then considers the importance of organization to future presidential effectiveness, and the importance of organizational concerns with respect to personal characteristics for overall presidential success.     

A Review of “Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don't Kill the U.S. Constitutional System”

How, and why, do presidents use the rhetorical content in signing statements for strategic purposes? The article analyzes the rhetorical content of the 985 signing statements from FDR through Carter and argues that the president's rhetoric is an effort to frame the accomplishment that has just occurred with an eye toward maximizing prospective power and building legacy. The article explores the impact of different political contexts (divided government and elections) on several important rhetorical characteristics found in signing statements. In addition, the study delves into three interesting cases related to presidential credit claiming and attribution. LBJ and Carter were the most likely to attribute credit to members of Congress, while Nixon was the most likely to claim credit for himself. The findings help illuminate the various motivations that presidents have to use signing statements for reasons beyond constitutional challenges.

Successful political leaders do not necessarily do more than other leaders; successful leaders control the political definition of their actions, the terms in which their places in history are understood. The failures are those who, upon leaving office, look to some time in the distant future when people might begin to appreciate the wisdom of what they did. (Skowronek 1997 Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  [Google Scholar], 17–18)     

The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Polarization and Presidential Success in Congress

For better or for worse, presidents receive much of the credit and much of the blame for their legislative success in Congress. Indeed, much has been written about the correlates of presidential success in Congress. In this article, we test the proposition that presidential success in Congress is mainly a function of context and the context of presidential interactions with Congress has changed over the past 50 years. Specifically, it is both the best of times and worst of times for presidential relations with the legislative branch. It is increasingly the case that because of partisan polarization in Washington, presidents can be quite successful, if they command a majority. However, if they face a divided government gridlock is the result and overcoming that gridlock has gotten to be more difficult over time.     

Identifying the Critical Members of the House of Representatives

This article combines the historical record of presidential-congressional relations with previous scholarly findings to develop a model that identifies the members of Congress whose support is critical to the president's ability to build enacting coalitions. It then analyzes the relationship between President Obama and the House of Representatives during the 113th Congress as a case study that demonstrates the model's utility. Conventional wisdom and political pundits suggest that presidents working in divided government will have impossible difficulty working with Congress, but history suggests otherwise. The president's ability to successfully build enacting coalitions during divided government requires him to perform two rather disparate tasks. First, the president must minimize the amount of presidential party members who cross party lines to vote against the president's position. Second, the president must entice at least some opposition party members to cross party lines and support the president's position. Using data from 1981 to 2015, I find that representatives’ behavior on presidential support votes are related to constituency-level presidential strength, electoral vulnerability, ideological moderation, and ideological extremity. I use these results to identify the critical members of the 113th Congress. When a majority of these critical members supported President Obama's positions his legislative efforts were successful. When a majority of these members opposed the president's positions, the House Republican majority defeated the president.     

The Pendulum of Congressional Power: Agenda Change,Partisanship and the Demise of the Post-World War II Foreign Policy Consensus

Many scholars contend that Congress rarely matters in the realm of foreign policy. The source of this collective impotence is often explained by the weaknesses in congressional institutions vis-a-vis the president, as well as a general inability to respond effectively to a dynamic international political environment. We contend that the debate over congressional activism has not adequately addressed the role of agenda change. We analyze all roll call votes in the House of Representatives relating to the international affairs agenda between 1953 and 1998. We find that presidents have become significantly more likely to stake out positions on economic and trade issues as compared to other international issues. We also observe that presidential positions in the realm of foreign policy are increasingly characterized by interparty and interinstitutional conflict. While this increased conflict has dramatically decreased the president's ability to successfully pass executive priorities in foreign affairs more generally, presidential success on economic and trade issues has witnessed a significantly greater decline. We infer from these results that changes to the foreign policy issue agenda represent one important factor that has affected not only the incentives for political parties to participate actively, but also the willingness of Congress to challenge the president in the foreign policy debate.Asked one day whether it was true that the navy yard in his district was too small to accommodate the latest battleships. Henry Stimson (chair of the House Naval Affairs Committee early in the century) replied, 'That is true, and that is the reason I have always been in favor of small ships.'1Carriers have been, are and will be for the foreseeable future an absolutely essential part of our deterrence force…2John Warner, senator from Virginia, home state of Newport News Shipbuilding     

A Tale of Three Variables: Exploring the Impact of Alternative Measures of Presidential Approval On Congressional Voting

This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background variable rather than a determinant of congressional voting, we maintain that theoretically more meaningful relationships between public opinion and congressional voting can be developed. Specifically, we argue that a more relevant test can be made which includes opinion measured closest to where that opinion is likely to matter to members, namely among electoral copartisans and district-level constituencies. We estimate various models (bivariate and integrated multivariate), and find strong support for our hypotheses that, to the extent members of Congress use public approval as a voting cue, they do in fact pay far more attention to partisan and constituency interests than they do to national opinion.     

Legal Challenges to Presidential Policies on the Use of Military Force

A review of legal challenges to the use of military force, from the Vietnam War era to the Gulf War, demonstrates a judicial unwillingness to constrain presidential policymaking. In most of these cases, the judiciary has ruled the legal challenge nonjusticiable. In the first post-Cold War challenge , Dellums v. Bush, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued the equivalent of a declaratory judgment. Arguably, this is the only practical judicial response to the presidential use of force, but it does little more than redirect the policy conflict from the courts to Congress. The rule of law remains a weak reed in efforts to constrain presidential policymaking on the use of military force.     

Congressional Position Votes in the Truman Administration, 1947–52: A View from the White House

Scholars have routinely overlooked Harry Truman in analyses of presidential position votes in Congress. The principal data source for longitudinal studies of executive-legislative relations, Congressional Quarterly, did not regularly begin compiling presidential position votes until 1953. Yet position votes for the Truman administration do exist. Archival research at the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, Missouri, revealed that the president commissioned his White House staff to undertake an analysis of position votes spanning the 80th, 81st, and 82nd Congresses (1947–52). This research note analyzes Truman's success rate on this set of domestic and foreign policy votes and provides details on the 83 House and 99 Senate position votes for future use by researchers.     

The President as Agenda Setter‐in‐Chief: The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting

In this paper, we investigate the agenda leadership capability of two American political institutions, Congress and the presidency, in an array of issue areas that include both domestic and foreign policy. The president has long been considered to have the most significant role in setting the policymaking agenda, but there is limited empirical research to support that claim. Examining the issue areas of defense, environment, health care, international affairs, law and crime, and macroeconomics from 1956 to 2005, we find statistically significant positive influence by the president on the congressional agenda in all six of the policy areas under examination, providing compelling evidence of presidential agenda leadership and a reactive Congress. Additionally, we find that the agenda relationship between the president and Congress is issue dependent, in that presidential attention has the largest substantive effect on the congressional agenda in the area of international affairs.     

Iranian Journalism and the Law in the Twentieth Century

Although the first Persian language newspaper was published in Iran 170 years ago, Iranian journalism is a twentieth century creation, indeed a product of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. The press played a significant part in the revolution, especially by promoting the demand for the rule of laws enacted by parliament, rather than decrees issued by the king or the religious leaders. Once a constitution had been declared, many journalists felt relieved of all restrictions and engaged in bitter, personal attacks on their opponents, including the monarch and his family. Many papers also opposed a press law that was passed soon after the revolution, arguing that it was meant to suppress their newly-gained freedom. Five more press laws have been passed in Iran since then, but the debate over press freedom and the rule of law in the country does not appear to be anywhere near resolution.     

Presidential Influence Over the Systemic Agenda

One of the most widely accepted sources of presidential power is agenda setting. Being able to affect the media's agenda on key issues–influencing the systemic agenda and expanding the scope of conflict–has enormous consequences for the president's ability to govern effectively. Yet the literature to date has not conclusively determined the extent to which presidents consistently set agendas, especially over the media, because it has not explicitly considered variation in agenda setting influence by policy type. For these reasons, we test whether presidential public statements have increased the media's attention to three policy areas. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis, we demonstrate that presidents have some influence over the systemic agenda, at least in the short term, with policy type being an important predictor of presidential influence. Understanding when and why presidents may or may not be successful agenda setters is crucial to explaining the varying legislative impacts of presidential speech making.