Mister Unpopular: François Hollande and the Exercise of Presidential Leadership, 2012–14

This article examines the first two years of François Hollande's presidential term from a leadership perspective. The central argument is that while Hollande has sometimes been unlucky in the face of unanticipated events and severely constrained by contextual factors outside of his control, notably France's low levels of economic growth, he has also displayed a lack of certain essential leadership qualities. He failed to grasp the scale of the economic situation in the early months of his tenure and so lost precious time in fully addressing the need for structural reforms and engaging in a persuasive pedagogic narrative. In addition, his public communication—an essential leadership quality in the era of mediatised politics—has been poor. Hollande's attempt to relaunch his presidential leadership following the disastrous set of mid-term election results in 2014 marks the start of a new phase in his tenure of the office.     

Executive Publicity and Congressional Resistance, 1905-1913: Congress and the Roosevelt Administration's PR Men

Theodore Roosevelt circumvented Congress and expanded presidential power at the beginning of the 20th century, in part, by using the press to establish executive leadership of public opinion. This article describes how Roosevelt and his chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, launched a crusade in the press for Progressive conservation despite the opposition of congressmen who tried to block the use of publicists by executive agencies. Although Congress forbade the hiring of "publicity experts" in 1913, they were already common in executive agencies.     

In Retreat from Excellence: The Single Six-Year Presidential Term

Analysis of the effects of the single, six-year term proposal by assessing its probable impact on presidential tenure in the past reveals that it would have reduced the tenure of highly regarded presidents who were relatively successful in dealing with Congress and increased the tenure of presidents with lackluster reputations and limited success in congressional relations. Thus, by inference, the adoption of this widely-touted institutional reform might undermine rather than strengthen presidential leadership in American politics.     

William Howard Taft,the 1908 Election,and the Future of the American Presidency

Although the first presidential election where both major party candidates (William Howard Taft and William Jennings Bryan) hit the campaign trail, the election of 1908 is a neglected election. When scholars do address it, they typically focus on retiring incumbent president Theodore Roosevelt and his role therein. This article turns the focus away from Roosevelt, and also Bryan, and places it firmly on Taft, a reluctant candidate. Taft's role in 1908 is important because his very reluctance to embrace the changing expectations of the presidency helps to highlight the tensions between the old and new ways of campaigning and, more broadly, the traditional and modern presidencies.

The article first addresses Taft's decision to abandon his “front-porch” campaign. Taft's initial inclination toward a front-porch campaign reveals well his more traditional approach to the election and to the presidency in general, just as his decision to abandon this plan and “stump” for votes reflects his submission to developing trends and expectations. Second, the article examines the changing role of technology, this election being the first to feature phonograph recordings of the candidates, which would then be sold—and played—across the country. Third, the tours and speeches of Taft in the 1908 general election take center stage. The spectacle of these tours offers further evidence of the changing contours of American politics and presidential leadership, especially in elevating the personalities of the candidates. Finally, the 1908 election is examined from the standpoint of American political development and presidential history.     

FDR, Lewis Douglas, and the, Raw Deal

"Despite my emotions, I could not refuse the responsibility which has been offered; for in times like these, even more so than in times of war, individuals cease to be significant. Only the common welfare is important," explained Lewis Douglas in 1933 as he accepted President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt's offer of the position of director of the budget.¹ Douglas came to his post with a strong sense of obligation—he was certain the United States was in a "critical condition," and the only solution to the devastating depression lay in balancing the budget.² Roosevelt seemingly agreed with Douglas. Newspapers reported that the young budget director would "make his mark in the Roosevelt administration" and "be at the heart of things." Journalists argued that Roosevelt's appointment was an "indication that Roosevelt means business in his promise to reduce government costs."³     

‘Quacking like a duck’? Bush II and presidential power in the second term

It seems a truism of American politics that second presidential terms are destined to be less successful than the period of office which they follow and yet there is very little academic analysis as to why this is the case. Whether there are inherent or structural features of the US political system that unduly affects second-term presidencies and what impact these features might have on the remainder of the Bush administration is the subject of this article. While the impact of this phenomenon is analysed in general, particular attention is focused on the effect of American foreign policy since the Bush presidency, because of Iraq, this subject will ultimately determine the success or failure of the second term. This focus also reflects the fact that second-term administrations tend to be dominated by a focus on foreign policy. The article argues that despite being returned to power with a considerable number of political advantages compared with previous presidents at this stage of their tenure, the Bush administration is already displaying many of the characteristics of an underachieving second term. The article consists of three sections: part one examines the presidential record and analyses the contention that second terms are somehow different; part two sets out the reasons that might account for this factor; and part three applies these factors to the Bush administration to see which of these features apply to the present incumbent and thus what can be expected for the remainder of his second term in office until January 2009.     

The Wrong King: Apocalypse and Transformation (or Not) in the White House

Abstract

Jonathan Z. Smith has argued that apocalyptic discourse grew out of a political desire to remove the "wrong" king from the throne. Later, though, the same discourse was used to prevent a "wrong" king from taking the throne. Thus apocalyptic discourse can either motivate or resist transformative change. In US political history it has served both purposes. This article focuses on the trend in presidential discourse, especially in foreign policy, since Franklin D. Roosevelt to use apocalyptic language to resist transformation. The electorate's desire to prevent substantive change was the determining factor in the presidential election of 2008. In Barack Obama's first year in office, though he seemed to promote transformation, his dominant message was a reassuring one: The threat of fundamental change would continue to be contained both at home and around the world. No "wrong" rulers would be allowed to disturb the security of America.     

The playwright who dramatised his own war record: a reassessment of William Douglas-Home’s accounts of his refusal to fight for the liberation of Le Havre

At a court martial in October 1944, William Douglas-Home was convicted of wilfully disobeying a lawful command because he claimed a moral justification to do so. Cashiered and jailed for his offence, he would return to the events that occasioned his refusal throughout a long career as a playwright. In his post-war accounts, Mr Douglas-Home developed a defence of his decision that depicted it as principled. He submitted petitions in which he sought to overturn retrospectively the court martial ruling. This essay argues that he concocted the accounts of his actions on which his efforts to revise the record were based.     

Alberta’s Premier Ed Stelmach: The Anomalous Case of Leadership Selection and Removal in a Canadian Province1

Why would a new provincial premier, having in his first general election increased his governing party’s seats in the legislature from 62 to 72 out of 83, resign just three years later? Normally, in Canada a provincial first minister remains in office so long as s/he wins elections, and either retires of his/her own accord or is forced to resign after an electoral defeat. Ed Stelmach’s brief tenure (2006–11) as premier of Alberta is a singular anomaly in that regard. Relying on interviews with the principal players, monographic and newspaper accounts, and party as well as Elections Alberta websites, this article makes systematic comparisons between the major features of Stelmach’s term in office and his predecessors, Peter Lougheed and Ralph Klein. This leads to the conclusion that popularity with the voting public simply did not translate into popularity in the backrooms of Alberta politics, where it apparently counts most.     

Assessing Reagan's Legacy

Abstract

I have argued in other research that modern presidents have been facilitators rather than directors of change. They are highly dependent on their environments and can do little to increase their resources of influence. This article probes such a theory of presidential leadership further by examining the congressional leadership of George Washington.

Perhaps the most revered political leader in American history, Washington entered office with tremendous prestige, a Congress dominated by men he viewed as political allies, and, because he was the first president, the fewest constraining precedents of policy or process. Thus, Washington enjoyed the greatest potential to serve as a “director” and move the country in new directions through his leadership.

Yet the study reveals that Washington was mainly a facilitator, not a director of change—much like George Bush two centuries later. Systemic factors such as political culture and the structure of the constitutional system determined that Washington had to be a facilitator, dependent on the opportunities the electorate handed him rather than a director, creating opportunities for change through his own leadership. Similar features characterize the leadership of the current administration.     

“Where Do I Go without Money?” Reza Shah’s Finances in Exile

When Reza Shah died in exile in Johannesburg, South Africa, in July 1944, he left in his account at Barclays Bank a deposit of £110,000, a considerable amount of money. Yet when he went into exile only three years earlier, Reza Shah feared he would be hard-pressed for money, if not left altogether destitute—and with good reason. He left Iran with a “horde” of progeny, family members and retainers. Before departing, he had ceded all his enormous wealth in cash and property to his son and successor. He did not remain destitute for long. His son, the new shah, continued to send him money, and for a while the British paid for a major part of his upkeep. Yet his money anxieties did not cease. This article describes and follows the winding trail of Reza Shah’s finances in exile.     

Thoughtlessness: Rumsfeld in Washington

This review article considers the case of Donald Rumsfeld and his disastrous tenure as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), as recounted by Rumsfeld himself in his memoirs and other writings, and in interviews with the celebrated documentary filmmaker Errol Morris, for The unknown known (2014). In all of these works he appears completely unreconstructed; indeed, remarkably self‐satisfied. The article reflects on Rumsfeld as operator and courtier, and Morris's pursuit of a man without qualities, with reference to Hannah Arendt's notion of ‘the banality of evil’.     

Empire, Patriotism and the Working-Class Electorate: The 1900 General Election in the Battersea Constituency

The extent to which the Unionist victory in the 'khaki' general election of 1900 was the result of patriotic sentiment arising from the South African war has long been a source of controversy among historians. Battersea has been cited as an area that was largely unaffected by patriotic and imperial fervour during this period. This article examines the general election campaign in the Battersea constituency. The sitting MP, John Burns, was re-elected despite his opposition to the war, but the Conservatives achieved their highest percentage vote of that at any parliamentary election between 1885 and 1918. While the war was not the only issue raised during the campaign, it was the most prominent and clearly benefited the imperialist and pro-war Conservative candidate. In order to retain his seat Burns had to fight a far more dynamic local campaign than his opponent, and even then he won only narrowly. Although imperial sentiment was not quite enough to oust Burns from this otherwise safe seat, it was the main reason for the strong Conservative performance.     

JFK and the future of global leadership

On 10 June 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a speech that changed the world. His commencement speech at American University helped to spur the signing of a world‐changing agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This episode of peacemaking is remarkable for two reasons. First, it arguably helped to save the world, since the nuclear confrontation at that stage of the Cold War was not a ‘stable balance of terror’, as sometimes described, but rather a highly unstable situation that was prone to accidents, misjudgements and potential disasters. Second, this was an episode of statesmanship in which presidential leadership played a crucial role. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that he bore sole responsibility on the US side to find a way back from the brink of nuclear war. He used the ‘peace speech’ to create a novel kind of peace diplomacy, and worked together with his counterpart, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, to pull the superpowers back from this precarious brink.     

Visions of Statesmanship Across The Atlantic: Presidential Masculinity and the American Response to Benito Mussolini

This article explores how hegemonic masculinity forged discourses of modern statesmanship in the United States and Italy in the first three decades of the twentieth century. It unpacks the ‘presidential masculinity’ of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and compares these gendered performances of political leadership in the United States to Benito Mussolini's Fascist rule in Italy during the 1920s. In doing so, this article contends that the manliness of these three modern leaders rested on a contrasting of pairs: if Roosevelt embodied the hegemonic ideal of the ‘frontiersman-as-president’, Wilson personified its ‘unmanly’, bourgeois-liberal countertype and thereby engendered the initially hospitable view of Mussolini's Fascist masculinity in the United States during the Jazz Age. The article covers the publications in The Atlantic Monthly to reveal how the American disillusion with Wilson's liberal internationalism transformed the Duce into a Fascist surrogate for Roosevelt. In a decade of political, economic and social upheaval, the transatlantic ‘public relations state’ in both the United States and Italy discursively positioned Mussolini as the personification of the masculine ideals of acumen, willpower and virility for the American public; a ‘Doctor-Dictator’ who, akin to Roosevelt, became a symbol of modern manliness that signified stability, progress and reform. In the process, the Duce's Fascist manhood shaped hegemonic ideals of statesmanship across the Atlantic while hinting at the paltry support for the liberal democracies of the West.     

The President and the Environment: A Reinterpretation of Neustadt's Theory of Presidential Leadership

Neustadt's theory of presidential leadership is conventionally viewed as based on a model of the Bargaining President, in which presidents focus on twisting arms and trading favors rather than on making public appeals. However, Neustadt's theory has a deeper logic—the logic of strategic choice, in which both effective bargaining and rhetorical appeals are techniques of presidential persuasion enabled by a President's choices. This reinterpretation of Neustadt's theory is supported by an original case study of President George H.W. Bush's leadership on the 1990 Clean Air Act. The President presented an initiative in a manner that capitalized on the public mood and he made key strategic choices aimed at persuading congressional leaders to engage with his administration in a non-zero sum game to enact a law that served their mutual policy and political interests. Rhetorical appeals were few in number. Quid pro quo bargaining played a limited role.     

Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice

Ten years after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the United States remains embroiled in a long‐term struggle with what George W. Bush termed the existential threat of international terrorism. On the campaign trail, his successor as US President, Barack Obama, promised to reboot the ‘war on terror’. He claimed that his new administration would step back from the rhetoric and much of the Bush administration policy, conducting a counterterrorism campaign that would be more morally acceptable, more focused and more effective—smarter, better, nimbler, stronger. This article demonstrates, however, that those expecting wholesale changes to US counterterrorism policy misread Obama's intentions. It argues that Obama always intended to deepen Bush's commitment to counterterrorism while at the same time ending the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq War. Rather than being trapped by Bush's institutionalized construction of a global war on terror, the continuities in counterterrorism can be explained by Obama's shared conception of the imperative of reducing the terrorist threat to the US. The article assesses whether Obama has pursued a more effective counterterrorism policy than his predecessor and explores how his rhetoric has been reconstituted as the actions of his policy have unfolded. By addressing his policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Guantánamo Bay and torture, the uses of unmanned drone attacks and domestic wire‐tapping, this article argues that Obama's ‘war’ against terrorism is not only in keeping with the assumptions and priorities of the last ten years but also that it is just as problematic as that of his predecessor.     

Social Relations and War Remembrance: Second World War Atrocities in Rural Tuscan Villages

This article addresses the issue of how long‐term memory of extreme conditions is socially transformed. It focuses on elements of the social structure and pre‐war habitus that might help understanding of the divided memory of massacres that were perpetrated by the Nazis in three rural Tuscan villages between 1943 and 1944. Within the “mnemonic communities”, discrepancies arise since some of the villagers paradoxically blame the partisans instead of the Nazis. An attempt is made to trace current representations of historical events in the framework of traditional social institutions and political life of these small villages in time of crisis. Battles over memory are seen as a twofold process—that is, as part of “internal”, intra‐village relations as well as a form of reaction toward the “external” world of which they feel victims. The article argues that long‐term memory of past political violence is strictly bound up with local power relations.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

A well‐established fact of American government is the unpredictability of vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court. Representatives and Senators face voters every two and six years, respectively. A President serves for four years and may be reelected only once. Justices, however, do not sit for fixed terms and in effect enjoy life tenure. After his inauguration as the forty‐third president in January 2001, George W. Bush had no opportunity to make a High Court appointment until he was well into his second term when, on July 1, 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her intention to leave the Bench. ¹ By contrast, the forty‐fourth President encountered his first High Court vacancy much sooner, and in his first term, as Justice David Hackett Souter notified the Obama White House on May 1, 2009, of his intention to retire from “regular active service as a Justice” when the Court recessed for the summer. ²