Executive Branch Management and Presidential Unilateralism: Centralization and the Issuance of Executive Orders

Despite the useful simplifying assumptions of recent work on unilateral power, archival analysis shows the issuance of executive orders is a process rife with transaction costs as presidents bargain with the bureaucracy over formulating their scope and substance. As a result, presidents must create what Williamson (1985) called “governance structures” to minimize those costs, with the Office of Management and Budget's clearance process at its heart. As with legislative policy formulation, presidents assert more centralized control over executive orders (EO) production on items that affect large numbers of departments, on matters of executive reorganization, and on significant matters. Political contexts are trumped by managerial concerns. Orders dealing with implementation of recently passed statutes or other presidential “clerkship” functions tend to follow a far less centralized formulation process.     

Agency Characteristics and the Use of Executive Orders

Past scholarship has offered varying explanations for why presidents choose to use executive orders. However, to this point, much of what we know of unilateral powers does not adequately address the role the bureaucracy plays in the president's decision. This research seeks to account for bureaucratic factors as a strategic presidential consideration in the employment of such directives. I classify executive orders from 1989–2012 based on which agency or agencies they apply to, and consider the importance of various characteristics (e.g. agency ideology, level of centralization, politicization, etc.) in determining which organs of the bureaucracy presidents will direct executive orders to generally. The results provide evidence that the White House directs fewer executive orders to agencies that have a politically independent leadership structure, and this result holds across a variety of measures judging an order's impact. The results demonstrate that the type of directive is crucial in determining a president's strategic decision to use executive orders, in line with previous research, and that agency centralization is one crucial component of this strategic calculation.     

Power Plus Persuasion: The Anatomy of Kennedy’s Housing Order

We examine the influence of various political actors on the substance and timing of presidential orders. Specifically, we analyze President John F. Kennedy’s decision to issue E. O. 11063, which directed the federal bureaucracy to eliminate discrimination in the sale or lease of residential property overseen by the federal government. We show that this order did not result solely from Kennedy’s policy preferences; rather, it was a product of persuasion by several political actors who coaxed Kennedy to act. This reinforces previous findings that the president’s power of the pen is often conditioned by the informal political costs of unilateral executive action.     

Public Outreach,Executive Orders,and the Unilateral Presidency

Scholars have traditionally and loosely defined executive orders as presidential directives that instruct bureaucrats about how to implement policy. In contrast, proclamations are thought to be used by presidents to address policy matters regarding the general public. This has been an assumption that scholars have accepted without empirical evidence. We have long known that presidents strategically pursue policy to build support among numerous groups, such as African Americans, religious organizations, women, educators, and labor unions. Presidency scholars also know that executive orders are an expedient tool that an administration utilizes to pursue its policy agenda. As a result, why should we assume that the exclusive target population of executive orders is members of the federal bureaucracy? This is the first study to explore whether and how presidents from 1936 through 2008 use executive orders to target specific populations with policy.     

The Allocation of Excepted Political Positions: What and Whose Executive Priorities Do They Serve?

Abstract

Scholars have only begun to examine the roles played by non-career SES and Schedule C personnel in managing the bureaucracy. This, despite the fact that these individuals help to establish, communicate, and implement policy, and despite the broad discretion presidential administrations have in appointing them, defining their duties, and allocating their positions across the federal government. As an effort to redress this neglect, we first provide an overview of what lower-level political personnel do and of the processes and constraints that determine how they are distributed. We then examine how changes in presidential administration have affected the allocation of political SES and Schedule C positions across departments. Although dramatic infusions of these personnel into some agencies can be tied to policy objectives, they appear to be idiosyncratic and driven more by the preferences of agency leaders than by the White House. As such, they provide little support for positive theories that frame the administrative presidency in terms of centralized strategic planning.     

The Right Tool for the Job: The Canalization of Presidential Policy Attention by Policy Instrument

This article investigates how presidential policy attention is allocated across policy tools and whether there is a channeling of tool use by policy area. I also examine whether there is evidence of disproportionate information processing within presidential policy attention allocation and whether it is common across presidential policy tools. Presidential messages, hearings on administrations' legislative proposals, amicus briefs, and executive orders are employed to capture presidential policy tools. The allocation of attention via these four instruments is examined from 1957–2007 in the policy areas of defense and foreign affairs, macroeconomics, banking and commerce, civil rights, law and crime, and labor and immigration. I find that there is a canalization of presidential policy attention by instrument, and that the opportunity structure of policy tools shapes attention allocation. Additionally, I find evidence for punctuated equilibrium theory in the allocation of presidential policy attention via these four tools. When presidents do shift their attention to an issue area, they often attack the issue with some coordination of their policy instruments.     

Managerial Friction and Land-Use Policy Punctuations in the Fragmented Metropolis

Despite the portrayal of bureaucratic organizations as resistant to change, public managers have some ability to strategically move land-use processes out of incrementalism, even when bureaucratic lethargy acts as a drag. This article examines managerial influence in land-use policy by synthesizing theories of political markets and punctuated equilibrium. An information-processing logic is developed to explain why local government managers shift from “inward” to “outward” land-use management strategies in periods of environmental change. "Managerial friction” is defined as a strategic managerial adjustment producing punctuated land-use policy change in the face of environmental changing conditions. Hypotheses are tested using data on Florida local government comprehensive plan amendments and a Bayesian methodological approach. The evidence suggests managerial friction can be distinguished from the effects of environmental and political complexity as well as other forms of institutional friction, including management turnover, legislative institutions, and bureaucratic structure.     

Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws passed from the 95th through the 108th Congresses in order to demonstrate the specific influence of presidential signing statements on future congressional amendment activity. The results of our analysis lend support to the theory that laws receiving presidential signing statements are in fact more likely to be revisited and revised by Congress. These findings add to the literature both on presidential signing statements as well as the evolution of laws.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

新公共管理对官僚制是摒弃还是扬弃——基于制度层面的思考

新公共管理是20世纪70年代以后西方各国先后开展的以“企业家政府”为理论模型、以市场化运作模式和私营部门的管理为研究方法、以提高政府工作效率为目的的一项改革运动。新公共管理对政府流程再造的初期的确发挥了一定的作用,提高了行政效率,但是仍然无法改变官僚制的人事制度。新公共管理所提出的私营部门的管理方法,只是对官僚制的修正与补充,是对官僚制的扬弃,而不是摒弃。     

Heterogeneous Presidential Source Cue Effects on Public Opinion: The Case of the Sotomayor Nomination to the Supreme Court

Do presidential source cues affect public opinion? If so, which types of voters are most susceptible to presidential source cue effects? This study uses a split-ballot experimental design embedded into a nationally representative survey to test for presidential source cue effects, using the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court as the test case. Results detect significant presidential source cue effects. Two factors, respondents' political predispositions and educational level, mediate those cue effects. The conclusion discusses the real world implications of the findings and offers suggestions to improve the use of experiments to test for presidential impacts on of public opinion.     

Constraining Bureaucrats Today Knowing You'll Be Gone Tomorrow: The Effect of Legislative Term Limits on Statutory Discretion

Do finite time horizons constrain a legislature's ability to control the bureaucracy? I argue that legislators subject to legislative term limits enact legislation with less statutory discretion today to ensure that their preferences are implemented by the bureaucracy tomorrow since most legislators will not be around to monitor the bureaucracy over the long term. Although past works suggest that legislative term limits decrease legislatures' rate of bureaucratic oversight, I find that term‐limited legislatures use ex ante means of bureaucratic control to a greater extent by granting less statutory discretion to the bureaucracy.     

浅谈"管理伦理"诸学科的逻辑演进

管理伦理作为一门元学科,发端于企业伦理,拓展于政府管理领域的行政伦理。经过公共伦理的瑕扰之后,最终公共管理伦理登上了管理伦理演进的舞台。这一复杂的过程正反映了管理伦理诸学科的演进史,也揭示了管理伦理元学科的发展规律与发展方向。     

Presidential Influence Over the Systemic Agenda

One of the most widely accepted sources of presidential power is agenda setting. Being able to affect the media's agenda on key issues–influencing the systemic agenda and expanding the scope of conflict–has enormous consequences for the president's ability to govern effectively. Yet the literature to date has not conclusively determined the extent to which presidents consistently set agendas, especially over the media, because it has not explicitly considered variation in agenda setting influence by policy type. For these reasons, we test whether presidential public statements have increased the media's attention to three policy areas. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis, we demonstrate that presidents have some influence over the systemic agenda, at least in the short term, with policy type being an important predictor of presidential influence. Understanding when and why presidents may or may not be successful agenda setters is crucial to explaining the varying legislative impacts of presidential speech making.     

The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Polarization and Presidential Success in Congress

For better or for worse, presidents receive much of the credit and much of the blame for their legislative success in Congress. Indeed, much has been written about the correlates of presidential success in Congress. In this article, we test the proposition that presidential success in Congress is mainly a function of context and the context of presidential interactions with Congress has changed over the past 50 years. Specifically, it is both the best of times and worst of times for presidential relations with the legislative branch. It is increasingly the case that because of partisan polarization in Washington, presidents can be quite successful, if they command a majority. However, if they face a divided government gridlock is the result and overcoming that gridlock has gotten to be more difficult over time.     

Realignment Theory and the Modern American Presidency: A Reformulation

Realignment theory must be adapted to take account of changes that have occurred in the nature of the American presidency. The modern presidency is characterized by a direct, near-exclusive relationship with the public, through use of the mass media. This relationship has fundamentally altered the President's relationship with other political institutions and distanced presidential politics from congressional and local politics. The American party system, in other words, now encompasses a number of separate political processes that need to be approached as distinct theoretical problems. Realignment theory successfully explains much of what has taken place in one of those processes, presidential politics, over the last twenty years. But, given the immediacy of the modern President's relationship with the voting public, we should no longer expect broad shifts in the character of presidential electoral coalitions to be reflected at other levels of the American party system.     

景区经营权转让对边远旅游地影响的实证研究--湖南凤凰八大景区(点)的案例分析

近年来,转让经营权成为一些风景名胜区管理和经营改革过程中引入企业化经营的一种制度创新模式。为解决湖南凤凰县旅游开发和保护资金不足等难题,这一新型的旅游开发经营模式成功落户于凤凰。本文基于对包括凤凰县政府部门、黄龙洞投资股份有限公司、凤凰当地居民在内的三大旅游地主体的问卷调查和访谈记录分析,认为景区经营权转让对旅游地景区资源价值与知名度、景区资源环境、旅游地文化生态以及旅游地生活环境等产生了重大影响,并提出完善景区经营权转让模式、规避经营管理风险和负面影响的相关对策,旨在为我国相关旅游地的开发提供有益的实践参考和理论借鉴。     

Presidential elections and Europe: the 2012 game-changer

Abstract

As well as marking 60 years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, 2017 will see the 10th presidential election of France’s Fifth Republic. The overlap between the question of Europe and the election to France’s highest office provides the framework for this article to explore the development of the European debate in France. Prior to 2012, and despite the increasing and undeniable salience of it for French domestic concerns, the question of Europe is widely considered to have been a secondary issue in presidential elections. Focusing in particular on the period since the pivotal debate and referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and the intervening transition from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’, this article will explain how and why Europe has seemingly defied logic to remain on the margins of successive election campaigns, before presenting the 2012 presidential elections as a game-changer on how the question of Europe featured. The conclusion offers a discussion on the ramifications for future presidential elections, starting with that of 2017.     

Introduction to forum: the 2000 presidential election and the Florida debacle in geographic context

This short essay provides a brief introduction to the 2000 U.S. presidential election as well as overviews of the five essays which follow. The purpose of this forum section is to provide a geographic context and evaluation of the 2000 presidential election while emphasizing the role of the State of Florida.     

National Forces and the U.S. House Vote, 1980-2004: The Uncertain Progress of Nationalization

Much recent scholarly attention has focused on the theme of growing nationalization in U.S. House elections. In this study, I reach a mixed verdict concerning the extent to which national forces have become more determinative of the House vote from 1980 to 2004. Only voter partisanship, but not ideology, economic evaluations, or assessments of presidential candidates' personal qualities, has increased in importance during presidential year elections. Since presidential voting, on the other hand, has come to depend more heavily on all these factors except the last, this means that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the bases of House and presidential voting actually have grown less, rather than more, similar over time.