Whose Approval Matters? Reelection,Constituency Approval,and Senate Support for President George W. Bush

Debate exists concerning the impact of presidential approval on congressional support for the president. One source of this debate is that while theory specifies an electoral connection, suggesting that legislators will be responsive to approval within their reelection constituency, most research employs national approval measures. Lack of constituency-level data has forced studies to use national measures of approval, but in as much as national and district level approval differ, national approval will not provide quality estimates of district opinion on the president. This article uses SurveyUSA data from 2005–2006, which provide state-level estimates for approval as well as breakdowns by partisanship (Democrats, Republicans, Independent). Analysis finds that, with controls, state-level approval has a statistically significant, albeit marginal, impact on senator support for the president. Stronger effects on support are found for approval from the senators’ reelection constituency, defined as voters of the senators’ party. These findings suggest directions for future research.     

Party registration choices as a function of the geographic distribution of partisanship: a model of `hidden partisanship' and an illustrative test

The Public Choice literature has identified conditions in which voters in multi-candidate contests would have an incentive to vote strategically rather than vote for the most preferred candidate or candidates. In the US, where party registration and party primaries play a critical role in the electoral process—especially in states with closed primaries—the existence of multiple layers of elections across constituencies can induce strategic falsification of party registration that is tied to the geographic distribution of electoral strength. Following V. O. Key, we should expect that a long history of one party dominance in local elections should encourage voters to register in the party whose elections are most determinative of electoral choices, even if that is not the party with which they most identify. However, in many states, while politics may be dominated by one party locally, there may be real two-party competition for at least some offices at the state level and for the presidency.We use a `natural experiment' to view the link between party registration and voting for president and obscure judicial offices in order to test the hypothesis that, for whichever party is the minority party in the local unit, party registration will understate the voting support in presidential or other statewide elections, where that party's candidates have a realistic chance to win. In the modern South this hypothesis can be shown to imply that the relationship between Republican party registration and vote shares for Republican candidates for president or statewide office ought to be curvilinear. To test this and other related hypotheses, we examine data on political units (e.g. counties) with considerable variation in party registration and concomitant variation in the extent of one-party dominance of local politics by looking at county level data from North Carolina for the presidential elections and obscure judicial elections in 1984 and 1996. As hypothesized, for the North Carolina data the relationship between party registration and voting can best be fit by a quadratic function, but the strength of the quadratic term is much less for the 1996 data, reflecting the increase in Republican registration and the success of local GOP candidates in the 1990s.     

Identifying the Critical Members of the House of Representatives

This article combines the historical record of presidential-congressional relations with previous scholarly findings to develop a model that identifies the members of Congress whose support is critical to the president's ability to build enacting coalitions. It then analyzes the relationship between President Obama and the House of Representatives during the 113th Congress as a case study that demonstrates the model's utility. Conventional wisdom and political pundits suggest that presidents working in divided government will have impossible difficulty working with Congress, but history suggests otherwise. The president's ability to successfully build enacting coalitions during divided government requires him to perform two rather disparate tasks. First, the president must minimize the amount of presidential party members who cross party lines to vote against the president's position. Second, the president must entice at least some opposition party members to cross party lines and support the president's position. Using data from 1981 to 2015, I find that representatives’ behavior on presidential support votes are related to constituency-level presidential strength, electoral vulnerability, ideological moderation, and ideological extremity. I use these results to identify the critical members of the 113th Congress. When a majority of these critical members supported President Obama's positions his legislative efforts were successful. When a majority of these members opposed the president's positions, the House Republican majority defeated the president.     

The Multiple Roots of Party Loyalty: Explaining Republican Dissent in the U.S. House of Representatives

Why does any member of Congress choose to be loyal to one's party? The conventional wisdom is that party loyalty stems from constituent expectations, electoral concerns, or a lawmaker's ideological beliefs. However, this neglects two other, less-instrumental reasons for sticking with a political party: partisan identity and personal connections with party leaders. I test these alternative theories as well as conventional ones on a set of key moments in the 113th Congress (2013–2014) when rebellion against House Republican leadership by the rank-and-file was especially noteworthy. The results provide some support for both the party identity and personal connection hypotheses. They also indicate that although constituency characteristics help predict the likelihood of dissent from GOP leaders, there is little evidence for the electoral hypothesis, while cross-cutting ideological preferences as well as preferences along the traditional left-right spectrum prove statistically significant. In short, evidence reveals both personal and instrumental roots of party loyalty in Congress.     

A century of constituency delimitation in India

Constituencies are de jure apportionment of space for the purpose of electing representatives of people living in the territorial limits of a democratic state. The elected representatives represent not only the people but also their respective segments of territory, the constituencies. These two — the land and the people — and the prevailing law of the country provide the basis for constituency boundaries and their delimitation. The laws concerning constituencies can have two dimensions. The first is related to the laws of enfranchisement as to who among the population have the right to vote. This gives the total number of electors and the number of representatives to be elected. The other aspect of constituencies is the actual drawing of boundaries and enclosing people within the constituency framework. This is indeed a sensitive issue for several reasons. First, a lack of understanding of the human geography of the area can divide up people who may in effect lose their representation or voice in the legislature. Second, the division of space into constituencies can be so organised that it may carve out either a safe support base for a party or a candidate, or create a combination of societal forces which are opposed to a particular party or candidate. This task should be assigned to impartial and non-partisan persons. Thirdly, a new boundary can change the pattern of electoral representation in the legislature. The degree of involvement of those who are largely to benefit from it varies from country to country according to its electoral laws. It varies from the largely neutral British case through slight party involvement in New Zealand to the total party involvement in the USA (Gudgin, G. & Taylor, P.J. (1979) Seats, votes and the spatial organisation of elections (p. 11), Pion Ltd, London). In South Asia, it varies from Sri Lanka where the Delimitation Commission consists purely of persons who are entirely out of politics, to India where the Delimitation Commission comprising of three persons (two of whom have generally been judges of the Supreme Court and State High Courts, and the third member has been the Chief Election Commissioner, ex-officio) associates in its deliberations nine politicians of different political shades in each state. Of these, four belong to the Lok Sabha (lower house of Indian parliament) and five to the Vidhan Sabhas (lower house of state legislatures) (Chandidas, R. (1971) Electoral system and political development. In: L.M. Singhvi et al., Elections and electoral reforms in India (p. 114). Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, New Delhi). But the Commission's verdict is final and can not be challenged even in the Supreme Court. In spite of the involvement of politicians, there have however been no or little reports of gerrymandering in India because of the constitutional safeguards. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that no study of the actual delimitation of constituency boundaries and its effect on electoral outcome and the geography of representation in India could be carried out due to the secrecy and non-availability of delimitation commissions' reports on the actual considerations for delimitation of constituency boundaries.Even though concepts of democracy, representative institutions, limitations on the arbitrary powers of the rulers, and the rule of law were practised in ancient India, and some of the representatives bodies like Gram Sanghas, Gram Sabha or Panchayats have survived up to now (Kashyap, S.C. (1994) Our constitution (p. 7), National Book Trust of India, New Delhi), the experience of electoral participation in a representative democracy in this country is hardly one century old. In fact, the twentieth century in India could be termed as the century of transformation from being subject of a British colony with no right to elect their own government to the largest democracy in the world. The electoral experience of India can be divided into two parts: selective enfranchisement in the colonial period and universal adult enfranchisement in independent India.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

A Tale of Three Variables: Exploring the Impact of Alternative Measures of Presidential Approval On Congressional Voting

This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background variable rather than a determinant of congressional voting, we maintain that theoretically more meaningful relationships between public opinion and congressional voting can be developed. Specifically, we argue that a more relevant test can be made which includes opinion measured closest to where that opinion is likely to matter to members, namely among electoral copartisans and district-level constituencies. We estimate various models (bivariate and integrated multivariate), and find strong support for our hypotheses that, to the extent members of Congress use public approval as a voting cue, they do in fact pay far more attention to partisan and constituency interests than they do to national opinion.     

New Labour,new electoral system,new electoral geographies?: A review of proposed constitutional changes in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom electoral system remained virtually unchanged throughout the twentieth century but three reports (two of them commissioned by the Labour government elected in 1997) published in late 1998 propose significant changes in: the administration of elections, with specific reference to increasing turnout rates; the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns; and the electoral system itself—with a recommendation for a system that is broadly proportional but retains the link between (most) MPs and single-member constituencies. This paper reviews those reports, relates them to the geography of electoral behaviour in the UK, and explores the geographical implications of their major recommendations.     

Partisan gerrymandering and population instability: Completing the redistricting puzzle

How can partisan mapmakers enact a partisan gerrymander in the presence of risk-averse co-partisan incumbents who wish to keep most of their constituencies intact? Until now the literature on redistricting has focused on how redistricting affects the geography of partisan support, that is, the underlying partisan balance of electoral districts. We posit that this emphasis on partisanship misses half of the story. Partisan mapmakers have another tool at their disposal: the fostering of population instability that may not affect a district's partisan balance. By examining all redistricting plans enacted in 2001–2002, as well as three case studies, we show that partisan mapmakers strategically foster population instability, which poses problems for incumbents in a way that may not be apparent when looking exclusively at the effects of redistricting on partisanship. Our results show how partisan mapmakers simultaneously achieve two goals: enacting an “optimal gerrymander,” which strengthens some opposition-party incumbents, while inducing instability and reducing the personal vote of those same incumbents. We also show that so-called “neutral” redistricting plans are successful in disregarding incumbency. Finally, our results suggest another mechanism that explains why the 2002 congressional elections in the U.S. produced little competition.     

Tempus Fugit,Incumbency Stays: Measuring the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. Senate

This article evaluates the incumbency advantage in the U.S. Senate. We argue that existing methods utilized to measure this advantage are suboptimal to gauge the concept in the Senate. After testing and highlighting the weaknesses of some of these methods, we present an alternative way to measure the incumbency advantage based on the number of electoral victories or terms spent in office. We test the impact of this new measure on candidates’ reelection prospects and their vote share by analyzing senatorial elections from 1948 to 2008. We find that the share of the vote obtained by incumbents increases linearly with time spend in office.     

Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms: interpreting the Italian experience

During 2011 Italy reached the verge of a financial default because of its huge public debt. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left governments that alternated in power in the 2000s were able to introduce the reforms necessary for reducing the debt and promoting growth. The impotence of the government became incompatible with the requirements of the country's continued presence in the eurozone. In November 2011, under the pressure of financial markets and eurozone institutions and leaders, the incumbent centre-right government was obliged to resign, and was substituted by a government composed of technocrats and experts, the Monti government. This lasted until December 2012 and was supported in parliament by a cross-partisan coalition; it was able to introduce some of the structural reforms required, because of the threat of default but also because it did not need to seek the electoral support of powerful constituencies. This article advances an interpretation of the Italian crisis of November 2011, identifying the political and institutional structures and the specific political conditions that fostered a policy stalemate in the country in the 2000s and whose persistence makes the continuation of reforms after the February 2013 elections uncertain.     

Decentralised Institutions and Electoral Authoritarianism: The Case of Town Councils in Singapore

Singapore’s electoral autocracy is well known for its innovative use of political institutions such as Parliament and elections to enhance its durability, but relatively little attention has been paid to decentralised subnational institutions such as Town Councils, which require elected Members of Parliament to manage public housing estates in their constituencies. This paper focuses on Town Councils by examining the motives behind their formation and exploring how they serve as institutions to support authoritarianism. Based on analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources such as parliamentary Hansard, government documents and newspaper articles, this paper argues that the formation of Town Councils was politically motivated and specifically designed to thwart opposition growth. It also argues that Town Councils support authoritarianism in three ways. First, they create extra hurdles and disadvantages for the opposition. Second, they give the ruling party an additional election issue on which to attack the weaknesses of the opposition and allow it to shift the focus of elections in its favour. Lastly, they facilitate more effective and targeted material distribution and create more opportunities for elite co-optation. The implications of the study for Singapore politics and the role of decentralisation in electoral autocracies are discussed.     

Earmarks and Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

Popular treatments of earmarks abound with allegations that members of Congress use them to aid their reelection campaigns, but the academic literature has yet to examine whether earmarking influences elections. To begin to fill this void, we search for relationships between earmarking and several facets of electoral competition and outcomes in the 2008 and 2010 House elections. There are three principal findings. First, in both election years, active earmarkers faced weaker primary election competition than other members. Second, in 2008 there was a positive correlation between earmarking and campaign receipts. Third, both of these correlations exist only among Democrats. These findings suggest that earmarks critics might be correct in charging that members, particularly Democrats, benefit from the earmarks they place into spending bills.     

Re-examining a modern classic: does Putnam's Making Democracy Work suffer from spuriousness?

What makes democratic institutions work efficiently? Robert Putnam argued in Making Democracy Work that a mixture of political participation and immersion in associative and social networks in the community, conceptualised as ‘civic community’ or ‘social capital’, is the explanation. Ever since its publication, many questions have arisen about the validity of Putnam's theory. Among the most relevant concerns stands the influence of the Italian Communist Party on Putnam's empirical tests. This paper aims to fill the gap left in the literature by testing Putnam's hypothesis against the political party in the regional government and the PCI's electoral support. Supporting Putnam, this paper finds that variations in the quality of democratic governments in Italy's regions are a function of civic community even after adjusting for the presence of the Italian Communist Party.     

Geolocation and voting: Candidate–voter distance effects on party choice in the 2010 UK general election in England

The effect of geographical distance between candidate and voter on vote-likelihood in the UK is essentially untested. In systems where constituency representatives vie for local inhabitants' support in elections, candidates living closer to a voter would be expected to have a greater probability of receiving that individual's support, other things being equal. In this paper, we present a first test of this concept using constituency data (specifically, notice of poll address data) from the British General Election of 2010 and the British Election Survey, together with geographical data from Ordnance Survey and Royal Mail, to test the hypothesis that candidate distance matters in voters' choice of candidate. Using a conditional logit model, we find that the distance between voter and candidates from the three main parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) matters in English constituencies, even when controlling for strong predictors of vote choice, such as party feeling and incumbency advantage.     

The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design

The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate development, preventing the Senate from allowing its chair to reduce dilatory action, as the House has done. Accordingly, delay, via the filibuster, has become commonplace in the Senate. Such delay has reduced the Senate's efficiency, but has largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch.     

Managers and Agents: Conservative Party Organisation in the 1850s*

During the 1850s in the wake of the calamitous Peelite split, Britain's Conservative Party struggled to rebuild its numbers in the house of commons. The structure of the party's electoral organisation is well known‐parliamentary leaders, election managers such as Sir William Jolliffe and Philip Rose, plus local constituency based agents. Jolliffe's and Rose's 1859 election notebooks help understand this, but they also reveal serious gaps in the Conservatives' information networks. This article delineates the electoral activities of Sir John Yarde Buller (first Baron Churston) and his ally Samuel Triscott, who supplemented the spasmodic flow of information from small boroughs in at least two counties. Mid‐level or second‐tier managers, to whom no attention has previously been given, assisted the Conservatives in their gradual electoral recovery. Their roles also suggest that the party's organization may have been more complex than previously believed.     

The Marginality Hypothesis and Supreme Court Confirmation Votes in the Senate

Studies of Supreme Court confirmations have found that a senator's vote is primarily determined by his or her ideological proximity to a nominee and that nominee's objective qualifications. This literature does not account for the extent to which a senator's electoral safety may enhance or mitigate the effects of ideology or qualifications. We argue that senators from less competitive states are more likely to eschew a nominee's qualifications in favor of their own ideological preferences. By analyzing roll call data on confirmation votes from Byron White to Elena Kagan, we support this argument and add an intriguing new piece to the puzzle underlying the changing dynamics of Senate confirmation voting.     

Electoral instability and the modern campaign: New Zealand labour in 1987

This essay explores the theme of the rise of the ‘modern campaign'—the electoral focus on polling, targeted appeals, and the professional, managed use of the media—as the strategic response by parties to the exigencies of electioneering in an era of increasingly fluid, weakly partisan electorates. Given New Zealand Labour's unparalleled policy‐reversals since 1984, which rocked a political system noted for its stable, loyal partisan politics, it is argued the 1987 campaign constitutes a threshold election in which Labour's executive consciously embraced the modern campaign to deflect reactions to its unorthodox policies, and to allow appeals to newly heterogeneous bases of electoral support. Interviews with key figures in New Zealand's Labour and National parlies afford the chance to examine this strategic tactic as a considered response to electoral uncertainty.     

E. J. Nanson,Social Choice and Electoral Reform

The most distinctive Australian contribution to institutional design is the construction of electoral systems. This paper locates the work of E. J. Nanson 1850-1936; Professor of Mathematics, University of Melbourne, 1875-1922 in its intellectual context. After setting out the puzzle of the frequent discoveries and disappearances of axiomatic social choice, and its awkward relationship with electoral reform, the paper explores Nanson's arguments in both social choice and electoral reform. The first were good; the second disappointingly weak. Nanson's failure to influence Australian institutional design at the foundation of the Commonwealth and the subsequent adoption of Nanson's recommendations for Senate elections are analysed.