Presidential Leadership of Congressional Civil Rights Voting: The Cases of Eisenhower and Johnson

Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson presented dramatically contrasting styles of leadership in their relationships with Congress. Yet each was successful in securing passage of monumental civil rights legislation in very different political environments. Focusing on the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we show that both Eisenhower and Johnson attracted support from the opposition party's faction at the far end of the ideological spectrum while retaining support from his own party's dominant faction. The analysis suggests that it is not the president's leadership style alone that produces legislative results, but a proper mixture of leadership style and the political environment.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

Ancient Israel on Political Leadership: Between the Book Ends

Abstract

Looking to the US presidential election of 2008, this paper considers models of leadership as they are rendered in the Books of I and II Kings in the Hebrew Bible. That corpus of historical memory is informed by the theo-political traditions of covenant in the book of Deuteronomy. At the beginning of the corpus, Solomon is presented as a leader committed to the pursuit of self-aggrandizement on the basis of political autonomy that need account to none. At the end of the corpus Josiah is presented as a king who practiced public power congruent with the neighborly requirements of Torah. The issue raised by this critical tradition concerns autonomy and moral accountability. There is, of course, no direct transfer of this tradition to US politics. But the testimony of the text lingers, ever critical, even until our time and place, a testimony about limit, connectedness, and consequences.     

The President and the Environment: A Reinterpretation of Neustadt's Theory of Presidential Leadership

Neustadt's theory of presidential leadership is conventionally viewed as based on a model of the Bargaining President, in which presidents focus on twisting arms and trading favors rather than on making public appeals. However, Neustadt's theory has a deeper logic—the logic of strategic choice, in which both effective bargaining and rhetorical appeals are techniques of presidential persuasion enabled by a President's choices. This reinterpretation of Neustadt's theory is supported by an original case study of President George H.W. Bush's leadership on the 1990 Clean Air Act. The President presented an initiative in a manner that capitalized on the public mood and he made key strategic choices aimed at persuading congressional leaders to engage with his administration in a non-zero sum game to enact a law that served their mutual policy and political interests. Rhetorical appeals were few in number. Quid pro quo bargaining played a limited role.     

A Tale of Three Variables: Exploring the Impact of Alternative Measures of Presidential Approval On Congressional Voting

This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background variable rather than a determinant of congressional voting, we maintain that theoretically more meaningful relationships between public opinion and congressional voting can be developed. Specifically, we argue that a more relevant test can be made which includes opinion measured closest to where that opinion is likely to matter to members, namely among electoral copartisans and district-level constituencies. We estimate various models (bivariate and integrated multivariate), and find strong support for our hypotheses that, to the extent members of Congress use public approval as a voting cue, they do in fact pay far more attention to partisan and constituency interests than they do to national opinion.     

The President as Agenda Setter‐in‐Chief: The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting

In this paper, we investigate the agenda leadership capability of two American political institutions, Congress and the presidency, in an array of issue areas that include both domestic and foreign policy. The president has long been considered to have the most significant role in setting the policymaking agenda, but there is limited empirical research to support that claim. Examining the issue areas of defense, environment, health care, international affairs, law and crime, and macroeconomics from 1956 to 2005, we find statistically significant positive influence by the president on the congressional agenda in all six of the policy areas under examination, providing compelling evidence of presidential agenda leadership and a reactive Congress. Additionally, we find that the agenda relationship between the president and Congress is issue dependent, in that presidential attention has the largest substantive effect on the congressional agenda in the area of international affairs.     

The Dynamics and Interactions Between the President's and the Public's Civil Rights Agendas: A Study in Presidential Leadership and Representation

Past research views presidents as reactive and minor actors in the civilrights policy process. However, that research has focused solely on the latter stages of the policy process. This report views the president's role from an agendasetting perspective. A content analysis reveals that presidents lead public opinion on civil rights, but that the public has little impact on the president's civil rights agenda. The distinction between discretionary and required agenda items explains this asymmetry between the president and the public in civil rights policymaking. A fuller notion of policymaking that includes all stages of the process, from agendasetting to implementation and evaluation, is required to understand the role of the president in civil rights policymaking and leads us to revise the perception that presidents play reactive and minor roles in civil rights policy.     

Campaign Finance Reform and the 1994 Congressional Elections

Based on partisan arguments regarding the likely effect of campaign finance reform on electoral competition, one might suspect that, had spending limits been in place prior to the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans would not have been able to gain control of the House of Representatives. To examine this proposition, we first create a regression model designed to explain the Democratic percentage of the vote as a function of candidate spending, incumbency, nonincumbent candidate quality, and the underlying partisan leanings of the congressional districts. We then use this regression model to simulate the likely effects of campaign finance reform on the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections. Our results indicate that while spending limits would have limited the number of seats gained by the Republican party, Republicans likely would have gained control of the House of Representatives even if spending limits had been in place prior to the 1994 elections. In addition, our results indicate that campaign finance reform that includes some form of public subsidy in addition to spending limits actually may have enhanced rather than diminished the Republican "earthquake" in 1994.     

Presidential Vetoes: Motivations and Classification

For all its importance, comparatively few, empirically-based studies have centered on the presidential veto, and virtually none have sought to classify vetoes by presidential motivation or policy area. This article updates and confirms the major findings of extant studies, and suggests one important caveat to the conclusions of older research: the categories of and reasons for presidential vetoes are remarkably similar from president to president, independent of party. Frequently, presidents have just as much in common with each other in doing battle with Congress than as Republicans or Democrats fighting for different ideological programs and considerations.     

论20世纪70年代美国国会的改革及其影响

整个20世纪,美国国会一共有2次重大的委员会体制改革。第一次是在1946年,第2次是在70年代。如果说1946年国会的改革标志着现代国会制度的最终确立,那么70年代的变革则是在此基础上试图进一步完善国会制度的一次重大努力。     

Neo-Conservatism and Presidential Nomination Reforms: A Critique

The neo-conservatives fault the post-1968 reforms in presidential nominations because, they argue, increased participation opportunities have weakened political parties and produced unrepresentative candidates who are unable to govern. They favor changes that would enhance the influence of party regulars and professionals because it is asserted that such participation would strengthen parties and encourage the selection of more popular and better qualified nominees. We argue that the critique suffers from several weaknesses: a failure to consider other plausible explanations for the effects attributed to the reforms; the use of inadequate or misleading measures; and the misuse of historical examples. In addition, we find that a key concept in their critique–professionalism– is not clearly defined, and that the several plausible definitions suffer from a variety of logical and analytic shortcomings. Although many political scientists