Presidential Speeches and the Stages of the Legislative Process

Presidents go public frequently to increase their success in Congress. Yet scholars know little about when presidents speak within the legislative process or why. If presidential speeches are indeed a source of power for presidents, then presidents are likely to use them throughout the legislative process, not speak only to affect final passage. We argue that presidents speak generally to meet broad electoral and political goals, but target speeches according to their goals at each stage of the legislative process: to frame the debate at the agenda-setting stage, to push bills out of committee, and to finalize support from legislators at the roll call stage. We analyze 116 bills between 1989 and 2004, supplemented by Bush Library archival data and a case study of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The results illustrate that presidents speak mostly at the agenda-setting and roll call stages and presidential attention at each stage varies by informational cues provided by the larger political environment.     

Personal Tragedy and Presidential Performance: Calvin Coolidge as Legislative Leader

The elevation of Calvin Coolidge to the presidency in the summer of 1923 was impressively smooth. The new president was entirely comfortable in his new role and impressed Washington officialdom with his self-assuredness, political adroitness, and hard work. One of his main initial objectives was to develop a strong and productive relationship with Congress and to lobby it to enact his extensive and progressive legislative agenda. During his first year, he worked vigorously at these tasks and achieved a notable degree of success. However, in July, 1924, the president confronted a devastating personal tragedy–the death of his young son–that left a deep imprint on the remainder of his presidency. He lost interest in legislative affairs and withdrew from interaction with Congress. The result is that he has been ranked among the least successful presidential leaders of Congress in U.S. history. However, incapacitation as a result of severe clinical depression rather than either incompetence or ideology was the precipitating cause.     

Sharpening Advocacy Coalitions

The concept of “advocacy coalitions” is the bedrock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), one of the most established and successful approaches for understanding policy processes across the globe. This article revisits and sharpens the conceptual definition of advocacy coalitions. We summarize the lessons from its theoretical emphases under the ACF and specify its five attributes (policy actors, shared beliefs, coordination, resources, and stability). Through this specification, we identify the ideal coalition type and several coalition subtypes. We then clarify and make a distinction between how we think about coalitions as a concept and how we approach coalitions empirically. This article sharpens the lens for describing and explaining coalitions toward better observations, theorizing, and measurements. It ends with next steps for further deepening and broadening knowledge about advocacy coalitions.     

Issues,Coalitions, and Divided Government

Ryan J. Barilleaux, The Post-Modern Presidency. The Office After Ronald Reagan. New York: Praeger. 1988. Pp. x, 175. $35.95.

Richard Rose, The Postmodern President: The White House Meets the World. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 1988. Pp. x, 350. $17.95.     

Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy Change

The advocacy coalition framework (AC) explains policy stability The policy entrepreneurship model (PE) explains dynamic policy change. Thus, augmenting the AC with insights from the PE provides a method of explaining a common empirical phenomenon: policy stability punctuated by dynamic policy change. This analytical strategy could be used to explore stability and change in many policy arenas. Here, we use it to interpret the background lo and dynamics of recent education policy reform in Michigan.     

Large Scale Projects: Planetwide Coalitions Needed

Abstract

Taking the Channel Tunnel as an example, there is a need for hard cost-benefit estimates to be made before any large scale project is begun. Long periods of gestation are frequent, high tech is not limited to macrosystems and structured collaboration between governments and other institutions is essential for success. The PAT system, supersonic tube flight and the priority selection of macroprojects are discussed and the establishment of a prototype development group is recommended.     

Presidential Oral History: The Clinton Presidential History Project

Most conventional oral history takes a bottom-up approach tothe past, focusing on settings where there is little in theway of a functional written record. This essay discusses thevalue of oral history in the opposite case of the American presidency.The written archive and journalistic record on each presidentis immense. Yet oral history is a valuable resource in thiselite environment, too. There are routine silences in even thebest of presidential papers, which oral history interviews canhelp fill. Moreover, the White House has become a workplacewhere recorded details can be hazardous to one's political health.Accordingly, few presidential aides today keep diaries or notesof key meetings—impoverishing the archive future historianswill use to study the presidency of our times. Oral historythus fortifies a weakening documentary record. This essay exploresthese broad issues and how they are being dealt with in theconduct of the William J. Clinton Presidential History Project.     

Interest Groups and Presidential Transitions

The study of interest group behavior has focused on many tactical decisions, but not on the decision to participate in presidential transitions. This is a limitation because transitions are associated with policy change and are the first opportunity to influence a new president. This article develops a theory of interest group participation in presidential transitions through an original survey administered during the 2008–2009 Obama transition. The findings suggest that groups participate based on their relationship with the outgoing administration and an evaluation of whether the transition will to lead policy change that advances or harms their interests.     

Belief System Continuity and Change in Policy Advocacy Coalitions: Using Cultural Theory to Specify Belief Systems,Coalitions, and Sources of Change

This paper evaluates the prospects for application of the “grid/group” cultural theory (CT), as advanced by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, to the Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACF). CT would seem to be relevant to several key aspects of the ACF: the content of the core beliefs that provide the “glue” that binds coalitions; the resilience of core beliefs and associated implications for belief change and learning; and the structure of coalitions and the mechanisms for coordination and control within them. The paper considers the compatibility of the ACF's account of deep core beliefs and coalition structure with that of CT; surveys an array of empirical studies based on variations of CT; and extends accounts of change in cultural identities from CT to the ACF. In addition, we highlight some of the ways in which the ACF may offer important theoretical insights for scholars of CT, potentially clarifying hypotheses concerning the relationships among basic worldviews, more specific beliefs, and behaviors.     

《中日和平友好条约》的签订

《中日和平友好条约》的签订经历了曲折的过程。中日双方于1974年11月开始缔约的预备谈判,后因日本政局变动使国内政治力量重组,自民党亲台势力掌控党政大权,在反霸问题上态度变化,导致谈判受阻;与此同时,中国也因文化大革命在缔约问题上回旋余地有限,致使缔约谈判一度中断。20世纪70年代末,日本国内政治环境和国际形势的变化为恢复中日谈判创造了有利条件,在邓小平的推动下,中日于1978年5月恢复了谈判,并于8月正式签署了《中日和平友好条约》,条约的签署对中日来说都具有重大意义。     

The Signing of the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920

This article looks at the efforts China and Iran made towards strengthening themselves and their search for independence and integrity after the First World War. Since the nineteenth century, the two countries had been in a similar situation, under pressure from treaties and rivalries with European powers. The change of the world order brought about by the 1914–18 war created an opportunity for China and Iran to claim back their rights, such as ending extra-territoriality. After the war, the Fourteen Points drawn up by the American president, Woodrow Wilson, gave hope for China and Iran to maintain their independence and integrity. During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, China and Iran made both gains and losses. China was unable to solve the Shandong Problem but became one of the founding members of the League of Nations, while Iran did not get access to the Peace Conference but obtained Britain’s assurance of independence and integrity by signing the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, and then joined the League of Nations. China and Iran attempted to bring about cooperation between Asian countries, and therefore signed a treaty in 1920. The significance of the treaty was that the two countries agreed not to grant extra-territoriality to each other, which was what both countries were seeking to achieve at that time.