Executive Branch Management and Presidential Unilateralism: Centralization and the Issuance of Executive Orders

Despite the useful simplifying assumptions of recent work on unilateral power, archival analysis shows the issuance of executive orders is a process rife with transaction costs as presidents bargain with the bureaucracy over formulating their scope and substance. As a result, presidents must create what Williamson (1985) called “governance structures” to minimize those costs, with the Office of Management and Budget's clearance process at its heart. As with legislative policy formulation, presidents assert more centralized control over executive orders (EO) production on items that affect large numbers of departments, on matters of executive reorganization, and on significant matters. Political contexts are trumped by managerial concerns. Orders dealing with implementation of recently passed statutes or other presidential “clerkship” functions tend to follow a far less centralized formulation process.     

Legalism as an Executive Ideology: Foundations of Barack Obama's Leadership Style

Abstract

The purpose of this commentary is to explore the sources of decision-making by President Obama. Specifically, the article notes his strong foundation in legal education, law journal editing, and early occupational activities related to law practice. It is observed that a legalist cast of mind rather than broad statements about race, class, and nation define the Obama early period in office. These considerations are often at the center of presidential options chosen, especially in areas of foreign policy and global challenges. The article claims that “legalism” serves to place serious limits on initiatives and independent actions, but also serves to put a brake on tendencies to impose a new imperial presidency. Such ideological checks and balances show unique dimensions to this president, but also continuity with past limits to extremism.     

George Bush and Executive Branch Domestic Policymaking Competence

This article critiques the George Bush domestic policymaking process and argues that Bush had the second-lowest level of policy competence among postwar presidents, ranking above only Ronald Reagan. Although not overtly antianalytic like Reagan, Bush gave little thought and effort to restoring the badly damaged executive branch domestic policymaking process. The article closes with suggestions about the steps needed for, and the difficulties in establishing, a strong White House policymaking process that generates fruitful interaction among key policy advocates over time and that establishes sufficient Executive Office of the President (EOP) capacity to monitor the implementation and management of presidential policies.     

Constitutional Design of the Executive: Vice Presidencies in Comparative Perspective

Given the history of the institution in the U.S., it is perhaps not surprising that few democracies have adopted a vice presidency. But, why do any countries have vice presidencies? What, if any, functions do they fulfill? In this paper we examine constitutional provisions for vice presidencies in 29 presidential democracies throughout the world. Specifically, we examine the extent to which the office of the vice presidency fulfills three possible institutional purposes: succession, legislative, or executive functions. Almost all vice presidencies included in our analysis fulfill the role of successor in the event of a presidential vacancy. Of those that have additional duties, most are assigned executive functions, while a few are assigned legislative functions. On the whole, the paper provides empirical evidence that vice presidencies seem to be marginal institutions.     

论九一八后行政院的机构调整与改革(1932-1937)

九一八事变后,国民政府行政院为应对危机,在内部动力与外在压力之下进行了机构调整与改革。主要内容是机构调整与人员裁并,目标是提高行政效能,树立政府威信。行政院的机构调整与改革具有延续性,以谋求稳定的政治局面为取向。在派系矛盾严重的政治环境中,这一时期的行政院机构调整与改革未能深入进行,但为抗战时期的机构改革建立了一定基础。     

Public Watchdogs or Imperial Pitbulls: An Evaluation of Special Prosecutor Investigations of Executive Branch Misconduct

The independent counsel investigation process was created to provide a politically neutral and independent avenue for investigating executive misconduct. Twenty investigations of high-ranking department and White House officials occurred during the independent counsel era. During this time, the process was criticized for a lack of accountability, for politicization, and for ineffectiveness in terms of investigatory outcomes. This research provides an empirical evaluation of the primary criticisms of the investigatory process by utilizing data concerning the investigations conducted during the independent counsel era (1978–1999), as well as information from more recent investigations conducted by special counsels appointed directly by the attorney general (1999 to the present). Specifically, I analyze the charge of lack of accountability by measuring the cost, duration, and expansion of jurisdiction for each independent and special counsel investigation. To analyze politicization of the process, I evaluated the impact of divided government and congressional involvement in the investigatory process. Last, the article provides a brief evaluation of the effectiveness of the investigations under review.     

Admiralty Law and Neutrality Policy in the 1790s: An Example of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Cooperation

The subject of admiralty law may have lost much of its luster over the years, but during the first decades of the nation's existence this branch of the law provided a vehicle for establishing foreign policy principles that helped protect the new nation. The admiralty cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-1790s were important to administration policy in the realm of foreign affairs and to the Court's own development as an independent arm of the national government.