'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post‐1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.     

The United States and Maghreb–Sahel security

Although the Maghreb has never been a priority, it now represents a region of significant interest for the United States. The importance of the Maghreb, and its Sahel extension, springs first from political and economic/energy interests, and second, from military, strategic and security concerns. The first relates to America's energy needs in the region, as well as to the regionalization that could create a potentially lucrative market for US businesses, especially since competition with China has increased over its recent gains in Africa. The second motivation, linked to the first, stems from Washington's new strategy and security policies initiated since 9/11 which have heightened the need for a new type of management concerning security, Islamism, terrorism, and, for a time, democratization. Unquestionably, the problems of terrorism, illegal migration, and other illegal activities are symptoms which cannot be understood if they are disconnected from their causes. However, rather than promoting economic development and good governance, the United States has focused predominantly on hard security matters and established a security system in the region which has continued under the Obama administration. Furthermore, Washington has not so far distanced itself from the regimes in the region whose authoritarianism, mismanagement of the economy, and violation of civil liberties is precisely what brought about the ills from which the Maghreb–Sahel suffers. Without addressing these issues therefore, there is little chance that the region will witness long-lasting peace, security, and prosperity. Furthermore, the protracted conflict in the Western Sahara, the resolution of which has been impeded by the geopolitical considerations of outside powers, has not only hindered the necessary construction of an integrated Maghreb, but also has the potential of leading to regional conflict.     

Middle power strategic choices and horizontal security cooperation: the 2009 Australia-South Korea security cooperation agreement

ABSTRACT

This article examines why Asia-Pacific middle powers cooperate with each other on security issues. The article challenges the assumption that middle powers are primarily influenced by great-power structural factors in their security relations with each other. It argues that the dominant structural explanations of security cooperation between secondary states—balancing against the rise of China, responding to burden-sharing pressure from the United States, or hedging during a period of great power transition—have not been sufficiently tested. Using the 2009 Australia-South Korea security cooperation agreement as a representative example of middle power security cooperation, it finds that inter-personal leadership preferences played a key intervening role in filtering existing structural incentives into actual policy cooperation. It shows how congruence in leadership preferences shapes when and with whom middle powers are likely to cooperate on security issues. The article opens up the research agenda on middle powers by examining how they approach security relations in bilateral and horizontal contexts with each other.     

Total security as threat: The blurring of hard and soft security in northern Europe

Part of the rapid change in thinking about security and security policy is occurring in northern Europe. Notions of “hard” and “soft” security are being implemented, most notably in the Visby Process of the Baltic Sea states. These variations of national security also interact with those of the United States and NATO. The direction of US security policy is called “total security” in the paper. The content of US policy is discussed as a contradiction of the basis for identifying hard and soft security. The blurring of these concepts contributes to the threatening character of total security. Implementation of measures to ensure total security involves the creation of pervasive and comprehensive intelligence gathering mechanisms that, because of their lack of sharply defined targets, has the potential for threatening the security of individuals for the sake of preserving national security.     

Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the mid-1980s, Israel, thGawdat Bahgate United States, and other Western powers have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Iranian officials have categorically denied these accusations and claimed that their nuclear program is designed for civilian purposes. This essay examines the history of Iran's nuclear program since the late 1950s and analyzes the forces that shape the country's nuclear policy. These forces include perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States; domestic economic and political dynamics; and national pride. The following section will discuss the European and Russian stance on Iran's nuclear ambition as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the international community's concerns and Tehran's demands. The essay concludes with some predictions on how Iran's nuclear program is likely to evolve in the next few decades.     

Rules of engagement: America's Asia-Pacific security policy under an Obama administration

The United States’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific stands at a historic juncture. How the new Obama administration conceives and implements its Asia-Pacific policy during its first term of office will have major and enduring ramifications for America's future. The new administration must have a clear vision of its country's national security interests in the Asia-Pacific as well as a better appreciation of the evolving dynamics of the region. To this end, it should continue to underwrite its bilateral security commitments, albeit through a less threat-centric lens, and be more cognisant of the region's multilateral overtures by further anchoring US participation in regional multilateral institutions. This shift from a position of bilateral primacy to one of engaged bilateral and multilateral partnership—a ‘convergent security’ approach—is the best strategy for Washington to advance its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.     

Peace Protest and Policy

The tremendous fluctuations in public mobilization against United States nuclear weapons policy, a relatively stable policy over four decades, present a difficult riddle to social scientists. Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have consistently protested both the content of United States national security policy and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however, has this protest spread beyond a handful of relatively marginal groups, generated substantial public support, and reached mainstream political institutions. This article examines the political cycles of peace movement engagement and quiescence, and their relation to external political context, particularly public policy. I begin with a brief review of the relevant literature on the origins of the movements, noting parallels in the study of interest groups. Building on recent literature on political opportunity structure. I suggest a theoretical framework which emphasizes the interaction between activists choices and political context. I then describe the cycles of peace movement activism and quiescence on nuclear weapons issues in the United States using mass media sources to delineate periods of mobilization. I outline a number of policy variables which may help explain protest mobilization. My conclusions address the importance of policy and political context in explaining movement cycles and the potential influence of protest movements on policy.     

Diaspora, kinship and loyalty: the renewal of Jewish national security

This article assesses the new thinking on Jewish security, both inside and outside the state of Israel, since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. To what extent are Jewish diaspora voices and concerns being heeded in Israel, and how are new manifestations of anti‐Semitism being addressed in this context? What is the new role that Israel ascribes to the diaspora in its redefinition of itself and its security environment? In addition, how is the diaspora responding to these new challenges and how is it defining its own role? All of these elements are examined by the authors in the different contexts of Israel, western Europe and the United States.     

More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence

In September 2014 the people of Scotland will vote on whether to become an independent nation, with the defence and security of Scotland proving to be one of the more vociferous areas of debate. This article argues that defence and security implications of this referendum are far more fundamental than either the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaigns have admitted. It makes four points. First, it suggests that the Scottish government's plans for defence and security in NATO and the EU are at odds with its proposed armed forces and that Scotland may well find itself having to make far greater commitments to defence to assure its allies. Second, it argues that a vote for independence will represent a game‐changing event for the remainder of the United Kingdom's defence and security, which will have significant consequences for the United Kingdom's partners and allies in NATO, the European Union and elsewhere. Third, the article contends that even a vote against independence will have a long‐term impact, in that the ‘West Lothian question’ and Scottish support for nuclear disarmament influence the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Finally, the article highlights how this issue has revealed weaknesses in the think‐tank and academic communities, particularly in Scotland. The independence vote does, therefore, represent ‘more than a storm in a tea cup’ and thus there needs to be far greater engagement with these issues within the United Kingdom and elsewhere.     

Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy

More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race.     

Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?

A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty‐first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.     

US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race

This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino‐US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.     

1797-1800年美国与法国准战争探析

18世纪晚期,美国为维护海上权益与地缘安全,加剧了与英法之间的矛盾。美国在《杰伊条约》中对英国的让步,换取到美英之间十年的和睦,却导致美法关系紧张,美国与法国从同盟走向准战争状态。最终美法危机得以和平解决,但这场准战争深深影响了美国早期的内政和外交。     

The national security implications of solar geoengineering: an Australian perspective

ABSTRACT

Given current emissions trends an increase in global temperatures in excess of 2°C is highly likely in the coming century. In this context, it seems increasingly probable that states may consider solar geoengineering as a stop-gap climate response. Solar geoengineering refers to measures that aim to alleviate some measure of global warming by intentionally increasing the amount of the sun’s energy that is reflected into space. Currently the two most discussed solar geoengineering techniques involve either marine cloud brightening or dispersing aerosols in the stratosphere. These techniques could be relatively inexpensive, are within the technological capacities (after a brief period of development) of technologically-advanced countries, and could have an almost immediate impact on temperatures. Yet, while solar geoengineering might potentially be utilised to manage some climate-linked security threats, it itself would create new security challenges. Consequently, this paper explores potential international security implications for Australia if a regional state, or group of states, initiates a solar geoengineering program. We conclude that since solar geoengineering is unlikely to become a first-order international issue, disputation over solar geoengineering will likely reflect, or act as a proxy for, wider patterns of state interaction. However, scenarios in which China and the United States take different positions, or in which there are divisions among regional powers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Singapore would pose the greatest threat to Australia’s national security.     

对日媾和与美菲同盟条约的缔结

冷战之初,面对中国内战局势的变化和美国改变对日政策可能导致的日本重新军国主义化威胁,菲律宾将确保国家安全的希望寄托于美国,积极寻求与之订立"太平洋公约",但该构想不符合当时美国的战略考虑,屡遭拒绝。朝鲜战争的爆发,促使美国加快对日媾和。由于媾和方案在安全和赔偿方面未能满足菲律宾等国需求,遭到反对。为平息盟国不满,美国改变对"太平洋公约"的态度并提出自己的方案,但该方案将日本包括其中,被菲否定。经过博弈,在美国提供正式安全保证的前提下,菲律宾最终接受了媾和方案。     

The Effects and Defects of Nuclear Cosmogeny

Joseph Masco suggests that nuclear weapons have become the icon of American technological superiority in the post-World War II era, and that their manufacture has transformed our worldview. Insofar as this is true, the production, testing, and use of such weapons has exposed the United States of America's experiment in freedom and equality to some of its most brilliant and most tarnished moments. The five volumes considered in this review explore some of the reflections from that patina and uncover many layers of tarnish that accompanied the transformation of the United States into a nuclear super-power.     

The War on Terror from the Perspective of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia

This article examines the perspective of two major Islamic nations—Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—toward the United States' War on terror and how this war shaped and influenced the behavior of the two Islamic governments toward domestic challenges and their partnership with the United States, as they have declared their support of the United States. Indeed the war against terror has developed several security concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. However, each state has followed different methods to fight Islamic radical movements as well as a different framework of partnership with the United States on its war against terrorism.     

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2006

Australia in 2006 reaffirmed its close relationship with the United States while deepening engagement with other major power partners, with further agreements concluded with China, cooperation extended with Japan, and the profile of ties with India enhanced. Australia continued to navigate through the sometimes sensitive relations among the major powers, amid additional pressures arising from North Korea's nuclear test. Tensions with Indonesia were followed by a new security agreement, though increased confidence was needed in the relationship at both official and public levels. Internal disorder in several southwest Pacific states challenged Australia's capacities to provide effective short and medium term responses. Involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with the latter situation particularly problematic. Growing demand for energy in the Asia–Pacific region directed further attention towards Australia's uranium resources, as climate change issues assumed a higher profile in domestic debate and multilateral activities.     

The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet‐made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non‐nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far‐reaching implications for nuclear non‐proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major‐power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co‐operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order.     

A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis

Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsular was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening 'rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive.