George Bush and Executive Branch Domestic Policymaking Competence

This article critiques the George Bush domestic policymaking process and argues that Bush had the second-lowest level of policy competence among postwar presidents, ranking above only Ronald Reagan. Although not overtly antianalytic like Reagan, Bush gave little thought and effort to restoring the badly damaged executive branch domestic policymaking process. The article closes with suggestions about the steps needed for, and the difficulties in establishing, a strong White House policymaking process that generates fruitful interaction among key policy advocates over time and that establishes sufficient Executive Office of the President (EOP) capacity to monitor the implementation and management of presidential policies.     

Presidential Speeches and the Stages of the Legislative Process

Presidents go public frequently to increase their success in Congress. Yet scholars know little about when presidents speak within the legislative process or why. If presidential speeches are indeed a source of power for presidents, then presidents are likely to use them throughout the legislative process, not speak only to affect final passage. We argue that presidents speak generally to meet broad electoral and political goals, but target speeches according to their goals at each stage of the legislative process: to frame the debate at the agenda-setting stage, to push bills out of committee, and to finalize support from legislators at the roll call stage. We analyze 116 bills between 1989 and 2004, supplemented by Bush Library archival data and a case study of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The results illustrate that presidents speak mostly at the agenda-setting and roll call stages and presidential attention at each stage varies by informational cues provided by the larger political environment.     

Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism

Abstract Many theoretical models analyze the effects of decentralized environmental policymaking. The predictions range from a race to the top, a race to the bottom, or no effect. However, little empirical evidence exists to resolve this ambiguity. This paper fills the void by examining the impact of decentralized environmental policymaking in the U.S. under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. For abatement expenditures, Reagan's decentralization had no discernible impact before the mid‐1980s, but by the mid‐1980s the data are consistent with decentralization leading to a race to the top. No statistically significant effect is found on nitrogen oxide or sulfur dioxide emissions.     

George W. Bush,Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership

The foreign policy world views of George W. Bush and Barack Obama differ dramatically. Bush made terrorism the focal point of his foreign policy and dismissed the idea that either allies or international institutions should constrain America's freedom of action. Obama sees terrorism as one of many transnational problems that require the cooperation of other countries to combat and, as a result, the United States must invest more in diplomatic efforts to build partnerships. Despite these differences, both presidents share one common conviction: that other countries long for US leadership. Bush believed that friends and allies would eventually rally to the side of the United States, even if they bristled at its actions, because they shared America's goals and had faith in its motives. Obama believed that a United States that listened more to others, stressed common interests and favored multinational action would command followers. In practice, however, both visions of American global leadership faltered. Bush discovered that many countries rejected his style of leadership as well as his strategies. Obama discovered that in a globalized world, where power has been more widely dispersed, many countries are not looking to Washington for direction. The future success of US foreign policy depends on the ability of policy‐makers to recognize and adapt to a changing geopolitical environment in which the US remains the most significant military, diplomatic and economic power but finds it, nonetheless, increasingly difficult to drive the global agenda.     

The White House and Congress on Child Care and Family Leave Policy: From Carter to Clinton

Over the last two decades four presidents produced a variety of family policy initiatives with mixed results. Carter issued his nine-point plan on the family and convened the first White House Conference on Families in American history. Reagan created the White House Working Group on the Family and issued Executive Order 12606, which established family impact statements. George Bush continued many of Reagan's policies and pushed family values to near the top of the political agenda by 1992, and Bill Clinton set forth his eight-point plan on the family and moved quickly to reverse many of the policies of the Reagan-Bush era. Discussed is the role of the White House and Congress in shaping two family policy initiatives in particular: The Child Care and Development Block Grant of 1990 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.     

Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and Its Aftermath

This paper compares the decision-making approaches of two presidents, John F. Kennedy and George W. Bush, in relation to unanticipated international crises. One, President Kennedy, employed a broad body of expert opinion and entertained a wide range of options in meeting the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963. The actions taken avoided a potential worldwide nuclear war. The other, George W. Bush, consulted only a few, like-minded colleagues and appears to have decided early on that a war directed against Iraq and Saddam Hussein was a necessity. The administration's justifications for the war were difficult to prove and the administration chose an essentially bilateral (as against a multi-lateral) approach. The Iraq War was won fairly easily, although its long-range consequences remain unclear. The two styles of decision-making present polarized approaches to international crisis situation management.     

Notes from the Book Review Editor

Democratic theory promises that the public influences elected officials, and thus policy. Since the Nixon administration, presidents have employed a public opinion apparatus in order to capture and employ public attitudes. Public opinion polls, by virtue of statistical certitude, appear both scientific and representative of the public. However, there is another tool in the public opinion arsenal, albeit an unrepresentative one. President George H. W. Bush's administration employed not only public opinion polls but also focus groups during his tenure. When challenging the use of polls, the media, elites and even scholars rarely condemn the practice as poorly representative of the public; focus groups, in contrast, are discussion sections of approximately 20 people considering questions of policy, rhetoric, and performance. Using archival documents, this article compares the use of focus groups with the traditional application of the polling apparatus during the Bush presidency. Despite the inherent consequences of employing such a narrowly representative tool, the Bush White House employed focus groups in much the same manner as the statistically driven polling apparatus.     

Assessing Presidential Communications in Civil Rights Policymaking

This chapter compares the public communications of modern presidents across target groups and issue areas of civil rights. We find that attention, support, and symbolism on civil rights vary considerably across individual presidents and political party. Not surprisingly, in their public messages Democratic presidents are more attentive and supportive of civil rights than are Republican presidents. Some results were expected, while others were surprising. Lyndon B. Johnson was attentive and supportive; but, unexpectedly, George H. W. Bush was highly attentive to and quite nonsupportive of civil rights. Also surprisingly, on most indicators, Bush's policy statements were less symbolic and less equivocal than were Ronald W. Reagan's. Most attention is given to blacks as a target group (although this is declining) and to the employment issue area. Overall, the findings reveal the considerable flexibility and discretion in presidents' public communications in the civil rights realm.     

New Data and New Directions in Interbranch Lobbying: Congressional Mail Summaries of the George H.W. Bush White House

Charles W. Dunn and J. David Woodward, American Conservatism from Burke to Bush. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991. Pp. ix, 213. $18.95. Terry Eastland, Energy in the Executive: The Case for the Strong Presidency. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pp. 392. $22.95. Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers, From F.D.R. to Bush, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. xi, 431. $16.95 paper, $38.00 hardbound. Thomas S. Langston, Ideologues and Presidents, From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. Pp. xxi, 247. $35.00. Arthur Sanders, Victory: How a Progressive Democratic Party Can Win and Govern. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Pp. xiv, 192. $14.95 paper, $42.50 hardbound.     

Assessing Reagan's Legacy

Abstract

I have argued in other research that modern presidents have been facilitators rather than directors of change. They are highly dependent on their environments and can do little to increase their resources of influence. This article probes such a theory of presidential leadership further by examining the congressional leadership of George Washington.

Perhaps the most revered political leader in American history, Washington entered office with tremendous prestige, a Congress dominated by men he viewed as political allies, and, because he was the first president, the fewest constraining precedents of policy or process. Thus, Washington enjoyed the greatest potential to serve as a “director” and move the country in new directions through his leadership.

Yet the study reveals that Washington was mainly a facilitator, not a director of change—much like George Bush two centuries later. Systemic factors such as political culture and the structure of the constitutional system determined that Washington had to be a facilitator, dependent on the opportunities the electorate handed him rather than a director, creating opportunities for change through his own leadership. Similar features characterize the leadership of the current administration.     

George W. Bush's City on a Hill

This paper explores the various and sometimes contradictory meanings of the metaphor of A City on a Hill, with an emphasis on how such an investigation can contribute to an understanding of the foreign policy of George W. Bush, especially in terms of the War on Terrorism in general and the war in Iraq in particular. The strands within the metaphor include religious, political, economic, and technological dimensions which too often exacerbate the confusions about national self-image many Americans have about our role in the world and about what has been called the right-wing Wilsonianism of the Bush White House. Greater clarity about the role of this metaphor in our history might help in minimizing what can fittingly be called the law of unintended consequences.     

Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration (1989-1993): Preliminary Evidence from Case Studies

Presidents have many tools in the policy-making process. One of the most powerful of these is vetoing legislation. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool relying on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article provides a framework for understanding the use and effectiveness of veto threats. First, the present understanding of the use of veto threats is discussed, including the conditions under which they are most likely to occur and to be effective. Next, we provide a conceptualization of the context in which a veto threat is issued and the result of such a threat. Finally, using the Bush administration (1989-1993), we illustrate two possible results with case studies of civil rights and child care legislation.     

Bush,Obama and a faith‐based US foreign policy

In a calculated move to appeal to his core constituency during his first term, President George W. Bush launched domestic and international faith‐based initiatives designed to leverage public finance for religious groupings to carry out social and welfare functions formerly performed by government or secular organizations. In December 2002 the Center for Faith‐Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) was extended to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Center's intention was to ‘create a level playing field’ for faith‐based and community groups to compete for foreign assistance funding. These presidential initiatives are problematic, however, calling into question the first amendment—the separation of church and state. Upon taking office Barack Obama set up the Office of Faith‐based and Neighborhood Partnerships, promising a greater emphasis on community/neighbourhood programs. The CFBCI remains a fixture in USAID and Obama shows as much enthusiasm for the initiative as his predecessor. Faith‐based international relations and political science scholars have sought to build on these initiatives and call for a greater role for faith in US foreign policy. On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, this article considers the claims for a faith‐based foreign policy by examining the construction of a faith‐based discourse by academics and successive presidents. Using faith‐based initiatives and USAID as a case–study, the article discusses criticisms of the policy and focuses on the role of a conservative evangelical organization, Samaritan's Purse, to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of faith‐based approaches. The article argues that advocates of faith‐based foreign policy, in seeking special privileges for ecumenical religious actors, overlook their declining international significance and the opportunities afforded to less tolerant but more populist religious actors which have the potential seriously to harm US foreign policy objectives.     

‘An Angel Directs the Storm’: The Religious Politics of American Neoconservatism

Abstract

In his inaugural speech, President George W. Bush suggested that the mission of America to spread freedom and democracy in the world is a divinely authored mission. The intention first announced in Bush's inaugural to globalize an American Christian vision of freedom and democracy, and of free market capitalism, reflects the theological underpinnings of the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration. In this article I trace the remarkable continuities between the neo-conservative political theology of Bush and his acolytes and more mainstream Niebuhrian approaches to democracy and the ‘manifest destiny’ of America. I then subject the emergence of an American imperium, and the political theology associated with it, to a critique in dialogue with early Christian critics of Roman Empire, and with the Christian pacifist tradition as recently retrieved by North American theological ethicists John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas.     

Politics and Policy in the 103rd and 104th Congresses: Evaluating the Effects of Divided Government in the Postreform Era

The 1980 Reagan transition and the 1988 Bush transition offer important case studies for understanding the challenges of presidential transitions. Although not without its shortcomings, the 1980 transition was, at least comparably, the most successful of the transfers in power since the modern era of presidential transitions commenced with the Carter effort in 1976. 1988 offers useful lessons about "friendly takeovers": the passing of power from a president to a president-elect of the same party. The 1988 transition is also of interest because it offers the only instance of a sitting vice president elected to the presidency since Martin Van Buren in 1836. The 1988 transition, moreover, marked the ascendancy of President George W. Bush's father to the office, and it was a transition in which he and several members of this administration participated, Chief of Staff Andrew Card most notably.     

The Spanish American War’s ‘Most Durable Hero’: Admiral Pasquale Cervera and Popular Heroic Values in the United States, 1898–1909

The United States honored a host of military heroes during the Spanish American War including Pasqual Cervera y Topete, the enemy admiral who had experienced a humiliating defeat at the Battle of Santiago Bay, Cuba (3 June 1898) at the hands of US naval forces. Over the course of the war and in the year that followed, American public opinion of the admiral became positive and increasingly laudatory. By late 1899, Life Magazine, followed by other popular publications, claimed that Cervera was a better war hero then Admiral George Dewey and other American officers who had been wildly celebrated for their wartime heroics. The enemy admiral’s heroic rise was possible because of a fundamental change in the relationship between the press and the nation’s war heroes that sped up each champion’s ultimate decline. In the late nineteenth century Americans sought chivalrous, selfless men of action for their heroes. As journalists began covering each war hero’s daily life as they did other celebrities, however, they discovered character flaws in the nation’s homegrown champions. This examination of Cervera’s gradual rise as an American hero through his death in 1909 includes an overview of the American hero-making process and lifecycle and how celebrity journalism shortened the reign of most war heroes. After identifying the complicated set of values the nation sought in its war heroes at the end of the century, this study will also explain why journalists considered naval heroes as better representatives of those cherished ideals than those from the Army (including volunteer Theodore Roosevelt) until well after the end of the war. Roosevelt was honored as a hero during the war and won the 1899 New York gubernatorial election largely because of his wartime popularity, but was not considered selfless because of his clear political ambitions. American hero-worship of Cervera developed slowly, was considerably more subdued than the public enthusiasm displayed for America’s native-born champions, and was undoubtedly bestowed, in part, as a criticism of the failure of American heroes to live up to the heroic narrative created for them by reporters and biographers. Cervera’s ranking as Life’s ‘most durable hero’ of the war, while seemingly nonsensical, begins to make more sense when the Spanish admiral is reconfigured as a national cultural hero instead of an American military champion. Despite his enemy status, Cervera came to epitomise important military values of the day, because of the rapid decline of the nation’s American-born war heroes brought about by celebrity journalism.     

Nationalist Religious Broadcasting: The Case of the 2004 US Presidential Nominating Conventions

Abstract

In televised broadcasts from the 2004 US Presidential nominating conventions, religion played a somewhat surprising role at gatherings of ostensibly secular political parties. Across Democratic and Republican conventions, three streams of religious discourse and practice were evident, in varying emphases and shadings: revivalist Protestantism, civil religion, and a cultural religion of "innocent domination." These three aspects of religious discourse and practice sought to associate "America" with an innocent, pure and persuasive form of transcendent authority. Republicans marshaled assertions of both innocence and domination to the service of their candidate, President George W. Bush, more effectively than Democrats did for their candidate, Senator John W. Kerry, thereby lending Bush a convention "bounce" in polls that Kerry lacked. A close reading of the role of religion in these conventions suggests, in short, that something more complex and pervasive than a theocratic conspiracy by "the religious right" was at work.     

Presidential Appeals to Moral Foundations: How Modern Presidents Persuade Cross‐Ideologues

Many assume that modern presidents cannot persuade cross‐ideologues to support their policy proposals. The idea that a conservative would support a liberal policy advocated by a cross‐partisan president seems ludicrous. However, recent research suggests that conservatives will support liberal policies that are framed consistent with moral foundations. Using a national survey experiment that carefully manipulates the actual text of a speech given by President Obama, this article demonstrates that fairness frames in presidential speeches motivate liberal policy support among conservative, moderate, and liberal Americans who value fairness.     

The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo‐liberalism to Iraq

This article argues that American policy towards Iraq went through four major shifts between the invasion in 2003 and the announcement of the surge in 2007. The best way to understand the Bush administration's evolving policy towards Iraq is by examining the ideological parameters within which it was made. The article assesses various approaches to understanding the relationship between ideology, policy making and foreign policy, concluding that ideology shapes the paradigm and analytical categories within which foreign policy is made. A major change in foreign policy originates either from the decision‐maker consciously recognizing and attempting to rework the ideational parameters within which policy is made or in reaction to ‘discrepant information’ or ‘anomalies’ that destabilize the paradigm and its analytical categories. The article goes on to examine the extent to which both neo‐liberalism and neo‐conservatism shaped George W. Bush's foreign policy. It identifies a series of major analytical categories that originate from within these two doctrines and shaped policy towards Iraq. The article argues that the four major shifts in Bush's policy towards Iraq were forced upon the administration by the rising tide of politically motivated violence. Ultimately this violence forced Bush to abandon the major analytical categories that, up to 2007, had given his policy coherence. In order to extricate his administration from the quagmire that Iraq had become by 2006, Bush totally transformed his approach, dropping the previously dominant neo‐liberal paradigm and adopting a counter‐insurgency doctrine.