Neglect,Inattention, and Legislative Deficiencies: The Consequences of One-Party Deliberations in The U.S. House

Congressional scholars have conducted little research on the consequences of the majority party controlling bill formulation and excluding minority members from the legislative process. Critics of one-party deliberations use case-study evidence to argue that such processes lead to error-prone, often defective legislation. However, no large-N analysis has sought to operationalize and verify this effect. I develop new empirical strategies to explore claims about the relationship between deliberative procedures and policy outcomes. Examining legislation drafted in the U.S. House between 1987 and 2008, I find suggestive but consistent evidence of error-prone bills being developed under one-party processes.     

A Voice for Black Interests: Congressional Black Caucus Cohesion and Bill Cosponsorship

This study enhances our understanding of the vexing dilemma (i.e., the crosspressures emanating from individual goals and collective aspirations) confronting black legislators. Extant research based on roll call votes or on interest group scores that are also based on roll call votes is limited in what it can tell us about African-American representation in Congress. By examining African-American representatives' cosponsorship of legislation, this study uses a more accurate measure of members' legislative behavior and thus overcomes the "censored sample problem" associated with roll call data. Bill cosponsorship is a good indicator of a representative's intensity of commitment to constituent interests. We examine public bills cosponsored by African-American representatives from 1971 through 1993. The analysis finds that the cohesiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) transcends policy arenas, notwithstanding higher rates of cosponsorship on social issues, and that the number of bills cosponsored by the CBC is noticeably higher after 1982. In addition, analysis suggests that CBC members, just like all members of Congress, respond to the structure that governs the House and the political forces that shape their electoral fortunes.     

Earmarks and Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

Popular treatments of earmarks abound with allegations that members of Congress use them to aid their reelection campaigns, but the academic literature has yet to examine whether earmarking influences elections. To begin to fill this void, we search for relationships between earmarking and several facets of electoral competition and outcomes in the 2008 and 2010 House elections. There are three principal findings. First, in both election years, active earmarkers faced weaker primary election competition than other members. Second, in 2008 there was a positive correlation between earmarking and campaign receipts. Third, both of these correlations exist only among Democrats. These findings suggest that earmarks critics might be correct in charging that members, particularly Democrats, benefit from the earmarks they place into spending bills.     

Managing midterm vacancies: institutional design and partisan strategy in the Australian parliament, 1901–2013

This article explores how replacement rules for midterm vacancies affect legislative turnover in the context of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The differing electoral rules and replacement procedures for the two chambers of the Australian parliament over more than a century permit an analysis of the complex interplay between institutional rules, party strategy, and patterns of representation between 1901 and 2013. Since 1901, the Australian House of Representatives has been committed to single member electoral systems and by-elections for filling midterm vacancies, but major changes to both the electoral system and midterm replacement rules for the Australian Senate have played a critical role in enhancing party control of Senate careers.     

"Don't Go Changing to Try and Please Me": A Preference-Consistency Analysis on Trade Policy in the U.S. House

Trade voting in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993 to 2001 provides an opportunity to move beyond examining the determinants of trade voting on single bills and to focus on the consistency members of Congress demonstrate in their trade preferences. We find that while a significant percentage of House members are consistent in their trade preferences during the time period, a surprising percentage of those members serving over the entire period are inconsistent, affecting important changes in U.S. trade policy. Ideological, partisan, and constituency- based factors prove significant cross-pressures on House members' trade preferences throughout the time period; however, we unearth differences in effects between the two parties. It is these cross-pressures that lead to inconsistent preferences among some legislators.     

Sources of electoral support for the Australian democrats in the house of representatives and Senate elections of 1990 and 1993: A comparative analysis

Election to the Australian Senate under proportional voting and statewide quotas gives to minor parties of the political centre a chance to win parliamentary representation otherwise denied them in the single member constituency‐based House of Representatives. Focusing on the Australian Democrats, vote splitting in the context of ? consistently higher levels of support for the Democrats in the upper house provides some evidence of differences among sources of electoral support between House and Senate, but within a context of general similarity of voter behaviour. Findings support a view that, as a party of ‘concerns’ rather than ideology, with a highly unstable support base, the future of the Democrats as other than a focus for protest must remain in doubt.     

Cold War,Public Opinion,and Foreign Policy Spending Decisions: Dynamic Representation by Congress and the President

Conventional wisdom before the Vietnam War held that public opinion exerted no influence on U.S. foreign policy decisions. Scholars working in Vietnam's aftermath found episodic influence of public opinion on foreign policy, but missing in our understanding were longitudinal examinations of public opinion's influence on foreign policy. A number of post-Vietnam scholars subsequently revealed a long-term relationship between public opinion and defense spending. This study extends that work by analyzing responsiveness to public opinion in different foreign policy arenas by different government institutions, and by accounting for a critical variable not relevant in most previous studies: the end of the cold war. We construct a model explaining the influences of public opinion and the cold war on spending proposals for defense and foreign economic aid by the presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Both public opinion and the end of the cold war exert direct influence on defense spending proposals by the presidency, while the Senate and the House respond primarily to public opinion inputs and the partisan composition of the Senate. In the case of foreign economic aid, the cold war's end gives occasion for increasing spending proposals, contrary to the public's expectation that the end of the cold war minimized the need for the U.S. to provide foreign economic assistance.     

Consensus,Conflict, and Partisanship in House Decision Making: A Bill-Level Examination of Committee and Floor Behavior

Although conflict and partisanship are deeply entrenched in the public's view of the U.S. Congress, political scientists have noted that consensus characterizes much of the legislative branch's operations. We build on an expanding literature that moves beyond a focus on roll call voting and explore individual bills as the unit of analysis in an attempt to obtain an accurate picture of the broader context in which House decision making occurs. Drawing on evidence spanning 24 years, we document the extent to which consensus rather than conflict typifies House decision making. Our bill-level analysis facilitates a unique examination of the context in which committees operate as well as the ensuing floor environment. The results provide insight into the factors attending to the degree of consensus and conflict associated with bills—particularly the salience of the issue and the committee of origin—while painting a more complete picture of the day-to-day environment of the U.S. House.     

Defining Debates from the Outside Looking In: How Presidents Affect the Decisions of the House Rules Committee

In this study I demonstrate how presidents influence the decisions of the House Rules Committee. I show that, since the late 1980s, this rise in presidential influence has not been at the expense, but rather at the behest, of Speakers intent on instilling greater partisan order over the House. Speakers direct the Rules Committee to protect through restrictive rules those bills expressly supported by co-partisan presidents. Moreover, they do the same for bills opposed by presidents from the competing party. Statistical analysis of rules granted to almost 1,800 bills between 1977 and 2004 shows that these exogenous partisan factors perform more robustly than prevailing committee-based spatial models in the explanation of Rules Committee decisions in the postreform era. I conclude that scholars must continue to develop and refine formal and statistical models that explain the role and influence of partisanship not just within institutions, but also across them.     

试析当代美国华人参与选举政治的方式

当代美国华人参与选举政治的方式主要有参加选举登记与投票、政治捐款、竞选议员及政府公职和争取政治委任等。本文分析了华人参与美国选举政治的这些重要方式。作者认为,这些参与方式没有优劣和重要与次要之分,都是影响美国政治,为华人争取权益和提升华人形象的手段,它们可以优势互补,相得益彰。     

Shirking and Ideology: Defense in the Senate

A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of their constituents. This paper shows, at least for the case of defense in the Senate in the 1980s, that the evidence is sufficient to reject the claim that shirking represents the consumption of personal ideological policy preferences. Instead, the apparent impact of shirking on defense voting was an instrumental, reelection-oriented response to President Reagan's ability to muster popular support for his defense build up, and thus cannot be regarded as shirking at all.     

Identifying the Critical Members of the House of Representatives

This article combines the historical record of presidential-congressional relations with previous scholarly findings to develop a model that identifies the members of Congress whose support is critical to the president's ability to build enacting coalitions. It then analyzes the relationship between President Obama and the House of Representatives during the 113th Congress as a case study that demonstrates the model's utility. Conventional wisdom and political pundits suggest that presidents working in divided government will have impossible difficulty working with Congress, but history suggests otherwise. The president's ability to successfully build enacting coalitions during divided government requires him to perform two rather disparate tasks. First, the president must minimize the amount of presidential party members who cross party lines to vote against the president's position. Second, the president must entice at least some opposition party members to cross party lines and support the president's position. Using data from 1981 to 2015, I find that representatives’ behavior on presidential support votes are related to constituency-level presidential strength, electoral vulnerability, ideological moderation, and ideological extremity. I use these results to identify the critical members of the 113th Congress. When a majority of these critical members supported President Obama's positions his legislative efforts were successful. When a majority of these members opposed the president's positions, the House Republican majority defeated the president.     

Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.     

Majority Party Bias in U.S. Congressional Conference Committees

This article examines the representativeness of conference committees in the U.S. Congress by measuring the difference in observed policy preferences between the conference delegations and the parent bodies. We predict and find significant differences between the House and Senate in terms of the partisan bias of conference delegations. House conference delegations are systematically biased in favor of the majority party and away from the chamber median. We take the additional step of exploring the source of this bias. In particular, we examine whether majority party bias in conference is a function of partisan processes at work directly in the selection of conferees. We find evidence that the conditions of majority party influence in the House are consistent with some existing theoretical models of party influence in legislating. There is less conclusive evidence of partisan processes in the Senate, which is consistent with institutional differences in appointment practices.     

Electoral databases: big brother or democracy unbound?

Modern political campaigning is becoming increasingly professionalised to the extent that in Australia today the major parties use electoral databases to assist with their campaigns. The electoral databases of the Coalition (Feedback) and the Australian Labor Party (Electrac) store information on the constituents of each House of Representatives seat. The information gathered in the databases, such as the policy preferences and party identification of individual voters, are used by candidates for House seats to tailor correspondence to swinging voters, and to identify potential party supporters. Party organisations aggregate the information in the databases and use it to conduct polls and focus groups of swinging voters, and to tailor policy development and campaign strategies. Electoral databases have the potential to improve the level of communication between elected representatives and their constituents. There are, however, a number of ethical problems associated with their use. While the usefulness of the databases to the major political parties is undeniable, their use underlines the trend in modern campaigning towards targeting swinging voters at the expense of the majority of the electorate. Considerable public resources are devoted to the smooth operation of the databases. They would be much less effective were political parties not exempted from the Privacy Act. The use of personal information collected by members of parliament by political parties should be more closely regulated. Despite the wishes of the major political parties to keep their operation a secret, the advantages and disadvantages of the use of electoral databases should be more widely debated.     

Congress as Principal: Exploring Bicameral Differences in Agent Oversight

Previous theoretical and empirical work suggests differences in the way the congressional chambers approach the responsibility of agent control. The Senate should, the literature hypothesizes, exercise greater and qualitatively more systematic, substantive, and preemptive oversight of agents than does the House. Yet little research on congressional oversight has focused upon bicameral differences in principal behavior. This paper begins to fill the void by examining House and Senate oversight of the Federal Reserve. Specifically, I look at three types of oversight activity: monitoring of, and signaling to, the agent, and the principal's alteration of its contract with the agent. Utilizing original data and a variety of statistical methods, I show that there exist few, if any, quantitative and qualitative differences in House and Senate behavior. I then discuss theoretical reasons for my unexpected findings.     

The Personal or the Partisan? The Politics of House Appropriations Amendments, 1985-2016

Offering amendments represents an important tool for individual members to engage in behaviors that help them pursue reelection, like position-taking and credit claiming. When the House leadership limits the opportunities for rank-and-file members to offer amendments on most measures debated on the floor but leaves spending bills relatively open to amendment, we might expect that individual members will respond by redirecting their amendments to the appropriations process. In this article, I explore whether members use these opportunities to pursue personal goals and to enhance their party's collective reputation.     

Temp to Perm: Stacking the Electoral Deck Through U.S. Senate Appointments?

One concern with allowing governors to appoint replacements for U.S. Senate vacancies is that appointees may have an advantage over their competition in seeking election. Another is that governors may use their power to further their own political ambitions. This investigation explores whether an electoral benefit is conferred through receiving or making an appointment. The analysis provides insight into how gubernatorial appointments shape electoral outcomes for quasi-incumbents and the Senate's membership. Notably, the results reveal an electoral boost for representatives who are appointed prior to making a run for the Senate. Although the results demonstrate that some appointees gain an advantage by receiving appointments, governors who run for Senate do not experience an electoral benefit from making an appointment.