Majority Party Bias in U.S. Congressional Conference Committees

This article examines the representativeness of conference committees in the U.S. Congress by measuring the difference in observed policy preferences between the conference delegations and the parent bodies. We predict and find significant differences between the House and Senate in terms of the partisan bias of conference delegations. House conference delegations are systematically biased in favor of the majority party and away from the chamber median. We take the additional step of exploring the source of this bias. In particular, we examine whether majority party bias in conference is a function of partisan processes at work directly in the selection of conferees. We find evidence that the conditions of majority party influence in the House are consistent with some existing theoretical models of party influence in legislating. There is less conclusive evidence of partisan processes in the Senate, which is consistent with institutional differences in appointment practices.     

Issue Salience and Bill Introduction in the House and Senate

I propose that many if not most bills introduced in the House and Senate represent electoral position taking on the part of members. Thousands of bills are introduced every year, only a fraction of which are passed into law, much less seriously considered in the chamber. Moreover, bills are very good position-taking devices in that they can appear to voters to be a credible step in the electoral process. I search for electoral motivations by examining the content of the bills members introduce. For five different policy areas, and in both the House and the Senate, I find strong correlations between indicators of issue salience in members’ districts and the number of bills the member introduces within the policy area. In addition, in the House the relationship between salience and bill introduction is strongest among vulnerable members, although in the Senate vulnerability does not influence the relationship.     

The political geography of campaign advertising in U.S. House elections

The extent to which elections are useful instruments of accountability is closely related to the ability of citizens to acquire and utilize information about candidates running in those contests. In this paper, I examine the visibility of campaigns for the United States House of Representatives by analyzing how candidates, political parties and interest groups strategically allocate campaign advertising in media markets and congressional districts across the United States. I show that this allocation is based not only on the competitiveness of the campaign, but also according to the cost and reach of the media markets that dominate congressional districts. Overall, the findings indicate the importance of political geographic considerations for understanding the substantial variation in advertising aired both across and within congressional districts during House campaigns.     

Trade politics in the American Congress:: a study of the interaction of political geography and interest group behavior

Political geography plays an important role in influencing how industries build coalitions to secure desired trade benefits in American politics. The political geography of an industry is defined as the intersection of its economic geography, i.e. the location of its means of production, and the institutional structure of the political system in which it operates. In the case of the United States, trade-sensitive industries lobby the bicameral Congress and the executive branch for beneficial trade policies, and their geographic location strongly influences the strategies they adopt. Industries concentrated across heavily populated states will be more powerful in the House of Representatives than in the Senate. They will therefore ground their efforts in the House and form coalitions with industries that are powerful in the Senate. Industries that are concentrated across less populated states will be stronger in the Senate and will seek to form coalition partners that are strong in the House. A theory of political geography is used to explain the behavior of import/export sensitive industries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that these industries choose coalition partners who bolster their political weakness in the House or Senate by extending, rather than replicating, their geographic base of support.     

What's Happened to the Watchful Eye?

This article reports results of a follow-up study to my book Keeping a Watchful Eye (1990), updating it with data from the 1990s. It examines whether congressional oversight has increased or decreased relative to earlier periods, how the variables that predicted oversight behavior in the period from 1961 to 1983 worked in later years, why changes have occurred, and what they mean. It also examines whether there was something distinctive about oversight in the 1990s when Republicans dominated both chambers. Results indicate that the amount of primary-purpose oversight continues to be quite high and that the model developed in the book to explain committee oversight behavior remains remarkably effective. What has changed is a large drop in legislative hearings and meetings (where oversight behavior often occurs), something that the data show actually predates the Republican 104th Congress. However, the Republican takeover did lead to a more oppositional oversight context–to more oversight hostile to the basic goals of programs and agencies.     

A Review of “Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government”

We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007. The results indicate that the type and number of objections raised in presidential communications affects congressional oversight activity.     

Gender and Patterns of Roll Call Voting in the U.S. Senate

Previous studies of gender and representation at the state legislative level and in the U.S. House of Representatives have shown that women tend to be more liberal than their male colleagues and are more likely to support women's issues. Because of the limited presence of women in the body over the years, there is scant empirical evidence to confirm whether this pattern is present in the U.S. Senate. Sound theoretical basis indicates that the institutional rules of the Senate, the Senate's individualistic culture, the Senate's six-year election timetable, and the national profile of U.S. senators may create conditions that allow gender differences in roll call voting to be more easily detected than is possible in more rigidly structured institutions such as the U.S. House. This study employs a longitudinal design that pools roll call voting data from the 103rd Congress through the 110th Congress to determine whether female senators compile substantively different policy records than their male colleagues. The results indicate that gender does systematically influence roll call voting patterns in the Senate. However, it is largely a function of female Republicans voting in a less conservative fashion than male Republicans on the basic left-right policy space and on a smaller set of issues of importance to women.     

Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.     

Public and Partisan Opinions of the Speaker of the House

Using polling data from 1982 to 2009, I develop a model of public opinion toward the Speaker of the House. I show that, in addition to economic and institutional factors, the speaker's ideology and events associated with the speaker's responsibilities in office affect the public's opinion toward this congressional leader. I also examine the partisan differences in the formation of public opinions about the speaker. I find that minority party partisans are more likely to have negative evaluations of the speaker when the speaker has more ideologically extreme views which lead to higher levels of polarization. In addition, members of different parties weigh economic and institutional factors differently in their evaluations of the speaker.     

Sources of electoral support for the Australian democrats in the house of representatives and Senate elections of 1990 and 1993: A comparative analysis

Election to the Australian Senate under proportional voting and statewide quotas gives to minor parties of the political centre a chance to win parliamentary representation otherwise denied them in the single member constituency‐based House of Representatives. Focusing on the Australian Democrats, vote splitting in the context of ? consistently higher levels of support for the Democrats in the upper house provides some evidence of differences among sources of electoral support between House and Senate, but within a context of general similarity of voter behaviour. Findings support a view that, as a party of ‘concerns’ rather than ideology, with a highly unstable support base, the future of the Democrats as other than a focus for protest must remain in doubt.     

Senate Amendments and Legislative Outcomes in Australia, 1996–2007

There has been a recurring argument in Australia about how the Senate should exercise its constitutional power to amend government legislation that it receives from the House of Representatives. Much less attention has been paid to how the Senate has exercised this power, and how often Senate amendments have resulted in legislative changes that governments otherwise would not have made. This article explores the legislative record and finds that, during the Howard ministry, Senate amendments did not often provoke negotiations leading to bicameral compromise. Most often, the House either agreed to the Senate's amendments, many of which were government proposals, or disagreed to them. In the latter cases, the Senate most often gave way, instead of insisting on the legislative changes it already had approved.     

Congress,Health Care Reform,and Reconciliation

This article explores the role of reconciliation in the passage of health care reform in the 111th Congress. Although counterintuitive, the analysis suggests that the loss of a filibuster-proof super-majority with the election of Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) aided Democrats in clearing the overhaul package by facilitating the use of reconciliation. Reconciliation provided the critical procedural mechanism enabling health care reform to be enacted into law. Despite reconciliation's importance, substantively the reconciliation “fixes” were relatively modest amendments. Moreover, notwithstanding the use of reconciliation, Congress passed the health care legislation with largely conventional means—separate health care reform measures cleared the House and Senate in 2009, in 2010 the House approved the Senate bill, and then both chambers quickly passed the reconciliation addendum. This research draws on discussions I had with over a dozen key actors after health care reform passed.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

The coordinated behavior of members of a state delegation to the U.S. Senate can provide constituents in a state greater representation in Congress. Despite this potentially improved level of representation through coordination, popular and scholarly accounts of the U.S. Senate often feature senators from the same state at odds with one another on a variety of policy issues. In this research, we investigate competing expectations regarding the frequency (across topics) of collaborations between members of a state delegation to the Senate. We then test our expectations using patterns in bill cosponsorship in the 103rd–110th U.S. Senates. We find that senators from the same state work together often on the development of legislation, and that this coordinated activity is consistent across a variety of bill topics across many sessions of congressional activity. Notably, same-state status is an even stronger predictor of support via cosponsorship than is same-party status, raising possible avenues of breaking through partisan gridlock.     

Representational Styles in the U.S. House of Representatives

This paper attempts to explicate and test the assumptions underlying typologies of legislative behavior. Quantitative data on a wide range of behaviors of 150 House members are used to produce a typology of styles of congressional behavior and to test two related theories of congressional behavior. Cluster analylsis reveals four distinct types of representatives: (1) activists, who are fairly extreme ideologically, highly active and highly visible, (2) backbenchers, who are inactive across all dimensions of behavior sampled here, (3) ingratiators, who are highly constituency-oriented, active in the solicitation and exploitation of casework, and very moderate ideologically, and (4) ideologues, who are moderate in their general level of activism, and rather extreme ideologically. Individual electoral threat is a weak determinant of the style a representative will adopt. Years of seniority within the institution and the political culture of the home district have major effects.     

Five Factions,Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994–2002

This paper examines the extent of ideological cohesion and distinction of two Republican congressional factions (the conservative Republican Study Committee and the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership) and three Democratic congressional caucuses (the moderate Blue Dog Coalition, the liberal Congressional Black Caucus, and the liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus) in the House of Representatives from 1994 to 2002. Whereas much of the literature on congressional caucuses has focused on the reasons members join such groups and the policy and political orientations of those groups, this paper examines how much unity exists in the voting behavior of the members of Congress who join caucuses in comparison to their fellow partisans not in a faction. Although political parties are still a major unifying force for their respective party members, we do find that factional members are more ideologically cohesive than are nonfactional members. Joining a faction is not an insignificant activity for members. Factions allow like-minded colleagues to come together and vote on common issues, at times against direction of their party.     

Recent Research on “Incumbency Advantage” in House Elections: Part II

Research before 1978 on elections for U.S. Representative persistently raised the question of just what factors yield the advantage incumbents enjoy (Beth, 1982; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1980: 62; Fiorina, 1982: 35-38; Hinckley, 1980a: 645-646). To illuminate this question, the 1978 national election survey by Michigan's Center for Political Studies, taking the congressional district as the primary sampling unit, included extensive questions on voter contact with awareness of, and evaluation of, House candidates (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980: 133). A side effect of this design was uneven coverage of Senate races; it also happened that incumbents ran more strongly in sampled races than overall, and among respondents than in the electorate (Mann and Wolfinger: 133-136; Jacobson, 1981a: 240-242; 1981b: 185; Fiorina, 1982: 42). This essay surveys recent articles on the subject, especially those using this data.     

The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design

The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate development, preventing the Senate from allowing its chair to reduce dilatory action, as the House has done. Accordingly, delay, via the filibuster, has become commonplace in the Senate. Such delay has reduced the Senate's efficiency, but has largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch.     

Explaining Congressional Staff Members’ Decisions to Leave the Hill

The high turnover of congressional staff members can have a negative effect on the functioning of Congress as an institution. Though junior staff turnover is not considered a significant concern, the high turnover of senior staff members is problematic. Using data from a survey of staff members located in the Washington personal offices of House of Representatives members, this article investigates what factors influence the likelihood to leave congressional employment. Specifically, I explore how solidary, purposive, and material work incentives influence staff members’ plans to exit. The results of two different models—one for junior and mid-level staff members and one for executive staff members—indicate that purposive incentives, and material incentives that accrue for future employment opportunities, carry the most weight across both models. Current salary has a significant effect on executive staff members, but not on their lower-level counterparts. Following this analysis, I propose actions that congressional offices might take to retain staff.     

The Ideological Ends Against the Middle: House Roll Call Votes on Normal Trade Relation Status for China, 1990-2000

From 1990 to 1999, the House of Representatives held roll call votes to attempt to overturn presidential extensions of Normal Trade Relation (NTR) status to China. What was once a routine matter attracting little congressional attention became a highly divisive matter. Interestingly, the coalition that formed to oppose such extensions was a partnership of strange bedfellows: extreme liberals joining their far-right colleagues to try to rescind the president's extension of normal trade status for China. When the distribution of opposition on the yearly extensions of NTR is compared to that on the vote to approve permanent NTR (PNTR) for China, the ideological distribution of opponents changes noticeably. I argue that important procedural differences between the votes on the yearly extension, and PNTR, serve to explain why ideologically extreme members formed their strange alliance.     

Representation in Congress and the Executive: Rethinking the Perspectives of James Madison

This article contributes to the development of a "revised" interpretation of James Madison's views on representation. I suggest that Madison's approach to representation is more complex than has been recognized. Specifically, Madison believed different "styles" of representation are necessary for the House, Senate, and President because of the unique functions served by each institution. "Style" refers both to the nature of the representative-constituency relationship (the "role" of the representative) and the character of the individual most likely to be selected as representative. In Madison's scheme, the proper functioning of each institution is guaranteed only if the method of selection insures the appropriate role is maintained and persons of proper character are selected. Throughout the essay, I note significant differences between the arguments which Madison put forward in the Constitutional Convention and those he defended in the Federalist essays.