Before the Honeymoon Ends: Presidential Leadership and Congressional Response

Academicians and journalists inevitably pass judgment on the progress of a president's major "honeymoon period" initiatives. Obviously, the success of those initiatives will depend on how Congress responds to new presidents. Data on aggregate congressional response to the "honeymoon" initiatives of the Carter and Reagan presidencies are presented in order to explore how members of Congress react as they evaluate and interact with a new president. Evidence suggests that, despite the conventional wisdom regarding Carter's limited political ability and inflexible nature, members of Congress were more inclined to emphasize organizational deficiencies. Conversely, while Reagan was perceived to be almost as inflexible as Carter, he received superlative marks for organizational efficiency and for providing access to Congress. The analysis then considers the importance of organization to future presidential effectiveness, and the importance of organizational concerns with respect to personal characteristics for overall presidential success.     

George Washington and the Building of the Constitution: Presidential Interpretation and Constitutional Development

As first president, George Washington was in an historically unique position to shape the forms and customs of the newly-ratified Federal Constitution. Unlike most previous accounts of his presidency that focus on Washington's symbolic contributions, this essay suggests that he had a very clear substantive constitutional agenda–an agenda which he consciously sought to shape. Specifically, Washington attempted to graft his own views of separation of powers, executive privilege, federalism, and the rule of law on to the Constitution. More of the “original formsrdquo; of the Constitution, then, bear Washington's distinctive mark than heretofore thought.     

Presidential Leadership of Congressional Civil Rights Voting: The Cases of Eisenhower and Johnson

Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson presented dramatically contrasting styles of leadership in their relationships with Congress. Yet each was successful in securing passage of monumental civil rights legislation in very different political environments. Focusing on the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we show that both Eisenhower and Johnson attracted support from the opposition party's faction at the far end of the ideological spectrum while retaining support from his own party's dominant faction. The analysis suggests that it is not the president's leadership style alone that produces legislative results, but a proper mixture of leadership style and the political environment.     

Presidential Appeals to Moral Foundations: How Modern Presidents Persuade Cross‐Ideologues

Many assume that modern presidents cannot persuade cross‐ideologues to support their policy proposals. The idea that a conservative would support a liberal policy advocated by a cross‐partisan president seems ludicrous. However, recent research suggests that conservatives will support liberal policies that are framed consistent with moral foundations. Using a national survey experiment that carefully manipulates the actual text of a speech given by President Obama, this article demonstrates that fairness frames in presidential speeches motivate liberal policy support among conservative, moderate, and liberal Americans who value fairness.     

A Tale of Three Variables: Exploring the Impact of Alternative Measures of Presidential Approval On Congressional Voting

This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background variable rather than a determinant of congressional voting, we maintain that theoretically more meaningful relationships between public opinion and congressional voting can be developed. Specifically, we argue that a more relevant test can be made which includes opinion measured closest to where that opinion is likely to matter to members, namely among electoral copartisans and district-level constituencies. We estimate various models (bivariate and integrated multivariate), and find strong support for our hypotheses that, to the extent members of Congress use public approval as a voting cue, they do in fact pay far more attention to partisan and constituency interests than they do to national opinion.     

The President as Agenda Setter‐in‐Chief: The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting

In this paper, we investigate the agenda leadership capability of two American political institutions, Congress and the presidency, in an array of issue areas that include both domestic and foreign policy. The president has long been considered to have the most significant role in setting the policymaking agenda, but there is limited empirical research to support that claim. Examining the issue areas of defense, environment, health care, international affairs, law and crime, and macroeconomics from 1956 to 2005, we find statistically significant positive influence by the president on the congressional agenda in all six of the policy areas under examination, providing compelling evidence of presidential agenda leadership and a reactive Congress. Additionally, we find that the agenda relationship between the president and Congress is issue dependent, in that presidential attention has the largest substantive effect on the congressional agenda in the area of international affairs.     

Assessing Presidential Agenda-Setting Capacity: Dynamic Comparisons of Presidential,Mass Media,and Public Attention to Economic Issues

Research on presidential agenda setting has rarely attempted to simultaneously assess the ability of the president to influence the policy agendas of the mass media and the public. This is primarily due to the lack of time-refined measures of public issue attention. With advances in technology, information about Internet search engine behavior can provide an indication of the level of interest the public has over time about specific issues. Using Google Trends weekly data about public search interest levels, this project contrasts dynamic attention to several economic issues: unemployment, recession, and inflation. The vector autoregression analyses performed suggest the president does not have the capacity to directly guide public attention, nor does the president have the capacity to indirectly guide public attention through the media. There is some indication that the president can indirectly guide public attention by influencing actual economic conditions, and that the president is responsive to attention from the mass media and the public. The moving-average representation analyses indicate that an increase in presidential attention has the potential to produce a small contemporaneous increase in either mass media or public attention to some economic issues. The duration of these positive shifts in mass media or public attention are all very brief, indicating the president has a limited capacity through either direct or indirect leadership to sustain the attention other actors in the political system place on the specific issues studied. Strong evidence in all three of the issue areas studied supports that mass media attention and public attention are closely related.     

Votes and markets: Designing policies to increase the influence of individuals

The design of public policies is usually carried out from the perspective of policymakers. This paper views policy design from the perspective of ordinary individuals, seeking to identify ways in which policy design may increase the capacity of citizens to influence the provision of welfare services of significance to their everyday lives. The first section demonstrates that the phrase ‘welfare state’ is a constricting misnomer; welfare in society is the sum of activities in the household, the market and the state. Secondly, the paper considers characteristic consequences of the allocation of welfare by the state, the market and the household. On this basis, the third section reviews the implications for individual influence on public policies of policy designs that are intended to provide more popular participation; bring the state further in; and the use of market alternatives.     

Campaign Finance Reform and the 1994 Congressional Elections

Based on partisan arguments regarding the likely effect of campaign finance reform on electoral competition, one might suspect that, had spending limits been in place prior to the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans would not have been able to gain control of the House of Representatives. To examine this proposition, we first create a regression model designed to explain the Democratic percentage of the vote as a function of candidate spending, incumbency, nonincumbent candidate quality, and the underlying partisan leanings of the congressional districts. We then use this regression model to simulate the likely effects of campaign finance reform on the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections. Our results indicate that while spending limits would have limited the number of seats gained by the Republican party, Republicans likely would have gained control of the House of Representatives even if spending limits had been in place prior to the 1994 elections. In addition, our results indicate that campaign finance reform that includes some form of public subsidy in addition to spending limits actually may have enhanced rather than diminished the Republican "earthquake" in 1994.     

Presidential Vetoes: Motivations and Classification

For all its importance, comparatively few, empirically-based studies have centered on the presidential veto, and virtually none have sought to classify vetoes by presidential motivation or policy area. This article updates and confirms the major findings of extant studies, and suggests one important caveat to the conclusions of older research: the categories of and reasons for presidential vetoes are remarkably similar from president to president, independent of party. Frequently, presidents have just as much in common with each other in doing battle with Congress than as Republicans or Democrats fighting for different ideological programs and considerations.