Passing Nonincremental Policy: Presidential Influence in Congress,Kennedy to Carter

This article represents an important step in understanding early, modern presidents’ strategic use of signing statements by taking a sharp focus on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In contrast to recent presidents who have used the instrument increasingly to challenge legislative provisions, Eisenhower's use of signing statements was rather complex—from political credit-claiming, explaining the provisions of bills to the American public, and reinforcing his views on the federal-state balance of power—to maintaining bipartisan relations on foreign policy, shaping implementation of congressional bills, and selectively criticizing Congress for overspending. The theoretical framework devotes particular attention to the interplay of contexts—electoral, institutional, and economic—on Eisenhower's use of signing statements by policy area across his two terms.     

Visual Persuasion in George W. Bush's Presidency: Cowboy Imagery in Public Discourse

Discussion of George W. Bush's rhetoric typically focuses on his spoken address, yet his use of cowboy visuals also qualifies as public communication. By visually identifying himself as a cowboy Bush associated his presidency with the story of the mythic cowboy, a powerful concept in American culture. While visual images are typically not considered a substantive and rational form of political communication, Bush's cowboy persona, emphasized visually, prompted widespread debate about his leadership style and approach to national problems, particularly terrorism. While many did not agree with his policies, the simplicity of the visual message and the foundational nature of the cowboy story provided a narrative that prompted a national debate on substantive issues of the day. Language is still considered the critical element of political debate, but as Bush's experience demonstrates, rhetoric includes visual communication as well.     

The Price for Austria's Security: Part I — Joseph II,the Russian Alliance,and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789

This article examines Lyndon Johnson's handling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear-sharing issue and specifically plans for a NATO Multilateral Force during the first three years of his presidency. The article argues that although Johnson did not confront the nuclear sharing/Multilateral Force issue directly for the first year of his presidency, he subsequently made sensible policy decisions in the face of a number of challenges. These included pressure for a speedy resolution of the nuclear-sharing issue from within his own State Department and from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side, and opposition to the Multilateral Force from the British and French governments on the other. The nuclear-sharing issue is discussed in the context of challenges to NATO, most notably French President Charles de Gaulle's rejection of US leadership and his withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 and broader debates about nuclear consultation within the alliance. The article concludes that by using the advisory process well and through some deft diplomacy, particularly refusing to demand a quick resolution to the nuclear-sharing problem, the Johnson administration had effectively resolved the nuclear-sharing issue by late 1966.     

Eisenhower and Nixon: A Friendship of Unequals

Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon are linked forever in the history of the American presidency, yet only recently have scholars paid notable attention to their relationship. While this uptick in research about how the two men related to each other has been important, it has not fully grappled with the political implications of their relationship. This article argues that understanding the friendship the two men had, including how it changed over time, provides insight into the way each viewed and conducted his own politics. I argue that the two most often shared an Aristotelian friendship of utility, which provided Eisenhower with a rising conservative politico and Nixon with a respected national figure for a mentor. Though neither would ever come to fully understand the other they influenced each other in profound ways.     

“Going Public” Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts,and Revisionist Theories of Presidential Power

This paper examines the thesis of the public presidency. In light of the success of Ronald Reagan, many revisionist scholars have criticized traditional models of presidential politics. Whereas traditional views emphasized the bargaining presidency, these recent scholars now argue that, today, the politics of rhetoric dominate the politics of bargaining. This paper examines the central case study of the going-public model, Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts, a critical case because it represents Reagan's central legislative success and because many scholars and pundits have credited this success to Reagan's frequent televised public appeals. The case reveals that a strong bargaining dynamic played a part in the 1981 process, and that going public strategies were not as dominant as previously thought.

What has changed significantly is the balance of incentives and constraints that influence strategic choice and the kinds of politicians in the Oval Office who make them. Contemporary presidents, after carefully considering their options, will choose going public over bargaining more often than did their predecessors.

–Samuel Kernell, Going Public     

Korea — squandering a mandate for change?

In winning the presidential and legislative elections of 2007–8, the Grand National Party and its leader Lee Myung-bak have attained a potentially unique opportunity to influence South Korea's political, economic and diplomatic trajectory. This paper reviews Korea's ‘once in a generation’ election and prospects for change under President Lee. Despite the political capital accrued from his party's landslide victories, Lee appears set to replicate previous incumbents of the presidency, each of whom has been overwhelmed by the high expectations of the public on the one hand, and the harsh constraints imposed by Korea's geopolitical position on the other.

     

Personal Tragedy and Presidential Performance: Calvin Coolidge as Legislative Leader

The elevation of Calvin Coolidge to the presidency in the summer of 1923 was impressively smooth. The new president was entirely comfortable in his new role and impressed Washington officialdom with his self-assuredness, political adroitness, and hard work. One of his main initial objectives was to develop a strong and productive relationship with Congress and to lobby it to enact his extensive and progressive legislative agenda. During his first year, he worked vigorously at these tasks and achieved a notable degree of success. However, in July, 1924, the president confronted a devastating personal tragedy–the death of his young son–that left a deep imprint on the remainder of his presidency. He lost interest in legislative affairs and withdrew from interaction with Congress. The result is that he has been ranked among the least successful presidential leaders of Congress in U.S. history. However, incapacitation as a result of severe clinical depression rather than either incompetence or ideology was the precipitating cause.     

Presidential Leadership of Congressional Civil Rights Voting: The Cases of Eisenhower and Johnson

Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson presented dramatically contrasting styles of leadership in their relationships with Congress. Yet each was successful in securing passage of monumental civil rights legislation in very different political environments. Focusing on the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we show that both Eisenhower and Johnson attracted support from the opposition party's faction at the far end of the ideological spectrum while retaining support from his own party's dominant faction. The analysis suggests that it is not the president's leadership style alone that produces legislative results, but a proper mixture of leadership style and the political environment.     

Flirting with Neutrality: The Shah,Khrushchev, and the Failed 1959 Soviet–Iranian Negotiations

Despite the Eisenhower administration's strong support for the Pahlavi monarchy, tensions simmered under the surface of Mohammad Reza Shah's relationship with the United States throughout the 1950s. Following the Qarani coup attempt and the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, the shah sought to diminish the Soviet threat to his regime and reduce his dependence on the United States by exploring Moscow's offer of a non-aggression treaty. Drawing on American, British, and Iranian sources, this article provides the first detailed history of these secret Soviet–Iranian negotiations that ended in disastrous failure for the shah in February 1959.     

Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Abstract

Abraham Lincoln's presidency was defined and dominated by war, yet Lincoln himself had very little direct experience with warfare; nor had the American presidency been truly tested by war when he took office. Lincoln had to negotiate very difficult political and constitutional terrain as he waged the Civil War: issues of executive authority, constitutional powers and their limitations, and the nature of civil liberties during war constantly bedeviled him. His guiding principle in all these matters, and the greatest lesson we can learn from him today, was his flexibility and his pragmatism.     

“Birtherism” and Anti-Blackness: The Anti-Islamic Ante-Life of Africanized Slavery

The first black President of the United States, Barack Obama, entered office on a wave of racial optimism. But rather than transcending the United States’ racialized history, Obama's presidency has in a sense “outed” it, exposing this history's anti-Islamic origins. This article establishes a link between anti-blackness and the Islamophobic reaction to his election: late medieval and early modern European Christians could classify newly Africanized peoples as uniquely and ontologically enslaveable only because they previously had imagined Muslims as such.     

“The true principles of government”: William Henry Harrison and the Whig counter-revolution

Beyond his military exploits on the frontier, William Henry Harrison is best remembered as the president who died a month after taking office. Discussions of his presidency frequently focus on the ephemeral, such as the fatal illness he contracted while delivering his inaugural address – the longest ever – in the bitter cold. The address itself, one of the most unusual state papers in U.S. history, has largely escaped the serious notice of historians, political scientists, and legal scholars. Harrison proposed nothing short of a constitutional revolution that would have reduced the chief executive to a mere figurehead. This paper explores the many peculiarities of Harrison's address, including the Whig theory of the presidency, a radical and overlooked innovation that aimed to fundamentally alter the role of the chief executive in the constitutional order. A close reading of Harrison's inaugural and brief tenure as president also reveals a number of factual errors and interpretative missteps made by leading scholars of the period.     

Education of the Supreme Commander: The Theoretical Underpinnings of Eisenhower's Strategy in Europe, 1944–45

Abstract

Eisenhower's popular image as both senior officer and, subsequently, President of the United States tends to overplay his personal geniality and undervalues his intellect and clear professional mastery of the military art. This article argues for an Eisenhower who devoted himself to the study of war in the decades before the Second World War, and whose professional attainments defy the popular image.     

William Howard Taft,the 1908 Election,and the Future of the American Presidency

Although the first presidential election where both major party candidates (William Howard Taft and William Jennings Bryan) hit the campaign trail, the election of 1908 is a neglected election. When scholars do address it, they typically focus on retiring incumbent president Theodore Roosevelt and his role therein. This article turns the focus away from Roosevelt, and also Bryan, and places it firmly on Taft, a reluctant candidate. Taft's role in 1908 is important because his very reluctance to embrace the changing expectations of the presidency helps to highlight the tensions between the old and new ways of campaigning and, more broadly, the traditional and modern presidencies.

The article first addresses Taft's decision to abandon his “front-porch” campaign. Taft's initial inclination toward a front-porch campaign reveals well his more traditional approach to the election and to the presidency in general, just as his decision to abandon this plan and “stump” for votes reflects his submission to developing trends and expectations. Second, the article examines the changing role of technology, this election being the first to feature phonograph recordings of the candidates, which would then be sold—and played—across the country. Third, the tours and speeches of Taft in the 1908 general election take center stage. The spectacle of these tours offers further evidence of the changing contours of American politics and presidential leadership, especially in elevating the personalities of the candidates. Finally, the 1908 election is examined from the standpoint of American political development and presidential history.     

Presidential Coequality: The Evolution of a Concept

The assertion that the presidency is coequal in power to the other branches in the American system of government is often heard, has been suggested by all recent presidents, and has even made its way into political science. But tracing the history of the concept demonstrates that this assertion is an invention of quite recent vintage. Those who wrote and favored the Constitution did not make such claims, nor did early presidents. Even Andrew Jackson's famous and, to his generation, shocking assertion of coequality coincident with his censure was not really a claim of equal power between branches. According to our systematic analysis of presidential rhetoric it was Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford who initiated and popularized the idea of interbranch coequality. They did so to defend themselves in two episodes of substantial presidential vulnerability: Watergate and the ensuing midterm elections. Subsequent presidents have elevated something that would have seemed wrong and absurd to any founder into a blithe truism. This belief harms governance by creating both artificially high expectations for the president and a presumption of institutional stasis. The “second constitution” based on popular beliefs about interbranch relations continues to evolve, as much a product of happenstance as of rational design.     

Interview with Romano Prodi

On the occasion of the Conference on the State of Italy, held at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies on 29–30 October 2013, David Kertzer interviewed former two-time Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. Their focus was on the evolution of Prodi's involvement in Italian government and politics. This first in what is planned to be two such interviews examines Prodi's initial move from an economics professor at the University of Bologna interested in the study of political economy and industrial policy, to a major figure in implementing industrial policy in Italy. It looks at his brief stint as Minister of Industry under Giulio Andreotti, his founding of the influential industrial study group Nomisma, and then his presidency of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), Italy's giant holding company. With the crisis of the Italian political system in the early 1990s, Prodi was central to the creation of a new centre-left coalition, named L'Ulivo (the Olive Tree), an experience he recalls here, along with his first experience as Prime Minister, from 1996 to 1998.     

Public Presidential Appeals and Congressional Floor Votes: Reassessing the Constitutional Threat

The assertion that public appeals by presidents can create electoral threats to noncompliant members of Congress is central to arguments about the value of "going public" as a legislative strategy. Although recent scholarship suggests a link between popular presidential rhetoric and the likelihood of bill passage, researchers have yet to examine the impact of public presidential appeals on individual legislators. This study examines the logic of electoral threats imposed by going public. We test whether a president's going public with increased intensity leads individual members of Congress to increase their support for presidential preferences on congressional floor votes. We employ several measures to assess the intensity of presidents' public appeals, including domestic speeches, nationally televised addresses, and speeches in legislators' home states. Several logistic regression models are tested to determine whether congressional support for presidential preferences on the floor is influenced by the interaction between members' electoral vulnerability and presidents' use of popular appeals. The findings suggest that presidential speechmaking has very little impact on the likelihood that members of Congress will support the president's position on roll call votes. We argue that this suggests a necessary revision of criticisms of the "rhetorical presidency." Public presidential appeals do not seem to present a considerable threat to a constitutional order that is predicated on congressional autonomy and deliberation.     

Atomic Fatherhood: ‘Uncle Louis’, ‘Ike’ and the Electoral Politics of Paternalism in Canada and the United States, 1949–53

Louis St Laurent and Dwight Eisenhower came to power during one of the most intense periods of the Cold War. The Soviets had recently developed a nuclear bomb, touching off an arms race, while both the Canadian and American governments ran desperate investigations to purge their ranks of suspected communist sympathisers. St Laurent's victories in 1949, and again in 1953, as well as Eisenhower's in 1952, are often seen as inevitable. This interpretation is rooted in the fact that both men managed to stir overwhelming support from the hearts of their citizens. However, this viewpoint often fails to examine how their campaigns did this – through the projection of a reassuring, paternalistic image that spoke to hegemonic masculine norms in the era. Elaine Tyler May argues that the nuclear family, with the father at the helm, was seen as a form of ‘domestic containment’ against external ills. This article extends that theory upwards and explores how voters responded positively to the projection of a fatherly image from St Laurent and Eisenhower. At the same time, it examines how their campaigns actively deployed masculine image-making to discredit opponents and depict them as outside the hegemonic masculine ideal. By voting instead for St Laurent and Eisenhower, citizens could be reassured that their families would come under the protection of a calm father figure, who would guide the nation through the current period of intense instability.     

Constitutional Design of the Executive: Vice Presidencies in Comparative Perspective

Given the history of the institution in the U.S., it is perhaps not surprising that few democracies have adopted a vice presidency. But, why do any countries have vice presidencies? What, if any, functions do they fulfill? In this paper we examine constitutional provisions for vice presidencies in 29 presidential democracies throughout the world. Specifically, we examine the extent to which the office of the vice presidency fulfills three possible institutional purposes: succession, legislative, or executive functions. Almost all vice presidencies included in our analysis fulfill the role of successor in the event of a presidential vacancy. Of those that have additional duties, most are assigned executive functions, while a few are assigned legislative functions. On the whole, the paper provides empirical evidence that vice presidencies seem to be marginal institutions.     

George Washington and the Building of the Constitution: Presidential Interpretation and Constitutional Development

As first president, George Washington was in an historically unique position to shape the forms and customs of the newly-ratified Federal Constitution. Unlike most previous accounts of his presidency that focus on Washington's symbolic contributions, this essay suggests that he had a very clear substantive constitutional agenda–an agenda which he consciously sought to shape. Specifically, Washington attempted to graft his own views of separation of powers, executive privilege, federalism, and the rule of law on to the Constitution. More of the “original formsrdquo; of the Constitution, then, bear Washington's distinctive mark than heretofore thought.