Russia's Energy Policy: A Divergent View

A noted American analyst of Russian, Central Asian, and Transcaucasian oil and gas industries and markets offers his own perspective on issues raised in the preceding paper on Russia's energy policy (Milov et al., 2006). While generally concurring that Russia indeed pursues an ad hoc (rather than systemic) energy policy, he expresses divergent views on the role of government-regulated versus market-based pricing in final and primary energy use, reasons for the intense flows of oil and gas to Europe, the role of pipelines in determining oil export allocations, and the contribution of regional monopolies and refining capacity to domestic oil product prices. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L71, O13, Q40, Q48. 20 references.     

A Response to Tomás Halík

Abstract

The Churches were significant players in the debate surrounding what has been called Britain's "lost opportunity" in the 1940s and 50s to play a leading role in building a united Europe. This article focuses on Christian theological and historical assumptions about humanity as a universal community, the nation and the Church. It examines Christian discourse about the political dimension of these communities and the part that Christianity as a belief system should ideally play between them. It then outlines the "Christendom" narrative, which represented medieval Europe as a model for the future of Europe, as a partial realization of the ideal alignment of power and culture, which in its decay was the cause of international crisis. Finally, some of the points of tension between Christendom, British national identity, and a united Europe among Christians are discussed.     

Rhetoric of unity and cultural diversity in the making of European cultural identity

The fundamental aim of the cultural policy of the European Union (EU) is to emphasize the obvious cultural diversity of Europe, while looking for some underlying common elements which unify the various cultures in Europe. Through these common elements, the EU policy produces ‘an imagined cultural community’ of Europe which is ‘united in diversity’, as one of the slogans of the Union states. This discourse characterizes various documents which are essential to the EU cultural policy, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Agenda for Culture and the EU’s decision on the European Capital of Culture program. In addition, the discourse is applied to the production of cultural events in European Capitals of Culture in practice. On all levels of the EU’s cultural policy, the rhetoric of European cultural identity and its ‘unitedness in diversity’ is related with the ideas and practices of fostering common cultural heritage.     

Climate Change: An Important Foreign Policy Issue

International climate policy is one of the most fascinating issues in foreign policy, yet in recent years it has become one of the most contentious. The failure of the conference in The Hague revealed, among other things, strongunderlying rifts in the transatlantic relationship. As the self-acclaimed worldleader, the United States is not in a position to exert leadership in this vital area owing to a mixture of constitutional constraints and an ever-growing cultural dependence on fossil fuels such as oil and gas. It therefore falls to the European Union to take up this challenge. This will require careful coalition building with the rest of the world as well as confidence in the ability of Europe to develop a united position, to stick to that position and to translate the rules of the Kyoto Protocol into stringent domestic climate policy. The climate change regime is at a crossroads. At the resumed COP-6 con-ference, the Parties must decide whether to continue the process under theassumption 'that global problems require global solutions' or whether to turn to the more regional concept of 'think globally, act locally'. In either case, steering climate policy in this century on to a successful path will require the skills and dedication not only of natural scientists and technology developers, but also of those in the foreign policy community.     

The geography of the Atlantic peace: NATO 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall

This article examines NATO's transformation from the Cold War to the present and offers a framework of interpretation. Transformation has entailed a downgrading of territorial defence and an upgrading of out‐of‐area crisis management, as well as diplomatic engagement and partnership. NATO has thus become a more diversified and globalized alliance. The article traces the evolution post‐1989 of the principled policy areas for the alliance—defence, crisis management and partnership—and explains difficulties of development within each area. It also enters into the controversy of interpreting NATO. It explains NATO as an outcome of America's enduring need to engage in the management of Eurasia's rim and Europe's equally enduring need for outside assistance in organizing a concert of power inside Europe. NATO has historically been strong when Europe's and North America's power capabilities and concepts of order are in equilibrium and thus when NATO governments have defined the geography of the Atlantic peace in such a way that both pillars can contribute to it in substantial ways. The article puts this perspective in opposition to two mainstream frameworks of thinking—liberal idealism and retrenchment realism—and applies it in a critique of the diversified and globalized profile that the alliance has developed. The article finally offers a moderately positive assessment of NATO's September 2014 Wales summit as a contribution to renewed geopolitical equilibrium, and it suggests how this contribution could be further strengthened.     

试析尼克松政府的西欧外交

尼克松总统上台执政时,正值美国深陷越战不能自拔,而当时的国际局势较战后初期已发生了重大变化。为了使美国的对外政策适应这种变化,尼克松提出了以"实力"、"谈判"和"伙伴关系"为三大支柱的新战略——"尼克松主义",并应用于西欧外交,对美国的西欧政策做了转折性调整。虽然尼克松的西欧外交标志了美欧关系史上的一个新时代,但其实施却困难重重。     

Crises and policy responses within the political trilemma: Europe, 1929–36 and 2008–11

The recent debate on the Eurozone failed to appreciate a particular characteristic of European crisis experiences, namely their fundamentally political character. To make my argument, I borrow from Dani Rodrik (2000) the framework of a “political trilemma” between cross-border economic integration, national institutions and democracy (in the sense of mass politics) and discuss its relation to the more commonly known “macroeconomic trilemma” as well as some limitations of the framework. The recent experience of a European debt crisis and the experience of Europe's Great Depression can be interpreted as a “political trilemma”: both reflect the problem of designing effective policy responses to major economic shocks within the environment of deep economic integration across political boundaries and the regime choices that this involves. Within this framework I highlight some aspects of the 1930s that are informative to the policy choices in Europe today. Once we accept that some policy choices should be avoided, attention should be shifted to the remaining options and the obstacles that prevent their implementation, notably the challenge to transform democracy beyond national borders.     

The International Monetary Fund and its New Economics

This article focuses on a key element of the IMF's agenda for change: the repackaging of its economics of crisis around inflation targeting. It examines how this new policy regime redefines the political economy of the IMF's policy advice, and contextualizes it by focusing on Eastern Europe, the region worst affected by the global financial crisis which began in 2007. The article compares the conditionalities designed under the new and old policy regimes and argues that the mainstreaming of inflation targeting reproduces the IMF's function within a neoliberal political economy. It shows how, depending on the role of the IMF in the policy process, the models that inform policy are employed differently. During ‘normal’ times, models engender a contractionary bias that favours speculative capital. When acting as ‘lender of last resort’, the IMF retains the traditional emphasis on fiscal contractions, paying only lip service to its new economics of crisis while further ignoring crucial questions of macroeconomic policy coordination or the destabilizing potential of short‐term capital inflows.     

The European Difference: Karl Heinz Bohrer's Critique of the European Project

Literary critic and essayist Karl Heinz Bohrer offers a Eurosceptic perspective on the German commitment to a united Europe. This article is a reconstruction of Bohrer's argument. It identifies two distinct critiques. The first is a somewhat prosaic observation that the differences between the national traditions of Europe are simply too great for a united Europe to be viable. The other is a more complex reflection on “European decadence”: Europeans lack the will that is required to project power, and power is a precondition for cultural achievements. Protestantism—the “Protestant mind”—plays a central role in this second critique. The two critiques are connected through Bohrer's conception of the nation-state as an entity that integrates in an agonistic way legal and cultural power.     

Searching for energy independence,finding renewables? Energy security perceptions and renewable energy policy in Lithuania

Lithuania's electricity sector has one of the EU's highest dependency rates, with about seventy percent of consumed electricity being generated abroad. This high rate was accentuated by the fact that until 2015 the dependency was on a sole country, namely the Russian Federation. With virtually no primary energy resources of its own, Lithuania progressed from a pro-nuclear to a renewable national energy strategy in just one decade. Based on the revised Copenhagen Securitization School, this article analyses energy security perceptions as a factor that determines the recent turn in Lithuanian energy strategy. Our findings show that renewable energy policy was shaped by the perception of potential energy security threats, but in contrast to the theory of securitization we identify achieving a high degree of perceived energy security as the primary enabler of renewable energy. The analysis of political processes leading to two distinct national energy strategies (2009–2012; 2013–2018) shows that rather than renewable energy being installed because of the energy security concerns related to the high dependency rate, it was the desecuritization of energy supply which allowed the turn to a renewables-based strategy. Only after a certain level of perceived energy security was established by linking up to the European energy landscape, Lithuania found it permissible to base its national energy strategy on renewables. The findings shed light on Europe's geography of (de)securitization, an East-West split within the European Union in terms of renewables and energy security. On the basis of our findings we conclude that the current geopolitical crisis in Eastern Europe is greatly affecting this geography, possibly to the detriment of the transition to renewable energy.     

Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and Hungary

We compare Russian nuclear energy diplomacy toward Finland and Hungary, where the Russian state corporation Rosatom intends to build nuclear power plants by the 2020s. Russian nuclear energy diplomacy features Rosatom working with other state institutions, its own subsidiaries, and an extensive network of companies and R&D actors to support Russian nuclear power projects abroad. Using the structuration approach, we find three interests driving such diplomacy: energy business and associated profits; modernization of the Russian economy, including the diversification of its export structure; while foreign policy interests are also involved, considering the constraints emerging in EU–Russia energy diplomacy in the oil and gas sectors, including the sanctions since 2014. Some domestic actors in Finland and Hungary make the linkage between nuclear energy and foreign policy as explicit as do some Western commentators. Seeking to pursue these interests, Russian actors must accommodate their considerable assets to the structural constraints they encounter in the target countries. We identify four structural dimensions: the Russian actors are well endowed as regards the resources, technology, and infrastructure dimension; and the dimension of finance, business models, and markets. However, on the institutional dimension, they face a less controllable environment. Regarding the ecological dimension, they must conform to local safety requirements. In both cases, Russian actors were able to strengthen perceptions of joint interests with actors in the target country facilitating the nuclear power plant projects, thereby paving the way for the use of soft power.     

Italian state politics and the disruptive factor of volunteer groups

The Cretan crisis and the Greco-Ottoman War meant a revival of philhellenism all over Europe. Especially in Italy the war caused vigorous philhellenic reactions: demonstrations and collections of money for the Greek cause, as well as organization and shipping of groups of volunteers to the Greek war fronts. Scholarly discussion on the Italian involvement in the crisis of 1897 has revolved around two main foci: Italy’s search for a diplomatic role and a national identity between “grandezza” and “raccoglimento” policies or Italian philhellenism as an example of the power of philhellenism in nineteenth-century Europe within the broader international context of Risorgimento philhellenism. In this paper, Italian state politics will be discussed from another perspective, namely the Italian policy towards the Italian volunteer groups fighting for Greece. Published Italian state documents as well as research studies based on further Italian primary sources not having dealt with the specific desideratum, the allies’ angle, also partly the Greek perspective, as revealed through their state archives allow us to extensively reconstruct the different steps taken by the government in Rome in its endeavours to deal efficiently with the uncontrolled dynamics of its national revolutionaries both inside and outside the country. Irregular volunteer groups claimed their right and in part imposed their share to actively participate and influence directly or indirectly national and international policies, aspiring to represent continuity in a powerful revolutionary tradition against the priorities of nation-states. In times of internal crises, and despite their divergent, even contradictory, policies, nation-states of the nineteenth century came together in their objective to defend their exclusive right to shape and pursue national policy according to their priorities against the disruptive factor of national revolutionaries, and to deal efficiently with – or repress – the actions and potential for instigation by volunteer groups both at home and abroad, especially when internal collection was for them the only viable alternative left.     

Between Kant and Machiavelli: EU foreign policy priorities in the 2010s

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty invites and enables Europe to develop elements of a common foreign policy. Europe should resist the tendency of listing all issues calling for attention, and be aware that it will have to address three agendas, not just one. The first agenda is the Kantian one of universal causes. While it remains essential to European identity, it presents Europe with limited opportunities for success in the 2010s as could be seen at the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen. The ‘Alliance’ agenda remains essential on the security front and would benefit from a transatlantic effort at rejuvenation on the economic one. Last but not least, the ‘Machiavellian’ agenda reflects what most countries would define as their ‘normal’ foreign policy. It calls for Europe to influence key aspects of the world order in the absence of universal causes or common values. While Europe's ‘Machiavellian’ experience is limited to trade policy, developing a capacity to address this third agenda in a manner that places its common interests first and reinforces its identity will be Europe's central foreign policy challenge in the 2010s. A key part of the Machiavellian agenda presently revolves around relations with Ukraine, Turkey and the Russian Federation, three countries essential to Europe's energy security that are unlikely to change their foreign policy stance faced with EU soft power. Stressing that foreign policy is about ‘us’ and ‘them’, the article looks at what could be a genuine European foreign policy vis‐à‐vis each of these interdependent countries, beginning with energy and a more self‐interested approach to enlargement. The European public space is political in nature, as majority voting and mutual recognition imply that citizens accept ‘foreigners’ as legitimate legislators. At a time when the European integration process has become more hesitant and the political dimension of European integration tends to be derided or assumed away, admitting Turkey or Ukraine as members would change Europe more than it would change these countries. Foreign policy cannot be reduced to making Europe itself the prize of the relationship. What objectives Europe sets for itself in its dealing with Ukraine, Turkey and Russia will test whether it is ready for a fully‐fledged foreign policy or whether the invocation of ‘Europe’ is merely a convenient instrument for entities other than ‘Europe’.     

Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?

The controversial framework of interaction between Russia and Europe is defined by some enduring parameters—geographic realities, historical experiences, religious beliefs, normative values, psychological characteristics, behavioural patterns, cultural orientations. The incongruity between cultural/civilizational and geopolitical identities further complicates Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes to, Europe. Russia's initial pro-Western enthusiasm in the early post-Cold War period was soon overshadowed by serious difficulties in its adaptation to a reduced position in Europe, as well as by numerous grievances with respect to the West. As a result, Russia's attempts to develop a 'pan-European architecture', as well as its policy with regard to multilateral structures operating in continental Europe, have been marked by deeply contradictory patterns of promoting openness towards Europe on the one hand and keeping a certain distance from it on the other. The enlargement of NATO and especially recent NATO military operations in the Balkans have been perceived in Russia not only as confrontational but also as relegating it to the sidelines of European developments. Although Russia's long-awaited transition to the post-Yeltsin era and its new European perspective have been undermined by the war in Chechnya, President Putin's unexpected pro-Westernism (its pragmatism notwithstanding) is a promising sign of rapprochement with Europe.     

Community as a Policy Instrument: A Comparative Analysis

Over recent decades. "community" has been a powerful theme in social policy development not only in the United States but elsewhere in North America and Europe as well. Existing analyses of the concept, however, tended to approach it more from philosophical and sociological perspectives than from the standpoint of policy analysis. This article examines the uses of community as a policy instrument, considering its diverse applications us policy objective, policy means, and policy rhetoric. A cross-section of major community-oriented policies in the United States and Quebec is analyzed, providing a basis file policy-level, regime-level, and political culture comparison. Identifying the key components that community policies may incorporate, we propose a schema for systematically describing deferent types of interventions. Finally. we review the difficulties encountered in implementing policies with a community orientation and the need to avoid simplistic judgments of success and failure.     

Building détente in Europe? East–West trade and the beginnings of Romania's nuclear programme, 1964–70

This article examines the connection between détente in Europe and East–West nuclear technology transfers through the lens of Romania's co-operation policy in the field of atomic energy in the 1960s. It argues that until 1967 the bourgeoning relations between Western Europe and Romania did not stem from a desire to overcome the artificial division of Europe, but rather from the pursuit of unilateral economic benefits. This situation worked to the advantage of the Romanians, who acquired an important nuclear research reactor from the British by playing West European countries against one another. Afterwards, in order to boost their competitiveness, the West Europeans started pooling their nuclear industries together, although traditional rivalries such as the Anglo-French competition endured. Despite these efforts to achieve closer integration, the West Europeans failed to sell a nuclear power plant to Romania because of internal problems within their nuclear–industrial complexes, and because of Soviet meddling in the internal affairs of its satellites. This research adds to our understanding of Romania's détente policy during the 1960s, while also shedding light on the development of East–West relations in the field of atomic energy.     

The United States and the Question of the Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922

Abstract

In the post World War II era, the strain in the trilateral relation between the United States, Greece and Turkey is one of the most disquieting and vexatious elements to emerge from American foreign policy. The so-called southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently beset with tensions that threaten to impede its contributory role in NATO's overall defense strategy for southeastern Europe (if they have not already done so). In this political drama, the principal antagonists, Greece and Turkey, have a number of outstanding differences which on occasion have brought them to the precipice of war. As a result, the United States has intervened as the protagonist and consequently has become the recipient of the enmity of these two NATO allies for not recognizing their ‘special’ claims or interests. As in the characteristic classical Greek drama, the chorus of NATO partners offer a common chant: they are united in proclaiming that the current state of affairs seems to portend failure to the concerted effort to defend Western Europe.     

China's Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism

A noted American authority and investigator of China's economy outlines the general features of the ongoing reorientation of Chinese economic policymaking toward increased state activism, which has gained momentum in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. An initial section of the paper describes the marketization and privatization initiatives of China's late reform period to provide a baseline against which to measure the subsequent shift toward increased state intervention and guidance in the economy. The author traces the shift in three critical policy arenas (social policy, state-owned enterprises, and industrial and technology policy) and demonstrates how state involvement in each intensified during the global financial crisis. He then proceeds to explore the implications of accelerated state activism in the future, identifying potential rewards as well as large risks. Among the latter are macroeconomic imbalances, a "softening" of budget constraints, difficulties in recognizing and terminating unsuccessful economic programs, and tensions with trading partners.     

Canada–United States Energy Relations: Making a MESS of Energy Policy 1 , 2

Energy policy-making has become ever-more challenging over the last three decades, comprising a larger and more complex set of inter-related dimensions. Energy policy-makers have to deal with energy as a discrete market sector, pursuing competitive, efficient, safe, and affordable energy. They also have to address environmental imperatives, ensuring energy is developed with due regard for sustainability, ecosystems, air quality, climate change, and the like. In addition, energy policy must address security objectives, which themselves have broadened over time. Finally, energy must be developed in ways that are socially acceptable. This article examines how these four policy dimensions—Market, Environment, Security and Social acceptability, the acronym MESS—have come to characterize energy policy-making in the twenty-first century. It then explores what kind of MESS the Canadian and American governments are making of energy policy—both domestically and bilaterally—and offers some proposals for key sectors and activities that could benefit from greater collaboration.     

China's Energy Future: A Framing Comment

A noted Hong Kong-based specialist on China's energy industries presents a comment on three papers comprising a symposium on that country's rapidly expanding oil, natural gas, and nuclear power sectors. He frames his observations around five overarching themes that have shaped China's energy sector development over recent decades and will continue to do so in the future. These include observations to the effect that: (a) China's energy policy seeks broadly similar objectives to those of other countries; (b) the country's energy resource endowment is not particularly rich when viewed in relation to the size of its population; (c) its energy mix continues to be dominated by coal, with important implications for the environment and domestic freight transportation; (d) the country's economy is confronting a pronounced spatial mismatch between the location of energy resources and the markets where they are consumed; and (e) strategies for energy developments in China are closely tied to overriding political and economic concerns at any given point in time.