The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

From Utopia to reality: Plaid Cymru and Europe†

ABSTRACT. This paper traces the evolution of Plaid Cymru's attitude towards Europe. It does so by focusing in turn on: the place of Europe in the ideas of Saunders Lewis, the dominant figure in the party between its foundation in 1924/25 and 1945; the more ‘northern’ or Nordic vision of Europe that gripped the party in the post ‐ World War II era; and the waxing and waning of the party's most EU‐enthusiastic phase between the mid ‐ 1980s and the present day. By adopting a longer timeframe than is normally the case, the paper argues that Europe has played a wider role in the thinking of the party than is often conceded; a role that was not at all or only tangentially related to actually existing institutions. The paper goes on to argue that it was in part the chastening impact of Plaid Cymru's eventual exposure to actually existing European institutions that led the party in 2003 to abandon its utopian commitment to a post‐sovereign Europe in favour of an explicit commitment to ‘independence’ as its long‐term aim.     

European Postcolonial Studies and Ireland: Towards a Conversation amongst the Colonized of Europe

In the 1980s, key Irish Studies scholars proposed that Irish culture, politics and economics – both past and present – are most usefully viewed in the context of imperialism, colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism. The result of this intervention is an Irish postcolonial studies which, over the past 35 years, has produced an influential body of scholarship premised on the idea that Ireland is a colony/former colony of the British Empire. Notwithstanding its considerable impact, Irish postcolonial studies has not been without its detractors, with the country's location within Europe forming the basis for one of most persistent objections to the application of a postcolonial framework to Ireland. Given the key role assigned to geography in the postcolonial debate in Ireland, this article explores the implications for Ireland of an emerging postcolonial critique centred on Europe. In addition to discussing the concept of internal colonisation as applied to such Western European countries as Italy and Britain, the article makes reference to postcolonial analyses of the region of Eastern and Central Europe and its relationship with both Russia and Western Europe. The article acknowledges that the branch of European postcolonial studies that focuses on uneven power relationships within and between European countries offers a useful challenge to the argument that Ireland should either be examined within a European framework or a postcolonial one, but argues that the categorisation of a greater number of European societies as colonies or former colonies raises important questions that require further debate.     

Narrating Difference and Defining the Nation in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 'Western' Europe

This article examines the influence of Orientalist representations of Eastern Europe on definitions and theories of the nation, and their impact on normative interpretations of the nature of nations and national identity in Western Europe. It focuses on the history of the development of these normative interpretations in the decades leading up to and including the First World War. During this period European progressives--whether intellectuals, social scientists or politicians--residing in Britain and France, definitively 'Western European' states, were keen to discuss the future application of the principle of nationality, its necessity and its obstacles. With the outbreak of war in 1914, such progressive interest in the status of nations and national identities helped shape the anticipated democratic 'new world order' and the mental map of Eastern and Western Europe. I argue that their attempts to explain and represent the nature and significance of nationhood and national identity iterated Orientalist versions of Eastern Europe, and, at the same time, their definitions and theorisations of nations were replete with anomalies that defy any simply categorisation of the nature of Western Europe or the status of its nations.     

Images of Europe around the Crisis

In this article I examine the extent to which the European crisis has debunked certain images of Europe and spread other new ones. I will try to summarize the stages of this symbolic tour through (1) furtive and mechanical Europe; (2) the remoteness of non-salient Europe; (3) the Europe that hopes and the Europe that fears; (4) headstrong Europe, which claims that crises are necessarily opportunities; and then (5), the Europe with which I identify the most: contingent Europe, which could be or not be, or be in another fashion, whose interest lies in that it is an uncertain product of our conditioned freedom and which, for that very reason, we can consider (6) a politicized Europe.     

Russia's Europe, 1991–2016: inferiority to superiority

Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia's superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great‐Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about‐turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken.     

Between Kant and Machiavelli: EU foreign policy priorities in the 2010s

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty invites and enables Europe to develop elements of a common foreign policy. Europe should resist the tendency of listing all issues calling for attention, and be aware that it will have to address three agendas, not just one. The first agenda is the Kantian one of universal causes. While it remains essential to European identity, it presents Europe with limited opportunities for success in the 2010s as could be seen at the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen. The ‘Alliance’ agenda remains essential on the security front and would benefit from a transatlantic effort at rejuvenation on the economic one. Last but not least, the ‘Machiavellian’ agenda reflects what most countries would define as their ‘normal’ foreign policy. It calls for Europe to influence key aspects of the world order in the absence of universal causes or common values. While Europe's ‘Machiavellian’ experience is limited to trade policy, developing a capacity to address this third agenda in a manner that places its common interests first and reinforces its identity will be Europe's central foreign policy challenge in the 2010s. A key part of the Machiavellian agenda presently revolves around relations with Ukraine, Turkey and the Russian Federation, three countries essential to Europe's energy security that are unlikely to change their foreign policy stance faced with EU soft power. Stressing that foreign policy is about ‘us’ and ‘them’, the article looks at what could be a genuine European foreign policy vis‐à‐vis each of these interdependent countries, beginning with energy and a more self‐interested approach to enlargement. The European public space is political in nature, as majority voting and mutual recognition imply that citizens accept ‘foreigners’ as legitimate legislators. At a time when the European integration process has become more hesitant and the political dimension of European integration tends to be derided or assumed away, admitting Turkey or Ukraine as members would change Europe more than it would change these countries. Foreign policy cannot be reduced to making Europe itself the prize of the relationship. What objectives Europe sets for itself in its dealing with Ukraine, Turkey and Russia will test whether it is ready for a fully‐fledged foreign policy or whether the invocation of ‘Europe’ is merely a convenient instrument for entities other than ‘Europe’.     

Reflections on the European Legacy (from the Plains of Anatolia)

Turkey's insistence on its European credentials, and its endeavours to join the European Union, provide an opportunity to reflect on what the European legacy means. While acknowledging the diverse contributors to Europe, and the extensive interactions with the rest of the world that have shaped European history and identity, this essay locates Europe's most important legacy—and measure—in the realm of ideas, especially the ideas we use to organise our experience and approach the challenges of the world. These ideas came to fruition in the Enlightenment, and they provide an approach that is potentially liberating for peoples but uncomfortable for those with power, and those that aspire to power, including within Europe itself. The challenge for Turkey is to recognise that the EU is not necessarily the last word on ‘Europe,’ while continuing to engage creatively with the European legacy.     

Europe,public opinion,and Brexit*

ABSTRACT

The construction – and deconstruction – of Europe is a spatial democratic process, and public opinion is central to it. One part of public opinion is fuelled by pragmatic – either economic (the search for prosperity) or strategic (the need for security) – arguments. Another is fired by political, moral and religious ideologies and identities (and utopian views of Europe in particular). Attitudes concerning Europe were never identical in the Western or Eastern halves of the continent, or in Britain. They evolved in connection with processes of economic change (from the second to the third phase of the Industrial Revolution), and latterly in relation to globalization and its geographic impact. Euroscepticism demands a deep adjustment of Europe to its current political-intellectual scene and geographic organization.     

Salmon farming and lessons for European planning

Salmon farming has been an unprecedented success. It has provided employment and incomes, and has revived isolated communities. Europe maintains its dominance in salmon farming, but other countries such as Chile and Canada are becoming important producers. The paper describes the development of the industry in Europe, with an emphasis on its lessons for policy‐makers.     

RETHINKING the OPPIDA

Summary: The appearance of large sites known as oppida, and generally qualified as urban or proto-urban, is a central feature of all accounts of late Iron Age Europe. But the category of oppidum groups together sites that are very diverse in morphology, scale and function, and excludes other sites that share many of the same features, but lack fortifications and/or are located outside the supposed heartland of the oppida civilisation. Few oppida seem to be at the centre of differentiated settlement networks of the kind usually associated with urbanism, and few display a higher level of intra-site zoning than do rural farms or hamlets. A reassessment of late La Tène settlement, focusing on its technological and cultural unity, contributes to an analysis of late prehistoric Europe which stresses the contrasts between the social trajectories of temperate European and Mediterranean societies.     

Ismail Kadere’s Idea of Europe

The aim of this article is to reconstruct and pinpoint the peculiarities of Ismail Kadare’s idea of Europe. Kadare’s idea of Europe, it is argued, differs from the ideas of Europe embraced or presumed by intellectuals like Paul Valéry, Georg Simmel, Danilo Ki?, Václav Havel, Adam Michnik, or Milan Kundera, or from that of the European Union. For Kadare it is literature rather than the polis or its particular ideology that is the guardian of European values. Thus the European legacy, in his view, is primarily Homeric rather than Socratic. I suggest first that the persecution of writers and the repression of literature in totalitarian regimes underlies Kadare’s idea of Europe. I then further characterize Kadare’s theme of persecution as a dialectic between regime and culture. Finally, I reconstruct Kadare’s narrative of Albania’s “return to Europe” as the struggle for recognizing Albania as the birthplace of European culture.     

中国的和平崛起与对外移民

在中国和世界移民史的框架内,从中国的人口政策、经济发展战略、外资的引进和城市化与就业政策等角度,对中外社会经济性质及移民政策进行比较分析。认为,中国的人口政策和经济发展战略保持了极低的对外移民率;随着中国的和平崛起,未来中国国际移民与人口比例将比当时欧洲崛起时低得多、“移民峰”的时段也将比欧洲当年的时段短得多。     

Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?

A major public debate on the costs and benefits of the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union is presently under way. The outcome of the referendum on 23 June 2016 will be a pivotal moment in determining whether the EU has a future as a component of the UK's European diplomatic strategy or whether there is a major recalibration of how the UK relates to Europe and more widely of its role within international relations. Since accession to the European Economic Community the UK has evolved an uncodified, multipronged European diplomatic strategy. This has involved the UK seeking to reinforce its approach of shaping the security of the continent, preserving a leading diplomatic role for the UK in managing the international relations of Europe, and to maximize British trade and investment opportunities through a broadening and deepening of Europe as an economically liberal part of the global political economy. Since accession the UK's European diplomatic strategy has also been to use membership of the EU to facilitate the enhancement of its international influence, primarily as a vehicle for leveraging and amplifying broader national foreign and security policy objectives. The strategy has been consistent irrespective of which party has formed the government in the UK. Increasing domestic political difficulties with the process of European integration have now directly impacted on this European strategy with a referendum commitment. Whether a vote for a Brexit or a Bremain, the UK will be confronted with challenges for its future European strategy.     

Reexamining transport poverty,job access,and gender issues in Central and Eastern Europe

Tirana, the Balkan capital examined in this study, displays patterns of gendered job search behavior and access, which are unique within contemporary Europe and even within post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Here, it is a rather spatially constricted job search range rather than transport poverty that prevents women living in first-ring suburbs from attaining satisfactory employment. Female commutes are extraordinarily short and most often on foot. While the city now has nearly one million inhabitants and a high car ownership rate, and is located in Europe, the employment and mobility choices and behaviors of its female residents resemble those in developing rather than developed countries, and in small rather than large cities. The reasons underpinning this situation have more to do with socio-cultural gender barriers and less with transport poverty or labor market weaknesses. This finding might apply to other Balkan capitals or cities outside Europe, which have recently experienced large waves of internal migration and where both existing residents and newcomers have not yet adjusted to ‘big city’ life.     

The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. Strední Evropa

Since its introduction, Central Europe has been a contested term, subject to rival efforts to lay daim to the continent's middle. This article traces how a German and then a Czech ‘idea’ of Central Europe has taken shape since the nineteenth Century, based on broader discourses on Europe, including ‘Eastern Europe’, and on ‘the middle’ as a virtuous place and attribute. It is argued that the new debates on Central Europe of the 1980s were heavily indebted to these older discourses, and that the seemingly competing and conflicting Czech and German ideas of Central Europe shared many basic assumptions, using much the same parameters for defining the région and its Others.     

The Israeli–Palestinian Road Block: Can Europeans Make a Difference?

Europe needs a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict for the sake of its own social harmony, and could reconfigure the calculations of the parties by inviting Israel to integrate into Europe's social, economic and security space in return for withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza and Arab East Jerusalem. The idea would be to capitalize on the drive for separation that prevails in Israel and abandon an unrealistic policy that requires the Arabs to integrate Israel in the region. It is also time for Europe to face up to its own role in the problem and the solution, and demonstrate that anti-Semitism does not influence its policy.     

Renaissance maps and the construction of the idea of Europe

The paper assumes that maps have the power to affect perceptions of power and space, and takes as a case study the portrayals of the continent of Europe during the Renaissance, when a number of fundamental shifts took place. The voyages of exploration, the rediscovery of Ptolemy, and changes in theology and philosophy permitted an emancipation from medieval constraints. An early effect was to make Europe seem smaller in relation to the rest of the world, but new projection techniques placed Europe both central and dominant on the world map, and it was made yet larger by shifting its border with Asia eastward. Triumphalism entered the portrayal of Europe in the world, helped by Habsburg pretensions. By personifying the continents as young women, and making Europe the noblest and most regal of them, iconography asserted Europe's superiority over the other regions of the world. Renaissance cartographers devised maps of Europe in the shape of a queen, decorated all manner of geographical books with images of the «noble» continent lording it over her «sisters», and covered the margins and cartouches of their maps with the images of European superiority. Only the rise of nationalism and imperialism eventually diluted this assertion of Europe.     

US—European Relations: Past and Future

In this revised text of a lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in June 2003, Stanley Hoffmann traces the history of America's close postwar alliance with western Europe. Out of the treaty in which America undertook to protect western Europe came the organization of NATO. Despite the difficulties and differences of opinion among its members in the early years—decolonization, German rearmament, Vietnam, US—French relations—the alliance survived and continued to survive after 1991 despite losing its main enemy, the Soviet Union. It then became a tool for managing relations between members and the newly liberated countries of central and eastern Europe and Russia. After the first Gulf War, however, NATO became a field for US—European relations, encompassing rivalry over approaches to eastern Europe, and cooperation in the Balkans. September 11 and the 'war on terrorism' marked the real turning point in the alliance and the subsequent war in Iraq in 2003 exposed deep divisions in the approach to international relations. Stanley Hoffmann concludes that it is still unclear how far Iraq has affected the substance of US foreign policy and its relations with Europe. It may be possible to predict, however, that the central importance of Europe for the US will remain under a cloud—'the days of relative harmony have not returned'.     

The Arabn influence on Western European cooking

The importance of the spice trade to commercial development in Europe in the later middle ages has long been recognized, although the reasons for the demand for exotic condiments from the East have not been much considered. There seems little evidence to support the idea that spices were used either to mask the taste of rotting or “vulgar” food or as preservatives. There are sources, however, which do provide a basis for the unriddling of the taste for spices. Contained within the recipes of the period is evidence that the style of cooking was adopted from the Arabs, and that the heavy use of spices was but one of a cluster of characteristics of Arab food replicated in Europe. In order to establish the similarities between European and Arabic medieval cookery, a sample of French, Italian, Spanish, Flemish, English, and German texts is drawn upon and compared with the main features of the several Arabic works which have been translated into Spanish, French and English. Underlying the upheaval in the cooking of the élite in Europe from about 1300 was a changed attitude toward eating which was stimulated by the place of food in Moslem theology as represented in depictions of the Garden of Delights, a concept which is explored in its rather wide currency in Europe. I postulate that, intrigued with the sensual pleasures of eating as portrayed in the Garden, Europe began to associate luxurious dining with the food of the Arabs, and thus the passage of what was a strange and alien cuisine was facilitated.