Drug or medicine? China's experience of Marx's opium thesis on religion

This paper tracks the changes in the influence of Marx's celebrated opium thesis in China. Marx's view that religion is “the opium of the people” was first introduced into China through propaganda associated with the Russian revolution. It became very influential among Chinese intellectuals and dominated the religious policy of the CCP for a long period. However, as the revolutionary party became the party in power after 1949, it was obvious that the opium thesis alone would be insufficient to deal with the religious situation in a socialist country. Although the “five natures” of religion thesis was proposed to explain the persistence of religion in socialist China, the opium thesis proved more powerful politically and resulted in a general attack on religion during the Cultural Revolution. Not until the era of reform and “opening up” was the opium thesis questioned. After the release of a major document entitled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during our Country's Socialist Period” in 1982, the opium thesis was viewed as too simplistic an instrument for understanding “the problem of religion.” Scholars have argued that religion contains important cultural elements and can make a positive contribution to a socialist society in certain respects. After lengthy discussion, a consensus was reached that Marxist views on religion should keep up with the times and that the opium thesis was no longer compatible with contemporary Chinese society. Although different voices can still be heard on the issue, religion is no longer viewed as just a “drug” but rather as a kind of “medicine.” Marx's opium thesis has been replaced in China by a new theory, one that emphasizes that religion should and can adapt to the needs of a socialist society.     

The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952)

From its very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had a shifting policy towards the bourgeoisie. Until the early 1940s, it maintained a relatively stable policy which successfully isolated the monied classes in China and helped it overthrow the rule of the KMT. But with the establishment of the new regime, the CCP Central Committee came under conflicting pressures: on the one hand it continued its former policy out of political expediency; on the other hand, based on traditional socialist political theory and Soviet experience, it kept a close watch on the bourgeoisie and even proposed targeting them as the chief enemy of next revolution. After the establishment of the PRC, as a result of the failing economy and the new government's lack of economic support and political experience, the CCP firmed up its policies on the bourgeoisie. However, with the bourgeoisie and capitalism still prominent elements in Chinese society, the communists became uncertain about which direction to take. As the CCP Central Committee had anticipated, officials of both the party and the government often gave way to corruption after taking over major cities. The Central Committee regarded this particular combination of money and power as a “violent attack” against the new communist regime by the bourgeoisie as a whole. In order to tighten its grip on national power, the Central Committee launched two anti‐corruption movements known as the Three‐Antis and the Five‐Antis. These movements were in fact aimed at the bourgeoisie as a whole, and succeeded in destroying the basis for capitalist business in the New China. Encouraged by this outcome, the CCP launched a policy of socialist transformation aimed at depriving Chinese capitalists of their means of production. Thus the CCP gradually and inevitably moved away from its original policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie.     

Disciplined love: the Chinese Communist Party’s wartime restrictions on cadre love and marriage

ABSTRACT

During the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) imposed restrictions on the marriage of its cadres, so as to maintain the Party’s effective control and combat cohesion. The Central Committee of the CCP did not issue uniform regulations on this topic; most decisions were made by the base areas, with the indirect support of the Central Committee. Marriage and love are personal matters, and the restrictions certainly caused emotional suffering for ordinary cadres affected. However, there were important reasons for the CCP’s implementation of these measures. Through punishment and guidance, these restrictions were carried out smoothly and did not cause great upheaval. As love and marriage became areas subject to the political power of the CCP, they unexpectedly became a focal point of the collision between individuality and Party spirit and between the individual and the group.     

The theory and implementation of the People's Republic of China's revolutionary diplomacy

The foreign relations of modern China, starting from the birth of the People's Republic in 1949 until the Cultural Revolution, can be said to have had continuous ups and downs and twists and turns. Its underlying abstruse principles, while stemming from nationalism, contained for the most part the Chinese Communist Party's own revolutionary principles and individual revolutionary experiences. The Chinese Communist revolution was based on class analysis and class conflict, on struggle and ideology. This ideology determined how China viewed itself and the world; no views could be separated from the ideology of class struggle and class analysis. The leadership's adherence to this type of ideology led to the long-term instability of China's diplomacy. Though those who, like Mao Zedong, employed class revolution in order to seize political power while viewing class analysis, class struggle, and in particular the success of using class ideology in a united front policy as the magic wand of the revolution's success, were singularly able to adapt such views to China's foreign policy and diplomacy. This became the fundamental red line for China's foreign policy.     

日本在“东亚共同体”建设中面临的困境

“东亚共同体”构想是一度作为东亚经济牵引车的日本酝酿已久的重大经济外交方针,但这一构想却因在现实中面临着诸多困境而在实践中举步维艰。日本亚洲认同意识的摇摆不定、东亚地区政治安全机制的匮乏、对美优先的经济政策方针和东亚区域经济结构性障等都成为束缚日本推动“东亚共同体”构想的重要羁绊,束缚着日本“东亚共同体”建设的实践。     

农民何以支持与参加中共革命？

内容提要 农民的支持与参加是中共革命胜利的主要保证,问题是如何解释农民的这一行为。学术界的解释与争论主要涉及四个方面：一是土地集中、家庭贫困与农民革命的关系,二是社会经济改革与农民革命的关系,三是民族主义与农民革命的关系,四是中共动员与农民革命的关系。以上说法都揭示了问题的一个主要方面,而且多是从自上而下的视角进行分析,缺乏农民自身的声音,尤其是缺乏对农民个体或群体感受的关怀。事实上,农民支持与参加革命的动机十分复杂,很难能用一条或几条理论概括。在农民支持或参加中共革命的行动中,土地分配、家庭贫困、社会经济改革以及民族主义在动员农民中究竟起了什么作用,仍需要做大量的农民个体与群体的实证研究。只有在此基础上,方可还原农民的革命动机,也才有利于中共革命胜利原因的解释。     

BIMSTEC and emerging patterns of Asian regional and interregional cooperation

The first phase of India's Look East Policy in 1991 was exploratory in nature and tinged with more idealism and optimism to break out of the South Asian region which was stagnating in economic growth. The second phase of India's Look East policy took stock of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 to 1998 and China's growing linkages with the Southeast Asian region. In 1997, mainly through the diligence of Thailand, a new grouping that could act as a bridge between Southeast and South Asia was established called BIMSTEC. The objective of the paper will be to argue that BIMSTEC balances India's engagement with Southeast and South Asia but it also counters China's growing influence among ASEAN members, in particular Myanmar. Thailand is the driving force behind BIMSTEC activities as this would enhance its trade hub status and engagement policy with Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV) states.     

Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.     

National legitimacy and overseas Chinese mobilization

This paper examines the Chinese Nationalists’ overseas Chinese policies during the early War of Resistance and the early Cold War. The strategies, organizations and problems of huaqiao mobilization during the Anti-Japanese War set patterns for Cold War anti-Communist efforts. In both struggles, the Nationalists emphasized that they represented China's legitimate government and that support from overseas Chinese was part of a crusade dating back to Sun Yat-sen, the father of the nation. As mothers of the revolution, huaqiao were to remain loyal to Sun's legacy by backing Chiang. Southeast Asia, home to the majority of overseas Chinese, became the focus of Nationalist attention and is the most appropriate arena to examine the vicissitudes of huaqiao policies. Obstacles to huaqiao mobilization did not simply result from Japanese, then Communist, machinations. The Nationalists encountered difficulties due to overseas Chinese apathy and disunity. Further, the complex political environment of Southeast Asia, before and after decolonization, stymied mobilization. Nevertheless, after each military defeat, whether at the hands of the Japanese or the Communists, huaqiao support became more important, not for the material benefits they offered, but for the legitimacy they conferred.     

How Japan matters in the evolving East Asian security order

This article argues that Japan matters crucially in the evolving East Asian security order because it is embedded both in the structural transition and the ongoing regional strategies to manage it. The post‐Cold War East Asian order transition centres on the disintegration of the post‐Second World War Great Power bargain that saw Japan subjecting itself to extraordinary strategic constraint under the US alliance, leaving the conundrum of how to negotiate a new bargain that would keep the peace between Japan and China. To manage the uncertainties of this transition, East Asian states have adopted a three‐pronged strategy of: maintaining US military preponderance; socializing China as a responsible regional great power; and cultivating regionalism as the basis for a long‐term East Asian security community. Japan provides essential public goods for each of these three elements: it keeps the US anchored in East Asia with its security treaty; it is the one major regional power that can and has helped to constrain the potential excesses of growing Chinese power while at the same time crucially engaging with and helping to socialize China; and its economic and political participation is critical for meaningful regionalism and regional integration. It does not need to be a fully fledged, ‘normal’ Great Power in order to carry out these roles. As the region tries to mediate the growing security dilemma among the three great powers, Japan's importance to regional security will only grow.     

Australia-Southeast Asia relations and the East Asian Summit

The economic and geopolitical landscape of Asia has changed dramatically in recent years, providing Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to become an integral and significant player in a wider Indo-Pacific region as it charts its future and seeks to manage tensions while shaping a new architecture of cooperation. Late in 2004 at their annual summit, leaders of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, agreed to create a new forum—the East Asian Summit—and hold the first meeting of heads of government of participating countries in Kuala Lumpur in December this year. The summit seems destined to become a regular event and thus the policy-guiding core of any future East Asian or Indo-Pacific community.     

National identity,nation and race: Wang Jingwei's early revolutionary ideas, 1905–1911

This article examines Wang Jingwei's ideas on nation and race before the 1911 Revolution. It has often been agreed by scholars that there was a strong current of anti-Manchuism among the revolutionaries and as a result, on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the revolutionaries remained divided as to whether the new Republic should inherit all the territories ruled by the Manchu dynasty and whether it should include the Manchus into the nation. It was only in the reformist camp led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao that the Manchus were unambiguously regarded as part of the Chinese nation. This article suggests that in the revolutionary camp before the 1911 Revolution, it was Wang Jingwei who broke new ground in mapping out a place for the Manchus after the revolution. He stood out among the revolutionaries in the clear formulation of the idea that the new Chinese nation should be composed of different nationalities including the Manchus. This article also suggests that although Sun Yat-sen had an influence upon Wang Jingwei's political thinking during the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) times, Wang's intellectual talents and resources enabled him to outgrow Sun's framework and develop his own ideas. His concepts on race and nation and perceptions of Han–Manchu relations owed a considerable debt to the Swiss legal scholar, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli. Wang Jingwei has been a much reviled political figure in twentieth century Chinese history. His contribution to the formulation of a racial identity for the new Chinese nation has long been underrated, and this article attempts to throw light upon this aspect of his political thought.     

Toyotomi Hideyoshi's effort of retreat and the ending of the East Asian War

Abstract

During the second stage of the East Asian War, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉 hopefully sought to make an honorable exit, but the Choson 朝鮮 formulated a unique diplomatic strategy that brought the Ming to the battlefield, and there was no way for Toyotomi Hideyoshi's retreat and attempts at peace talks to be successful. In the end, the war concluded with Toyotomi Hideyoshi's death from illness and the retreat of the Japanese army in defeat, and the international order established between China and Korea was maintained.     

Sharing a similar fate: the historical process of the Korean Communists’ merger with the Chinese Communist Party (1919–1936)

In their early history, the Chinese and Korean Communists had little contact with one another. However, similar fates brought them together, and some Korean revolutionaries in China voluntarily joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After a futile effort to establish a Communist party in Korea, the Korean Communists shifted their attention to Chinese Manchuria. Under extremely difficult circumstances, different factions of the Korean Communist organizations either willingly or under force disbanded. However, after winning support from the Comintern, the CCP recruited a substantial number of Korean Communists. Thus, within a short period of time, the CCP expanded its strength in Manchuria. It also shouldered responsibility for assisting the Korean Communists in their efforts to establish their own party. In the aftermath of the September 18th Incident in 1931 the CCP Central Committee called for an armed struggle against the Japanese invaders. The Korean Communists in Manchuria became a force to be reckoned with. After the CCP gradually shifted the focus of its policy toward the War of Resistance against Japan, the Korean Communists in China became integrated into the CCP army.     

Boosting nationalism with non‐nationalist ideology: A comparative biographical analysis of the Chinese communist revolutionaries

This article conducts a comparative biographical analysis to explain why the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) revolutionaries used non‐nationalist Marxism to boost a nationalist movement. It argues that these people, based on their own observations of the precommunist Chinese nationalism, thought that China lacked structural conditions for making a solid nationalist movement such as cultural homogeneity, mass literacy, and a shared pride in modern history. They thus turned to seek a non‐national ideology that could still fulfil the functions of integrating leading elites, mobilizing the masses, and motivating the patriots themselves. Then, to explain why the CCP leaders particularly adopted Marxism, this article draws comparison with the Kuomintang (non‐communist nationalists) elites who advocated for more patience and insistence to develop regular nationalism. The comparison shows that the CCP's impatient jump stemmed from their disadvantaged backgrounds that had limited their ideological horizon: lower‐class origins, narrow overseas experiences, poor education, and weak attachment to traditional culture. To pre‐existing literature, this article makes three contributions: (1) provides a more detailed interpretation of the CCP's diagnosis of Chinese nationalism; (2) explains why the same structural dilemmas produced nationalist and non‐nationalist responses alike; and (3) draws a biographical database of the CCP and the Kuomintang.     

Not-so-new silk roads: Japan's foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar

Scholarly narratives concerning China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) tend to contextualise this project within China's rivalry with the United States and Japan. Such interpretations often reduce and misconstrue Japan's initiatives in Asian infrastructure finance as mere reactivity to China's advances. This paper will showcase Japan's own foreign and financial policies regarding infrastructure in Asia and the New Silk Road regions since the end of the Cold War. I argue that Japan's presence in that field is underappreciated and under-researched, as Japan's infrastructural footprint in the New Silk Road significantly pre-dates the BRI. Furthermore, I stress the fact that Japan's foreign policy in Asian infrastructure finance featured important cooperative postures toward China, especially within multilateral development banks. The paper makes a contribution to emerging scholarship on the BRI—often reliant on strategic communications and projections—by highlighting Japan's role in regional infrastructure to show how our understanding of international relations and international political economy in Asia can be better informed by economic history and area studies.     

Writing about a different kind of medical history: a critical review of Zaizao bingren by Yang Nianqun

After the implementation of China's Reform Policy and the dissolution of the Cold War system, the conditions in Japan for conducting scholarly research on China's modern history changed drastically. We can categorize Japanese research on China's modern history since the 1980s into two components: the relativization of the Chinese Revolution and a rediscovery of the uniqueness of Chinese society. Some historians, however, continue to point out that an alternative vision of history that integrates detailed research results already achieved within individual areas of history has not yet replaced the conventional revolution‐based paradigm. It is indisputable, as they emphasize, that breaking away from the so‐called revolution‐based viewpoint of history in Japan has created diverse visions of history and has contributed to a more substantial body of work pertaining to China's modern history. The question of what kind of new vision we should search for, however, remains unanswered. Recent overviews of modern Chinese history in Japan were expected to answer this question. This paper is intended as a general review of recent trends and expected developments in Japanese research on China's modern history by introducing the most important overviews written by Japanese scholars. We are not concerned here with individual case study research.     

走向分裂:从暗中斗争到公开论战——1960年代中苏关系研究之二

1961年后期,为了将中苏关系缓和的局面继续维持下去,中共中央对苏共二十二大采取了暗中斗争的方略,对定性为是集修正主义之大成的苏共新党纲不做公开直接的批判。其后,随着中国国内经济状况的好转,中共从维护阿尔巴尼亚党人手,开始着手与苏共进行新一轮意识形态斗争。中苏关系缓和的局面结束。1962年新疆中国边民外逃苏联的伊塔事件、中苏在加勒比海危机和中印边界战争期间的外交较量,不同程度地影响了中共中央对中苏关系性质的认识,影响了两党继续务实地寻求共同利益,求同存异,保持关系的基本稳定。特别是毛泽东把中共党内反省三年来政策失误时显露的否：毫“大跃进”、人民公社、总路线的倾向,当作是对赫鲁晓夫关于中共国内政策批评的呼应,进而：重新检讨与苏关系问题,警惕国内外修正主义分子勾结起来进行颠覆活动。与此同时,国际左派队伍的形成使中共领导人认为,中共作为共运领导中心的条件已具备、时机也已成熟。中共做出了中苏两党矛盾已成为敌我性质、赫鲁晓夫已成为资产阶级代言人的判断。毛泽东最终调整对苏方针的基调,改以妥协、让步、缓和关系为主为以主动进攻、做针锋相对的斗争为主。中共开始与苏共进行关于国际共运总路线的大论战。中苏两党关系的破裂成为定局。     

Rising Sino-Japanese competition: perspectives from South-East Asian elites

One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam—perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South-East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with major-power dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions.     

中共创建时期党内的几次争论

中国革命有着自己的特点,这在创建时期党内的几场争论中大都有所反映.然而从这些争论的结果来看,对中国革命的一些基本问题,党显然还没有形成统一的明确认识.这使得中共对于理论准备不足情况下,怎样建设马克思主义的政党,以及在非无产阶级群体中,如何建成工人阶级的先锋队,这两大与生俱来问题的解决大大地延误了.