Limits of historical and scientific knowledge

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that subtle and essential uncertainties in language determine the limits of science and history, and thereby define the boundaries of research in the history of science. Historical research, in the strict sense of history as opposed to prehistory, begins with the examination of written records. There is a host of problems in the interpretation of the historical record, but underlying all of these is the simply stated yet complex question of the meaning of words in historical documents. Since this is where the practice of history begins, this problem delimits the boundaries of historical knowledge. In this paper, I will examine structural ambiguities in the meaning of words, explain how they arise, and provide independent evidence for the validity of the analysis.     

评章学诚的史学史观念

在中国史学发展史上 ,“史学史”的概念和学科体系的创建是 2 0世纪初由梁启超明确提出的。但是 ,中国史家的史学史观念却由来已久 ,而且随着史学的不断发展 ,史学史观念的内涵也逐步丰富与深刻。本文初步考察了 1 8世纪中国史家章学诚的史学史观念 ,希望能够引起学界对中国史学史之史的重视。     

经世致用——侯仁之学术生涯的思想基调

“经世致用”是贯穿侯仁之学术生涯的思想基调。文章探讨了这一思想基调的发展历程,及其在历史地理学研究、地理学科普和现实关怀中的实践,阐释了这一思想对时下历史地理学发展的当代意义。     

The Essential Difference Between History and Science

My thesis is that there is a deep, intractable difference, not between history and science per se , but between paradigmatically central kinds of historical interpretations—call them humanistic historical interpretations —and theories of any sort that are characteristic of the physical sciences. The difference is that unlike theories in the physical sciences good humanistic historical interpretations (purport to) reveal subjectivity, agency, and meaning. I use the controversy provoked by Gordon Wood's recent reinterpretation of the American Revolution to illustrate and substantiate this thesis. I also use it to support the claim that unless one attends to the ways in which humanistic historical interpretations reveal subjectivity, agency, and meaning one has no hope whatsoever of getting the epistemology of historical studies right.     

Rethinking Performative Methods in the History of Science

Performative methods have been part of history of science research and education for at least three decades. Understood broadly, they cover every methodology in which a historian or philosopher of science engages in embodied interaction with sources, tools and materials that do not traditionally belong to historical research, with the aim of answering a historical research question. The question no longer appears to be whether performative methods have a place within history and philosophy of science research, but what their place is, could, or should be; when and how they can and cannot be used. Because although performative methods are seen as an enrichment of the field by many, their growing popularity also raises questions: what new insights and challenges has the increased use of performative methods in the history of science brought us? How has it changed the field? Should performative research methods become a mandatory part of the training of new generations of historians of science? In this special issue, historians and philosophers of science for whom performative methods play an important role in their work reflect on these questions from their own research and teaching practices.     

Wissens‐ und Wissenschaftstransfer – Einführende Bemerkungen

Knowledge and science transfer – introductory remarks. The article presents introductory remarks on the historical study of knowledge and science transfer. Discussion focuses initially on the reasons for speaking of knowledge transfer and not only about science transfer, and the relations of this topic to current research in general history on cultural transfer. Multiple levels of knowledge / science transfer are then discussed, specifically: (1) transfer by means of migration or other movement of people across geographic boundaries; (2) scientific changes related to the transfer of objects (such as plant specimens or instruments) across continents or disciplines; (3) knowledge or science transfer in practical contexts. Addressed throughout is the problematic character of the concept of transfer itself. The author suggests that users of this concept often presuppose a static conception of scientific and cultural contents being more or less successfully transferred; more interesting, however, are the changes in science and culture conditioned or caused by the migration of individuals as well as the transfer of culture by other means.     

Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Ur- und Frühgeschichte

During the past few years a history of special subjects and a history of science, being critical and historical as well as taking into account scientific theory and methodology, has established itself under the influence of philosophy in many domains of the sciences. Such a scientific history is now also required in the branch of the science of history. It demands the ability of re-evaluating historical sources and studies as well as the knowledge of the political aspect of a future scientific history. As a matter of fact a future scientific chronicle of prehistory has to examine not only the subject of historical research itself, but also its aim, method and the whole sociopolitical background. This is more important than a positivist study of individual and specific historical aspects, a thorough compilation of different approaches in historical research, scientists and institutions. It is also better than making an arbitrary selection of single biographies in order to have a political legitimation of the present state of research. Moreover, the danger of such a selection is the degradation of persons in history and the falsification of historical facts. Apart from a determination of the subject with regard to scientific and political aspects the search of historical clues as well as the re-evaluation of historical and archeological sources could both lead to a revision of prehistory.     

PERFORMING HISTORY: HOW HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP IS SHAPED BY EPISTEMIC VIRTUES

Philosophers of history in the past few decades have been predominantly interested in issues of explanation and narrative discourse. Consequently, they have focused consistently and almost exclusively on the historian's (published) output, thereby ignoring that historical scholarship is a practice of reading, thinking, discussing, and writing, in which successful performance requires active cultivation of certain skills, attitudes, and virtues. This paper, then, suggests a new agenda for philosophy of history. Inspired by a “performative turn” in the history and philosophy of science, it focuses on the historian's “doings” and proposes to analyze these performances in terms of epistemic virtue. It argues that historical scholarship is embedded in “practices” or “epistemic cultures,” in which knowledge is created and warranted by means of such virtues as honesty, carefulness, accuracy, and balance. These epistemic virtues, however, are not etched in stone: historians may highlight some of them, exchange one for another, or reinterpret their meaning. On the one hand, this suggests a rich area of research for historians of historiography. To what extent can consensus, conflict, continuity, and change in historical scholarship be explained in terms of epistemic virtue? On the other hand, the proposal outlined in this article raises a couple of philosophical questions. For example, on what grounds can historians choose among epistemic virtues? And what concept of the self comes with the notion of virtue? In addressing these questions, philosophy of history may expand its current scope so as to encompass not only “writings” but also “doings,” that is, the virtuous performances historians recognize as professional conduct.     

„Und setzet eure Worte nicht auf Schrauben”︁ Medizinische Semiotik vom Ende des 18. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts - Gegenstand und Forschung

There is no doubt that medical semiotics are having a revival at the moment. Different aspects of yesterday's and today's interest in semiotics and in the historical interpretation of signs of disease in the context of theory and history of medicine can be illuminated: their deciphering as the history of the sign in medicine by historic science, their overestimation by philosophy during the Age of Enlightenment, their reduction to a phenomenology of medicine and natural science during the first half of the 19th century and their transformation to medical diagnostics since the middle of the 19th century and recently even their functionalization as methodical instrument within the history of science. The following will show the change in meaning of medical semiotics. Modern development and especially the transition to medicine, based on natural science, will be emphasized.     

简论冯家昇先生的边疆史研究

冯家昇先生在语言学、民族史、历史地理、科技史等多个学术领域多有建树,而边疆史地在其学术研究中占有极其重要的地位。本文对冯家昇的边疆史研究做了简要梳理,认为对诸如冯家昇等先贤的相关研究做进一步的梳理和总结对于边疆学的构建显得很有必要。     

Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftsphilosophie – Einführende Bemerkungen

History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Introductory Remarks. This article introduces two special issues of the journal History of Science Reports (Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte) with contributions on the relationships of history and philosophy of science since the seventeenth century. The introduction begins with a brief reminder of Thomas Kuhn's provocative discussion of the relationship in the 1970s, placing it in the context of the debate of the period over whether the foundation of university departments for History and Philosophy of Science in the United States had led to a mere “marriage of convenience” or something more. Following this the paper briefly outlines the transformative impact of the “practical turn” in both philosophy and history of science since the 1990s, and contends that the relationship of history and philosophy of science has nonetheless become increasingly distant over time. This is due in large part to the professionalisation of history of science and to the recent turn to cultural approaches in that field; both trends have led to the adoption of strictly historicist rather than analytical perspectives on knowledge. General historians, too, are paying more attention to the increasing impact of science and technology, but have at most instrumental use for philosophical perspectives. Thus, the distinct possibility arises that the debate between historical and analytical approaches in philosophy of science is becoming a conversation within one discipline rather than a dialogue between two disciplines: what was once a ?marriage of convenience”? could end in respectful separation or amicable divorce. The article concludes with brief summaries of the articles published in the two special issues, indicating their relations to specific aspects of the broader topic at hand.     

“中华人民共和国地方史工作研讨会”纪要

盛世修史是中华民族的传统 ,我们今天研究和撰写中华人民共和国国史和地方史 ,正是要通过不断总结历史经验 ,坚持真理 ,修正错误 ,使我们的事业不断发展。地方史研究与国史研究一样 ,不是权宜之计 ,国家有关部门和各级政府应将地方史工作纳入社会科学研究的全面长远规划当中 ,给予充分的重视 ,建立相关常设机构 ,并在经费上予以保障。目前地方史工作缺乏统一的指导和规划 ,应在统一规划的基础上 ,加强地方史工作的交流     

浅议"文革"史研究中文献法与口述法的综合运用

文献法与口述法的结合运用,能够更大程度地赋予普通民众阐释自身历史的权力,推进宏观论证与微观调研、量化研究与质性分析的同步进行,不仅有助于挖掘新史料,还能够拓宽研究视野、提供新的研究方法。对“文革”史研究具有突破性的意义。     

The emergence of french research policy: Methodological and historiographical problems (1945–1970) 1

French research policy has been of interest to historians for quite some time. However, the very notion has become so evident for us that its history is told as an heroic one of the state's progressive awareness of the importance of the scientific field.

Nevertheless, this historiographical tradition appears misleading. The stress put on the search for ancestors obscures many issues. This paper accordingly tries to reconstruct a quite different picture underlining the heterogeneity of the meaning of research policy.

The aim is to give a different status to the notion in the context of post‐war France. Science policy should cease to be considered as an evident entity and be seen as an object which organizes and stimulates reflection around the development of science.

After suggesting important themes needed to tackle anew research policy, this study of the major characteristics of the French case ends with a brief account of the progressive definition of the object “research policy”. Focusing on a kind of historical geography of the use and practices of this object, it stresses discontinuities, oppositions and compromises, and also the important work needed to achieve political legitimacy.     

An Apologia for Theoretical History

Karl Popper's critique of theoretical history remains formidable but contains serious flaws. Popper held erroneous views about the practice of the natural sciences and created overly severe strictures for theoretical statements in the social sciences. General theory and general theoretical statements play a legitimate role in the social sciences. Merton has promoted middle-range theories and models and Lakatos multiple ontologies. One can answer Popper's criticisms of either the impossibility or triviality of long-term historical laws by searching for stable constellations of local or middle-range laws rather than a universal law. Moreover, the successful use in the social sciences of various types of scales of measurement rather than an absolute scale shows that quantitative analysis is possible in history. Investigators need to find the boundaries, the frameworks of feasibility, in which historical trends and laws operate. Popper's maximalism plays into the irrationalist trends that he himself deplored. If historical investigators and theoreticians set appropriate goals for theoretical history, they can practice their discipline responsibly and find meanings, if not a single meaning, in history.     

Existentialism as a Political Problem in Karl Löwith's Thought

The aim of this paper is to make a case for the claim that Karl Löwith's thought is predominately preoccupied with one major philosophic–historical problem that may be broadly labelled existentialism. This notion is usually employed by Löwith in order to grasp the various phenomena and developments within the European (or Western) history in the modern age. I claim that the meaning assigned by Löwith to the notion of existentialism is inseparable from its political consequences. In other words, I attempt to reconstruct the notion of existentialism in Löwith's thought primarily as a political problem. By advancing this argument, I am inclined towards the view that Löwith’s ?uvre deserves more careful reception from political theorists than it has yet received.     

Systems and Boundaries in International History

The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn's preoccupation with national discourses at the expense of international structures and processes is diverting the field away from the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The author argues that international history should distinguish itself from global and transnational history by drawing clear yet open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of inquiry needs some consensus about what it is, where it is going and why: in other words, an identity, purpose, and values. The author argues that what defines international history is its focus on the origins, structures, processes, and outcomes of international politics, above all the causes of war and the conditions of peace.     

A REGIME OF UNTRANSLATABLES: TEMPORALITIES OF TRANSLATION AND CONCEPTUAL HISTORY

This essay focuses on untranslatability to discuss the diachronic temporality of the history of concepts. Defining untranslatables as the paradoxical origin and product of translating, it explores their role in mediating the long‐term history of concepts by disrupting the historical boundaries of a period and challenging the contexts through which past meaning is confined to the moyenne durée. Addressing first the critical appraisal of the history of ideas by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, it discusses their alternative suggestion of a history of discourses, rather than concepts or ideas, to move to Pocock's formulation of the category of “diachronic translation” as a shift from the moyenne to the longue durée. It then turns to Begriffsgeschichte to explore the interrelation of untranslatables, Koselleck's consideration of translation, and his theory of historical times. It suggests that Koselleck not only states that translation mediates the history of concepts, but also envisions a distinct temporality associated with the aporetic condition of translating what is untranslatable. The aporia of translations underlies both the historical depth of concepts as a conceptual reserve and an act of silencing past meaning. The ensuing conjunction of surplus and erasure qualifies Koselleck's category of multiple times by designating the time of translation as “obscure time.” It is a time that displaces us from the apparent meaning of concepts in a certain period by receding toward the otherness of the past and suspending meaning that is already in the future. These two characteristics of obscure time, its receding and suspending nature, not only stand against the continuity of periodizing; they also make visible a politics of translation as an act of disruption of the present wherein the past becomes a reserve of meanings resisting appropriative interpretation.