The Tannenberg myth in history and literature, 1914–1945

ABSTRACT

The Battle of Tannenberg in late August 1914 has been described as the ‘most powerful German myth’ of the First World War. This essay analyses the role of the battle in German collective memory up to the end of the Third Reich. During the war, the victory in East Prussia was celebrated widely and greatly contributed to the personality cult surrounding Paul von Hindenburg. After 1918, Tannenberg served right-wing circles as a political argument against the post-war order, evoked to underscore the notion of German victimhood against Slav ‘encirclement’, the ‘war guilt lie’ and the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. However, it never really captured the attention or imagination of writers and artists. Linked primarily to national-conservative groups and ideals, Tannenberg was also of no major significance in National Socialist propaganda.     

Australia's Economic Ambitions in French New Caledonia, 1945–1955

ABSTRACT

From 1945, consistent with its broader South Pacific ambitions, Australia sought to strengthen its economic position in New Caledonia. The leaders of the European-descended ‘Caledonian’ community wanted economic autonomy for the territory and improved trade with Australia. Yet the opportunity proved illusory. France remained committed to imperial preference and economic dominance. Its revival was underwritten by Marshall Plan aid, including in New Caledonia. Australia failed to provide enough of the coal that appeared to offer economic influence. In the 1950s the Melanesians gained the vote, and the Caledonians lost political power. Conservative governments in Australia showed less interest than their Labor predecessors. Australia would have welcomed an economically autonomous New Caledonia with close Australian links, but this idea clashed with France's centralist and unitary traditions. In the tension between New Caledonia's geography and its history, France had ensured that history won.     

The dynastic triangle in international relations: Modena,England, and France, 1678–85

This article is a case study of how dynastic marriages in the early-modern period were wont to disappoint the participants. In this era, ruling dynasties frequently sought to marry suitable members of their family networks to well-placed clients in other states. These marriages were frequently intended to cement friendship or bind political wounds caused by previous conflicts. In 1673, the marriage between James Stuart, Duke of York, and Maria Beatrice d’Este, sister to the Duke of Modena, was sponsored by Louis XIV, King of France, thus giving rise to what one might term a ‘dynastic triangle’. This article, written from the Este perspective, demonstrates how the Duke of York and the King of France each subsequently failed, on two occasions, to support Francesco II d’Este's geopolitical objectives in northern Italy. For York, and his brother King Charles II, the failure to assist the Duke of Modena was as a result of their political inability to do so. On the other hand, Louis XIV's refusal to help Modena was because of conflicting French objectives in Italy. The negative Este reaction was both an indication of the Italian states’ fear and distrust of France, and a reminder that small states had ambitions and goals which were difficult to attain when not sponsored by a larger power. But these goals were often pursued when such sponsorship appeared likely, and were often unrealistic. The strains in dynastic relationships usually resulted from realisation that certain goals were irreconcilable.     

French–German relations: the Strasbourg–Kehl encounter, 1945–55

German–French relations have proved to be pivotal to the course of modern European history. Recent success, however, has somewhat obscured our memory of the difficult path that has been trod. Directing our attention to Kehl, a small village on the upper Rhine, we can revisit the difficulties inherent in resolving feelings of mutual animosity and longstanding historical problems. Kehl stands for the quest for reconciliation at the local and regional level. In the immediate postwar era, French dreams of continued influence over the Rhine valley would have to be put aside just like German anger over their treatment by the French.     

The atomic meal: The cold war and irradiated foods, 1945–1963

Following World War II, food technologists in the US participated in an Army‐led program to develop food irradiation technology. The program involved over 120 military, government, industrial, and academic institutions. Focusing on the MIT Department of Food Technology, I trace the networks that formed between these groups and their motivations for developing the technology. I argue that food irradiation was Cold War science directed towards the development of a consumer product, and that it highlighted the links between large‐scale military‐funded research and consumers' everyday lives. I suggest that researchers advocated for irradiation not because the technology produced better processed food, but because the development of the technology produced a number of valuable benefits for the researchers. These included increases in funding, materials, and prestige.