The face of the other: Zapatismo,responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction

Recent work has highlighted the importance of moral and ethical issues for geographical inquiries of space and place. Much of this work has been couched in a modernist framework, drawing on universalist conceptions of subjectivity and legal rights in an attempt to ground the normative foundations for ethical conduct. In this paper, I draw upon post‐structuralist theory to elaborate an alternative approach to spatial ethics. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, I outline a theory of subjectivity that would view our relationship to distant others as a form of unconditional responsibility. Our ability to meet this responsibility, I suggest, is dependent upon a deconstructionist ethics which, in recognizing the impossibility of grounding ethical conduct, expands the horizon of political engagement. In the second half of the paper, I interpret the Zapatista movement in Mexico as an example of such an ethics. Through an examination of the writings of Subcomandante Marcos, I argue that the Zapatistas have articulated a new form of ethical and political engagement, one that transcends the boundaries of space and identity, and invokes an unconditional responsibility.     

The post-analytic roots of humanist liberalism

Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire's early engagements with logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy are examined as historical and philosophical reference points for locating an alternative – interpretive and humanist – tradition that developed within analytic philosophy at Oxford in the 20^th C. Berlin and Hampshire's writings show the legacy of an enduring Idealist philosophy, one that nonetheless had to be revised and reinvented against the new empiricist challenges brought on by the rise of analytic philosophy. Berlin and Hampshire rejected idealism's metaphysical pretensions of the Absolute in favor of the new empiricism's insistence on grounding philosophy in experience, but staunchly opposed applying the latter's narrowly ‘scientistic’ view of knowledge to human experience, re-affirming the indivisible connections between epistemological issues and moral and political issues. The idealist themes they expounded are most clearly evident in their arguments for an interpretive philosophy in opposition to the reductivist tendencies of logical positivism, and in their defense of humanist liberalism against the drive of analysis toward naturalism where inquiry into human life is concerned. Such themes include: (i) an anti-naturalist, vitalist, philosophy of human sciences, (ii) an insistence on the intrinsic force and importance of human values against moral relativism, and (iii) the recognition of the political significance of the plurality of human values. As such, Berlin and Hampshire reveal the strong interpretive and humanist ways of reasoning from within the analytic tradition itself. Moreover, these interpretive and humanist themes continue to have strong echoes, this paper argues, in the development of post-analytic political theory in the latter half of the 20^th century through today, as further evinced in the ideas of Bernard Williams (1929–2003) and Charles Taylor (b. 1931). By calling attention to such continuities, this paper reveals how moral and political philosophy in the Anglophone world lay not moribund but continued to develop in the heyday of analytic philosophy from the late ‘30s to the ‘50s and onward, thereby challenging the commonplace of the ‘death’ of normative political theorizing until Rawls reinvigorated it in the ‘70s.     

Italian receptions of Hegel: Epilogue

ABSTRACT

The reconstruction of national receptions of Hegel, and the inflections of his influence through local traditions and international exchanges, remains a fruitful field of investigation. The Anglophone literature has been relatively neglectful of the specific contributions made by Italian readings of Hegel, from his earliest reception onwards. The collection published here builds toward a fuller understanding of Hegel’s diagnosis of the origins and functions of the modern state and the dialectics of modern individuality and freedom, as these issues appear in debates undertaken in the Italian Risorgimento and beyond.     

The beginning of ideology: Consciousness and society in the French reformation

David Lewis presented Convention as an alternative to the conventionalism characteristic of early-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Rudolf Carnap is well known for suggesting the arbitrariness of any particular linguistic convention for engaging in scientific inquiry. Analytic truths are self-consistent, and are not checked against empirical facts to ascertain their veracity. In keeping with the logical positivists before him, Lewis concludes that linguistic communication is conventional. However, despite his firm allegiance to conventions underlying not just languages but also social customs, he pioneered the view that convening need not require any active agreement to participate. Lewis proposed that conventions arise from “an exchange of manifestations of a propensity to conform to a regularity” (87–8).

In reasserting the conventional quality of languages and other practices resting on mutual expectations, Lewis comfortably works within the analytic tradition. Yet he also deviates from his predecessors because his conventionalist approach is comprehensively grounded in instrumentalism. Lewis adopts an extension of David Hume's desire-belief psychology articulated in rational choice theory. He develops his philosophy of convention relying on the highly formal mid-twentieth-century expected utility and game theories. This attempt to account for language and social customs wholly in terms of instrumental rationality has the implication of reducing normativity to preference satisfaction. Lewis’ approach continues in the trend of undermining normative political philosophy because institutions and practices arise spontaneously, without the deliberate involvement of agents. Perhaps Lewis’ Convention is best seen as a resurgent form of analytic philosophy, characterized by “a style of argument, hostility to [ambitious] metaphysics, focus on language, and the dominance of logic and formalization” that solves the dilemma of “combining the analytic inheritance…with normative concerns” by reducing normativity to individuals’ preference fulfillment consistent with the axioms of rational choice.     

The culture of Sofia: At the crossroads of paradox and optimism

NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION FOR CULTURAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL (ACEI) in co‐operation with Northeastern University, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA 8–11 May 1996     

Hegel and the Paradox of Democratic Education

This article explores Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a work on education that responds to two democratic ideals: the ideal of individual integrity, which demands that individuals come to know the principles that animate them of their own accord, and the ideal of collectivism, which demands that individuals be at home in a shared world. While the great political works of Plato and Rousseau fasten on one of these ideals at the expense of the other, I show that Hegel’s political philosophy accepts both. The result is what I call the paradox of democratic education. Hegel solves this paradox through a three-fold pedagogical strategy which speaks to the transformational possibilities of institutions as well as more directly to the needs of the “ironic consciousness.” This strategy reveals a Hegel who calls on us to strengthen our commitment to a democratic polity through a deeper conception of the requirements of democratic education.