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The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?  相似文献   

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In 1961, at the height of the Berlin crisis, the United States and Great Britain simultaneously struggled to adopt effective policies toward the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade. While the John F. Kennedy administration initially adopted a policy of standoffishness toward the conference, the government of Harold Macmillan engaged in a campaign of quietly encouraging moderate attendance. Moderate British expectations led to sound policy, whereas the Kennedy administration's inability to develop a coherent outlook and response cost it a priceless opportunity to understand the emerging phenomenon of nonalignment.  相似文献   

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20世纪30年代经济大萧条背景下,美英法三国的货币政策特别是汇率政策取决于各国如何权衡国内经济恢复和国际汇率稳定.1931年英镑贬值、1933年美元贬值都是美英当局把货币贬值作为刺激总需求和出口的主要手段.金本位制的崩溃和英镑、美元的相继贬值使国际金融和贸易体系处于分割和对立的状态.美国对国内经济恢复的重视、英国对自治领的义务、法国对金本位的固执导致1933年三方货币合作会谈的失败.不过,随着英美两国经济的恢复,特别是希特勒德国加紧重新武装所造成的欧洲紧张局势促使美国决策层积极推动美英法三方货币合作.从货币集团分割和竞争性贬值的"货币战"发展到1936年9月后三国在汇率政策上的"有限合作",这种关系转变不仅是美国决策层"思想进展"的结果,而且是特定国际形势的产物.因此,1936年的美英法<三方货币稳定协议>具有深刻的政治含义.  相似文献   

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Since the 1990s, governments in the United States, France, and the Netherlands have expanded their capacities to police their national borders against immigrants. The paper examines how such efforts have contributed to the growth of centralized policing agencies and the devolution of powers to individualized border enforcers (local police, service providers, nonprofit organizations, etc.). The paper argues that bordering strategies have closed some “holes” in national walls, but they have also introduced countless disagreements, disputes, and resistances by undocumented immigrants, legal permanent residents, national citizens, and frontline border enforcers. Many of these small resistances stay small and do not evolve into large contentious struggles. Others scale up and present more important challenges to government efforts. Rather than simply producing smooth governing machines that sharpen boundaries between the national citizen and the foreign Other, bordering strategies generate waves of small and big struggles that puncture and blur these facile boundaries.  相似文献   

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Feverishly the strikers watched for signs of intervention bythe American and British occupation forces. It was beyond theircomprehension . . . that the nations of the free world withwhom they felt themselves allied, should stand idly by whilethe Soviet Union crushed the rising with its war machine. Insome places rumour had it that American tanks had crossed thezonal border, that American aircraft were to drop weapons.1  相似文献   

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