New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

从货币战到有限合作——1933-1936年美英法三国货币外交

20世纪30年代经济大萧条背景下,美英法三国的货币政策特别是汇率政策取决于各国如何权衡国内经济恢复和国际汇率稳定.1931年英镑贬值、1933年美元贬值都是美英当局把货币贬值作为刺激总需求和出口的主要手段.金本位制的崩溃和英镑、美元的相继贬值使国际金融和贸易体系处于分割和对立的状态.美国对国内经济恢复的重视、英国对自治领的义务、法国对金本位的固执导致1933年三方货币合作会谈的失败.不过,随着英美两国经济的恢复,特别是希特勒德国加紧重新武装所造成的欧洲紧张局势促使美国决策层积极推动美英法三方货币合作.从货币集团分割和竞争性贬值的货币战发展到1936年9月后三国在汇率政策上的有限合作,这种关系转变不仅是美国决策层思想进展的结果,而且是特定国际形势的产物.因此,1936年的美英法<三方货币稳定协议>具有深刻的政治含义.     

Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States, and the East German Uprising of 1953

Feverishly the strikers watched for signs of intervention bythe American and British occupation forces. It was beyond theircomprehension . . . that the nations of the free world withwhom they felt themselves allied, should stand idly by whilethe Soviet Union crushed the rising with its war machine. Insome places rumour had it that American tanks had crossed thezonal border, that American aircraft were to drop weapons.¹     

A solution from hell: the United States and the rise of humanitarian interventionism, 1991-2003

This article traces the rise of humanitarian interventionist ideas in the US from 1991 to 2003. Until 1997, humanitarian intervention was a relatively limited affair, conceived ad hoc more than systematically, prioritized below multilateralism, aiming to relieve suffering without transforming foreign polities. For this reason, US leaders and citizens scarcely contemplated armed intervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994: the US 'duty to stop genocide' was a norm still under development. It flourished only in the late 1990s, when humanitarian interventionism, like neoconservatism, became popular in the US establishment and enthusiastic in urging military invasion to remake societies. Now inaction in Rwanda looked outrageous. Stopping the genocide seemed, in retrospect, easily achieved by 5,000 troops, a projection that ignored serious obstacles. On the whole, humanitarian interventionists tended to understate difficulties of halting ethnic conflict, ignore challenges of postconflict reconstruction, discount constraints imposed by public opinion, and override multilateral procedures. These assumptions primed politicians and the public to regard the Iraq war of 2003 as virtuous at best and unworthy of strenuous dissent at worst. The normative commitment to stop mass killing outstripped US or international capabilities—a formula for dashed hopes and dangerous deployments that lives on in the 'responsibility to protect'.     

日美企业改革的比较分析

制度变迁理论是企业改革的基本理论,本文以这一理论为基础,对日美两国企业制度改革进行比较分析,随着世界经济环境、国内经济状态、企业经营状态以及经济思潮等因素的变化,日美两国先后开始对国内企业制度进行改革。这种改革涉及企业所有制、企业雇用制度等方面。日美两国企业制度改革有不同的特点,并在企业制度的具体形式、企业劳动生产率、企业国际地位、国民经济增长率和国民收入分配等方面有不同的绩效表现。