'More carrot than stick', British Economic Warfare and Spain, 1941-1944

During the Second World War, economic factors became a centralaspect of Spain's relations to both Britain and Nazi Germany.In 1940, when the Franco regime was on the brink of joiningthe war on the side of the Axis, Britain tried to use Spain’sdependence on imports from the west to convince Franco to retainhis country's neutrality. Although, at the time, British ‘economicappeasement’ was not a major factor in the failure ofGerman-Spanish negotiations, it contributed to Spain's verygradual detachment from Nazi Germany over subsequent years.Between1941 and 1944, the focus of British policy towards Spain movedfrom keeping the country out of the war to restricting the servicesSpain rendered to the German war economy. Franco's sympathiesfor the Nazi regime and the economic and financial benefitsof continuing trade with Germany made British and US economicwarfare activities however only a partial success.     

Deutsch als Weltsprache? Franz Thierfelder, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich and the Promotion of the German Language Abroad, 1923-1945

The Deutsche Akademie (DA) in Munich was founded in the contextof a general upsurge in cultural diplomacy in Germany afterthe First World War and it was the precursor of today's GoetheInstitute. After a difficult start, by the early 1930s the DAhad become the leading institution in the promotion of the Germanlanguage abroad. The emergence of the DA's language policy wasclosely intertwined with the general development of German culturaldiplomacy, which was largely financed by the AuswärtigesAmt but executed by private associations. It was also influencedby the discussions in the 1920s about the role of language inshaping German national identity, by contemporary developmentsin German linguistics and language teaching, and by the discourseof the socalled ‘conservative revolution’. FranzThierfelder, secretary-general of the DA, managed to forge thesedevelopments into a coherent argument as to why Germany shouldintensify its language policy, centre it around the DA, anddirect it mainly towards the Balkan countries. The languagepolicy of the DA remained largely undisturbed by the Nazi seizureof power until the outbreak of war, even though the emphasiswas now on race rather than language as the determining factorin German national identity. The reason for this was, firstly,that the cultural diplomacy of the Auswärtiges Amt andits private institutions such as the DA continued to be dominatedfor some time by non-Nazis and, secondly, that Germany's culturaldiplomacy was dictated more by the constraints and dynamicsof international politics and by economic necessities than byideology. It was only after the outbreak of war that the expansionof the DA's language programme became closely linked to theracially motivated ‘new order’ for a Europe underNazi rule.     

A Duty to Forget? The 'Hitler Youth Generation' and the Transition from Nazism to Communism in Postwar East Germany, c. 1945-49

In Soviet-occupied East Germany during the mid- to late 1940s,a remarkable but scarcely remarked-upon transition took place.Hundreds of thousands of young Germans who had previously beenmembers of the Nazi youth organizations, the Hitler Youth (HJ)and the League of German Girls (BDM) flocked to join the Communist-ledFree German Youth (FDJ), a unisex ‘united youth organization’founded under Soviet auspices in March 1946. This paper examinesthe experiences of this ‘twice betrayed’ generation,whose members rapidly—though with varying degrees of enthusiasm—switchedallegiance from Nazism to Communism after the Second World Warand ultimately exchanged life in one authoritarian youth organizationfor life in another. Drawing on archival and interview material,it first seeks to outline Communist attitudes towards denazificationamong the young in the postwar period, before going on to examinefrom a grass-roots perspective the experiences, motivations,and attitudes of those who exchanged their HJ or BDM membershipbooks for those of the FDJ. Despite, or perhaps because of,East Germany's strongly-espoused and rigidly dogmatic ‘anti-fascism’,open discussion of the Nazi past was—for a variety ofreasons—taboo during the immediate postwar period, particularlyamong the young. This paper concludes by discussing the reasonsbehind this ‘pact of silence’ between the Communistsand the ‘Hitler Youth generation’—and howit impacted upon subsequent generations of young people ‘borninto socialism’.     

Relegating Nazism to the Past: Expressions of German Guilt in 1945 and Beyond

This article builds on a research thesis that confronting moralfeelings is essential to an understanding of the catastrophicpolitical success of Nazism in Germany and the way Germany developedafter its defeat in 1945. This research into a ‘moralhistory’ of Nazi Germany and its postwar echoes is carriedout through an interdisciplinary approach that, in essence,combines historical with philosophical analysis. In the immediatepostwar period, Germany continued to be stamped by discussionscentred on moral guilt arising from its Nazi past and from theHolocaust in particular. The article analyses the differentways this guilt was discussed in 1945 and how these discussionsechoed what can be described as a form of Nazi morality. Thearticle uses three main sources to explore these issues: first,the writings and interrogations with the Nazi lawyer and Governor-Generalof Nazi-occupied Poland, Hans Frank; second, the memoirs ofHitler's secretary Traudl Junge; and third, the essay The Questionof German Guilt by Karl Jaspers.     

Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s

Leo Amery has long been seen as one of the leading figures inthe anti-appeasement movement. However, key aspects of his caseagainst government foreign policy are not addressed in previouswork. This article considers Amery's reputation pointing outthat it is problematic to characterize him as an ‘anti-appeaser’because he did not rule out concessions to Germany and was willingto see Germany dominate Central Europe. However, he differedfrom the government in advocating a Danubian economic bloc tocreate stability and satisfy some German desires. This flowedfrom Amery's imperialism and his economic nationalism. Meanwhile,he fervently opposed colonial concessions, believing that Germangrievances could only be satisfied in Europe. Considering whetherAmery was an ‘anti-appeaser’ or a ‘real appeaser’,the article analyses Amery's doubts over whether to supportNeville Chamberlain over the Munich agreement. It concludesthat although Amery disagreed with Chamberlain more on tacticsthan strategy, these alternative tactics were significantlydifferent from government policy. As such, aspects of the anti-appeasementcase should be seen as being more nuanced than previously recognized,and the imperialist dimension of it should be understood.     

'For a Genuine and Noble Nakedness'? German Naturism in the Third Reich

This essay, based on primary sources from the privately-runInternationale FKK-Bibliothek and a growing body of secondaryliterature, examines some of the myths and misconceptions regardingthe fate of naturism in the Third Reich. It shows that despiteGoering's decree of 3 March 1933, which described the ‘nakedculture movement’ as ‘one of the greatest dangersfor German culture and morality’, naturism did not cometo an abrupt halt after the Machtergreifung. While officialhistories of German naturism talk proudly of the movement's‘persecution’ and ‘non-violent resistance’,there was little concerted effort to close down naturist associationsor to arrest individual activists. In fact, without a definitiveorder from the Führer, Germany's naturists existed in asemi-legal limbo for much of the 1930s. Many National Socialistsregarded the clothes-free lifestyle with contempt, but therewere elements within the Nazi state—and particularly theSS—which could see significant benefits from celebrating‘the instinct for bodily nobility and its beauty in ourVolk’. A mutual desire to de-eroticize nudity helped cementthe bond between Heydrich, Himmler and naturist leaders. Asa result, German Freikörperkultur passed some of its mostimportant landmarks in the years of Nazi rule, including itsvery first book with photographs in full colour, a full-lengthfeature film, and a new, more permissive Bathing Law. Thus whileGeorge Mosse's Nationalism and Sexuality claims the Nazis ‘forbadenudism after their accession to power’, a closer examinationof the fate of naturism after 1933 reveals a more complex picture,which serves to highlight not only the limits of the régime'stotalitarian aspirations, but also the naturist movement's owndisparate and problematic heritage.     

Pictures of Atrocity: Public Discussion of Der gelbe Stern in Early 1960s West Germany

This article discusses Der gelbe Stern by Gerhard Schoenberner,a book of Holocaust photodocumentation appearing in West Germanyin 1960, and analyses its reception in the contemporary WestGerman press. Both the work and its public discussion are placedin context of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (‘comingto terms with the past’) and of what historian Habbo Knochhas termed ‘the return of the pictures’, in otherwords, atrocity pictures of the kind that the Allies forcedGermans to see right after the war, that Germans tended to shunthereafter, but that came back into public view in the late1950s. The reception of Schoenberner's book included reviewsfrom a wide range of West German newspapers and magazines. Thesereviews were overwhelmingly favourable and in considerable agreementon the book's importance. There was consensus that its pictureswould stir viewers emotionally and lead them to ‘the truth’about the Third Reich and its crime against the Jews. In addition,there were moral, historical and political reflections, includinga discussion of German ‘guilt’ concerned not onlywith specific crimes but with the general acquiescence of Germansociety in persecution of Jews in the 1930s. There was alsoappreciation of the role of pictures in conveying historicalunderstanding and, it was hoped, in educating West German youth.In addition, some reviewers considered Der gelbe Stern to bea prod to greater public discussion and thus to an enlargementof democratic culture. There was a marked reticence in the reviewsto indicate that awareness generated by this book would contributeto public outcry against the employment of men with a Nazi pastas high officials of the Federal Republic, or to defend Schoenberneragainst the charge that was sure to come from the Right: sincesome of his photos were from Communist Eastern Europe they wereof dubious origin and no doubt part of a plot to distract theWest from the fight against Communism. It is suggested thatsilence on either issue would have had the effect of keepingreaders focused on the pictures and their moral, historicaland democratic implications.     

French public attitudes towards the prospect of war in 1938 1939: 'pacifism' or 'war anxiety'?

This article challenges the received wisdom that French publicopinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930sand that this sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeatof 1940. It will suggest that French public attitudes towardsthe prospect of war can be better defined as ‘war anxiety’rather than the value-laden term ‘pacifism’. Takingas a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a yearlater, the article will tease out the necessary distinctionbetween ‘pacifism’ and war anxiety. By employinga notion of ‘representations’ of public opinion,it will be shown how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifistthan many existing analyses assume. Instead, it will be contendedthat the public's anxieties with regard to a future war manifestedthemselves in a variety of ways, of which pacifism was merelyone example. Indeed, war anxiety increasingly demanded thatFrance prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark contrastto simply retreating into a defeatist mindset. War anxiety wasfar from being a contributing factor in the defeat of 1940.     

Foreign banks' attraction to the financial centre Frankfurt--an inverted 'U'-shaped relationship

This article traces the location of foreign banks in Germanyfrom 1949 to 2006. As suggested by New Economic Geography models,we find an inverted ‘U’-shaped concentration offoreign banks in Germany. Only after a competition between severalcities, Frankfurt has emerged as the pre-eminent financial centre,triggered by the ‘historical event’ of setting upthe German central bank in Frankfurt. After a strong increase,Frankfurt's share in the location of foreign banks in Germanydecreases slowly but significantly since the mid-1980s. We concludethat there will be a lesser role in Europe for second-tier financialcentres in the future.     

The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy

The debate on the ‘primacy of foreign policy’, whichraged throughout the 1960s and 1970s, has long since peteredout. The introductory chapter to this collection of new studiesin the primacy of foreign policy in German history begins bysummarizing its main tenets, and tries to sketch the historiographicalbackground in broad outline. It notes that the primacy of foreignpolicy was neither completely unchallenged before about 1960,nor totally eclipsed by 1980. More importantly, this chapterdraws attention to the remarkable renaissance which the primacyof foreign policy has enjoyed, objectively if not always subjectively,over the past decade. The result has been to put the state,and especially the struggle between states, back at the centreof historical attention. Finally, the chapter stresses the thematic,geographical, methodological and chronological diversity ofthe four path breaking case studies which make up this specialissue. These range from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentiethcenturies, and they illuminate the primacy of foreign policyfrom the perspective of Vienna as well as Berlin, from the civil-militaryas well as the individual state perspective. The result, itis hoped, is an enhanced sense of the importance of the primacyof foreign policy in German history based on original research.     

Innovative Trends in Women's and Gender Studies of the National Socialist Era

The text is less a review of the new literature than a reflectionon significant and innovative current trends in the historiographyon women and gender in the National Socialist era. The firstpart deals with various women's activities within milieus andprofessions, including their room for manoeuvre: midwives, socialworkers, female Nazi functionaries, and female auxiliary workersof the Nazi Wehrmacht. The second part of the article addressesspecific features of biopolitics, targeted not only againstJews but also against asocial women, homosexuals and prostitutes.It also looks at visual images of bodies. Although the Nazistried to create strongly determined binaries to categorize ‘we’and ‘the others’ in the arts and other propagandamaterial, there existed, in fact, a broad spectrum of body images,especially among media stars. A third trend in the history ofthe Third Reich deals not only with the politics of exclusionbut also of inclusion, as found in the concept of Volksgemeinschaft(national community), a concept that had many facets, such asthe Volksfamilie, comradeship and home front. And it was themedia that had the task of ‘translating’ this conceptto the people in many appealing ways. The fourth part considersthe gendering of memories after 1945 and the dominance of malenarratives and points of view. The four parts of the articleare intended to contribute to intersectional history and thehistory of social engineering.     

Indicting Auschwitz? The Paradox of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial

During the late 1950s, the German authorities in the publicprosecutor's office of the state of Hesse in Frankfurt beganto organize what would become the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial1963–5 of twenty people alleged to have been responsiblefor some of the worst crimes at the Auschwitz concentrationcamp. The trial opened with a seven-hundred-page indictment,an extraordinary document that included the testimony of twohundred and fifty-two witnesses (both survivors and former SSofficers) and a two-hundred-page history of the camp writtenby experts. In the mind of its principal organizer, the trialwas to put the entire ‘Auschwitz Complex’ beforethe court. This concept, ‘Auschwitz on trial’, isat the core of German public confrontation with the Nazi pastin the 1960s. But legal constraints, I argue, created the paradoxical situationin which the prosecution initially attempted to put Auschwitzon trial, but instead had to use some of the conventions ofthe Nazi regime in order to show the personal initiative ofthe defendants and convict them of perpetrating murder. By elucidatingthe origins and exigencies of the West German penal code, andby examining both the historical background section and thecharges against the suspects in the 1963 indictment, I showthat the decision to use the German penal code for prosecutingNazi crimes created a paradoxical situation for the state attorney'soffice in Frankfurt: they had to use Nazi orders and regulationsto show that the defendants had acted above and beyond the ordersof the SS in Berlin.     

Stirring Resistance from Moscow: The German Communists of Czechoslovakia and Wireless Propaganda in the Sudetenland, 1941-1945

This is a study of the radio propaganda campaign targeted atthe Sudetenland from the USSR from November 1941 to May 1945.Under the supervision of the Czechoslovak communist party andthe Comintern, the broadcasts were composed and conducted bySudeten German communists stationed first in Ufa and then inMoscow. At first, on the basis of limited information, theystrove simply to divide Sudeten Germans at home from the Nazirégime. But from May 1942 they stepped up their appealfor active resistance alongside that of their Czech ‘brothers’in the Protectorate. Through 1943 the appeal remained positive,assuring all German anti-fascists that they would be secureand treated equally in a future Czechoslovak state. By 1944,however, the message subtly altered in tune with Moscow's decisionto expel most Sudeten Germans. The broadcasts failed to spellthis out, but tried to warn their listeners of what might happenif they did not resist. In reality, though many in the Sudetenlandwere disillusioned with Nazism, the level of active resistanceseems to have been small and the broadcasts probably had a minimaleffect. Nevertheless, they alarmed the Nazi authorities andsome of the propaganda arguments certainly matched the growinganxieties of many Sudeten Germans. By 1944 the Sudeten communistbroadcasters themselves were divided over what tone to adopt.Some still felt a certain Sudeten allegiance and vainly resisteda policy line based on presumed Sudeten ‘collective guilt’.The majority bowed before the official, more critical line,accepting that most Sudeten Germans would be expelled afterthe war. The article seeks for the first time to probe the mindsetof Sudeten German communists, and to set this alongside thatof their target audience in the wartime Sudetenland.     

A Balancing Act: Domestic Pressures and International Systemic Constraints in the Foreign Policies of the Great Powers, 1848-1851

During the revolutions of 1848 and their aftermath, the governmentsof France, Austria and Prussia, respectively, were exposed toextraordinary pressure from a variety of nationalist movementswith fundamentally different agendas. They had difficult choicesto make as to whether they let their foreign policies be determinedby domestic concerns or heed the rules of the internationalsystem—it was hardly possible to do both. As a resultthey performed a ‘balancing act’ on a tight rope:a wrong step could cause their fall, either because they wouldbe overthrown by their own people, or they would risk war withother Great Powers. Those not affected by a revolution in 1848,i.e. conservative Russia and progressive Britain, had to opteither for backing countries with political tendencies similarto their own, or for simply upholding the balance of power andinternational rules. The author concludes that the ‘primacyof foreign policy’—within this context more preciselythe primacy of the international system's rules and the balanceof power—helps to understand the actual foreign policiesof four of the five Great Powers during the European crisisof 1848–51. Austria's government, the one country tryingto overthrow the balance of power and change the nature of thesystem, was effectively checked. The rules of the post-1815international system were still an efficacious tool for discipliningstates.     

No Hammock for the Idle: The Conservative Party, 'Youth' and the Welfare State in the 1960s

The postwar ‘baby boom’ focused unprecedented attentionon young people in Britain and made ‘youth’ a newand increasingly worrying category of both social and politicalidentity. Belief in the uniqueness of postwar youth was widelyshared among political parties but it caused particular anxietyfor the Conservatives who feared that young people in the 1960swere shaped by values that predisposed them to socialism, notconservatism. This article traces the Conservative party's interactionwith ‘youth’ through an examination of the policy-makingefforts of the Young Conservatives (YCs) organization. Afterthe 1959 election, the Conservative party was anxious to retainthe support of younger voters and saw the YCs as a vehicle topublicize its commitment to them. Departing from the YCs’long-standing emphasis on social activities, the party establisheda Policy Group Scheme to integrate younger members into policy-makingand encourage a ‘youth’ perspective on key policyareas such as the welfare state. However, in 1966, the PolicyGroup Scheme ended as it became clear that young people's loyaltyto the main party was not conditional upon participation inpolicy-making and the YCs’ model of postwar conservatismdiffered very little from that of older Conservatives. Thisanalysis of grassroots discussion of the welfare state thusestablishes the limits of a distinctive ‘youth’perspective on major issues in modern conservatism such as individualfreedom and the role of the state, and contributes to recentdiscussions of the role of age and demographic structure inpostwar Britain.     

Charismatic Legitimation and Bureaucratic Rule: The NSDAP in the Third Reich, 1933-1945

This article deals with the history of the Nazi Party's officeof the Deputy Führer, Rudolf Heß, which after Heß'sflight on 10 May 1941 was renamed the Party Chancellery andled by Martin Bormann. It evaluates the structures and functionsof this important party office which had the exclusive rightto control government legislation. The Deputy Führer'sstaff was established before 1935/36. It consisted of severaloffices which influenced nearly all processes of legislationand tried to introduce Nazi ideology into all sectors of Germansociety. This was done by corresponding intensively with ministerialbureaucracy. Although the staff of the Deputy Führer andof the Party Chancellery acted in a very bureaucratic manner,the article argues that Max Weber's concept of ‘bureaucraticrule’ is not appropriate for analysing the radicalizationof the Nazi régime throughout the Second World War becausethis Weberian ideal type tends to neglect social practices.The same is true for Weber's concept of ‘charismatic rule’which only offers fruitful insights into the social relationsbetween Hitler and his followers.     

Not Just a 'Dating Game': Origins of the Holocaust at Auschwitz in the Light of Witness Testimony

Historians now view Auschwitz as marginal to the origins ofthe Holocaust. In a surprising volte-face from a generationago, Historians now accept what can be called a ‘transformationnarrative’. That is, most accounts cast Auschwitz, notas first mover, but as late comer to the destruction of theEuropean Jews. This fits a much larger historiographical movementattributing the Final Solution to a local initiative withina disorganized, even ‘debureaucratized’ German state.Once again, this departs completely from, say, Raul Hilbergor Hannah Arendt, who defined the Holocaust as a crime uniqueto modern, organized society. Thus, in the case of Auschwitz,what some have come to ridicule as the ‘dating game’—thealmost obsessive attempt to identify a precise microchronologyof the final solution—has larger implications. It cutsto the heart of whether we see the Holocaust as a crime of amodern, dynamic industrial state or as a haphazard initiative. This article uses testimony from the three most relevant professionalgroups that built the genocidal factories of Auschwitz to reassessthe current consensus. Contrary to the ‘transformationnarrative’, little evidence supports the argument thatthe SS and its independent contractors were somehow divorcedfrom efforts to mechanize genocide from Minsk to Lublin to Oswiecimin the autumn of 1941. The testimony as a whole—drawnfrom civilian managers, SS architects, and prisoner-engineers—leaveslittle doubt that the new crematoria of Birkenau were intendedfrom the beginning (that is, from October 1941) as gas chambers.The ‘transformation narrative’, ironically enough,finds support in only one account: the internally contradictoryand almost desperate testimony given by one former SS architectat his own trial. To put a fine point on it, the ‘transformationnarrative’ hews most closely to a dubious defence narrativegiven by a perpetrator, in which neither his lawyers nor hisfellow defendants placed much credence.     

Richard Crossman, Harold Wilson and devolution, 1966-70: the making of government policy

This article expands our understanding of devolution, the Britishconstitution, the Wilson government of 1966–70 and thecareers and attitudes of Richard Crossman and Harold Wilson.It shows that devolution was debated not as a simply ‘Celtic’affair, but as part of a long-standing Labour concern with reformingthe ‘machinery of government’. This interest—expressedby Crossman amongst others—became submerged by other eventsand pressures. Perceived nationalist successes and the conflictingaims of (divided) Labour parties in Scotland and Wales pushedout Crossman's little-studied desire to replace ‘nationaldevolution’ with regional devolution across the UK. Wilsonadopted the delaying tactic of a Royal Commission on the Constitution.Using a wide range of private, governmental and Labour sourcesfrom across the UK, the article shows the interchange of policydebate between London and the ‘Celtic fringe’. Inthe process, the article reveals both national tensions anda commitment to Britishness, stemming from shared policy interestsand also from wider cultural influences.     

'Is he still alive, or long since dead?': Loss, Absence and Remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945-1956

This article uses the search for the ‘missing’ Wehrmachtsoldiers in the 1950s as a prism through which to explore theways in which we might insert the notion of trauma into ourunderstanding of West Germany's status as a postwar society.In seeking to point out the connections between the ways inwhich ‘ordinary Germans’ suffered during and afterthe war on the one hand, and the inability of post-war WestGerman society to ‘confront’ the crimes of the paston the other, it argues that the traumatizing impact of warhas to be considered alongside the ideological and politicalnecessities of the Cold War and reconstruction if we are tounderstand why West German society failed to place the Holocaustat the centre of its memorial culture in the immediate post-waryears. Moreover, in pointing to the Lutheran church as a keysite of memorial politics in the post-war era, it argues forthe integration of a study of religious narratives, mentalitiesand discourses into an understanding of the evolution of thecommemorative practices of the 1950s which has hitherto beenshaped by an excessively one-sided focus on secular sites andnarratives.