‘A strong and prosperous condition’ — the geography of state building and social reform in Peter the Great's Russia

The point is often made that the rise of the modern state in Europe provided models which have been influential, if not actually copied, across much of the rest of the world. In Russia during the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725), not only was the tsar aware of the European experience of state building, but consciously strove to base many of his political and social reforms on European models. Peter aimed at sweeping reform of the Russian state and society in the attempt to bring them into the modern world. The paper argues that the reforms were necessarily geographical, involving an attempt radically to reconstruct the country's economic and social geography. The focus is upon the spatial implications of reform, including the founding and development of the city of St. Petersburg as an experiment in social reconstruction. In the event, Peter's success was only partial, and the end product quite different from the models which had influenced his reforms. It is argued that this relative failure derived not only from the widespread resistance to reform but also from geographical, social and cultural circumstances peculiar to Russia. Greater scholarly sensitivity to the social and cultural contexts in which state building occurs might stimulate more cross-cultural and comparative perspectives and enrich this important area of social theory.     

Russia's Europe, 1991–2016: inferiority to superiority

Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia's superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great‐Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about‐turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken.     

Chinese Objects in Eurasian Empire: On the Cultural Meaning of Chinese Art in Russia in the Late 17th–Early 18th Centuries

This article examines special features of “Chinoiserie” or “Chinese fashion” (“Kitaischina”) in Russia from the late 17th to the early 18th century: The reign of Peter the First. It discusses this cultural phenomenon’s historical origins, demonstrates the role of Chinese luxury goods and art objects in the era’s Russo-Chinese cultural exchange, and illustrates how Chinese decorative arts were used in Russian palaces. While Chinoiserie in Russia was influenced by similar trends in Western Europe, it was rooted in the unique history of regular contacts between Russia and the Qing Empire. Chinese objects not only appeared as commodities in the higher levels of Russian society, they also contributed to the prestige of the Russian state. Peter the First had a political purpose behind the collection, display and imitation of Chinese art objects in Russian palaces, as these practices demonstrated the growing wealth and power of newly established Russian Empire, which enjoyed trade connections with the Qing Empire. While contemporary perceptions of China in Russia were derived mostly by the exotic images of export art, ethnographic collections of genuine Chinese utensils, which were founded during that period, also contributed to Russian views of China. This research uses a comprehensive methodology, combining studies of material objects preserved in Russian museums and written sources, including archival records.     

重新认识金融资本形成和资本输出的时间

本文批评了把商业资本主义、工业资本主义和金融资本主义作为资本主义发展循序渐进的三个阶段而不是资本主义三种形态的错误认识。通过翔实的经济史资料,本文说明随着欧洲大规模跨国商业和早期银行家的出现,金融资本和资本投资就随之出现。在近代资本主义的扩张中,资本输出很早就已开始,在英国,早在19世纪20年代,资本输出额就超过了商品输出额。     

Global multipolarity,European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future,once again

The international system is returning to multipolarity—a situation of multiple Great Powers—drawing the post‐Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ of comprehensive US political, economic and military dominance to an end. The rise of new Great Powers, namely the ‘BRICs’—Brazil, Russia, India, and most importantly, China—and the return of multipolarity at the global level in turn carries security implications for western Europe. While peaceful political relations within the European Union have attained a remarkable level of strategic, institutional and normative embeddedness, there are five factors associated with a return of Great Power competition in the wider world that may negatively impact on the western European strategic environment: the resurgence of an increasingly belligerent Russia; the erosion of the US military commitment to Europe; the risk of international military crises with the potential to embroil European states; the elevated incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons; and the vulnerability of economically vital European sea lines and supply chains. These five factors must, in turn, be reflected in European states’ strategic behaviour. In particular, for the United Kingdom—one of western Europe's two principal military powers, and its only insular (offshore) power—the return of Great Power competition at the global level suggests that a return to offshore balancing would be a more appropriate choice than an ongoing commitment to direct military interventions of the kind that have characterized post‐2001 British strategy.     

Slavic,European, or Asiatic? F. H. Duchinski on the Origins of the Russian People

The emergence of Russia as a dominant force in Europe from the early nineteenth century onward was characterized by growing tensions between Russians and Poles as seen in the recurring Russian suppression of Polish uprisings. F. H. Duchinski (1817–93) who, like other Polish intellectuals, tried to uncover the root causes of these political tensions, concluded that Russians were neither Slavic nor European, but Asians, and it was this fact alone, he believed, that accounted for the continuing Russian hostility toward the Poles.     

Excerpts from Tables of Contents of other Translation Journals

The Russian conquest of Siberia was one of the great feats of history, bringing almost one-tenth of the landmass of the world under the control of the Russian Empire. This paper proposes a framework for examining the role of Siberia in the development of the Russian state and the evolution of the world economy from the sixteenth to early twentieth century. This study supports the contention that, rather than representing an interesting aside in the annals of European imperialism, Russian colonization of Siberia was not only affected by European colonialism and the European-based capitalist world economy, but, in fact, was part of it Moreover, the conquest and consolidation of Siberia is viewed as a “series of changing geographies,” over space and time, as it was affected by and in turn affected the rise of Russian nationalism and the development of European capitalism. The three-part framework for analysis suggested in this study employs (1) a world-systems model, (2) a multi-disciplinary approach, and (3) cross-cultural comparison.     

European influence on Russian neurology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

In this study we consider the development of clinical neurology in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries focusing on European influence on Russian medicine. Russian physicians readily accepted newly described clinical signs, theories, and classification of nervous diseases designed in Europe. This influence initiated neurology's separation from general medicine and its transformation into a new clinical discipline. In Russia this happened already in the 1860s, decades before the similar trend in Europe. The Russian example is nearly unknown in the general history of neurology. It illustrates the relationships between physiology and practical neurology at the moment of establishment of the new discipline. It also shows that the Russian physicians of the time readily accepted European medical knowledge putting it immediately into medical practice and education.     

The Russian navy as Chartmaker in the eighteenth century

Abstract

The modern period of chart making in Russia began in the reign of Peter the Great. Peter created the country's navy, which became the main focus for cartography in the eighteenth century. In this paper the multi‐faceted duties of naval officers in the charting and mapping of seas, rivers, forest resources and other features important for ship building and the development of navigation, and essential to Russia's geo‐political interests, are considered. The history of the early stages of specialized naval education and the training of surveyors at the Moscow Mathematical‐Navigational School (from 1701) and the St Petersburg Naval Academy (from 1715) are outlined, and the first surveys in the Baltic and Caspian seas are described. Finally, special attention is paid to the hydrographical surveys and charting of the Aegean Sea during the Russian‐Turkish war of 1768–1774, the sources and methods involved, and the little‐known Atlas of the Archipelago (1788) which was created from the surveys.     

Russia,China, and the universalism of modernity: the “Account of the Reforms of Peter the Great” by Kang Youwei

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes a short essay by Kang Youwei (1858–1927) – one of the intellectual and political protagonists of late imperial and early Republican China. In it, he interpreted the historical experience of Russian modernization under Peter the Great (1672–1725) and used it as a “success story” for the renewal of Chinese monarchical institutions. It was written in 1898 and presented to the Manchu throne under the title “Account of the Reforms of Peter the Great”, and for our purposes will be the departing point for a “global intellectual circuit” through which the following questions will be addressed: Why was seventeenth and eighteenth century Russia considered as a model for China by the author? How did he manage to adapt the historical experience of Russia into a social and political conceptual framework for China? What was Kang’s historiographical method, and what kind of philosophy of history framed his reflections? What does this short essay tell us about Kang’s view on “Westernization”, on the concept of “modernity” itself, and on its use for historiographical purposes?     

Rousseau,Diderot and the Spirit of Catherine the Great's Reforms

In the Social Contract, Rousseau predicted that Europe would experience a cycle of increasingly intense wars, culminating in invasion from the east: first, Russia would conquer Europe's exhausted and war-torn states; then, Russia would itself become overextended and Europe would ultimately be overrun by the Tartars. The future of the modern state would be a version of the fall of Rome. The present essay provides an explanation of why Rousseau held such apocalyptic views by placing them in the context of projects to reform Europe's political economy in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In 1767, when Catherine the Great was planning a major revision of the Russian legal code, she outlined her goals in a manifesto called the Grand Instruction, key sections of which were derived from Montesquieu's analysis of depopulation of the countryside caused by uncontrolled industrialisation. The Grand Instruction became the subject of a critical exchange between the Physiocrat Le Trosne and Diderot, who, drawing upon Rousseau, was by turns both sympathetic to and sceptical of Physiocracy. This discourse reveals a triangular debate about the possibility of stabilising the international order by imposing a balance between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of Europe's rapidly growing economies.     

Book reviews

Books reviewed in this issue. International Relations theory The evolution of International Security Studies. By Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen. International law and organization Escaping the self‐determination trap. By Marc Weller. Punishment, justice and international relations: ethics and order after the Cold War. By Anthony F. Lang Jr. Foreign policy Perceptions and policy in transatlantic relations: prospective visions from the US and Europe. Edited by Natividad Fernández Sola and Michael Smith. Avoiding trivia: the role of strategic planning in American foreign policy. Edited by Daniel W. Drezner. India and the United States in the 21st century: reinventing partnership. By Teresita C. Schaffer. Conflict, security and armed forces The new counterinsurgency era: transforming the US military for modern wars. By David H. Ucko. Under a mushroom cloud: Europe, Iran and the bomb. By Emanuele Ottolenghi. Old and new terrorism: late modernity, globalization and the transformation of political violence. By Peter R. Neumann. Terrorism: how to respond. By Richard English. The de‐radicalization of jihadists: transforming armed Islamist movements. By Omar Ashour. Crime, war and global trafficking: designing international cooperation. By Christine Jojarth. Security and the war on terror. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy, Roland Bleiker, Sara E. Davies and Richard Devetak. Politics, democracy and social affairs Facts are subversive: political writings from a decade without a name. By Timothy Garton Ash. Political economy, economics and development A failure of capitalism: the crisis of ′08 and the descent into depression. By Richard A. Posner. The future of the dollar. Edited by Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner. Discipline in the global economy? International finance and the end of liberalism. By Jakob Vestergaard. Ethnicity and cultural politics The crisis of Islamic civilization. By Ali A. Allawi. Islam and the secular state: negotiating the future of shari'a. By Abdullahi Ahmed an‐Na'im. The fall and rise of the Islamic state. By Noah Feldman. Energy and environment Emerging global scarcities and power shifts. Edited by Bernard Berendsen. China and the energy equation in Asia: the determinants of policy choice. By Jean A. Garrison. History The rise and fall of communism. By Archie Brown. The great Cold War: a journey through the hall of mirrors. By Gordon S. Barrass. Europe Europe old and new: transnationalism, belonging, xenophobia. By Ray Taras. Farmers on welfare: the making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy. By Ann‐Christina L. Knudsen. European security governance: the European Union in a Westphalian world. Edited by Charlotte Wagnsson, James A. Sperling and Jan Hallenberg. Russia and Eurasia Russian Eurasianism: an ideology of empire. By Marlène Laruelle. Russian nationalism and the national reassertion of Russia. Edited by Marlène Laruelle. Middle East and North Africa Defeat: why they lost Iraq. By Jonathan Steele. Guardians of the revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs. By Ray Takeyh. Sub‐Saharan Africa China's new role in Africa. By Ian Taylor. China's African challenges. By Sarah Raines. Asia and Pacific Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian regionalism. By Amitav Acharya. Challenges to Chinese foreign policy: diplomacy, globalisation and the next world power. Edited by Yufan Hao, C. X. George Wei and Lowell Dittmer. Chinese security policy: structure, power and politics. By Robert R. Ross. North America Renegade: the making of Barack Obama. By Richard Wolffe. Latin America and Caribbean Cuban medical internationalism: origins, evolution, and goals. By John M. Kirk and H. Michael Erisman. Brazil as an economic superpower? Understanding Brazil's changing role in the global economy. Edited by Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez‐Diaz.     

Quantifying scarcity: deforestation in the Upper Volga region and early debates over climate change in nineteenth-century Russia

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the early history of environmental concerns in Russia. It focuses on a case study: the debates about a potentially detrimental impact of deforestation on water regimes, which took place in the 1830s–40s. It examines two sets of issues: the role of ideas about a growing scarcity of forest resources in Europe; and the actual state of forests in Russia that provided some evidentiary basis for these debates. It argues that these debates were possible at the convergence of several trends: an expanding role and objectives of the forest administration well-versed in European scientific debates of the age and at the same time a visible danger of deforestation in some regions of a strategic significance to the empire. The author also considers different expert cultures and evidentiary standards that could be observed during the debates.     

The narratives of exclusion and self-exclusion in the Russian conflict discourse on EU–Russian Relations

The article focuses on the interplay of the narratives of ‘exclusion’ and ‘self-exclusion’ in the Russian discourse on EU–Russian relations. Since the late 1990s, this discourse has acquired an increasingly conflictual orientation, whereby the official foreign policy objectives of ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU and Russia's ‘integration with Europe’ are increasingly problematised across the entire Russian political spectrum. In the analysis of the Russian conflict discourse we shall identify two at first glance opposed narratives. Firstly, the EU enlargement has raised the issue of the expansion of the Schengen visa regime for Russian citizens, travelling to Europe. Particularly acute with regard to Kaliningrad Oblast', this issue has also generated a wider identity-related discourse on the EU's exclusionary policies towards Russia. Secondly, the perception of Russia's passive or subordinate status in EU–Russian cooperative arrangements at national, regional and local levels resulted in the problematisation of the insufficiently reciprocal or intersubjective nature of the EU–Russian ‘partnership’ and the increasing tendency towards Russia's ‘self-exclusion’ from integrative processes, grounded in the reaffirmation of state sovereignty that generally characterises the Putin presidency. This article concludes with the interpretation of the two conflict narratives in the wider context of debates around the project of European integration.     

Asserting Europe's technological sovereignty amid American platform finance: Countering financial sector dependence on Big Tech?

Spearheaded by major technology companies (Big Tech), digital platforms have rapidly become key infrastructures for accumulation under global financialized capitalism, with consumer convenience and underlying practices of data collection, control and analysis giving rise to platform finance. While financial institutions are partnering with financial technology (FinTech) start-ups to digitally enclose customers, American and Chinese Big Techs increasingly mobilize their platforms to offer payment services, next to expanding their platformed services to financial incumbents. Observing the growing dependence of finance on American Big Tech platforms, this paper investigates how the shift toward platform finance in the European Union (EU) unfolds as a state-mediated and power-laden process between mostly ‘domestic’ (EU) financial incumbents and ‘foreign’ (non-EU) Big Tech firms. The starting point of the analysis is the European Strategy for Data launched by the European Commission in 2020. Through document analysis, we reconstruct the circulation of code words within ‘the Brussels Bubble’ in anticipation of- and in direct response to the proposal. We find that, despite its implication in the global financial crisis, incumbent EU finance presents itself as a fix for non-EU platform domination by Big Tech. The ‘technological sovereignty’ of the EU is marshalled by incumbent finance to defend market share as would-be pan-European digital financial champions. The Big Tech ‘threat’ is thereby transformed into an argument for strategic deregulation and forced data sharing by Big Tech for the sake of maintaining a ‘level playing field’. The outcome of these processes of strategic coupling is an alignment between the interests of EU data protection and the commercial interests of platformizing European banks.     

The Impact of State-Controlled Banks on the Russian Banking Sector

A senior Russian economist examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2011. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.     

Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine crisis and the return of geopolitics

The protracted crisis in Ukraine has exposed fundamental political differences between leaders in western Europe and their counterparts in Russia. The very existence of the European Union was meant to have refuted geopolitics as a useful theoretical lens through which to view power relations in Europe. After all, the European project is based on the idea that boundaries no longer matter and that national sovereignty is obsolete. And yet, geopolitics remains critically important—certainly for Europe's potential enemies, but also for Europe itself. It is poignant that to advance our understanding of this new constellation we are well served to turn to the insights of a classic, if hugely controversial, German political thinker: Carl Schmitt. Schmitt's political philosophy is relevant in three aspects. First, as a source of inspiration—even if only indirectly—for the contemporary Russian political establishment. Second, the behaviour of Putin's Russia, particularly since 2008, can be best understood through some of the key concepts that preoccupied Schmitt: sovereignty, the political and geopolitics. Third, Schmitt's philosophy can serve as a point of departure for reflecting on the possibility of a more robust response by Europe to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. What Europe needs is a more hard‐nosed realist approach, which recognizes that Russia's expansionist ambitions can only be constrained by its own readiness and willingness to deploy power both politically and, if necessary, even militarily.     

Who Grows Food in Russia and Eastern Europe?

Drawing upon an innovative program of surveys in Russia and Eastern Europe, a prominent Western public policy specialist and Russian geographer present an important empirical study demonstrating a wide diffusion of subsistence food production by both urban and rural households in Eastern Europe and by urban households in Russia. With access to land, rather than occupational specialization, determining who grows food in the stressful 1990s, the paper, based on an extensive survey in 1991 and 1992 with 3,550 Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Polish respondents and 2,100 Russian, reveals that most people in the post-Soviet realm consume the food that they produce. 1 diagram, 7 tables, 25 references.     

Monumentality in Urban Design: The Case of Russia

A prominent American urban geographer and observer of the Russian urban scene provides an overview of grand planning and monumental urban design in Russia and the former Soviet Union through the lens of four themes outlined in a previous paper by Larry Ford (2008). In the process, he adds two more themes relevant to Russia and the former USSR: town building and architecture intended to define and legitimize state power, and the shaping or remodeling of society to reflect a regime's ideology. Noting the obstacles in the West to getting large urban projects planned, accepted, and completed, he argues that monumental urban landscapes appear to demand some degree of sustained, centralized, authoritarian leadership. The latter has been present in Russia and the USSR during much of the past millennium, including the present, but the emergence of new commercial/corporate forces in urban land development also bears scrutiny in studies of the processes promoting urban monumentality. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O18, R14, R52. 10 figures, 44 references.     

中国俄国史研究百年检视与思考

中俄交往始于蒙古西征和金帐汗国时代(1238-1480年),中国学人撰写俄国史自1878年刊印的鹭江奇迹人的《俄国志略》,到今天已经有整整140年的历史。中国的俄国史学科伴随民族命运、国家危机以及世界形势的变化而生,自诞生之日起即负有学人情怀、民族重任和学术职责三重使命。因此,俄国史学科在中国一直发挥着“知夷”和“盗火”的两大作用。中华人民共和国成立后,俄国史(包括苏联时期和俄罗斯联邦时期)研究获得了70年的巨大发展,主要成就有:1985年中国苏联东欧史研究会成立(1992年英文更名为中国俄罗斯东欧中亚史研究会),高等院校、社会科学院、党校、国家有关部委及党政机构纷纷设立俄国史或俄罗斯问题研究机构,建立了从历史学学士、俄国史硕士到俄国史博士的三级专业人才培养体系,俄国史和俄罗斯问题研究的专业期刊创立并连续出版,大量的俄国通史、中俄(中苏)关系史、专题著作、各类教科书、翻译著作(来自俄文、英法、法文、德文、波兰文等)出版,中国俄国史学者积极参与国际学术会议和国际合作研究,具有中国特色的中国“俄罗斯学”新学科正在建立过程中。