解放军中的文职干部

问:近日,解放军总政治部颁发《关于规范大型文艺演出、加强文艺队伍教育管理的规定》(以下简称《规定》),要求"专业技术三级以上文职干部不得称将军或者文职将军"。请问,文职干部与现役军官有何异同?级别如何划分?专业技术文职干部特级一级二级三级四级五级六级七级八级九级现役军人职务等级上将中将少将大校上校中校少校上尉中尉少尉     

新中国军衔制发展历程

实行军衔制度是军队正规化、现代化建设的重要措施之一。授予军人军衔,是为了确定军人在军队中的等级地位,也是国家给予军人的一种荣誉。人民解放军在战争年代由于受当时历史条件所限,未能实行军衔制度。中华人民共和国成立后,为适应军队正规化建设的需要,人民解放军于1955年至1965年和1988年至今两次实行军衔制。     

战争年代人民军队的军衔情况

实行军衔制度是军队正规化、现代化建设的重要措施之一。授予军人军衔,是为了确定军人在军队中的等级地位,也是国家给予军人的一种荣誉。人民解放军由于受各种历史条件所限,直     

我军军衔制度的建立与完善

正我军历史上曾两次正式实行了军衔制:第一次是1955年至1965年,也叫首次军衔制;第二次是1988年至今,也叫新军衔制。军官军衔等级是军衔制的核心内容,军衔等级设置与军队规模大小、编制级别多少以及国家政治制度和民族传统等密切相关。我军两次军衔制的军官衔级是不一样的:1955年为四等十四级,1988年为三等十一级。设哪一级军衔,不设哪一级军衔,都是根据当时特定的历史背景而确定的,符合中国国情、军情。     

人员任务时间“三落实”修志才有保障

人员任务时间“三落实”修志才有保障《广西通志·人事志》编辑室《广西通志·人事志》的上限为１８４０年,下限到１９９０年,跨度１５０年。志书共分为１５篇,即晚清官吏、民国官员、新中国干部职务设置、吸收录用干部、军队转业干部安置、大中专毕业生分配、任免、奖...     

蒋介石的“大元帅“不是军衔

贵刊２００１年第１期《淞沪战役中的蒋介石》一文中说：淞沪战争爆发后蒋介石“自封了个大元帅的军衔”。这句话有两点不准确，第一，蒋介石的大元帅不是军衔，而是一个名誉职务；第二，蒋介石就任大元帅的时间是在淞沪战役前夕，而不是淞沪战争爆发后。 抗战期间，蒋介石确实有个大元帅的头衔，但那并不是一个正式的军衔等级。其实，非但蒋介石的大元帅不是军衔，中国近代所有的大元帅都不是军衔，而是职务，是一种权利的象征。细分起来，大致有两种类型： 一类是实际行政职务，如孙中山和张作霖的大元帅。１９１７年８月孙中山在广州召开…     

忆1958年军队反“教条主义”斗争

1958年,人民解放军内部曾经卷起一场反教条主义斗争的风波。这场斗争令人震惊地在军内高层揪出了一个所谓“以萧克为主帅、李达为副帅的反党宗派集团”,一批高级将领和高中级干部被打成“反党分子”,包括刘伯承在内的一批军中将帅受到错误批判和处理:刘伯承元帅被迫辞去军事学院院长兼政委的职务;主管全军军事训练和院校工作的解放军训练总监部被撤销,箫克上将、李达上将被免去国防部副部长兼训练总监部部长、副部长的职务,调出军队,陈伯钧上将、宋时轮上将、郭天民上将等也都受到严厉批判。这场斗争使建国后刚刚起步的军队正规化、现代化建设进程受到严重挫折,极大地破坏了军队训练和院校教学工作,并且给以后的军队建设工作造成了长期的恶劣影响。这段历史过去快四十年了。这里发表的萧克将军的回忆,真实地记述了这场所谓“路线斗争”的来龙去脉。     

毛泽东为何不当大元帅——开国授衔大揭秘

2010年7月19日,中央军委授予章沁生等11位高级军官上将军衔。至此,自1955年新中国首次实行军衔制和1988年恢复军衔制以来,已有185位高级军官警官获上将军衔警衔。我军1955年首次实行军衔制时,将衔设置为大将、上将、中将、少将。上将为将衔中的第二个级别。1988年重新实行军衔制时,将衔等级为:一级上将、上将、中将、少将。但一级上将一直空缺未授。1994年5月,全国人大通过了关于修改《中国人民解放军军官军衔条例》的决定,不再设一级上将。今年是解放军首次实行军衔制55周年,又是1965年取消军衔制45周年。当年的授衔中有元帅和大将两个现今没有的军衔。这些开国元帅和大将评定背后有哪些不为人知的故事?     

军衔的由来

军衔产生于15-16世纪资本主义萌芽和职业军队建立的时期，军衔一词最早出现于1578年的法文当中，意为“等级的台阶，不同头衔的阶梯或职衔的等级”。     

军衔的由来

军衔产生于15-16世纪资本主义萌芽和职业军队建立的时期，军衔一词最早出现于1578年的法文当中，意为“等级的台阶，不同头衔的阶梯或职衔的等级”。     

科技强军推动军队质量建设实现历史性跨越

以江泽民为核心的党中央和中央军委及时把握军事领域的新变化 ,做出了实施科技强军战略推进军队质量建设的重大决策。人民解放军按照“两个根本性转变”的要求 ,坚定不移地贯彻科技强军战略 ,全面加强以现代化为中心的各项建设 :依靠科技进步 ,加快武器装备研制步伐 ;掀起科技练兵高潮 ,创新作战理论 ;继续裁减军队员额 ,优化组织结构 ;深化后勤体制改革 ,提高保障能力 ;着眼未来战争需要 ,培养高素质新型军事人才。我军质量建设提高到新的历史高度 ,在现代条件下防卫作战能力进一步增强     

武卫中军与《谕武卫中军告示》

武卫中军是晚清武卫军中唯一一支经奏准招募的军队,是武卫军总统荣禄的亲军。该军虽然营制较新,饷章较丰,武器配备较先进,但军官缺乏统领新军的能力和水平,训练、教育方式方法落后,兵源构成复杂,训练、教育时间较短,使得其在镇压义和团运动和抗击八国联军入侵的活动中,表现出了极差的军风、军纪和作战能力。因而,它也是武卫军中成军最晚、裁撤最早、军纪最坏、练兵最不成功的一支军队。《谕武卫中军告示》有助于我们了解该军的一些背景、训练和教育的情况。     

北宁之役中清军将领之劣迹

中法北宁之役以清朝官军失败告终,以黄桂兰为首的军官腐败无能是战败的重要原因.这些军官的昏庸腐败主要表现在生活腐化,荒淫糜烂,粉饰太平,蒙骗上司,盲目虚骄,不谙戎机,胡乱布防,调度失灵等.     

德国与南京政府时期之军事变革研究

南京政府建立之际,日患渐重。对此,从1928年到1938年,在德国军事顾问的协助下,紧跟世界潮流,在武器装备更新、军队编制调整、军事教育等领域进行了大幅度的军事变革,使中国的军事发展适应了机械化战争的需要,也为即将到来的抗日战争奠定了坚实的物质基础。     

唐朝在百济故地初设行政建置考略

显庆五年(660年),唐朝在新罗导引下灭亡百济,并立即在百济故地设置熊津、马韩、东明、金连、德安五都督府及五都督府下辖的三十七州。唐朝在百济故地初设的行政建置与百济末期的"一都五方三十七郡"政区关系密切,本文以此为据对熊津、马韩、东明、金连、德安五都督府的地望和三十七州中部分州的州名和地望进行了考证。     

Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa

This article overviews the development of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to date and examines EU involvement in this. The European Union is the major financial partner in both military and non‐military assistance to the African Union (AU). Europe has shifted from being a major UN troop contributor towards the funding of African‐led peace operations, as well as the emergence of time‐limited, high‐impact, missions. With the exception of Somalia, these ESDP operations have provided little direct security benefit to Europe and their success has been limited. They have provided experimentation opportunities of ESDP capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Guinea Bissau. Events in the eastern Congo in late 2008 demonstrate that the EU needs to consider carefully when it intervenes militarily in Africa: non‐intervention and coordinated bilateral diplomatic efforts by EU member states can be more effective.     

'Not to do less but to do better. . .': French military policy in Africa

France's Africa policy has undergone significant change in recent years, particularly in its military aspects. In practical terms troop numbers have fallen; bases have closed; and financial and military resources have been reallocated or redirected. Politically, the will for forceful, unilateral French action in Africa seems largely to have dissipated. However, this does not mean that France seeks to disengage from the African continent. Rather, multilateral initiatives for maintaining influence are sought, including the possibility of diplomatic and potentially military action alongside the United Kingdom. However, it remains to be seen whether these policy reorientations will suffice to fulfil Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's dictum: 'not to do less but to do better'.     

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: reshaping China’s approach to strategic deterrence

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in the midst of a sweeping reform programme to significantly transform its organisation, force posture, command and control structures, and internal politics. Among the many important aspects of this effort is the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Creation of the PLARF solidified China’s missile forces as a critical element of China’s evolving strategic deterrent posture, portends continued significant investment in PLARF modernisation, and points to a more concerted effort to integrate PLARF capabilities into more effective PLA-wide joint operations—all key developments in the fundamental reshaping of China’s approach to strategic deterrence. These developments will affect U.S. strategic and extended deterrence postures, U.S.-China strategic stability, allied conventional force operations, information dominance and security, critical infrastructure, and other key aspects of national security. This study details the organisational, technological, and doctrinal changes afoot for the PLARF, and analyses how—if successful—they affect U.S. and U.S-allied military strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.     

Beyond the carrot and stick: the political economy of US military aid to China, 1945–1951

By applying the rent-seeking assumption and sifting through both the archival materials and published historical documents, this article revisits the US–China relationship during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and the early Cold War period, when the United States was caught in the conundrum of aiding the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. As military aid is usually regarded as an important representation of broader economic aid, this research mainly concentrates on the US military assistance to postwar Nationalist China. This topic is important, as it signifies a direct American involvement in the Chinese Civil War, when the influence of the United States in postwar world politics was overwhelmingly predominant. As a result, postwar Chinese history might be reevaluated in a broader global postwar context. In addition, this article also tells the story about rent-seeking behaviors in the complicated US–China military relations during the early Cold War period at both micro and macro levels. When it came to US military assistance to China, the formulation of policy was perennially in the name of one's best interest.     

American civil–military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The soldier and the state

Fifty‐five years after it was first published, Samuel Huntington's The soldier and the state remains an essential starting point for serious discussions of American civil–military relations. In part this is due to the boldness and ambition of the author. Huntington brought theory to a research area that had suffered from too little theorizing and then went on to formulate concepts that scholars and practitioners of civil–military relations still find useful. These include: the conceptualization of the military as a profession; the articulation of the two central forces shaping the nature of military institutions as the functional and the societal imperatives; and the formulation of subjective and objective control as the two main patterns of civilian control. This review article briefly revisits these concepts and argues that they retain utility in illuminating important issues in American civil–military relations today. It also argues, however, that Huntington's contributions were productive but not perfect. Some of his specific definitions, such as the content of military expertise, are debatable. Some of his central concerns, such as whether the United States could sustain a strong military over an extended period of time, are no longer central today. Finally, in some places the literature has moved beyond what Huntington offered. The best example is the ongoing debate over how the country's political leaders and its most senior military officers should interact. It is precisely on this point that Huntington's objective control is the weakest. While The soldier and the state certainly does not deserve uncritical acceptance, it does continue to merit a fair hearing. Current discussions of American civil–military relations are likely to be more reasonable and productive if Huntington is given a voice.