Introduction: The Future of Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

In her Introduction to this issue of International Affairs devoted to the future of Europe and the transatlantic relationship, Julie Smith highlights the challenges facing the West's major organizations—the European Union and NATO. The Convention on the Future of Europe, enlargement of both NATO and the EU, the euro debate, and the tensions in the transatlantic relationship are discussed in the context of the articles in these pages.     

The end of the West: the once and future Europe

Europe and the United States—the West—urgently need political leadership, economic fortitude and a clear vision of the future if they are to contend with the challenges posed by emerging regional powers and to resist the downward pressures of ‘relative decline’, the central focus of David Marquand's book, The end of the West: the once and future Europe. Central to this goal will be the West's ability to ‘rebalance’ between its institutions and democracy; its power and commitments; and its political and moral authority. Europe must ‘rebalance’ on issues related to ethnicity and identity, governance and authority, and civilization and territory. EU enlargement and its institutional reform processes have exacerbated this imbalance. American foreign policy objectives currently exceed its resources and are hampered by lack of strategic clarity and intellectual vision which keeps the United States from achieving an adaptive leadership model more capable of successfully operating in an increasingly complex and multipolar world. For Europe to become internally healthy and externally productive—both politically and economically—it needs to regain balance between its utopian, institutional objectives and democratic support for its future ambitions and policy course. Strong leadership and a powerful vision of prosperity from the West will be vital to return the transatlantic partnership to global economic and political advantage.     

Of Once and Future Kings: Rethinking the Anglo-American Analogy in the Rising Powers Debate

This paper seeks to advance the so-called rising powers debate of the past 15 years by interrogating its selective use of the past. Key to the debate are the impact of rising powers like China on the international order, and how to accommodate them. Historiography plays a crucial but unappreciated role in the debate, as scholars look to the past to make sense of the future. Especially in the United States, many compare the US now to Great Britain before 1940, the idea being that both faced the same difficulties of decline relative to rising challengers. This is the core case of power transition theory in the field of International Relations. It is also, fundamentally, weak. As I show, it relies on a ‘long chronology’ of British decline that the past quarter-century of historical scholarship on twentieth-century Britain has undermined. I instead propose a ‘short chronology’ of the transition away from Britain that emphasizes agency and contingency over structure and the longue durée. Bringing the work of historians to the rising powers debate thus indicates that the key factors to study are not grand systemic forces, but short-term politics and diplomacy.     

Britain and the Convention on the Future of Europe

If the reaction from the British Conservative Party and the right-wing press were to be believed, it would be easy to think that the constitutional treaty produced by the European Convention represented a failure for Britain. This article takes issues with such claims. It illustrates, by tracing British involvement within the Convention from its inception to the finalization of the draft treaty, that the British Government succeeded remarkably well in ensuring that the document reflected its major policy preferences.     

Revisioning the Past,Remembering the Future: Duna Accounts of the World's End

Taking as my example, the memories of Duna people at Lake Kopiago, who inhabit the northwestern part of the Southern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, I illustrate some of the ways events, and memories of them, have been constructed, manipulated and recast over the last twenty five years. By paying particular attention to a well known originary narrative, I show that space, the revelation of new knowledge via a spirit medium and the reinterpretation and negotiation of the meanings attached to events can result in the production of new memories about the past and the future.     

George Orwell on Political Realism and the Future of Europe

George Orwell perceived the possibility of a postwar united Europe, based on regional integration along social-democratic lines, as a means of survival in a world struggle rather than as a preamble to peace. This was the logical conclusion of his understanding of political realism: his endorsement of its assumption that violence is endemic to social life and that the force-wielding sovereign cannot be done away with. Yet Orwell also had reservations about realism. He argued that a purely realist analysis that was not normatively connected to any values outside itself would go astray because analysts would be unable to factor in their own positions and would thus lose the analytic distance from their objects of study. Orwell was thus as suspicious of a politics managed by experts as of the utopian anticipation of a violence-free world. His world-view, rooted in realist necessity while leaving room for the values of democracy and socialism, offered a vision of a postwar united Europe that fostered the spirit of solidarity and could endure the existential struggles of world politics.     

A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron,Charles de Gaulle andthe Politics of Grandeur

Charles de Gaulle devoted his life to cultivating French grandeur, a politics that attempted to carve out an equal and independent role for France among the great powers of the world. One who frequently criticized de Gaulle's ideas of grandeur was the eminent social theorist, Raymond Aron. Although Aron was generally supportive of de Gaulle and supported him ‘every time there was a crisis’, he never hesitated to criticize de Gaulle, sometimes quite sharply. Aron's lifelong friendship with de Gaulle was thus marked by alternating bouts of mutual irritation and respect: Aron worried that de Gaulle's theatrics were sometimes detrimental to French national interests while de Gaulle fretted that Aron's commitment to French greatness was less enthusiastic than it should havebeen.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Aron's reaction to de Gaulle's politics of grandeur. Despite his reputation for ‘lucidity’, Aron was often ambivalent about de Gaulle's ambitions for France. We argue that Aron's ambivalence stemmed from his political creed, or from his commitment to a political philosophy that - as de Gaulle sensed - allowed for few settled convictions. This paper reviews Aron's assessment of two issues at the heart of de Gaulle's politics of grandeur, namely, the effort to promote a sense of national unity and the effort to create a nuclear force. In both areas, we witness a remarkably ambivalent Aron, one who struggled to soften the harsher edges of the excesses of what he considered to be the excesses of grandeur and find his way to a more moderate and coherent position.     

重新审视中西比较史——《大分流：欧洲、中国及现代世界经济的发展》述评

一、标新立异《大分流》美国学者彭慕兰 (KennethPomeranz)的新著《大分流 :欧洲 ,中国及现代世界经济的发展》一经出版 ,即在学术界引起轰动 ,2 0 0 1年获得美国历史学会的费正清奖和世界历史学会年度奖 ,在国外 ,围绕着这本书和其他一些对中国史和世界史进行再评价的史学新著开展过多次讨论 ,在中国 ,这本书也正在引起越来越多的关注。何谓大分流 ?大分流的英文原文是“GreatDivergence” ,它有多种译法 ,已见之于报章的就有大分流、大分岔、大歧变、大裂变等 ,译者在听取学术界同仁意见后最终选定了“大分流”。1 8世纪在西欧发生的工…