Körpergefühl und Raumvorstellung: Leonardo und Descartes

“Experience and the conception of the world in science in transition to modern times” is the general subject. There are two different points to be made clear, i.e. 1. That the conception of the world had to be made imaginable by art before it could be taken over by science. The central perspective dates back to about three centuries before the time Descartes developed the co-ordinate system. 2. Furthermore it should be taken into account that it was first of all due to the lead of the painters (especially in the Italy of the Quattrocento’) that the possibility of making experiences had changed. In a space opened by a perspective view and seemingly thus appearing as measurable even the painted figures acquire a new reality. Due to his anatomic studies Leonardo could treat the natural movement of the figures shown in his paintings. It was the artists who first of all investigated optics and anatomy before relations could be measured with the aid of scientific methods ami before quantities — instead of qualities — could become the base of unbiased science, as called for by Galilei in 1623.     

Naked wax and necessary existence: modal voluntarism and Descartes’s motives

ABSTRACT

Descartes’s commitment to modal voluntarism was one of his most notorious and controversial doctrines. The reaction of contemporaries was hostility and incredulity; the reaction of modern scholars has been little different. Yet, though the issue has fomented considerable discussion and disagreement in the literature, the overwhelming majority of scholarly output has focused on questions of whether Descartes actually upheld the doctrine, or what he was committed too if he indeed did. Surprisingly, the underlying question of why Descartes would have upheld such a doctrine in the first place has gone almost entirely unnoticed and unasked. This paper proposes several possible answers to this question, each of which provides at least a partial explanation for Descartes’s attraction to modal voluntarism. The ultimate motive, however, was likely not one of positive attraction, but driven by Descartes’s anxieties over the thorny and deeply heretical implications of his conception of matter.     

Introduction

Abstract

For all of its political drama, the health care debate appears consumed with bureaucratic minutiae quite distant from political philosophy. Yet in important respects that debate is intimately connected with the founding premises of the modern technological project of the mastery of nature for the relief of man's estate as envisioned by René Descartes and Francis Bacon. This essay uses a recent discussion of the health care debate by bioethicist Daniel Callahan to raise some fundamental questions about the role of technology in our medical culture. It argues that modern health care is the Cartesian project come of age, and it uses Descartes' Discourse on Method to reflect on the possibility of a sensible politics of technology in our time.     

Le Débat Wolffien Sur L’Idéalisme de Leibniz Lors de la Première Diffusion de la Monadologie Latine

This paper proposes a reconstruction of the Wolffian debate on Leibniz’s idealism arising from the initial response to Leibniz’s Monadology. This reconstruction requires us to revisit some problems central to the debate: an inaccurate translation of a term in the latin Monadology («le composé» is translated as «substantia composita»); status of body as composed substance; status of elements as simple substances from which bodies result (which goes against the Cartesian conception of substance); status of Leibnizian notions of perception, force and pre-established harmony; status of experience as a holistic and systematic process (which goes against its conception and the tabula rasa in Locke) in the Wolffian response and system. A thorough examination of the founding texts of the response (Bilfinger and Wolff) allows us to reconsider the relation between Leibniz and Wolff from a new perspective.     

Descartes' visit to the town library, or how Augustinian is Descartes' neurophysiology?

Rene Descartes was early accused of taking his central philosophical proposition from St Augustine. Did he also take his central neurophysiological concept from the same source? This is the question which this paper sets out to answer. It is concluded that the foundational neurophysiology propounded in L'Homme does indeed show strong and interesting resemblences to Augustine's largely Erasistratean version. Descartes, however, working within the new paradigm of seventeenth-century physical science, introduced a new principle: whereas Augustine's neurophysiology is pervaded throughout by a vital factor, the pneuma, Descartes' theory involved only inanimate material forces. It is concluded, further, that in spite of the interesting similarities between Augustinian and Cartesian neurophysiology there is no evidence for any direct plagiarism. It seems more likely that Augustine's influence was filtered through the Galenical physiologists of Descartes' own time and of the preceding century.     

A terrible beauty is bought: 1916, commemoration and commodification

Abstract

Mindful of Benedict Anderson’s emphasis on Imagined Communities on the power of print culture – and print-capitalism – to shape and share national ideas and identities, this article offers a comparative analysis of the commemorations of 1798 and 1916 by looking at commemorative ephemera: kitschy memorabilia, themed merchandise, newspaper cuttings and advertisements, handbills and inventively branded commodities, as important cultural texts which purveyed ideological values and meanings at the time of their production. It suggests that the consumer sphere allows us to shed light on the commemorative discourses these ephemeral objects produce, retelling and retailing the risings in question. Texts often regarded as throwaway or lowbrow vied for their share in the ideological marketplace to form part of the heritage of 1798 and 1916, the centenary of the one feeding into the ferment of the other. The reception and representation of the pivotal figures of Wolfe Tone and James Connolly is discussed through the prism of Thomas Richards’ conception of commodity culture, and attention is paid to counter-commemorative strands as well as positive rhetorics of remembrance.     

Le scepticisme et les hypothèses de la physique

The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century?     

Descartes and the pineal gland in animals: A frequent misinterpretation

Abstract

Rene Descartes presented a number of reasons for his choice of the pineal gland as a logical place for the soul to interact with the physical machinery of the body. It is often stated that one of his reasons was that be believed animals do not have pineal glands, whereas humans alone possess a soul and this small structure. This is a misinterpretation of Descartes. The philosopher knew that barnyard and other animals possess pineal glands, having seen this with his own eyes. His point was that the pineal is unique in humans only because of a special function — acting as the seat for the rational soul.     

A “Calvinist” theory of matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa

In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640s, a minority believed that some Cartesian views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist grounds. It seems unlikely that Descartes was unaware of these views. The claim is that Descartes had two aims in his Replies to Arnauld: to show the compatibility of res extensa and the Catholic transubstantiation but also to differentiate the res extensa from some views of matter explicitly defended by some Calvinists. The association with Calvinism will be eventually used polemically against Cartesianism, for example in France. The paper finally suggests that, notwithstanding the points of conflict, the affinities between the theologically relevant theories of accidents, matter and extension ultimately facilitated the dissemination of Cartesianism among the Calvinists.     

Surviving the Holocaust: Emil Utitz’s ‘As-If Technique’

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to present the work of Emil Utitz, the Czech-German Jewish philosopher and psychologist, who was also a survivor of Theresienstadt. The power of the imagination and its intensification by the daily reality of the concentration camp was central to Utitz’s conception of life, which reveals the influence of the then popular ideas of Hans Vaihinger, and especially his theory of the importance of the human ability to act as though something was true. More specifically, the article reconstructs and contextualizes Utitz’s thought along two axes: the Kantian philosophical tradition, and Viktor Frankl’s and Hans Günther Adler’s conceptions of the Holocaust experience.     

Cougar figures,gender, and the performances of predation

This article considers how nonhuman animals are enrolled in the construction of gendered identities. Specifically, I interrogate two gendered figures with which I was repeatedly confronted over the course of researching cougar–human relationships on Vancouver Island, home to what is estimated to be North America's densest population of cougars. The first figure, Cougar Annie, was a woman ‘settler’ on western Vancouver Island, reputed to have killed over 100 cougars in her lifetime and now celebrated as a strong, independent female. The second figure is a contemporary trope, an older woman who expresses interest in younger men, known in slang speech as a ‘cougar’. Both figures are intimately bound to a third figure, the animal cougar, Puma concolor, whose material–semiotic relationship to humans both performs and is performed by ‘cougars’ and Cougar Annie. Haraway's conception of figures as embodied and performative mappings of power is central to this article's discussion, which lies at the intersection of animal studies, more-than-human geographies, posthumanism, and feminist science studies. Methodologically, I draw on interviews and archival research to trace the historical and contemporary specificities of these two figures – Cougar Annie and ‘cougars’ – revealing how they are informed by, and simultaneously produce, uphold, and perform, gendered understandings of the relationship between humans and cougars, predator and prey, humans and animals, and culture and nature.     

THE ‘LORD OF THE STONEMASONS’: PART II. ‘STANDING FIGURE WITH BETYLS’ AT PETRA

Abstract

This paper presents the second type of representation of the ‘lord’ of the Nabataean stonemasons, a male figure standing with betyls. This type is found in five rock-cut reliefs in Petra, usually high in the walls of quarries or monuments. It is argued that, like the so-called ‘sword deity’ figures presented in Part I, this second type was also carved by the stonemasons as another representation of their tutelary deity, possibly Dushara. Study of these little-known figures reveals new information on the diverse depiction of Nabataean deities, as well as on the religious beliefs of the stonemasons at Petra.     

Cyborg geographies: towards hybrid epistemologies

As a mode of critique, the cyborg is often separated from its role as a figuration. This article reviews Donna Haraway's cyborg theory to restate the importance of the cyborg as a figuration in critical methodology. Figuration is about opening knowledge-making practices to interrogation. I argue that the cyborg enables this inquiry through epistemological hybridization. To do so, cyborg figurations not only adopt a language of being or becoming, but narrate this language in the production of knowledges, to know hybridly. The epistemological hybridization of the cyborg includes four strategies: witnessing, situating, diffracting and acquiring. These are modes of knowing in cyborg geographies. To underline the importance of this use of cyborg theory, I review selected geographic literatures in naturecultures and technosciences, to demonstrate how geographers cite the cyborg. My analysis suggests these literatures emphasize an ontological hybridity that leaves underconsidered the epistemological hybridization at work in cyborg figuration. To take up the cyborg in this way is to place at risk our narrations, to re-make these geographies as hybrid, political work.     

Governing science before it governs us

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the motivation behind my latest book, ‘The governance of science: ideology and the future of the open society’, which is traceable to Karl Popper's dictum that scientists let their ideas die in their stead. I take this insight as the mark of our humanity more generally, even though we are on the verge of losing it. I argue that this is because, over the past century, the material and psychic investments in particular research trajectories have made it increasingly difficult to envisage what it would be like to pursue scientific inquiry in a substantially different way. I begin by discussing the historical significance of rhetoric in distinguishing between our privately held beliefs and publicly expressed theories, and then showing how this necessary – albeit morally ambivalent – distinction has been compromised with the onset of ‘big science’, first in physics and now in biology. We are thus saddled with a conception of scientific progress that threatens to render us, in evolutionary terms, overadapted to our environments. At the end of the article, I suggest some ways in which we may overcome the problem, at least in terms of the emerging ‘bioliberal’ regime.     

Believing in the USA: Derrida,Melville and the Great American Charlatan

ABSTRACT

This essay considers the relationship between the prophet and the charlatan, particularly as they figure in the contemporary American political landscape. It argues that at moments of democratic political crisis these figures arise and reveal the vacancy of sovereignty within the democratic model. The essay treats Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man along with Jacques Derrida’s writings on democracy and the apocalyptic tone as resources in this endeavor. It considers as well why recent worries over the status of facts in the era of “fake news” have led to critiques of deconstruction.     

The Picture of Artificial Intelligence and the Secularization of Thought

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critical interpretation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a philosophical notion which exemplifies a secular conception of thinking. One way in which AI notably differs from the conventional understanding of “thinking” is that, according to AI, “intelligence” or “thinking” does not necessarily require “life” as a precondition: that it is possible to have “thinking without life.” Building on Charles Taylor’s critical account of secularity as well as Hubert Dreyfus’ influential critique of AI, this article offers a theological analysis of AI’s “lifeless” picture of thinking in relation to the Augustinian conception of God as “Life itself.” Following this critical theological analysis, this article argues that AI’s notion of thinking promotes a societal privilege of certain rationalistic or calculative ways of thought over more existential or spiritual ways of thinking, and thereby fosters a secularization or de-spiritualization of thinking as an ethical human practice.     

Leibniz’s Kehre: From Ultradeterminism to the Philosophy of Freedom

Abstract

This article examines the rift in Leibniz’s conception of determinism after being rebuffed by the Parisian theologian Antoine Arnauld in their correspondence of 1686. As, in addition, his study of surds infracted his confidence in the “complete concept,” Leibniz embarked on a new, dynamic doctrine of substance or “law of the series.” In the literature, this strategy has been widely (mis)understood as “tweaking” the system to allow some self-assertion of free will. But as this article will show, it amounts to a revolutionary conception that culminates in the unmasking of determinism as an insupportable, indeed incoherent doctrine. As all forms of determinism are profoundly entangled with human self-perception, the Leibnizian Kehre invites us to a new engagement with human freedom and autonomy and the disentanglement from a philosophical position for which neither a metaphysical nor an empirical proof can be given.     

Bradley Holt,Thirsty for God: A Brief History of Christian Spirituality

Abstract

In this essay, I consider the relationship between more radically open conceptions of democracy and the recent "return of religion" as the return of distinct, particular religions. The radical democracy of figures such as Derrida, Badiou, and Hardt and Negri is found to be not radical enough to be open to the particular religious other. Derrida's "religion without religion" does violence to the particularity of concrete religious traditions, Badiou appropriates Paul's universalism while abandoning the particularity and difference in his conception of collective identity, and Hardt and Negri advocate a "politics of love" while severing that love from its ground— namely, God. I then show a way of rethinking both society and Christianity so that Christianity finds a place in society and society makes room for Christianity. A radical Christianity devoid of self-privilege and triumphalism provides a model for an intersubjectivity of love in which the other really comes first. Paul's radical conception of membership in the body of Christ accomplishes precisely what radical democracy fails to do: it allows for heterophony as well as polyphony, and incoherence as well as commonality. It is only when church and society allow the possibility of incoherence and heterophony that they are truly open to the other, and it is only when they are truly open to the other that they satisfy the demands of a truly radical democracy and radical Christianity.     

Rotten to the core: Against a core curriculum for geography in UK higher education

Abstract

This paper examines some of the main reasons why a core curriculum for UK higher education is seen as being desirable, and challenges these arguments with particular reference to geography. It suggests that a core curriculum would be damaging for six main reasons: that problems exist over the identification of central elements which could provide the basis of a core; that the higher education experience should be enlightening rather than dehumanising; that the strength of geography as a very broad discipline would be damaged by the imposition of a core; that much of the most exciting geographical ‘knowledge’ is created at the research frontier rather than in any potential core; that there are problems over the choice of people who might determine any core; and that there are serious questions over precisely in whose interests a core might be created.     

Mary Shelley’s ‘Romantic Spinozism’

ABSTRACT

Mary Shelley (1797–1851) developed a ‘Romantic Spinozism’ from 1817 to 1848. This was a deterministic worldview that adopted an ethical attitude of love toward the world as it is, must be, and will be. Resisting the psychological despair and political inertia of fatalism, her ‘Romantic Spinozism’ affirmed the forward-looking responsibility of people to love their neighbors and sustain the world, including future generations, even in the face of seeming apocalypse. This history of Shelley’s reception of Spinoza begins with the fragment of the otherwise lost translation of the Theologico-Political Treatise (1670) on which she collaborated. It extends through her journals, letters, poetry, and her second great work of speculative fiction after Frankenstein (1818): a post-apocalyptic novel set in the year 2100, The Last Man (1826). Through a creative synthesis of Spinoza with Plato, Cicero, Wollstonecraft, and Glasite Christianity, Shelley developed an anti-apocalyptic conception of love as apocatastasis: a cyclical restoration of an ethical attitude of stewardship toward the whole world and its necessity. Through this recovery of a vital chapter in the history of European ideas, Shelley emerges as a central figure in Spinozan philosophy, especially the ethics and political philosophy of love.