Whence nationalism?

ABSTRACT. There is widespread agreement that nationalism emerged in the historical fountainheads of modernity, and was subsequently diffused outwards. Contrary to that, there is a long standing view that nationalism precedes modernity even in the broadly accepted cradles of both modernity and nationalism, such as England or France, neither of which was modern when it engendered nationalism. Besides, some emergent nationalisms ran concurrent with their English or French counterparts, with little evidence of having been spawned by diffusion. Such early or protonationalisms often sprang from resistance to foreign conquest, putting in doubt the invention‐diffusion hypothesis. I am therefore suggesting that nationalism has not emerged in few societies, but in many, and that it was engendered by social interactions, not by a particular social formation. While nationalism emerges within society, its genesis occurs in‐between social groups and societies, making it a product of their interactions. That makes it u‐topic, its cradles socially diverse, and its conception interactional, not gestational.     

Is ‘white nationalism’, nationalism?

Are ‘white nationalists’ really nationalists? This label is one that right-wing, white activists themselves have chosen, and as such, compels rigorous investigation to avoid simply adopting the preferred nomenclature of these activists and their ambitions. The nation and nationalism are concepts with rich scholarly histories, and this paper seeks to examine the discussion, activities and statements of so-called white nationalists in light of this literature. We argue through a three-fold concept of the nation—based on territoriality, population and symbolic and/or cultural content—that the vision of the political community and ambitions of these activists falls short of the standard of a nation and that their aspirations do not conform to what the literature lays out as nationalism. We argue, therefore, that using the language of ‘white nationalism’ to describe these groups obfuscates and sanitises their motives and lends undue legitimacy to their standing in public discourse.     

Can civic nationalism reduce corruption? Transnational and translocal insights from Solomon Islands

Some scholars and practitioners argue that the key to addressing corruption in poor countries lies in citizens eschewing patronage ties and embracing civic nationalism. This view has led some to suggest that a corruption-busting nationalist sentiment can be encouraged by exposing elites from poor countries to the liberal values of relatively well-governed rich ones. However, thus far few scholars have attempted to understand the complex ways that different types of mobility shape perceptions about nationalism and corruption. This article examines the role mobilities play in shaping attitudes towards nationalism and corruption amongst stakeholders connected to anti-corruption reforms in the Pacific Island nation of Solomon Islands. It finds that highly mobile elites framed corruption and nationalism through two distinct concepts: transnationalism (conceiving the world as comprising territorially divided states) and translocalism (which focuses on local connections developed through [im]mobilities). Transnational framings, shaped by international travel and international indices, stressed the importance of promoting civic nationalism to fight corruption. Translocal framings, reinforced by everyday experiences, were more sceptical of both anti-corruption and nation- and state-building efforts. Findings provide insights into why anti-corruption reforms in post-colonial contexts are so challenging, and the potential for reimagining the relationship between nationalism and anti-corruption.     

Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems.     

Can direct democracy deliver an alternative to extractivism? An essay on popular consultations

Between 2013 and 2018, ten different municipalities in Colombia held popular consultations in which people were asked to decide whether they wanted or not extractive industries in their territory. Promoted and articulated by environmental movements for the defence of water resources and local livelihoods, popular consultations led to surprising alliances of traditionally opposed actors, that found their interests temporarily aligned in opposition to resource extraction. In all of the ten popular consultations people voted massively against allowing the industry to enter. Through the defunding of the popular consultations and through a series of legal challenges, the government rushed to stop an additional 54 votes from happening that threatened to derail its finances and model of development. In this essay, I identify three main boundaries in the literature concerning popular consultations: between what counts as legal and legitimate, between the centre and the periphery as loci of political power, and between people and nature as bearers of rights. By providing an analysis of the absent elements of the political and academic discourse, I argue that popular consultations as spaces of experimental autonomous activity have the potential to engender alternatives to extractivist development. Hence, building on the notion of ‘resource sovereignty’ and contemporary discussions on autonomy as a prefigurative force, I reconfigure the three boundaries into a theoretical framework to guide research and political action for alternative post-extractivist futures.     

Multicultural democracy: can it work?

After differentiating multicultural democracy (MD) from other types of democracy (liberal, consociational, ethnic and Herrenvolk), this article explores both the conditions favouring MD and the problems it faces. The main obstacle to MD is the model of the ‘nation–state’, which has been the basis of legitimacy in most liberal democracies since the French Revolution. Multiculturalism has existed in many non–democratic states (such as colonial and traditional empires) and in city–states. A distinction is made between minimal MD (the simple tolerance and legal protection of cultural diversity) and maximal MD (the celebration, encouragement and official support thereof). The article concludes that minimal MD is the more feasible of the two, and that political and social conditions for it are the most favourable in urban environments, especially in city–states.     

Restorative justice: deliberative democracy in action?

This paper examines the emergence of restorative justice meetings—in which victims come face to face with offenders—and asks whether they provide an example of deliberative democracy in action. The article analyses some restorative justice initiatives from the United States and Australasia and finds that they exhibit inclusiveness, and create more scope for democratic control, but are less strong on the equality criterion. Accountability has also been identified as a weakness of restorative meetings but, drawing on deliberative democratic theory, the authors suggest a possible solution. In their ability to transform preferences of both victims and offenders, restorative meetings offer both a vivid example to deliberative democrats and a powerful challenge to justice systems that rely heavily on incarceration.     

Is nationalism left or right? Critical junctures in Québécois nationalism*

ABSTRACT. Sub‐state nationalist parties of the industrialised West occupy different positions along the left–right political spectrum. Despite the similarities of their political agendas, these parties adopt different ideological identities. This paper seeks to explain the choice of party position and the long‐term consistency of these positions by employing a path‐dependent perspective. The focus is first, on the critical junctures during which such choices are made; and second, on the mechanisms of continuity ensuring the persistence of the left–right identities. The argument is explored within the empirical context of Québécois nationalism.     

Electoral databases: big brother or democracy unbound?

Modern political campaigning is becoming increasingly professionalised to the extent that in Australia today the major parties use electoral databases to assist with their campaigns. The electoral databases of the Coalition (Feedback) and the Australian Labor Party (Electrac) store information on the constituents of each House of Representatives seat. The information gathered in the databases, such as the policy preferences and party identification of individual voters, are used by candidates for House seats to tailor correspondence to swinging voters, and to identify potential party supporters. Party organisations aggregate the information in the databases and use it to conduct polls and focus groups of swinging voters, and to tailor policy development and campaign strategies. Electoral databases have the potential to improve the level of communication between elected representatives and their constituents. There are, however, a number of ethical problems associated with their use. While the usefulness of the databases to the major political parties is undeniable, their use underlines the trend in modern campaigning towards targeting swinging voters at the expense of the majority of the electorate. Considerable public resources are devoted to the smooth operation of the databases. They would be much less effective were political parties not exempted from the Privacy Act. The use of personal information collected by members of parliament by political parties should be more closely regulated. Despite the wishes of the major political parties to keep their operation a secret, the advantages and disadvantages of the use of electoral databases should be more widely debated.     

Is there weak nationalism and is it a useful category?

Introducing the category ‘weak nationalism’, this article emphasises the scales of intensity and the different operational modes of nationalism across time and space, as well as within the same space. It refuses to create a model or another dichotomy – strong/weak – on a par with earlier ones like organic/civic, Eastern/Western, bad/good. Rather, it approaches nationalism as a binary variable on a scale from weak/low to strong/high. It argues to extend the research focus beyond the fixation on extreme cases to so‐called weak or weaker manifestations that remain subordinate and under‐researched, all the time stressing the changeability of nationalisms in their local context and in the course of time. While it is a category more recognisable in a common sense approach than in a strictly quantifiable one, it can be identified and comparatively evaluated by the mobilising ability of the nationalist message in the public sphere.     

The ethnic democracy debate: how unique is Israel?

ABSTRACT. Sammy Smooha's “ethnic democracy” model challenged the notion of the uniqueness of Israel by setting it as the archetype of a special type of democracy: “ethnic democracy”. But contrary to what Smooha suggests, Israel's national identity is indeed unique. In each of Smooha's East European examples, besides the concept of a core ethnic nation, exists the notion of a civic territorial nation, which makes possible the integration or ‘assimilation’ into the dominant culture of those who are not members of the core ethnic nation. Yet, Israel's national identity does not recognise the existence of a civic territorial nation and makes no provisions for the integration or assimilation of non‐Jews, especially Arabs, into the dominant Hebrew culture. Setting Israel as an archetype for his model prevents Smooha from exploring the possibility that, unlike Israel, East European “ethnic democracy” could be a transitional phase towards a liberal democracy.