Writing Scottish Parliamentary History,c.1500–1707

In the 19th and 20th centuries, scholarship on the Scottish parliament was heavily informed by a narrative of ‘failure’, directed at explaining why its members voted it out of existence in 1707. Part of the problem was the tendency to see any deviation from the practices of the Westminster parliament as weakness. By reappraising parliament in terms of its utility to those who comprised its membership, notably the titled peerage and the monarch, historians have revealed its adaptability and inventiveness, especially in times of crisis. This essay considers how fresh approaches both to what constituted the parliamentary record and what can – and cannot – be found within it have exerted a transformative influence on our understanding of parliament's evolving role in Scottish political life. Although the Reformation crisis of 1560 and the accession of the ruling house of Stewart to the English throne in 1603 effected profound changes on parliamentary culture, this essay emphasises how parliament sustained its legitimacy and relevance, in part, by drawing on past practices and ideas. Historians have become more attentive in recent years to the means by which social groupings ordinarily excluded from formal parliamentary activity were nonetheless able to engage with, and influence, its proceedings. Gaps remain in our knowledge, however. Some periods have been more intensively studied than others, while certain aspects of parliamentary culture are understudied. The writing of Scottish parliamentary history will continue to offer rich possibilities in future.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Adjustment and Integration: The Scottish Representation in the British House of Commons, 1707–14*

The small minority of Scots who entered the house of commons in 1707 were slow to make their mark. Besides lack of numbers, they suffered several significant disadvantages. The Westminster scene was strange, and the style and tone of debate more vigorous and informal. Moreover, the aristocracy had dominated the unicameral Scottish parliament, and commoners found it difficult to emancipate themselves from noble tutelage. Most importantly, Scottish politics did not yet reflect the two‐party system dominant in England. Thus in the first sessions the Scots were unable to make headway in the essential business of parliament, legislation. Scotland suffered in comparison with the English provinces, and even the Irish, who were able to muster a more effective lobby. Soon, however, a new generation of debaters appeared, able to use their wit to discomfit English antagonists, and a new class of ‘men of business’ who grasped the rules of the legislative game. The fortuitous deaths of leading magnates and the polarisation of sectarian antagonisms in Scotland permitted the coalescence of the Scottish representation into two broad factions allied with the English parties. It was with English tory support that bills were passed to benefit the sectional concerns of Scottish episcopalians, accompanied by other measures of a more general nature. The combined attempt by Scottish peers and MPs in 1713 to secure the repeal of the union does not point to a lasting breakdown in Anglo‐Scottish relations, since it was also a manifestation of political opportunism by English whigs and discontented tories, and their Scottish allies. But the dawn of a party system in Scotland was dispelled by the death of Queen Anne and the ensuing jacobite rebellion. The complicity of tories in the Fifteen resulted in the destruction of the party in Scotland, and the construction of a whig hegemony.     

Saxon military revolution, 912–973?: myth and reality

For more than a generation Karl Leyser's influential thesis, which credited Henry I with undertaking a military revolution which made possible the Saxon dynasty's rule of Francia orientalis, has dominated the scholarly literature. According to Leyser, Henry radically reformed the Saxon military by building a large force of heavily armed mounted fighting men. These men provided the means necessary to assure Saxon domination. It is argued here, by contrast, that this Saxon military revolution is a myth and that the continental Saxons, as contrasted to those in England, saw the gradual development of a heavily armed mounted fighting force following their conquest by Charlemagne in 805. The real Saxon military revolution was Henry's creation of the agrarii milites and the building of frontier fortifications.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

The Indonesian Devaluation of November 15, 1978 – A Basketful of Dilemmas

The author has known Kurt Martin since the early 1960s when he was in Indonesia on an assignment to assist a new research institute (LEKNAS) in its formative years. It was the latter part of the Sukarno period, when the economy was suffering from rampant inflation, dwindling exports and foreign exchange reserves, and global political orientations that were not too favourable for the growth of the domestic economy. We remember Kurt Martin from those days as an inspiring counterpart in professional discussions, who always tested the logic and relevance of our arguments. We shall always be grateful to him for this role as intellectual sparring partner, but we were no match for his beloved chess games! Kurt is not responsible if, in later years, we have lost some of our intellectual rigour — after many years in government one tends to lose some purity of thought. The author left government in April 1978 to return to university life, but he is still suffering somewhat in the decompression chamber. He is trying to practice detachment in his observance of public affairs but finds this very difficult.     

Aristotelian Ethics and Luke 15:11–32 in Early Modern England

The discourse surrounding Luke 15:11–32 — commonly titled “the parable of the prodigal son” — in early modern England is a major site of convergence for Aristotelian and Christian ethics. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the perceived role of “prodigality” (in the sense of excessive expenditure) in the parable of the prodigal son became deeply bound up with Aristotelian ethics; the parable's evolving title and its increasingly prominent role in casus summarii both contributed to and were affected by these changes. Despite the importance of both Aristotelian ethics and the parable of the prodigal son to early modern culture, scant research exists on the vital intersection between the two. By tracing the evolution of biblical paratexts, this article explicates how the parable gained its title. It then explores how the shared use of ?σωτ?α (prodigality) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Luke 15:13 affected the interpretation of Luke 15:11–32 in early modern England, and the repercussions this had for early modern philosophy and theology. It concludes that Aristotelian ethics were hugely influential in both the early modern interpretation of Luke 15:11–32 and the concept of “prodigality” that the parable was so often used to explore.     

Buzz Kill: State Adoption of DUI Interlock Laws, 2005–11

Most states have adopted significant measures to reduce the incidence of driving under the influence (DUI) but a DUI death occurs about every 53 minutes; a significant portion of these accidents are the result of recidivist DUI drivers. A relatively new and novel way states can reduce DUI deaths from repeat offenders is to require offenders to install an interlock device on their vehicle, but not all states have adopted this measure. We explore whether the Policy Typology and Policy Diffusion Frameworks can help us understand the politics behind why some states have adopted interlock policies while others have not. Employing over‐time data from the American states our results suggest that the adoption of interlock laws is best explained by internal factors to the state and the adoption of interlock laws by neighboring states. In addition, the adoption of interlock laws is a form of incremental policymaking—states with existing DUI laws are more likely to adopt interlock policies. We conclude that interlock policies diffuse in a manner similar to other regulatory policies and that interlock policies should be categorized as protective regulatory policies rather than social regulatory policies.     

Articulations of rule: landowners, revolution, and territory in Chiapas, Mexico 1920–1962

This article examines struggles over the spaces of landed property in north-central Chiapas. Engaging the work of Mexico's ‘new cultural history’ and geographic theorizing of the entanglements of space, hegemony, and territoriality, it argues against widespread representations of Chiapan landowners maintaining autonomous domains of domination ‘untouched’ by the Mexican Revolution. Rather, the contours of landed property were made and remade through the complex articulation of landowner, state, and indigenous territorialities. Based on this analysis, it concludes that territoriality—as the diverse constellation of social–spatial practices through which space is bounded and these boundings sedimented with meanings—is both a central arena through which hegemony operates and a constant outcome of those struggles.