Vox populismus: a populist radical right attitude among the public?

In the last two decades, populist radical right (PRR) parties have been electorally very successful in Western Europe. Various scholars have argued that these parties share an ideological core that consists of a specific form of nationalism (nativism), in combination with two other attitudes (authoritarianism and populism). The aim of this research note is to assess whether this ideological core also exists as a consistent attitude among citizens. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the attitudes of Dutch citizens indicate that we can indeed speak of a consistent PRR attitude among the public. I also show that this attitude is strongly related to the probability of voting for the PRR Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid) of Geert Wilders.     

Propositions on right-wing populism: Available,excessive, optimistic

Every discourse on right-wing populism is, more or less explicitly, a discourse on affect. From claims that right-wing populism emerges from a background of racialized resentment or the anger of the ‘left behind’, through to analyses of how populist politicians mobilized hatred and rage in a ‘post-truth era’, attempts to explain the emergence and electoral success of contemporary right-wing populism have centered affect. In the midst of the turbulence of post 2007 financial crisis politics, the discourse on right-wing populism has repeated the tensions and ambivalences that surround affective politics per se – with populism simultaneously serving as a warning of what an affect-based politics might become, whilst also seeming to offer a lesson for the liberal-left in how to mobilize and move people otherwise disaffected. In this paper we supplement this attention to affect, and step outside of this tensed relation, by articulating the structure of feeling of contemporary right-wing populism in the U.S.A and UK. We do so through the form of the proposition, finding in the proposition a style of inhabiting an impasse that (re/dis)orientates attention and opens up disagreement and further discussion. In the first proposition - populism is available – we explore questions of definition, settling on how the discursive emptiness of populism allows for its constant articulation. Populism is excessive – the second proposition – shifts to emphasizing the affective fullness of populism, following how this fullness plays out in registers such as fun. Our third proposition – populism is optimistic – argues that right-wing populism is dependent on a ‘temporal loop’ optimism where the future to come blurs with the past that was. We conclude with some reflections on the future of this affect structure in light of the January 2021 events in the US Capitol and the electoral defeat of Donald J Trump.     

Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange

The purpose of the Exchange feature is to publish discussions that engage, advance and initiate new debates in the study of nations and nationalism. This Exchange article is on the subject of ‘Populism and Nationalism’. Each contributor addresses the following four questions on the subject: (1) What is populism and what role does it play within the context of democratic politics? (2) Does populism cut across left–right lines? (3) What is the relationship between nationalism and populism? (4) Are contemporary populist movements across Europe and the West comparable? Our aim is to generate a thought‐provoking conversation with regard to the rise of populism in Europe and the West.     

Long-term decline of regions and the rise of populism: The case of Germany

What characterizes regions where right-wing populist parties are relatively successful? A prominent hypothesis proposed in the emerging “geography of discontent” literature claims that places that are “left behind” constitute a breeding ground for the rise of populism. We re-examine this hypothesis by analyzing the rise of populism in Germany. Our results suggest that high vote shares of populist parties are associated with the long-term decline of a region's relative welfare, which goes beyond a lifespan of people inhabiting such “left behind” places. Moreover, we are able to show that a place-based collective memory about past prosperity plays a crucial role in shaping present resentment. Finally, we find the education level of the regional population to be an important channel through which the collective memory about the past translates into populism support today.     

Connections between populism and nationalism: Evidence from Jair Bolsonaro's speeches

Recent studies have warned about the close relationship between populism and nationalism. This article offers an empirical contribution to the examination of this relationship by analysing the presence of populist and nationalist elements in the official speeches of the outgoing Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro. We make two contributions to this expanding literature. First, we show that the supposed ambiguity between populism and nationalism can be resolved by an approach that clearly separates the two concepts. Second, we find that Bolsonaro is more populist than nationalist. His populism has elements in common with other European populist leaders (attacking political parties and the political class), but he distances himself from them by presenting authoritarian traits. Nativism is completely absent (unlike in Europe), but ‘sovereignism’ (‘us’ vs. ‘other nations or institutions’) and ‘civilisationism’ (‘us’ vs. ‘minorities’) sometimes overlap with populism. We conclude that a tension exists between populism and nationalism that can endanger the ‘good’ relationship between the populist leader and their supporters. This is something that future research on populism should consider.     

From Populism To Protagonism (and Back?) in Bolivarian Venezuela: Rethinking Ernesto Laclau’s on Populist Reason

Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist Reason, now over a decade old, is one of our generation’s most nuanced contributions to debates on political community and social change in the era of mass democracy. Against critiques of populism as illiberal demagoguery, Laclau’s conceptualization emphasizes the discursive nature of power and politics and considers populist sequences as radical democratic openings in an era of consolidated global neoliberal capitalism. This article considers the shifting terrain of democracy – from liberal, to populist, and finally to protagonistic forms – in the context of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution. I argue that despite Laclau’s important contributions, the formulations of power that underlie his populist reason are symptomatic rather than critical of contemporary liberal politics. The article offers an analysis of Bolivarian Venezuela that emphasizes popular experimentation with protagonism as an expression of democracy based in grassroots collective autonomy and direct democracy over the representation and managed development of the modern state.     

Astroturf and populism in Australia: The Convoy of No Confidence

The ‘Convoy of No Confidence’ was a trucking convoy that converged on Canberra in 2011 in a failed attempt to force the Gillard Labor government to an early election. At the time, there was widespread speculation that it was an ‘astroturf’ or synthetic grassroots movement. This article assesses the extent to which this alleged astroturf event exhibited populist elements, measured against Taggart's definition of populism. Unlike most Australian populist movements, which have been hostile towards all major parties (or all the big banks), the convoy's participants directed their anger almost entirely towards the Gillard government. In this, they were joined by Coalition politicians and right-wing media. The article finds that such one-sidedness is insufficient to characterise the convoy definitively as an Astroturf group, and therefore not genuinely populist. It also suggests that there may be a continuum between populist and astroturf movements.

“不信任游”是2011年坎贝拉的一次失败的卡车游行,意在迫使吉拉德工党政府提前大选。这是一个“人工草皮”或合成的草根运动。本文根据泰格特的民粹主义定义,探讨了这次所谓草根运动到底包含多少民粹因素。与仇视所有主要政党的大多数澳大利亚民粹主义运动不一样,这次游行的参与者把愤怒完全投向吉拉德政府。因此,他们得到了联盟政治家以及右翼媒体的联手。作者发现,由于这种单面性,该运动算不上草根群体,并非真正的民粹主义。作者认为,在民粹与人工草根运动之间存在着一个量变的连续体。     

The nation of the people: An analysis of Podemos and Five Star Movement's discourse on the nation

This article empirically explores how populist actors talk about the nation. This is a research area mostly tackled in studies on right-wing populism, with other forms of populist politics usually left out of the analysis. To fill this academic gap, we focus on the Spanish party Podemos and the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). The former is a paradigmatic example of radical left populism, whereas the latter is commonly considered as a catch-all populist party with no clear ideological connotation. Through a discourse analysis on leaders' speeches and official public declarations, we focus on the role that national identity plays in the strategies of Podemos and M5S and on the type of nation they discursively construct. Whilst Podemos' populist strategy purposely aims at contending to the right ideologically loaded concepts and signifiers to construct an idea of nation fitting the party's leftist values, M5S's strategy mostly aims at appropriating valence issues, such as the “Made in Italy” brand and the concept of “national interest”. Thus, our analysis contributes to clarify the differences between the leftist political culture of Podemos and the “post-ideological” one of M5S, as also reflected by survey data confirming strong differences in “nationalist” attitudes between their respective electorates.     

The secessionist spectre: the influence of authoritarianism,nativism and populism on support for Quebec independence

In recent years, Quebec has been undergoing a re‐evaluation of immigration and integration policies. The secessionist Parti Québécois had become the leader of this debate, which also coincided with a rise of right‐wing nativist, populist and sometimes authoritarian movements in other Western societies. This paper aims to evaluate the similarity or dissimilarity of Quebec's nationalism to these other nationalisms. We use the 2015 Canadian Election Study data to explore the influence of authoritarianism, nativism and populism directly on support for secession and also, indirectly, on voting intentions. We find that authoritarianism has a negative influence on support for Quebec independence and independentist parties, while the pattern is the opposite, and the effects somewhat weaker, for nativism and populism. Hence, we argue that Quebec nationalism does not seem to correlate with the right‐wing populist movement extending throughout many Western societies. Thus, Quebec nationalism was shown to be a distinct form of nationalism.     

Spatial variation in populist right voting in Austria, 2013–2017

The recent wave of populism sweeping Europe and the Americas generated considerable interest among political scientists, economists, sociologists and to some extent, geographers. The vast majority of these studies focuses on individual voter decisions or national comparisons over time but neglects the within-country spatial variation of the populist vote. This paper addresses this shortcoming and applies spatial econometric techniques to explore possible explanations for spatial variation in the increase of the populist right vote between the 2013 and 2017 national elections in Austria for 2118 municipalities. Spatial variation in voting shares can result from (1) compositional effects, regional differences in the composition of voters with different characteristics, (2) broad spatial, historically evolved institutional differences, such as membership to one of the nine states, (3) unequal integration of different types of regions into the global economy, such as peripheral regions, central urban regions, old industrial regions or tourist areas, (4) spatial vote spillovers due to localized social networks, and (5) unobserved spatial processes. We find that the populist right vote gains in Austrian municipalities are affected by all processes, but that the type of regions becomes insignificant once we correct for unobservable spatial structures in the regression framework. The increase in the share of foreigners, the share of foreigners, income and inequality levels, educational differences, selected state membership, as well as spatial spillovers of populist right voting are all important to explain spatial variation in the rise of the populist right vote.     

Human rights,domestic politics,and informal agreements: parliamentary challenges to international cooperation on migration management

ABSTRACT

Developed and developing countries are increasingly cooperating on migration management, and human rights NGOs have harshly criticised these instruments for cooperation. This article asks how and to what extent parliaments are challenging policies for international cooperation on migration management. On the one hand parliaments have traditionally been described as ‘moral tribunes’ in international relations, due to their principled support for human rights. On the other hand, parliaments are increasingly operating in political systems marked by anti-immigrant sentiment and increased support for right-wing populist parties. How do parliaments navigate between these two poles when it comes to international cooperation on migration management? Based on examples from Australia, the EU and Israel, this article shows that the use of non-legally binding instruments for cooperation limits the formal role of parliaments, but also and more importantly that there is a lack of political will to scrutinise these instruments and hold executives to account (notwithstanding attempts by some members of parliament or some political groupings to challenge policies through informal means). The lack of political contestation implies that, as far as migration management is concerned, ‘politics stop at the water's edge’.     

What is new and what is nationalist about Europe's new nationalism? Explaining the rise of the far right in Europe

Far‐right parties are on the rise across Europe. Their shared populist rhetoric, emphasis on sovereignty and policies that promote a ‘national preference’ has facilitated the term ‘the new nationalism’. According to an emerging consensus, this new nationalism is primarily a demand‐side phenomenon triggered by cultural grievances, i.e. a cultural backlash, driven by those on the wrong end of a new transnational cleavage. This explanation we argue tends to overlook important variations across countries and across time. As such, in this article, we contest the view that the ‘new nationalism’ is a linear and coherent phenomenon best understood as a cultural backlash. Specifically, our argument is threefold: (1) it is important to conceptually distinguish between populism, nationalism and the far right in order to draw meaningful conclusions about the extent to which this phenomenon is linear, coherent and comparable across cases; (2) voters' economic concerns remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage, entailing that voting behaviour is structured by two dimensions of contestation; (3) the explanatory power of nationalism is in the supply, i.e. the ways in which parties use nationalism strategically in an attempt to broaden their appeal.     

Blurred images: Indro Montanelli’s anti-politics

Through a close reading of Indro Montanelli’s 1944/1945 novel Here They Do Not Rest, this article argues that the famous and popular Italian journalist Montanelli contributed significantly to a particular Italian form of ‘anti-politics’ after the fall of fascism. It argues that anti-politics in Italy provides the foundation for the county’s right-wing populism and that it makes a significant contribution to political and historiographical revisionism of the fascist past. Indro Montanelli is read as an important architect of this revisionism and as such read against his popular image.     

Populism during the period of the 1911 Revolution

Russian populism spread in China at the turn of the twentieth century in the name of anarchism, nihilism, and socialism, and gradually contributed to the formation of modern Chinese populism. Populism around the time of the 1911 Revolution had two characteristics: one was its deep hatred of capitalism which regarded capitalism as an ugly, decadent, and regressive historical phenomenon; the other characteristic was an attempt to get around the developmental stage of capitalism in order to proceed directly into socialism. Compared with Russian populism, modern Chinese populism did not have well-organized proponents, nor did it have any systemic system of populist political thought. It manifested itself more as a populist intellectual tendency without a strong self-awareness. Agrarian civilization and Confucianism provided the hotbed for populism, and a superficial understanding of Western capitalism was the main cultural drive that bred populism. The most important feature of modern Chinese populism was the fantasy of leaping from a backward agrarian country into socialism by surpassing capitalist industrialization.     

Populism and nationalism

Few social science categories have been more heatedly contested in recent years than ‘populism’. One focus of debate concerns the relation between populism and nationalism. Criticising the tendency to conflate populism and nationalism, De Cleen and Stavrakakis argue for a sharp conceptual distinction between the two. They situate populist discourse on a vertical, and nationalist discourse on a horizontal axis. I argue that this strict conceptual separation cannot capture the productive ambiguity of populist appeals to ‘the people’, evoking at once plebs, sovereign demos and bounded community. The frame of reference for populist discourse is most fruitfully understood as a two‐dimensional space, at once a space of inequality and a space of difference. Vertical opposition to those on top (and often those on the bottom) and horizontal opposition to those outside are tightly interwoven, generally in such a way that economic, political and cultural elites are represented as being ‘outside’ as well as ‘on top’. The ambiguity and two‐dimensionality of appeals to ‘the people’ do not result from the conflation of populism and nationalism; they are a constitutive feature of populism itself, a practical resource that can be exploited in constructing political identities and defining lines of political opposition and conflict.     

Split parties finish last: Preferences,pluralities and the 1957 Queensland election

The 1957 election is a watershed in Queensland politics. Coming after the Labor split, the election saw the end of over 40 years of almost uninterrupted Labor rule in Queensland. Often overlooked in discussions of this key period is that the 1957 election was conducted under plurality rule, or as it is more commonly known, ‘first‐past‐the‐post’. Had the 1957 election been held under preferential voting, preferences would have been distributed in 46 of the 71 contested seats. Through simulations of distributions of hypothetical second preferences I assess the effects of the Labor split on the fates of the respective parties. Contrary to some interpretations of the 1957 election I find that plurality rule saved Labor from even greater electoral losses than those they would have sustained under preferential voting. Single‐member constituency electoral systems deal harsh punishment to small parties, or, as in 1957, split parties: a point well known by astute political leaders. Preferential voting may have given Labor leaders even more powerful incentives to heal the split of 1957, and perhaps even avoid it in the first place.     

The Conservatism of Radical Theology

Abstract

This article is principally intended to argue something that is counter-intuitive, namely that despite the socialist values of a number of radical liberal Christian and post-Christian writers the philosophical outlook and language of this phase of religious thought focuses upon some key ideas which find important parallels in Conservative philosophy. This is not in any way to imply that these ideas do not find parallels in other political philosophies, it is merely to highlight a set of relationships which appear to go unnoticed in debates on politics and theology. Subsequent to this principle argument I hope that it will become clear that there is more to the interaction between Conservative and Christian thought than the promotion of right-wing social authoritarianism—the raison d'être of most Conservative organizations and thinkers promoting ‘Christian’ values.     

And if they don't dance,they are no friends of mine: Exploring boundaries of national identity

National identity is widely used to explain anti-immigrant attitudes and thus the appeal for right-wing (populist) parties. Yet, consensus on how to capture national identity is lacking. This article identifies ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making across 42 countries and more than 25 years beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy and addresses the multidimensionality of national identity. Using latent class analysis and cluster analysis, four ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood are identified and shown to be differently related to national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism. Overall, the results close the methodological–empirical gap between classical approaches and recent inductive approaches to national identity and demonstrate that national identity is a cross-cultural phenomenon with distinct types.     

Authoritarian Neoliberalism,Radical Conservatism and Social Policy within the European Union: Croatia,Hungary and Poland

Exploring political and social policy developments in Croatia, Hungary and Poland, three EU member states, this article addresses the hegemonic position of authoritarianism, populism, conservatism and neoliberalism, albeit articulated differently in each state. All three countries are marked by modes of governmentality that combine heteronormative familialism, repatriarchialization, nationalism, ethnicized demographic renewal and anti-immigrant sentiments. In each, a kind of layered social divestment is occurring, delivering a radical new vision of social reproduction and fundamental differentiations in terms of access to social citizenship between those seen as ‘deserving’ of support and those who are not, who are increasingly subjected to disciplinary measures. Although the degree of welfare retrenchment varies across the cases, the radical nature of restructuring, breaking down traditional notions of left and right on welfare, is suggestive of longer-term restructurings not reliant on individual politicians or parties.     

‘Afterschool and during vacations’: on labor and schooling in the postcolony

ABSTRACT

The Indian state's recent deregulation of child labor, several years after it passed a law making schooling free and compulsory, forces us to attend to the distinct dynamic between child labor and schooling that frame contemporary efforts around compulsory education. This paper opens-up this terrain through historicizing the child-figure – who combines school with wage labor – within the workings of colonial and postcolonial capitalism. It discusses how the strong and continuing traces of a longer history of exclusions is manifest in the widespread global construction of ‘school’ as inherently ‘fungible’ or the fragility of the school form, as central to this moment of compulsory schooling. Through a focus on this subaltern child-figure, this paper contends that both the ‘fungibility’ of schools for marginal children as well as the privatization of child labor foregrounds the antipolitics that undergirds the current fraught working out of compulsory education in the postcolony.