Reassessing Kant's geography

This article offers a critical reassessment of Immanuel Kant's lectures on Physische Geographie and his contribution to geographical thought more generally. There are a number of reasons why this reassessment is needed: the lectures are finally about to be published in English translation; careful philological work in German has exposed how corrupted the standard text of the lectures is; and philosophers are finally beginning to critically integrate an understanding of the Geography into their overall assessment of Kant's work. English speaking geographers will therefore soon have access to the lectures in a way that they have not done before, but they need to be aware both of the problems of the edition being translated and the work philosophers have undertaken on their situation in Kant's work and their impact. More broadly, the reassessment requires us to reconsider the position Kant occupies in the discipline of geography as a whole. The article examines the history of the lectures and their publication in some detail; discusses Kant's purpose in giving them; and looks at the way in which he structured geographical knowledge and understood its relation to history and philosophy. In terms of the broader focus particular attention is given to the topics of race and space. While these lectures are undoubtedly of largely historical interest, it is for precisely that reason that an examination of them and Kant's thought more generally is of relevance today to the history of the discipline of geography.     

Stewart,Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense

Summary

Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart's poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart's reading, Kant's philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common sense philosophy. In his mature works—the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical ‘Dissertation? (1815–1821)—Stewart's analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.     

A Relocated Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?

The idea that the public needs enlightenment is generally formulated by people who consider themselves in possession of the enlightenment the public supposedly needs. Herein lies the paternalism problem of popular enlightenment. Some seventy years after Immanuel Kant formulated his famous answer to the question What is enlightenment?, a Norwegian philosopher reaches for his pen on a similar errand. The Norwegian context, however, is different, and the reflection takes a different turn. The questions become: What is popular enlightenment? Who is in a position to decide what kind of enlightenment ‘the people’ need and to define what is enlightenment as opposed to darkness? The text takes a closer look at the Norwegian reflections, published as three articles in two newspapers in 1852 and 1855. The newspaper articles are written by the philosopher Marcus Jacob Monrad (1816–1897). He finds support in Kantian insights when reflecting upon how a concrete initiative for the enlightenment of the public, in which he himself participates, should be understood. Monrad addresses the problem of paternalism in popular enlightenment, and he does this by using his reason publicly, which is what is required, according to Kant, in order for man to escape from tutelage.     

GENEALOGY,PROBLEMATIZATION, AND NORMATIVITY IN MICHEL FOUCAULT

Colin Koopman's excellent Genealogy as Critique argues that Michel Foucault's genealogies—and, in fact, his archaeologies—should be read as historical accounts of the emergence of particular “problematizations.” The idea of a problematization, which Foucault introduces late in his career, has two sides. First, there is the idea that the situation whose emergence a genealogy traces is problematic in the sense of being fraught or dangerous. Second, by tracing the genealogy, Foucault problematizes the situation itself, showing how it calls for attention. Koopman argues that Foucault's genealogies are not themselves normative, but they instead outline situations or practices in a way that allows for normative investigation and political intervention. What is required, then, are normative approaches that complement Foucault's genealogies. Koopman argues that Foucault's own late discussions of self‐transformation are inadequate to fully accomplish the task; they need to be complemented by recourse to Deweyan reconstruction or Habermasian normative reflection. However, and in turn, such reflection cannot be had on an absolutist ground but rather must be seen as historically contingent, universalizing rather than universalist in Koopman's vocabulary. I argue that there are several reasons to think that the strong separation between genealogy and normative posited by Koopman may be too strict. Foucault's rhetoric, his choice of certain problematizations, and Koopman's own commitments to problematizations as requiring attention all seem to point toward a more intimate, although admittedly implicit, relation between genealogy and normative positions in Foucault's work.     

Introduction

Summary

The Introduction sets the contributions to this special issue in the context of existing scholarship on Dugald Stewart. The main points are the great advance in our understanding of Stewart's intellectual development, his complicated relationship to his predecessors and contemporaries in Scottish philosophy, and his important role in the European republic of letters.     

An Early Assessment of Reagan Defense Policy and Programs

Abstract

Ralph Hancock’s Responsibility of Reason represents an important addition to the literature on the crisis of modernity. This article focuses on his account of the origins and nature of modernity and his claim that Tocqueville exemplifies the best way to work through the crisis of modernity. It then suggests that Hancock’s own reflections on the nature of human existence require a more balanced or even positive assessment of modernity than the one he offers in the book. Finally, it attempts to illustrate this point by showing that elements of Kant’s political thought are akin to Hancock’s.     

Historian or Philosopher? Ian Hunter on Kant and Vattel

Summary

Ian Hunter's essay pursues several lines of argument, one explicit and the others not. The first is that of an historian correcting the mistaken view among Kantian commentators that Kant's conception of international justice had displaced Vattel's as the dominant one in nineteenth- and twentieth-century international thought. The second, which is not acknowledged, is that of a philosopher entering a debate over the relative cogency of the two conceptions. To accomplish this unacknowledged philosophical task, Hunter exaggerates the importance of Kant's metaphysics in his treatment of international justice and understates the element of raison d'état in Vattel's casuistical ethics. The subtext in both lines of argument is criticism, political rather than either historical or philosophical, of Kant's effort to articulate principles of international justice, together with implicit advocacy of Vattelian ethics as a corrective to Kantian ideology.     

Three Philosophers in Paradise: Kant,Tillich and Ricæur Interpret and Respond to Genesis 3

Abstract

The story of the first sin, committed by Adam and Eve in paradise, has not only attracted the attention of biblical scholars. Philosophers have also shown much interest in the story. Study of the relevant work of Kant, Tillich and Ricæur reveals two opposing ways of philosophically reading the biblical story and similar myths about the fate of the first human beings. According to the first way of reading, best represented by Kant and his followers, including Schiller, the fall was a fortunate event, one that set humanity on the path of development and progress. According to the second, represented by Tillich and Ricæur, it was a tragic event, but one that had its merits, for it allowed humans to develop their own potentialities. Freedom was obtaine at the cost of being estranged from humankind’s divine ground of being.     

Judgment,Tradition and Reason: A Response

Abstract

The author of The Desire of the Nations (DN) and The Ways of Judgment (WJ) responds to the criticisms and questions of the eight other contributors, defending his concept of government-as-judgment and exploring questions about international law and contemporary pluralism.     

Fundamentalism: examining the role of public reason in ‘non-liberal’ approaches to ‘unreasonable’ doctrines

In this article, we examine ways in which critics of liberalism come to adopt, without acknowledgement, ‘liberal’ forms of public reason in responding to homogenising tendencies of fundamentalist doctrines. We focus on the divergent approaches of John Gray and Slavoj ?i?ek, arguing that the former upholds a comprehensive form of liberalism, while the latter upholds a political form popular among policy makers who endorse a ‘fundamentalism’/‘extremism’ dichotomy. We argue that the latter fails to recognise that ‘philosophical’ unreasonableness often translates into political unreasonableness. Examining these non-liberal approaches not only indicates the apparent value of reason as reciprocity, it also supports a long-held charge against liberalism: that it is not able to uphold its promise of accommodating radical forms of diversity.     

对卢梭公意学说和法理精神的述评

卢梭认为,公意就是人类自由意志的升华。公意的实现,惟有借助于法律。在卢梭激越而深邃的思想中,其公意学说和法理精神无疑是最具闪光点的。     

Review Article: Westward the Course of Empire

ARTHUR POWER DUDDEN. The American Pacific: Prom the Old China Trade to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. xx, 314. $39.50 (CDN)

SUNG-HWA CHEONG. The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese- South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945–1952. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991. Pp. xv, 190. $43.00 (US)

HIDEO IBE. Japan Thrice-Opened: An Analysis of Relations between Japan and the United States. New York: Praeger, 1992. Pp. 294. $49.93 (US)

RICHARD B. FINN. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Pp. xxi, 413. $42.00 (US)

ROBERT P. NEWMAN. Owen Lattimore and the ‘Loss’ of China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Pp. xvi, 669. $36.00 (US)

H. W. BRANDS. Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. xii, 384. $39.50 (CDN)

ODD ARNE WESTAD. Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Pp. x, 260. $16.50 (US).     

公共行政价值的纲领

对行政价值的纲领问题的普遍忽略以至＂集体失语＂,是目前行政价值研究的＂软肋＂。行政价值纲领问题,亦即政府在价值建设中＂举什么旗、走什么路＂的问题,无疑是一个国家公共价值建设中首要的、不可绕行的问题。中国政府应该以社会主义核心价值体系作为行政价值的＂纲领＂乃至＂母法＂,以社会主义核心价值体系为纲领,扎实推进未来我国公共行政价值建设。     

世界体系思想对华侨华人历史研究的意义

作为一种社会科学分析视角 ,沃勒斯坦的世界体系思想对华侨华人历史研究具有十分重大的理论指导意义。本文认为 ,这种影响主要体现于三个方面 :分析模式与价值取向的意义、分析单位和历史逻辑起点重构的意义以及分析背景和历史分期重构的意义。     

THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF LATE CRITICAL THEORY

Martin Jay's sweeping account of reason in Western philosophy provides the context for understanding the crisis that the Frankfurt School thinkers faced when they spoke of the “eclipse of reason.” In the background of the thinking of the first generation of Frankfurt thinkers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse is a hankering for a more substantive conception of reason that bears affinities with what Hegel called Vernunft (reason), which he contrasted with Verstand (understanding). According to Jay, the first generation of Frankfurt thinkers never quite succeeded in elaborating this substantive concept of reason and grew increasingly pessimistic in the face of the self‐destruction of reason. Habermas sought to elaborate a communicative theory of rationality that did not fall into the misleading promises of Hegelian Vernunft but could nevertheless provide a normative basis for the critique of instrumental, strategic, and systems rationality—a normative basis for critical theory. Jay presents an extremely lucid account of Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality. He concludes by reviewing some of the outstanding problems and questions that have been raised about the adequacy and success of Habermas's project. I seek to do justice to the strengths and weaknesses of Jay's narrative, and I focus on a number of deep, unresolved issues that confront the future of critical theory in its attempt to develop an adequate conception of rationality. I also raise concerns about what precisely is distinctive about critical theory today.