The Pendulum of Congressional Power: Agenda Change,Partisanship and the Demise of the Post-World War II Foreign Policy Consensus

Many scholars contend that Congress rarely matters in the realm of foreign policy. The source of this collective impotence is often explained by the weaknesses in congressional institutions vis-a-vis the president, as well as a general inability to respond effectively to a dynamic international political environment. We contend that the debate over congressional activism has not adequately addressed the role of agenda change. We analyze all roll call votes in the House of Representatives relating to the international affairs agenda between 1953 and 1998. We find that presidents have become significantly more likely to stake out positions on economic and trade issues as compared to other international issues. We also observe that presidential positions in the realm of foreign policy are increasingly characterized by interparty and interinstitutional conflict. While this increased conflict has dramatically decreased the president's ability to successfully pass executive priorities in foreign affairs more generally, presidential success on economic and trade issues has witnessed a significantly greater decline. We infer from these results that changes to the foreign policy issue agenda represent one important factor that has affected not only the incentives for political parties to participate actively, but also the willingness of Congress to challenge the president in the foreign policy debate.Asked one day whether it was true that the navy yard in his district was too small to accommodate the latest battleships. Henry Stimson (chair of the House Naval Affairs Committee early in the century) replied, 'That is true, and that is the reason I have always been in favor of small ships.'1Carriers have been, are and will be for the foreseeable future an absolutely essential part of our deterrence force…2John Warner, senator from Virginia, home state of Newport News Shipbuilding     

Congress,the Presidency,and U.S. Foreign Policy

Gibson, Martha L. Conflict Amid Consensus in American Trade Policy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. Pp. 213. $55.00 hardbound; $17.95 softbound.

Henehan, Marie T. Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Relations Perspective. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. 248. $49.50 hardbound.

Brands, H.W. The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1999. Pp. 194. $29 95 hardbound.

McNamara, Robert S., James G. Blight, and Robert K. Brigham, with Thomas J. Biersteker and Herbert Y. Schandler. Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 1999. Pp. 512. $27.50 hardbound; $17.00 softbound.     

美国对韩国的援助政策：缘起、演进与结果

在冷战背景下 ,对外援助是美国巩固与盟国关系、与苏联争夺新独立的第三世界的重要手段。美国对韩国的援助亦然。从最初的占领区救济性援助开始 ,美国对韩援助的内容伴随援助政策的调整不断发生变化。从结果来看 ,援助帮助韩国建立并维护了资本主义的发展模式 ,军事援助孕育了美国化的军队 ,为军事政变和韩国政治发展模式埋下了伏笔。     

Turning Weakness into Strength: France's Post-World War II Diplomacy

Books reviewed in this article:
Hitchcock, William I. France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1955     

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests

The rapid and unpredictable changes in the Middle East collectively known as the “Arab Spring” are posing tremendous challenges to U.S. policy formation and action. This article will explore and evaluate evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East and its potential implications. There has always been a tension in American foreign policy between pursuing American “values” (foreign policy idealism) and protecting American “interests” (foreign policy realism). For decades, the United States has sought to “make the world safe for democracy,” while at the same time often supporting repressive, nondemocratic regimes because of national security or economic self‐interest. The tension between these two fundamentally distinct policy orientations has become even more pronounced as the United States tries to respond to the Arab Spring uprisings. Why did the United States actively support the rebels in Libya but not the protestors in Syria or Bahrain? Is there an emerging, coherent “Obama Doctrine” on intervention in Arab countries, or was Libya just a “one‐off” event? These are some of the questions that this article will attempt to answer.