Continuity or Discontinuity in the Recent History of the Australian Labor Party?

Recent characterisations of the Australian Labor Party as a ‘cartel party’ suggest that there was, after the 1970s, a fundamental discontinuity in Labor's history. We assess this contention not only in terms of the ALP's policies but also the mechanisms which link it with different classes and social groups: Labor's electoral support, membership and local branches, the backgrounds of the Party's parliamentarians and leaders, the role of trade unions inside the ALP, and its sources of funding. While there have been some quantitative changes in these characteristics, we conclude that Labor remains, on balance, a ‘capitalist workers party.’     

A Call to Action: New Party Candidates and the 1931 General Election*

Sir Oswald Mosley established his New Party in early 1931. It proposed to cut across the party and class divides, with the objective of providing a ‘national’ solution to the economic crisis of the time. According to Mosley, the ‘old parties’– meaning the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Parties – had revealed themselves unable to adapt to the post‐war age. In their place, he argued, a modern organisation, based on youth, vitality and a scientifically reasoned economic plan, was needed to save Britain from terminal decline. Few heeded his call, and the party ultimately paved the way for the British Union of Fascists to emerge in 1932. Nevertheless, the New Party fought the general election of 1931, offering an unsuccessful but suitably intriguing challenge to the National coalition and Labour Party. This article will assess the New Party's election campaign, concentrating on those who briefly rallied to Mosley's appeal only to fall foul of the ballot box. In other words, it provides a case study of those who contributed to a dramatic electoral failure, and traces a significant stage along Mosley's journey to fascism.     

The 1949 federal election: A reinterpretation

The 1949 federal election in Australia is widely regarded as one of Australia's most significant elections. This election ended eight years of ALP government and began a long period of unbroken rule by Liberal‐Country Party governments. Surprisingly, very little has been written about the 1949 election although various authors have addressed themselves to the question of why the Chifley government lost in December 1949. The orthodox interpretation is that Chifley's defeat in 1949 was to do with the issues of ‘bank nationalisation’ and ‘communism’. In this article, I offer a reinterpretation of the connection between political issues and voting behaviour in the 1949 election. Following the theory of Fiorina that voters tend to make their decision on the basis of how a party fares in handling problems in the past, I argue that the Australian electorate in 1949 responded negatively to Chifley's handling of the general economy and his policies on two crises in 1949 — the national coal strike and the dollar crisis.     

The 1989 Tasmanian election: The green independents consolidate

This paper provides an analysis of the election of 13 May 1989 which was a major watershed in Tasmanian politics. Independent members of parliament were elected in each of Tasmania's five electorates with the result that neither the Liberal Party nor the ALP could govern in their own right The period following the election was marked by continuing political drama punctuated by several key events. These events included the development of the Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord between the ALP and the Independents, continued pressure from supporters of the Liberal Party for a fresh election, and arrests in relation to an alleged attempt to bribe a newly‐elected ALP member to cross the floor and support the Liberal Party. The defeat of the Gray government in a vote of no‐confidence following the recall of parliament, and the resignation of Premier Gray, led to the commissioning of a minority ALP ministry, relying on the support of the Independents.     

A battle in the Bush: Some lessons from liberal‐national rivalry in Warrnambool

An intriguing aspect of rural Australian politics has been the occasional capacity of one of the conservative parties to make sudden, substantial electoral gains at the other's expense. C.A. Hughes (1985:53) has suggested that, in order to understand Liberal‐National rivalry, we ought not dwell upon demographic variables but need undertake detailed electoral studies and draw out the importance of ‘the personalities and local popularity of candidates’. Such a micro‐level of political examination, he laments, is rarely attempted in Australia. Ours is a micro‐level study of the one‐time safe Liberal Victorian state seat of Warrnambool in which, in recent elections (1985 and 1988), the National Party has decisively wrested control. Certainly the local popularity of the National Party candidates contributed in no small way to the switch in conservative allegiance which has occurred in Warrnambool. However, contra Hughes, we also identify an important demographic explanatory variable in Catholicism.     

How Not to Run a Political Campaign: The Failure of the Unionist Free Traders 1903–6*

In 1903, Joseph Chamberlain launched a campaign aimed at the economic and political union of portions of the British empire behind a system of tariffs. The attack on Britain's 60‐year‐old system of free trade led to a polarising of opinion and sparked fierce controversy in the political sphere. It also shattered the unity of the Unionist Party, dividing it into three factions. One faction supported Chamberlain's policy, a second a more moderate policy proposed by party leader, Arthur Balfour, and a third – the smallest – the fiscal status quo. This article concerns this last faction, its motivations, actions and effectiveness. It argues that its concern with parliamentary alliances and methods, rather than the mass campaigns that were launched by its fellow opponents of Chamberlain, not only meant it was always bound to fail in its objectives, but made the problems of the Unionist Party far worse than they might otherwise have been. It concludes that the main reason why it failed to stop, or even delay Chamberlain's domination of the Unionist Party, not to mention suffering serious electoral losses, was largely due to its own incompetence in failing to grasp the new reality of mass politics and the need for new political approaches to deal with it.     

One Party,Two Traditions: Radicalism and Pragmatism in the Australian Greens

The 2004 Australian federal election established the Australian Greens (Greens) as the third largest political force in the country behind the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party in electoral terms. Despite the Greens’ electoral achievements, the party has been largely dismissed as a radical single-issue political party. This paper will argue that while radicalism is an institutionally entrenched feature of the Greens in both organisational and programmatic terms, there are also strongly pragmatic aspects to the party's modus operandi. It suggests that the Greens are astute political operators who use radicalism in a highly pragmatic way to achieve their political objectives.     

Rumour and politics

This article contends that rumour—the circulation of unverified information —is an important form of political communication which deserves more attention from political scientists. To illustrate this claim a study is made of the part played by rumour in the ‘destabilisation’ of Malcolm Fraser's position as leader of the Liberal Party in August to October 1981. Health is a natural subject of rumour, and rumours about Mr. Fraser's health were used as the basis for speculation about a possible leadership challenge by Mr. Andrew Peacock. The collective character of parliamentary party politics, the artificial nature of media ‘facts’ and the predominance of certain types of news value in the media all encourage such rumours to flourish. The rumours had the effect of destabilising Mr. Fraser's position by creating and then enlarging a climate of uncertainty and anxiety within the Liberal Party and the electorate. Mr. Peacock was thereby enabled to test the strength of his potential support without being obliged to risk an open challenge. The author concludes that the most apt model of rumour to this case is that of ‘milling’, on the analogy of a ‘milling crowd’.     

‘Sharing the white man's burden’ Nazi colonial revisionism and Australia's New‐Guinea mandate

ABSTRACT

The September 2014 general elections in Fiji resulted in a decisive victory for Prime Minister Bainimarama and his FijiFirst Party. It indicated a desire for stability on the part of the electorate as well as the popularity of measures such as ‘free’ education and the removal of affirmative action programmes for Indigenous Fijians. The Social Democratic Liberal Party garnered a significant portion of the Indigenous vote through appeals to ethnic identity, but will need to broaden its base in future to have any chance of forming a government. The high voter enrolment and participation reflects a hope for more accountability as well as transparency, in contrast to the arbitrariness of the previous eight years. New oversight institutions and a more expansive bill of rights in the constitution offer some ground for cautious optimism in the face of cynicism about the gap between the government's rhetoric and its actions.     

Party Leaders,the Media,and Political Persuasion: The Campaigns of Evatt and Menzies on the Referendum to Protect Australia from Communism

Abstract

The 1951 referendum campaign to ban communism produced a massive shift of public opinion, from Yes to No. This article attempts to explain why. It examines the political appeals and rhetoric of the Liberal and Labor Party leaders, their coverage across the entire metropolitan press, and their use of radio. Breaking with earlier interpretations, it argues that Evatt's campaign encompassed wider issues than civil liberties, suggests that Menzies' campaign was damaged by unruly meetings and shows that neither side appealed exclusively to ‘reason’ or to ‘passion’. Ultimately, the success of the No campaign rested on its capacity to mobilise most Labor voters and to attract some Liberals. This was an extraordinary achievement, but it was secured using routine forms of electioneering.     

Yellow fever? The political geography of Liberal voting in Great Britain

The rise of the Labour Party after World War I forced the Liberal Party in Britain back into the nonconformist and remote ‘Celtic Fringe’, where local identity and religion rather than class remained the dominant political cleavages. The party has struggled to break out of these Liberal ‘heartlands’ ever since. However, in the 1997 General Election the Liberal Democrats won a total of 46 constituencies, their best result since 1929, despite a fall in their national share of the vote. While historical voting patterns and the level of religious nonconformity can help explain the success in the traditional heartlands seats we must turn to contemporary reasons for why the party were able to make gains in areas of historical weakness. Bridging the credibility gap through success at the local level or in by-elections has been particularly vital for the party. Building on the understanding gained from qualitative interviews with the party elite and case studies in key constituencies, we analyze the basis of Liberal Democrat support in 1997. Models that include data on historical patterns, demographics and the local political context are found to be particularly successful in explaining the party’s support.     

The Candidates of the Liberal Unionist Party, 1886–1912*

Historians have hitherto based discussion of the electoral performance of the Liberal Unionist Party on incomplete data regarding the candidates of the party, as published sources, including F.W.S. Craig's British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, the standard reference work, include a number of cases where the party label of a Unionist candidate (either Liberal Unionist or Conservative) is uncertain or incorrect. Utilising a wide range of primary and secondary sources, this article resolves a number of these cases, and thus creates the most accurate list of Liberal Unionist candidates available. The creation of this list allows for accurate analysis of the party's history, and the article makes some preliminary observations based on the data presented. Among these observations are that the Liberal Unionists comprised a consistent percentage of the overall Unionist Party in the house of commons, that the number of seats contested by Liberal Unionists remained steady through the January 1910 election, and that existing interpretations of the electoral pact between the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives may be flawed.     

Re-examining a modern classic: does Putnam's Making Democracy Work suffer from spuriousness?

What makes democratic institutions work efficiently? Robert Putnam argued in Making Democracy Work that a mixture of political participation and immersion in associative and social networks in the community, conceptualised as ‘civic community’ or ‘social capital’, is the explanation. Ever since its publication, many questions have arisen about the validity of Putnam's theory. Among the most relevant concerns stands the influence of the Italian Communist Party on Putnam's empirical tests. This paper aims to fill the gap left in the literature by testing Putnam's hypothesis against the political party in the regional government and the PCI's electoral support. Supporting Putnam, this paper finds that variations in the quality of democratic governments in Italy's regions are a function of civic community even after adjusting for the presence of the Italian Communist Party.     

The Rebel Chief Whip: The Role of Leslie Wilson in the Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1922

This article explores the crisis within the Conservative Party in 1922 over the continuation of the coalition with Lloyd George's section of the Liberal Party, focusing on the actions of the Conservative chief whip, Leslie Wilson. Previously unused papers relating to Wilson's career shed new light on his role in the fall of the coalition. Wilson co‐ordinated opposition to the continuation of the coalition in its existing form, helping to solidify the group of junior ministers opposed to Lloyd George into a cohesive and powerful faction, which then forced the Conservative Party leader, Austen Chamberlain, into making concessions. Above all, Wilson was influential in forcing Chamberlain to agree to a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, at which the rebels won a decisive victory, causing the resignation of Chamberlain as party leader and Lloyd George as prime minister, in one of the most important events in modern British political history.     

The 13th national congress of the Chinese communist party and the agenda of Chinese politics

The 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in Beijing 25 October‐1 November 1987, continued the general re‐orientation of Chinese politics evident during the last decade. This paper discusses some of the main preparations for and proceedings of the Congress. It then focuses on two key aspects of the Congress: authoritative expression of the Party's overall orientation or ‘line'; and treatment of ‘reform of the political structure’. These themes are consistent with the reformist programme dominant within the Party and are central to the Chinese political agenda established by the Congress.     

The 1892 General Election and the Eclipse of the Liberal Unionists

This article seeks to establish that the 1892 general election marked a major change in the relative positions of the parties in the Unionist alliance. Not only did it reveal the limitations of the Liberal Unionist Party's strategy and appeal in an age of increasingly organised, mass politics, but it also acted as a brake on the ambitions of the new leader of the Liberal Unionists in the house of commons, Joseph Chamberlain. It argues that the Liberal Unionist Party suffered a more severe setback in 1892 than has been recognized hitherto and that Chamberlain's attempts to revive his party both before and after the general election were now prescribed by the reality of the political position in which the party now found itself. Rather than regarding the fluid political circumstances of the 1890s as the outcome of an emerging struggle between increasingly polarised ideologies, it seeks to reinforce the significance of local political circumstances and the efficacy of party management in the growing dominance of Lord Salisbury and Arthur Balfour and the Conservative central organisers.     

Tasmanian Forests,the Environment and Voting in the 2004 Australian Federal Election

The 2004 Australian federal election appeared to depart from the historical tendency for the Australian Labor Party to benefit electorally from adopting policies more sympathetic to environmental movement demands than those of the Liberal–National Coalition, when environmental issues have been prominent in election campaigns. This article assesses contending claims about the actual impact of environmental issues on the outcome of the 2004 election, and possible explanations for Labor's failure to gain a significant net electoral advantage from its environmental policies, in particular its commitment to preserve 240,000 hectares of native forest in Tasmania.     

Free Trade Empire to Commonwealth of Nations: India,Britain and Imperial Preference, 1903–1932

This article examines the dialogue between British tariff reformers and Indian nationalists over the application of imperial trade preference in India from Joseph Chamberlain's 1903 Birmingham address to the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference. For both groups, this issue was a focal point to assess India's constitutional status and national participation within an emerging British Commonwealth and international system after the First World War. Specifically, it marked a comprehensive challenge to the orthodoxy of free trade and liberal empire seen increasingly as a determent to reconciling national prosperity and imperial unity. It is argued that prominent tariff reformers’ well-studied criticism of an ‘unpatriotic’ cosmopolitan free trade made them also sympathetic to longstanding Indian grievances that this fiscal policy exacerbated economic exploitation and racial discrimination. After 1919, Indian nationalists, including ‘historical economists’, utilized metropolitan advocacy for imperial preference to demand fiscal and political autonomy from Britain and national, as well as racial, equality in collective imperial decision. At the 1932 conference in Ottawa, India's voluntary and negotiated acceptance of preferential trade with Britain, beside the white self-governing Dominions, helped transform the British Commonwealth into an egalitarian organization recognizable after 1947.     

‘A Tiny Little Footnote in History’: Conservative Centre Forward

In May 1985, two years after he had returned to the back benches, Francis Pym launched the first organised display of dissent within the parliamentary Conservative Party against Margaret Thatcher's leadership: Conservative Centre Forward. Those Conservative MPs who joined the group were very much believers in One Nation Conservatism. Conservative Centre Forward survived for barely a week after going public; it rapidly collapsed amid accusations of disloyalty and inept leadership. The group proved to be a short-lived experiment which achieved little of note and exposed those who were involved to widespread ridicule. Yet, it was precisely because Conservative Centre Forward collapsed so quickly and achieved so little that it was significant. In its own way, the short life of the group provided a revealing commentary upon the character of the mid-1980s Conservative Party. It was a party which, on the one hand, was moving inexorably to the right and therefore ever further away from the values of One Nation Conservatism which Conservative Centre Forward espoused. On the other hand, it was a party which was still traditional enough to view open displays of dissent, of whatever magnitude, as a threat to the unity upon which its continued electoral success depended.     

The problem with counting preferences: the example of one nation party preferences at the 2001 Western Australian legislative assembly election

A growing number of lower‐house seats at Australian State and federal elections rely on a distribution of preferences from Independent and small‐party candidates before seats can be awarded. Actors have attempted to gain political capital from this situation by claiming that the preferences of particular small parties have affected election outcomes. This paper uses the events of the Western Australian State election held in 2001 to explore the validity of such claims. More specifically, it investigates the widely propagated contention that the One Nation Party's anti‐sitting‐member preference strategy was a key determinant of the Coalition's electoral defeat. It concludes that the increased number of candidates contesting elections makes it difficult to assess whether the second and subsequent preferences of any particular small party were critical to the outcome.