Politicians,Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States: Lessons from the Philippines

Under what conditions will politicians strengthen state capabilities through bureaucratic reform? This article presents a principal–agent model of state capacity that shows that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or ‘political will’ to adopt bureaucratic reform. The validity of this model is tested using the experience of the Philippines in the period 1946–72. It is found that politically relevant groups in the Philippines were competing to influence policy over issues of social welfare, economic nationalism and control over public spending, and that groups' demands over these issues failed to align along a single dominant dimension. Consistent with expectations derived from the principal–agent model, there were numerous calls for and attempts to improve bureaucratic performance, but the calls went unheeded and the attempts failed miserably. The study highlights a lesson of potential use to countries currently undergoing democratization. It argues that state capacity is not a function of insulating the state from societal forces, but rather of clarifying lines of authority and accountability in the hierarchy of principal–agent relationships between society, politicians and bureaucrats.     

Rethinking Bureaucrats in the Policy Process: Criminal Justice Agents and the National Crime Agenda

Policy scholars have noted that bureaucrats can play an important role in defining policy alternatives. Few studies, however, examine the extent of their involvement in this process. This study contributes to public policy scholarship by offering a framework for understanding the strength of bureaucratic involvement in the process of defining problems and policy alternatives. Using witness data from congressional hearings on crime between 1947 and 1998, I find that federal, state, and local criminal justice bureaucrats have come to occupy a central role in the process of defining policy alternatives. In addition, I find that the centrality of criminal justice actors comes at the expense of interest groups, community organizations, and citizens/victims. Implications for criminal justice policy and understanding bureaucratic involvement in the policy process are discussed.     

Problem Definitions and Policy Contradictions: John F. Kennedy and the "Space Race"

Usually, when governments appear to be pursuing contradictory or mutually exclusive goals, the response of the scholarly community has been to look for evidence of bureaucratic error, a lack of leadership, or some other type of administrative malfunction. This essay argues that the concept of problem (or issue) definition, which has been widely applied in the study of public policy, may in some cases also help explain the occurrence of this phenomenon as well. Using as an example a major (and, at the time, quite startling) policy "reversal" in President Kennedy's approach to the U.S. space program, the essay shows how the appearance of a "contradiction" within the administration may well have been the result of a disagreement over how U.S. space policy was to be defined.     

Managerial Friction and Land-Use Policy Punctuations in the Fragmented Metropolis

Despite the portrayal of bureaucratic organizations as resistant to change, public managers have some ability to strategically move land-use processes out of incrementalism, even when bureaucratic lethargy acts as a drag. This article examines managerial influence in land-use policy by synthesizing theories of political markets and punctuated equilibrium. An information-processing logic is developed to explain why local government managers shift from “inward” to “outward” land-use management strategies in periods of environmental change. "Managerial friction” is defined as a strategic managerial adjustment producing punctuated land-use policy change in the face of environmental changing conditions. Hypotheses are tested using data on Florida local government comprehensive plan amendments and a Bayesian methodological approach. The evidence suggests managerial friction can be distinguished from the effects of environmental and political complexity as well as other forms of institutional friction, including management turnover, legislative institutions, and bureaucratic structure.     

Explaining State Budget Punctuations: Policy Transparency,Political Institutions,and Electoral Incentives

What factors cause policies experiencing long periods of stability to be interrupted occationally by a short period of large changes? This study argues that electoral incentives might influence the search, supply, and processing of information on constituency issues, as well as the associated cognitive or institutional frictions, and thus determine the presence and variation of punctuated policies. This article develops and evaluates this claim within a systemic framework consisting of policy transparency, political institutions, and electoral incentives. For the purpose of identifying policy punctuations, this research uses the Generalized Pareto Distribution in the Extreme Value Theory. This study analyzes budget spending data collected from FY 1988 to FY 2008 for all 50 American states. This study finds that greater policy transparency is associated with larger spending stability. By contrast, greater gubernatorial competition is more likely to produce extreme spending changes. Electoral incentives shaped by public preference and political term limits have a profound impact on nonincremental policy changes. The impact of policy transparency is conditional on public preference, while that of electoral competition and legislative professionalism is moderated by political term limits. Particularly, a transparent policy consistent with public preference and legislative professionalism with term limits are more likely to give rise to punctuated policies, while gubernatorial (legislative) competition leads to less punctuated changes when governors (legislators) are subject to term limits.     

Controlling Forum Choice and Controlling Policy: Congress,Courts and the IRS

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to litigation and its influence on social and bureaucratic policy. One area of research has focused on interest group litigation. Another area of scholarship has shown that Congress encourages individual use of the courts to monitor and control bureaucratic behavior. In several areas of law, litigants have a choice of forum by deliberate legislative design, which is sometimes derided as “forum shopping.” Little attention has been paid to the dominant national political coalition's ability to encourage forum shopping through legislation and the appointment process. One area of law that the coalition can encourage forum shopping is in challenging tax audits. It can do so through implict legislative signals and the appointment process to influence litigants to sue the Internal Revenue Service in the forum that offers the litigant the greatest chance of success. Given the prominent role of courts in setting and determining policy and given the particular prominence of taxes and tax policy over the past three decades, whether and where tax litigants choose to sue is critically important to understanding the dynamics of both tax policy and tax enforcement, as well as public policy creation and change. To demonstrate the influence of political forces on tax forum choice, I compare tax and district court filings from 1994 through to 2000. I find that as the Tax Court and national political coalition become more conservative, more taxpayers sue in the Tax Court and this “forum shopping” choice is supported by the national political coalition.     

Privatisation and new public management: Asset sales and Commissions of Audit in Queensland, 1990–2013

Governments since the 1980s have reshaped the public sector by selling public businesses and other assets, and by introducing competition in the supply of taxpayer-funded services. Explanations for these new directions have focused on political ideologies about the proper role of government, and economic arguments about business efficiency, while noting an international trend towards diffusion of these policy ideas. However, the methods for achieving significant policy shifts have often been overlooked. This study examines the case of Queensland, highlighting a wider range of reform factors, including bureaucratic advice and commission of audit recommendations.

1980年代以来各国政府通过出售公共产业和其他资产,通过在纳税人出资的服务业引入竞争而改造了公共部门。对这类新方向的解释都集中在政府职能以及企业效率的政治意识形态一面,以及造成这类政策思想扩散的国际潮流。不过,他们都忽视了造成如此重大政策转变的方法。本文考察了昆士兰的案例,讨论了更广泛的改革因素,包括官僚咨询以及审计委员建议等等。     

Private Citizens as Policy Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Autism Mandates and Parental Political Mobilization

Growing bodies of research in the social sciences point to politicians, bureaucratic officials, interest groups, and other actors who serve as policy entrepreneurs. In this paper, we argue that private citizens can also serve a primary role as policy entrepreneurs. To analyze this phenomenon, we investigate the behavior of private citizens and their role in changing state policies surrounding insurance mandates for autism coverage. Using a thematic analysis of focus groups and interviews conducted with individuals active in the push for autism policy change, we demonstrate that private citizens meet all of the requirements identified for policy entrepreneurs in the existing literature. We then investigate when, why, and how these private citizens step forward into the policy process as entrepreneurs. We show that entrepreneurship occurs when private citizens have needed resources, a sense of duty to fix a policy status quo they see as unjust, and a stake in policy change. We conclude by discussing the importance of our findings to the study of public policy and their generalizability beyond autism policy.     

The Determination of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948–1974*

The picture of the American state policy-making process which emerges from this analysis is one of a system where politics as well as economics matter a great deal. Partisanship and legislative competition are shown to have demonstrable effect on policy output. The control partisan preference exerts over policy decisions is severely constrained in taxing and spending areas, however, and is conditional on forces external to the model presented here. Surpassing the control over policy output exhibited by partisanship is the extent to which the electorate, or the electoral process, holds the parties responsible for policy performance. Apparently the public doesn't believe that “politics doesn't matter.”     

"New Governance" and Associative Pluralism: The Case of Drug Policy in Swiss Cities

Throughout the 1990s, hierarchical administrative governance structures have been replaced by self-governing networks for various motives, one of which is to improve the authenticity and democratic quality of public decisions. Thus, "new governance" has been praised for its propensity to provide a plurality of civil society organizations with access to the decision process. This article explores these claims based on the case of drug policy in Swiss cities. We show that self-governing networks indeed seem to have increased the involvement of civil society organizations in the policy process. However, we also find evidence that self-governing networks may in the longer run induce state control over civil society organizations, thus ultimately reducing associative pluralism. They do so either by imposing a policy paradigm or by excluding actors who do not comply with the dominant paradigm from the networks. We conclude by arguing that self-organizing networks should not be dismissed, given that former hierarchical bureaucratic approaches to drug-related problems have failed even worse. Rather, their long-term effects should be subject to further examination aimed at developing adequate responses to their shortcomings.     

Who needs a review of the financial system in Australia? the case of the Wallis inquiry

The Howard government reoriented the then existing institutionally based financial regulation towards a functionally based regime with new prudential and disclosure regulators in 1998. This paper uses the governmental agenda-setting framework of John Kingdon to explain this financial regulatory change undertaken in Australia following the Wallis Inquiry of 1996. It also examines the role of the Inquiry in the policy process. It shows that the financial regulatory change was on the bureaucratic agenda of the Treasury Department. A window of opportunity opened for the Treasury following the 1996 election, with the new Howard government keen to achieve financial regulatory reforms to address future regulatory challenges proactively while the new Treasurer Peter Costello wanted to consolidate his power within markets and politics. Costello coupled the Treasury's solutions to problems and to political processes. The Wallis Committee was ‘packed’ by the government in accordance with its regulatory policy preferences. Its role was to legitimise the government's policy preferences publicly, and to transfer the ‘governmental agenda’ into the ‘public agenda’. However, this was not a case of the government pressuring for its policy preferences over the financial services industry. In fact, the Inquiry was used as a venue to generate industry and public support for the regulatory changes, and was used to build a network of alliances within and outside the parliament.     

A Preamble to Family Policy: Issues of the Past and Present

The subject of family appears appropriately related to social policy, since family functions interface with society so closely. Moreover, U.S. families have been changing rapidly enough in this decade to warrant new attention to policy development. Public and political interest in family policy has been growing. Yet, historical barriers to government targeting family issues for policy development abound. While some intellectual, organizational, and bureaucratic mobilization has occurred, producing broad family policy declarations, interest groups are in the process of positioning themselves differentially, and disagreement about the value of explicit family policy is on the increase. The author believes that family policy will develop slowly in the D.S., and that comprehensive and cohesive family policy can better be considered a goal rather than a readily implemented public activity.     

Rethinking European Integration in the Competition Domain

This symposium explores the causes and consequences of European competition policy. I make two points in this essay, which the authors of the symposium reinforce. First, European integration is best examined from a public policy perspective, which focuses on the course of action that European public authorities decide (or not) to take. Second, the workings of competition policy in Europe cannot be understood without examining policies both at the European Union level and at national levels. The main benefit of the approach is to encourage cross-fertilization across several fields. Concepts and tools from policy studies and comparative politics are used to inform phenomena that have been investigated until recently mainly by international relations scholars.     

Masculine hegemony,the state and the incorporation of gender equity discourse: The case of Australian sport

Although the impact of affirmative action, equal opportunity and gender equity programs on the lives of Australian women have been explored in a number of areas, state interventions related to sport have received scant attention from public policy analysts. This paper examines how the Australian Sports Commission has framed its gender equity policy in the mutually reinforcing hegemonic discourses of masculinity and corporate managerialism. It is argued that the Commission's articulation of gender equity policy in terms of ‘market‐oriented individualism’ is both constituted by, and constitutive of, the shift from a ‘patriarchal‐welfare state’ to a ‘patriarchal‐managerial state’ in Australia. The paper also provides an example of the tensions between bureaucratic and feminist discourses in the state sphere.     

Lawmakers' Preferences for Bureaucratic Discretion: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996

Research on delegation stresses that chief executives are “privileged actors” well positioned to influence bureaucratic policy decisions. Therefore, legislative coalitions provide less authority to agencies when they disagree with executives about what policy should look like. Otherwise, executives would take advantage of voluminous agency discretion to direct bureaucrats to make decisions inconsistent with legislative coalitions’ policy goals. I stress that, in the U.S. lawmaking system, congressional committees are also privileged actors. As such—as with the president—those who experience policy disagreement with committees should wish to limit bureaucratic discretion. In addition, I examine individual lawmakers’ preferences for bureaucratic discretion to evaluate this perspective on agency design. As policy disagreement increases between senators and the Senate committee that oversees the agency/agencies receiving authority, senators prefer to limit the volume of discretion agencies receive.     

INFERRING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC DECISION RULES

Although the bureaucratic decision rules that govern delivery of municipal public services are presumably distributionally benign, they may in fact exert a strong influence on the distribution of urban policy benefits. This article explicates the decision rule governing delivery of two specific types of fire protection services in a small city, measures the distributional inequity characteristic of the patterns of delivery, and infers one or more distributional standards implicit in the decision rule. Statistical analysis using the Index of Inequity indicates that some decision rules incorporate elements of both equality and market standards, while others support need as the distributional standard.     

Ethics and Entrepreneurship

An important criticism of public entrepreneurship has been that Us precepts and practices are not consonant with democratic values. This paper examines the meaning of entrepreneurship as defined in bath the public and private sectors, suggesting that some attributes of entrepreneurs that commonly are deemed undesirable–egotism, selfishness, waywardness, domination, and opportunism–actually are functional for entrepreneurial activity. This is because entrepreneurship plays an essential role in addressing a particular type of policy problems (here called "anarchic")–those where goals are ambiguous or conflicting and where the means to achieve them are unknown or uncertain. Finally, methods are suggested for encouraging ethical entrepreneurship, whether undertaken in an anarchic setting or within an organizational matrix that is communitarian or bureaucratic.     

POLICY COMMUNITIES: THE BRITISH AND EUROPEAN POLICY STYLE

It seems possible to formulate broad characterizations of the British and European policy processes in terms of the relationship between government and interest groups. There is a preferred type of machinery in Britain, reflecting normative values, which is to avoid electoral politics and public conflict in order to reach consensus or “accommodation” in the labyrinth of consultative machinery. This style is aptly labelled “bureaucratic accommodation” and is a system in which the dominant actors are groups and government departments. Departments readily recognize the “relevant” groups in a given policy area and seek to mobilize the community around agreed policies. The predilection for the avoidance of conflict seems equally apparent in other Western European nations.     

Institutions, Bureaucratic Decisions, and Policy Outcomes: State Insurance Solvency Regulation

Although over the past 2 decades several scholars have documented a link between institutional arrangements and policy choices, few studies have demonstrated how different institutional arrangements give rise to different policy outcomes. Further, although some studies have related bureaucratic resources to policy decisions, almost none have illustrated that the way state agencies actually deploy regulatory resources—policy outputs—significantly influences policy outcomes. Focusing specifically on the insurance industry in the United States, in this article we illustrate the impact of state regulatory activities on the solvency of firms in the insurance industry from 1987 to 1997, and in doing so we emphasize the differences between policy outputs and policy outcomes. In the case of policy outputs, for example, we find that elected insurance commissioners, divided state government, budgetary resources, and larger insurance sectors lead to more aggressive solvency examinations of insurers. In addition to examinations, however, we discern an important role for both regulatory and political institutions in subsequent insurer insolvencies.     

Party Democracy: An Audit of Australian Parties

Competition between candidates representing political parties is usually regarded as a central feature of a liberal democracy. However, where competition between parties fails to provide the public with an effective choice of candidates, the real competition between candidates is displaced to a competition for party endorsement within particular parties. The paper examines the democratic implications of this displacement, and reports the findings of an audit of candidate-selection procedures within the principal Australian parties. The paper argues inter alia that the closed nature of electoral competition and the public status of Australian political parties imply that their internal affairs should be conducted democratically. The paper defines internal party democracy in structural and procedural terms. It applies realistic standards - realistic, because too much internal democracy could render a party ineffective and restrict electoral competition - in conducting an audit of the candidate-selection rules and the composition of candidate-selection voting panels for the principal Australian parties. The paper concludes with a suggestion for policy reform.